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


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
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Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge,
Piety, and Charity.







INSTITUTE ESSAYS.

READ BEFORE THE

"MINISTERS' INSTITUTE,"

Providence, R.I., October, 1879.

WITH AN

INTRODUCTION

BY
Whitney
REV. HENRY W. BELLOWS, D.D.

BOSTON :

SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE, PIETY, AND CHARITY.

1880.

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE.

THE publisher regrets the long but unavoidable delay in giving this volume to the public. But the intrinsic value of the Institute Essays, independent of the special occasion where they were first presented, as it is the only excuse for putting them in any permanent form, must warrant their republication, even at this late date.

While all the essays, with one exception, have been revised by the authors, special attention may, without invidious distinction, be called to Professor Ezra Abbot's remarkable discussion of the External Evidences of the Authorship of the Fourth Gospel. The paper originally read before the Institute has since been expanded and elaborated, until it now stands as a complete treatise on a subject of the profoundest interest to all Bible students.

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INTRODUCTION.

"THE MINISTERS' INSTITUTE" is an association of Unitarian and other ministers willing to work with them for the promotion of critical and independent studies in theology and religion. It was founded in 1876, and has had only two sessions. Its method is to assign, through a committee, to the best scholars, whether within or without its ranks, whose services it can obtain, such subjects as most require critical and learned treatment, and to give the writers at least a year's time to prepare their papers. A session of four days is held every other year, at some central and accessible place, at which these papers are read and discussed. Hitherto about one hundred and fifty ministers have been in attendance as members, and many others of various ecclesiastical connections as hearers. There are usually eight papers read; and an effort is made to have each important subject treated by two scholars known to incline to opposite sides of the question. Each day is thus given up to some one theme, on all sides of which light is thrown,—first by experts, and then by open discussion.

The present volume speaks for itself. It is a collection of the papers read at Providence, R.I., in October last, at the second session of the Institute. These papers were quite fully reported in the *Christian Register* of November first; but they are now printed from the original manuscripts, with the exception of one paper,—Rev. J. B. Harrison's,—which

could not be procured. They are published at the earnest request of many of those who not only heard them, but have read them in newspaper form, and wish to have them in a shape more convenient for reconsideration and preservation.

The business agent of the *Christian Register* has generously assumed the risk of the volume; and the least I can do, to show my sense of the value and credit of his enterprise, is to comply with his request to furnish a brief introduction.

The object of the Ministers' Institute, as may be inferred from the account already given, is not to proclaim fixed results, but to exhibit the best methods of study in theology and religion; to stimulate inquiry into matters still unsettled or unknown to the bottom, and to encourage and aim at a scientific mode in treating them. It is already plain that the Institute has not mistaken its way, and that its original aim and object is one deemed practicable and useful. When the Institute was first projected, it was supposed that the study of theological problems and the critical pursuit of truth in matters of religion was a work so nearly akin to that of theological schools, that only ministers anxious to continue the studies commenced there would be interested in its meetings. It was even seriously proposed to exclude the laity, lest any temptation to adapt the papers to their supposed tastes might lessen their frankness and rob them of the scientific severity which was so much desired by professional students. The experience of two sessions has proved that this notion did injustice to the laity; that they are quite as eager for thorough, scholarly, logical, and scientific treatment of theological questions as the ministers themselves, and no more alarmed at the light which learned criticism is throwing upon the history of the religious sentiment, the relations of the great religions to each other, the origin of our own sacred writings, nor at the changes which modern science, and especially anthropology, is making necessary in our views of inspiration and revelation, than those who have been professionally trained to the investigation of these theories.

Thoughtful people are discovering that the scientific method properly understood is just as applicable to one form of truth as to another; that religion can no more escape it, nor profit by neglecting it, than political economy or agriculture; in short, that it is simply treason to truth to doubt or deny that the same logic, the same caution, the same thoroughness, the same reliance on critical rules, should be applied to the investigation of religious truth as to all other. When it is understood that the scientific method is only another name for the employment of all the *best* means for discovering or testing truth, and involves in the treatment of every department of knowledge the use of the means that are appropriate to that department, the remaining prejudice against its employment will disappear. Some have carelessly imagined that the affections of the heart, the light of the conscience, the native sensibilities, were to be ignored by science; but when we are studying what concerns the heart, science will compel us to take the heart itself into counsel as the chief witness. To study theology without faith is a vain effort. To pursue religion in an irreligious spirit is futile. No doubt the study of metaphysics by physical methods and of theology by unspiritual methods will prove barren, and will be soon discovered to be as unscientific as it is destructive.

These papers are presented as studies only. The Ministers' Institute has no creed. It does not even except the Christian religion, its authority or its origin, from the themes which may be re-investigated, and on which new light may be thrown. In theory it is not even an association of Unitarian ministers or Christian ministers. It cordially welcomes the testimony of religious minds of all faiths, when it knows them to be learned, earnest, and profound. It will hear the Jew and the Gentile, the Roman Catholic and the Protestant, the Hindoo and the Persian, if men of virtuous and pious lives, of accredited learning and high gifts of expression, will come and teach them what they think they know. But hitherto the chief difficulty has been in getting Christian theologians of any school but the

Unitarian to come and share their studies and communicate their best thoughts and most exact opinions. It is hoped that this obstacle will sooner or later give way. Meanwhile, the Ministers' Institute will improve such opportunities as it finds open for broadening the platform of religious truth and sweetening the charity of common seekers after God.

H. W. B.

FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST.

BY REV. S. R. CALTHROP.

"Go ye, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."—MATTHEW xxviii, 19.

THIS is the ancient formula into which the generations of Christendom have been baptized. It was the truth underlying this formula which gave a new life to the world. To set forth that truth in nineteenth-century language, and to apply that truth to our own times and needs, will be our task to-night. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: let us take these three names in order, each by itself. Then best can we answer the question, Are these three names one Name?

1. *The name of the Father.* "Our Father who art in heaven." The Lord's Prayer is the true orthodox creed, or verbal statement of right thinking in religion. It is the creed of Jesus himself, the one form of words in which he embodied his statement of the faith. Take away from the gospel the Lord's Prayer, and the divine ideas it contains, and you have no gospel left,—no good tidings at all to tell to any man. But keep the Lord's Prayer, and, if you had nothing else, the glad tidings of salvation could still be joyously sounded into the ears and hearts of men.

If a man believes from his soul that he has a Father in heaven,—that is, if he knows that the infinite God is not only the all-wise and all-powerful Maker of the universe, but that he is also the just and tender Lover of all souls, that all mankind were begotten by that love, and rest forever in the bosom of that Love; if he hallows that Father's name,—that is, if from his soul he reverences truth, justice, purity,

love; if he gives loyal, unquestioning allegiance to these, can be depended upon always, in all places, to witness for these, since these are the name of God; if he prays and works for the coming of that Father's kingdom,—that is, for the time when that Father's will shall be done on earth as it is done in heaven,—when down here, down on the dull, sordid, commonplace earth (which is the name fools give to this particular one of God's heavens), the two commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and strength, and thy neighbor as thyself," shall be obeyed as naturally, as perfectly, as joyously as they are obeyed by God's angels in his upper heaven,—if a man believes and lives all this, and persuades other men to believe and live all this, that man is *a saved man*. For the man who trusts God for all this can surely trust God to give him his daily bread. The greater includes the less. "Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things." The man who has in his breast the heart of love that prompts him to forgive cannot help knowing that he, too, is forgiven. In the midst of the temptations of the world, he is safe; for has he not committed his all into the hands of Him whose is the kingdom, the power, and the glory forever and ever? Two words include it all,—*"Our Father."* That is enough. That sums up the Catholic faith which all men, always, everywhere, believe.

This is why Paul scorned the idea of another gospel. He knew well that there is, and can be, only one gospel,—the immense good tidings which Jesus told out to men, the tidings that God is *"our Father,"* and that, therefore, man is *"our brother,"* that mankind are *"one race of noble equals"* before God.

This, then, is the one only religion of the universe. It is the *"everlasting gospel."* It is the gospel *"as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end."*

Friend, friend, you and I will always be helped and strengthened by coming into contact with this sweet, this divine, this utter trust in *"our Father"* that dwelt in the heart of Jesus as in no other. Drift away from this, with

never so many philosophies or sciences, or advanced thinkings drifting away in the same boat with you, and the farther you drift, the nearer you come to chaos and the dark.

It is our just boast, as liberal Christians, that we have emphasized, as never before, the doctrine of the Father. No divided worship. Supreme allegiance only to the Supreme. Infinite adoration of the Infinite alone. All grandeur of the finite, all adorable qualities in a finite form, strictly subordinated to the Infinite, in whose bosom they dwell, and from whose bosom they proceed. That is the first, the cardinal article of our faith.

Nevertheless, since we are so firmly grounded on our central doctrine of the infinite Father, we can afford, without endangering our hold upon that, to give to all finite agencies of blessing their full due; knowing that He is the great original Source and Fountain of them all.

It is part of human sanity to weigh the *relative* importance of things considered in their bearings upon man and his world. It is quite true that the sun is only a star of the third class, that he is but one small member of the vast host of stars. But he is a star, and claims kinship with them all. To us his importance is supreme. To our life he weighs more than all other stars put together. From his life our bodily life springs, as water from a vast fountain.

So the sum total of the divine energy which has been, up to this hour, expended upon man, is but a small fraction of that vast force of God included in the galaxy of which our system is a part. But to us it is of more importance than all the rest. It is the amount due to the human race, appropriated by it, incarnated in it.

All the divine force that is in and around Sirius and his attendant worlds was not so important to Rugby school as one brave man, Thomas Arnold by name, governing Rugby school wisely, in the faith and fear of God. The spirit in that one man was, to a vast extent, the present God in that school,—brought more of God into that school than the whole starry heavens did.

For mankind, then, I believe that the influence of God,

incarnated in man, is as great as that of God outside of man. Incessantly, perhaps always, when God blesses a human soul, some other human soul is the vehicle of blessing,—is, at least, a necessary part of the blessing.

The Spirit of God brooded in all its fulness over all the geologic ages. But the cold, reptilian blood could feel but little of the gracious influence. Not in moss or seaweed, not in shark or saurian, not in lion or mastodon,—only in the body of a man,—could the fulness of the Godhead dwell. But when Jesus feels the waves of the divine love flooding his breast, then, and not till then, can God enter into his world, conquering and to conquer. Thus we learn to connect the doctrine of the Son with the name of the Father.

2. *The Son.* “The brightness of the Father’s glory, and the express image of his person.” “Who, being in the form of God, took upon himself the form of a slave, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name; that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things on earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.”

This is the form in which the Church of the first century put her confession of the doctrine of the Son. It is the task of this and the coming ages to take up all that is true and noble in the ancient confession, and include all the glory, gifts, graces, divinity of the Son inside of the circle of human glory, gifts, and graces, as the grandest illustration, part, and parcel of the divinity, the sonship of man. Only two classes of spirit in the universe,—the Infinite and the Finite; and these two are one. Whatever of divine power and glory Jesus, the Son of God, had, he had it because he was Jesus, the Son of Man. He who robs Jesus of any glory that was his robs himself, robs mankind of the grandest illustration of man’s high possibilities.

There must be room enough in the religion of the future

for the worship of *God in man*, for the adoration of divine qualities made human. The immense majority of mankind absolutely need this, before they can spiritually grow. If I were an Australian savage, and knew enough to do it, I would kneel in the dust before some good Englishman, put his foot upon my neck, and beg him to take me on his own terms, and make me a man! And so, brother man, if you feel intensely your need of the divine qualities that dwelt in the heart of Jesus, and if you long for his very being to take possession of you, you have the highest right to ask for this.

Gather together all your titles of honor, crown him with many crowns, kneel low before him, if that is the natural expression of your present relations to him; but understand that it is the glory of the Son of Man that you are thus reverencing; that it is the divine in man, the possible divine in all men, which he whom you love represents. You cannot love him too much, if in him you love the divine sonship of man. Every honor thus bestowed upon him becomes a prophecy of the glorious achievements of the race, out of whose bosom he sprung. For mankind is the stuff out of which the archangels are made. Thrones, kingdoms, principalities, powers, all heavenly stature, all divine nobleness, all spirit possibility, lie asleep in man.

The divinity of Jesus, then, types, prophesies the divinity of man. Man, at last, will be a partaker of the divine nature. As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. Jesus was most divine, because he was the most completely human. Jesus represents sonship, because he is a son. So much for the first part of the ancient confession, the divinity of Jesus.

The second concerns the headship of Jesus. "He was obedient to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth." This is the grand style of the first century. The first century sang its belief in poetry. The

nineteenth speaks its belief in prose. The first century looked mainly Godward. The nineteenth looks mainly manward. The first century spoke of God-appointed rulers. The nineteenth speaks of man-elected ones. Let us, then, in this matter adopt the nineteenth-century tone, and see where it will land us.

Let us, then, reduce this question of leadership to its lowest terms. Let us agree to speak under the mark, and therefore prosaically. To have a head is a necessity inherent in all collective human activities. No government, no army, no political party, no school, no family, no cricket or base-ball club, can do without a head. To the immense Human Nature this is also true, if ever the total Humanity is to feel itself an organized unit; if ever there is to come a time in the grander future, when there shall be gathered together into one all the children of God that are scattered abroad. Who, then, among all the sons of men, is to perform this essential function?

We may dismiss at once the consideration of all forgotten leaders; for a social faculty so pre-eminent as to render its possessor fit to be the permanent social leader of the whole human race would have manifested itself so powerfully that it never could have been forgotten. Moreover, the inherent physiological improbability of such a personality having existed in the barbaric ages is at least as great as the inherent improbability of a Newton having then existed. The organic conditions rendered both equally impossible. We are thus shut up to the consideration of the *known* religious leaders, — those who already occupy a conspicuous place in history. Who, in all the historic ages, have possessed the greatest power of making men feel their sonship to God and their brotherhood as men? — for this is the quality the religious head needs.

Four names, and four only, stand conspicuously out from all the rest: Confucius, Mohammed, Buddha, and Jesus. Mankind, busied for some ages in searching for its leader, has already, by a process of natural selection, concentrated itself on these four names as the fittest to survive. Let us look at the claims of each.

Confucius is the great leader of the Chinese. His service in uniting the Chinese has been immense, and will long continue to be so. But his department is confessedly provincial. No one dreams that his influence will ever penetrate with equal power beyond the Chinese empire. His universal leadership, then, is out of the question.

Mohammed was a grand torch, throwing a smoky light on the surrounding darkness. Of vast use in the semi-civilized ages, useful still among semi-civilized tribes, his influence over human thought is plainly declining. His inspiration, in great measure derived from that of the Old and New Testaments, is, on the whole, of a lower type. The Crescent wanes before the Cross.

Buddha has a more universal message. The first great missionary religion, Buddhism alone can be fitly compared with Christianity, for its tender compassion for the whole human race, and its longing for their deliverance. Both preach exhaustless mercy, pity, forgiveness of man to man. Buddhism and Christianity alone of all religions have the true universal enthusiasm for humanity. Confucius sets forth the duty of man in plain, manly prose. Buddha and Jesus sing it: with both, it is the poetry, the romance, the ecstasy of religion.

But Buddhism, so royally large manward, is weak and vague and uncertain Godward. It cannot show us the Father. Offspring alike and antagonist of Brahminism, this was the fatal legacy that antagonism left. Brahminism was absorbed wholly in God; Buddhism, wholly in man. Worship was the Brahmin's sole business. The deliverance was the Buddhist's. Forever a noble witness to the second commandment, Buddha must learn from Jesus the full glory of the first.

A poor Siamese girl, who had been converted from Buddhism to Christianity, when on her dying-bed comforted her distracted and terror-stricken mother, by telling her a beautiful dream from which she had just awakened. "I saw the Lord Buddha and the Lord Jesus standing close together in heaven; both of their faces smiled a welcome to me; both

looked lovingly on each other ; each clasped the other's hand. But the stature of the Lord Jesus was the loftiest."

I believe that in the end the verdict of mankind will confirm the dream of that dying girl. That is, I believe that in the end mankind will elect Jesus as its central religious leader, and, having elected him to a trust so vast, will be largely, generously, loyal to him. On the other hand, the leader must be utterly loyal to the human hearts that choose him. The least display of egotism, of presumption, would mar the grandeur of the relation. The leader must be the first to discover, to recognize, to employ, to rejoice in power of the same order as his own, or of a different order. Napoleon's greatest weakness was that, while he made admirable subordinates, he made no great men. What he wanted was brigadier-generals, corps-commanders, at most a Ney or a Lannes, but no Von Moltke or Wellington. If Jesus were such a one, his leadership would sooner or later come to an end, because not securely based on the universal humanity. It does not follow that the social leader should be also the leader in art or science or culture. Mankind needs for a social leader the one who has the largest social qualities, who possesses most of that divine magnetism which unites man with man, and man with God. If Jesus has most of this quality, sooner or later all men will acknowledge the fact.

There are doubtless many earnest Christian people to whom such a mode of presenting this high subject is bald, poor, and prosaic in the extreme. But let them remember that if unquestioning loyalty to the leader and the cause he represents ; if a joyful sense of belonging to a vast organized body of humanity, a whole family in earth and heaven ; if a resolute determination to do his full share of the work of that family is in the brain and heart of a man who thinks thus,—it, after all, comes to the same thing as the lofty poetry of the first century.

But what are you going to do with men who love and work for the principles of Jesus, but disown his leadership ? Just what the great body of anti-slavery men, who put the thing through, did to those sweet but crotchety persons who

refused to vote anti-slavery,—fellowship them, love them, know that they are on our part. They are working for Christ, because they are working for the cause which he loves better than himself. They do not know enough as yet to see that humanity must be organized into a single whole. They will see it, when it shines upon them like the sun.

But, after all, no prosaic nineteenth century can quite prevent an outburst of poetic, of religious, enthusiasm in the man who still believes what I have taken for granted throughout this argument,—that the human family is a unit; that there is only one family in heaven and earth. It is impossible to tear away Christianity as an historical religion from its key-thought of the unity of all the worlds; of the one kingdom of God penetrating all things alike in earth and heaven; the thought that we are surrounded by a great cloud of witnesses; that the Church triumphant in heaven sympathizes, heart-beat for heart-beat, with the Church on earth; that the uniting of men here types the union there as well as here. I give mankind on earth a thousand years, to discover beyond a peradventure the tremendous fact that the immense majority of mankind, the enormously preponderating mass of human nature, is not on the surface of the earth, but above and around it. The central nucleus of Human Power is there, not here. It will take a thousand years for our earnest, noble-hearted, wrong-headed Frederic Harrisons to learn this. One thing is plain. If the life immortal be anything at all, be sure it is most solidly real; be sure, indeed, that it is the central reality.

Christianity stands or falls with the doctrine of immortality. Two worships in the future, two mighty hopes,—God and the city of God.

The Father above all, through all, in all; the city of God, the great company of that Father's wise and faithful sons and daughters, with Jesus standing in the midst,—that is the home of the soul. That is the dear, dear country of which we all, please God, shall one day know ourselves to be citizens.

3. *The Holy Ghost*, Inspirer of the Church universal, who spake by the prophets ; Life-giver, Life-bringer, sign and seal of Christ's mission,— this is the substance of the first-century confession. "By the mystery of thy holy incarnation," says the mediæval litany of the Church of England, "by thy nativity, by thy baptism, fasting, and temptation ; by thine agony and bloody sweat ; by thy cross and passion ; by thy precious death and burial ; by thy glorious resurrection and ascension ; and by the coming of the Holy Ghost,— good Lord, deliver us !" Let us interpret this doctrine also in the words of to-day. The sign and seal of the mission of Jesus was and is the passage of the spirit that was in Him, into the hearts and lives of others.

The Holy Ghost, says the ancient confession, proceedeth from the Father and the Son. The Holy Ghost is God, but not God faraway yonder in the depth of space, but God nigh, in the mouth, in the heart, brain, lips, and nerves of men ; God alive in the breasts of his children ; God working inside the limits of man's life ; God inside the thoughts of men, bringing every thought into captivity to the law of Christ ; God inside the hearts of men, causing the peace which passeth all understanding to rule in them ; God also passing from breast to breast ; God using one consecrated life to influence another life, and that other another, and on and on, in endless succession, until the circle of mankind is completed.

If Jesus did not go away, the Comforter could not come, says the fourth Gospel. The spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son could not come,—that is, the spirit of the Father passing first through the being of the beloved Son, mingled up with the ardent temperament, the poetic tenderness, the faithful friendship, the consecrated life-purpose, the royal brother-heart of Jesus, could not come.

"But, surely, here at least, you claim divine honors for the Son of Man." Yes: all the honors of divine sonship ; all the honors due to the beloved of the Father, full of grace and truth. But it is just this same honor that you must covet for yourself: just this same honor, if you also are

faithful unto death, will be given to you in God's heaven as your crown of life. It may be that you have spent a lifetime in an obscure internal conflict with some sin or weakness to which you are peculiarly liable; spent a lifetime in obscurely illustrating some patient virtue of slow growth. Doubtless, this life of God in your soul has quickened here and there a soul whose path crossed yours. Nay, you have often timidly blessed God, when even your own eyes could see that this was so. Even in your earth life, the Spirit proceeding from the Father, and from you his son or daughter, has done its natural work of help and blessing. So in the three short years of Jesus' earthly ministry, he shed blessing on all the hearts he could reach. But, since he passed from earth to heaven, he has blessed uncounted millions. There you, too, will find that your capacity to help and bless, by the passage of the Spirit through you, has immeasurably enlarged.

Firdusi, the great epic poet of Persia, lived a life of poverty and neglect. The Sultan Mahmoud had promised him a piece of gold for every line in his vast poem. Firdusi desired to spend this wealth in bringing a copious supply of water to his parched native town. But envy and royal ingratitude for long years cheated him of his life's labor; and when, at last, the camels bearing one hundred thousand pieces of gold were entering the town at one gate, Firdusi's funeral was passing out at another.

Such a destiny may be yours; just as Jesus had to pass into the heavens, before the full privilege of directing the channels of the Father's grace to the needs of thirsting souls, far and near, could be tasted by him. Your faithfulness on earth will have given you the power to direct, through your own being, the channels of the water of life to souls that thirst as yours once thirsted. Your angelhood will consist in the power of doing this. If that is the reward you covet, it will be yours, as surely as God is God. You have been a cripple, a deformed person, and have learned the lesson of never repining. You will be sent to succor poor deformed or crippled human souls, that without your

help might have cursed the day they were born. You have uncomplainingly borne the prison and the chain. There you will be God's hand of pity, stretched out to all prisoners and captives. You have felt all your days the pinch of grinding poverty, and yet, being poor, felt rich in God's blessing and presence. There you will be one of God's strong and tender guardians of the poor, able to impart to all such trust in the poor man's God.

What a gospel, then, is ours to preach! With it we can sweep the world. The Father of an infinite goodness and majesty; the sonship of man, ushered in by the bright prophetic sonship of Jesus; the coming of the Holy Ghost; the sum total of the life-force of God in man,—why should we not march on at once to victory,—we spokesmen and prophets of the higher thought?

And yet,—and yet what do we see? Little deserted liberal churches are scattered over the land. For a brief season, red-hot shot were fired into the orthodox ranks from these audacious little forts. But to-day no foot travels thither: grass and weeds choke up the pathway to the door, because, when the firing was over, the peace eternal did not, in any large measure, descend. Forlorn human lives were, after all, not greatly helped. The kingdom of God was, after all, not largely brought in. The Holy Ghost did not, in any fulness, proceed. The Comforter did not, after all, come to any very great extent. Whose fault was this?

Partly, it was the fault of the congregations so gathered. What, for instance, can be expected of a congregation who have a lively sense that it is their pastor's duty to appear at church every Sunday,—for have they not hired him so to do? But they can say very truly, with the men in the parable, No man hath *hired us*. How much Holy Ghost, think you, could proceed from such a congregation?

Partly the fault of the ministers. "These are our failures," said Beau Brummel's footman, when caught taking down-stairs, in a clothes-basket, a couple of hundred creased white neckties. Clerical necks are no longer so universally draped in colors suggestive of the robes of the saints, but the clerical

failures continue to be carried down the backstairs of every denomination.

But partly it was owing to the working of a great organic law, which is only just beginning to be understood. No new and higher thought ever came to mankind, when mankind was perfectly ready to receive it. Physiologically, it is quite impossible that this should ever occur; for the organizations receiving the higher thought were moulded in the type of the lower. The higher thought has to modify organism, before it can have a fit habitation. No slave can ever be fit for freedom at the moment when he attains it, any more than any animal can ever be quite fitted for a changed environment at the moment of the change. In like manner, the higher thought in religion comes to a generation whose religious organism was moulded by a lower conception. The organism, developed by a coarser stimulus, cannot at first feel the force of the finer motive.

Mankind still needs a hell, said a despairing Universalist once, as he gave up the ministry. The lower faculties of man dwell in a house of cedar, fully organized and equipped for household service; but the ark of God always dwelleth in curtains. Always, then, God gives his new gifts in his own good time, which is just before human conditions are fitted to receive the gifts. Did he wait till men were completely ready,—ready on all sides of their nature,—he would wait forever in vain. For the gift is itself the instrument by which human conditions are gradually made fit to receive it, to hold it fast, to incarnate it. Not till it is incarnated, worked into blood, bone, brain, and nerve, is it safely the property of man.

It takes a long time to co-ordinate an animal to any great change in its circumstances. A sudden change of climate will destroy whole classes of animals, while those which survive will only very slowly become adapted to the new circumstances. Certain greyhounds, says Darwin, were sent out from Europe to course the hares in the table-lands of the Andes. But the air in those elevated plateaus was so rarefied, that the greyhounds' chests could not contain enough

of it, pant as they might, to enable them to run fast enough to catch their hare. But the offspring of these greyhounds, born to breathe that rarefied air, had larger chests, and so could breathe a larger quantity of air; and so they caught the hares.

To organize a large capacity of inspiration, you must keep breathing it in all the time, remembering that your present spiritual lungs are not yet fully capable of the task. Only by the incessantly repeated act of breathing can you gain at last the organic power you seek.

Our danger, as spokesmen and servants of the increasing Spirit, is, that we breathe it in intermittingly, fitfully, sluggishly, or sometimes stop breathing altogether.

If the facial or seventh pair of nerves be divided in a horse just beneath his ears, the horse dies literally of want of breath. This division does not injure the horse's lungs in the least, or the nerves directly connected with them. It simply causes the nostrils to collapse; and, as the horse can only breathe through his nostrils, the channel of communication between his lungs and the outward air is stopped up, and the animal dies. There is a facial paralysis of this sort, only too common in the spirit of man. Not quite so suddenly, however, you would say. This is true enough in most cases. Men are slow to believe in the possibility of any sudden, irremediable catastrophe ever happening to themselves. They see other men plunging suddenly into outrageous vice or crime; but such things will never come near to them or to those dear to them.

Let us, then, take another physiological illustration, which is much more generally applicable. If you divide the pneumogastric nerve, the only effect on the lungs is that respiration is retarded. The animal lies comfortably in a corner, simply doing nothing. If he be aroused, and compelled to move about, the respirations quicken for a time, becoming slower again, directly he lies down. By the second or third day, the number of respirations is reduced to four or five a minute, and the animal is still more disposed to lie still and do nothing. Death, however, invariably takes place in less

than a week. The animal is not convulsed, and does not suffer any pain; it simply gets more and more sluggish, more and more averse to be aroused, and the breathing keeps getting less and less, till the end comes. He dies more slowly than our horse did, but for the same cause—for want of breath.

Do you recognize the portrait? Unitarian people and Unitarian churches have, many of them, been posing to be taken in this attitude for a long time. Oh, for a trumpet-blast of the Holy Ghost, to rouse such dying sluggards!

Whoso longs to be a knight of the Holy Ghost, whoso desires to be the soldier and servant of this, to be the possessor and communicator of this, let him understand that it is of the essence of the Holy Ghost to *proceed*. You are filled with all joy and peace in believing. See to it that that joy passes into the lives of those with whom you live. Suspect any Holy Ghost that does not pass through you to bless others. The gracious Spirit abides, and can abide with you, only under the condition that it is perpetually proceeding from you to some one else.

This Spirit is yours,—yes! aye, it longs and tends to become your very self. But the more it is yours, the more sure you become that it is yours not by private, but by public right; yours, not because you are John or Jane, but because you are man or woman.

Do not say, Oh, I leave such heights as those to professing Christians! Friend, every man must profess manhood; and only thus can you obtain a complete, a noble manhood. Until the Holy Ghost speaks through you, the word you were intended to say does not get itself uttered. Not always, not half the time, perhaps not at all, through speech must your thought be told; but always in act and life,—told in your own way, by your own temperament, through your own specialty, whether as business man, or thinker, or inventor, or artist, or husband, or father, or friend,—told it must be, if you are to feel yourself a son of God.

It is absurd to suppose that this consecration is a new thing. It is as old as the first human heart that God ever

touched. It was in Jesus so strongly that through him it has streamed down the ages. The Christian Church has always had it. But each age has its new inspiration; and to this age comes the call to consecrate all the powers of man's intellect, all the achievements of man's will, as well as all the longings of his heart, to the blessed cause. This done, a clearness of thought in religion our fathers never knew will be ours. This done, religion will seem not only the high romance,—the noble ideal of man's life,—but the uniter of all his scattered thoughts; the consecrator of all his aims; the lifting up into heavenly places of these absolutely essential human powers, which too often have seemed common and unclean.

That is a poor, emasculated gospel, which does not include—aye, claim,—the whole of the normal activities of men. Trade and commerce, art and literature, thought and science, are part and parcel of God's idea of man,—part, therefore, of his gracious will; part, therefore, of his glorious gospel, which is committed to our trust. For God and his cause in the world I claim all invention and discovery, all sound systems of thought, all activities of trade, all daring enterprize by land and sea; for whatever enlarges man's life, whatever greatens and strengthens man, whatever subdues the earth and its hidden forces to man's will, is part and parcel of God's will. His is the manly strength that throws the world. All subjugation of metal or of stone; of earth or water; of light, heat, and electricity; all the noble gains of man, accumulated through all the ages, are God's will. Through all these, his purpose streams. His inspiration, his onward-moving power, is in all these. Whatever man needs, God needs for him; wherever man triumphs, God triumphs in him. "O God, by these things men live, and in these is the life of thy Spirit!"

I appeal, then, to you men, to whom the world's work is so largely committed,—on behalf of that Spirit, part of whose will and purpose is told out in steamship, railway, canal, bank, store, workshop, house, field, and garden; from whose thought spring the city and the State; part of whose inspi-

ration has to be incarnated, made a fact, by legislative assemblies, courts of justice, marts of trade, skilful inventions, wise adjustments of means to ends,—consecrate all your work to God and man : make that noble, and then all true work becomes prayer. That is your offering, that your sacrifice. Thus can you *organize* the Holy Ghost.

I appeal to you, women, to whom so much of the world's romance, beauty, ideality, grace, mercy, affection, and heavenly peace is entrusted,—on behalf of that God, part of whose will and purpose is told out by the glory of flower and star ; by purple cloud and sky of blue ; by the grace of human homes ; by the love-light in mother eyes ; part of whose glorious gospel is best told out by a true woman's heart, by a woman's gracious ways, by the inspiration of a woman's finest instincts and tenderest feelings ; that God whose will cannot be brought to pass without millions of woman angels to execute it,—welcome the incoming spirit : *organize it* : be its messengers, its poets, its finest, most fitting instruments. Then comes the statelier Eden back to men. Then springs the crowning race of human kind.

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THE RELATION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY TO LIBERALISM.

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The word "liberal" as applied to religion has two meanings, which, though sometimes confounded, are entirely distinct. In its primary sense, it signifies that one has passed out from the limitations of earlier beliefs. In its secondary meaning, it describes the temper of mind that should accompany such emancipation; namely, a genial sympathy with differing views, or at least a kindly toleration of them. A man who is an advanced liberal in the first of these senses may be very illiberal in the second; while one of the most liberal Christians, according to the second significance of the word, that I ever knew, was so conservative in his own views as to be almost a Roman Catholic. I mark this distinction simply in order to make clear that in this essay I shall use the word "liberal" wholly in its original sense. By the progress toward liberalism I mean the movement away from the older views known, under one form or another, as orthodox.

While I thus recognize the *terminus a quo* of this movement, I shall here recognize no *terminus ad quem*. I shall consider the process chiefly, if not wholly, in its negative aspect. There is a point where liberalism ceases to be Christian, there is a point where it even ceases to be religious. In the judgment of some, these points would coincide; in that of others, they would differ. Some would place them earlier, some later; but such points all would recognize, each from his own position. In other words, each of us would probably find in the history of this movement which does not rest short of the grossest materialism, points where it might well have stopped. These points I shall not here notice. It

is to a very great extent the same influences that are working through the whole process; and it is these influences alone with which we have to do. But, while I have here to consider merely negative relations, I believe that there is a positive aspect which is yet more important. This movement of destruction will prove to have been not wholly in vain. The essential truth of religion will come from the fires purified and glorified.

My special theme is the relation of philosophy to liberalism. From what has been said it will appear that the subject is to be treated historically. I can give only scattered fragments of a history, indeed, but I shall give them as such. I shall recognize an existing habit of thought, and seek some of the causes which have produced it. I shall state premises and conclusions, pausing rarely, if ever, to express approbation or dissent.

The relation of the history of philosophy to that of theology suggests much matter of curious interest. It might be thought, at first, that the two lines of history would run parallel to one another. Philosophy and theology, rightly understood, are but different aspects of the same thing. If theology be true, and if philosophy be also true, the latter expresses in the most abstract form what the other expresses more concretely. They differ thus as inner and outer. The two histories should then be but different forms of the same history, the stages of the one corresponding accurately with those of the other. In fact, however, this is not the case; and, as we look more closely, we shall see reasons for the difference.

One essential principle upon which the history of these different forms of thought depends is found in the relation of each to its own earlier results. Theology, in general, clings to the past. In its narrower forms, it seeks to preserve a minute and accurate identity with the system that preceded it. In its more liberal forms, it seeks to preserve this identity in regard to certain matters which it deems fundamental. In philosophy, on the other hand, each system seeks after originality. While theology strives to conceal even from

itself the differences that actually do arise, philosophy seeks often to exaggerate them. This difference in the susceptibility of each to change is one of degree only. Theology cannot escape the drift which is bearing it steadily, however slowly, from its old moorings ; and no system of philosophy can wholly escape from the hold which the past has upon it. Still the difference is great enough to keep the two from being in perfect accord with one another.

There is another element of difference still more fundamental, that works toward the same end. This arises from the fact already referred to ; namely, the concrete nature of the one and the greater abstractness of the other. Philosophy, dealing as it does with abstract principles, finds it more easy to attain the unity which its nature requires, by separating these principles than by combining them. Its tendency is to seize first one of these and then another. It thus swings from one extreme to the opposite. A system may appear wholly unconnected with one that has preceded it, and yet may have the greatest of all connections with it, in that both are parts of a common whole. Theology, while not wholly free from similar influences and results, yet, through its concreteness, moves more as a whole. It has to satisfy, to a certain degree, at every point, the whole spiritual nature of man. It is therefore less exposed than philosophy to sudden and violent changes. Thus the two histories follow each its own course and its own law. The two act upon one another, indeed ; but this interaction seems to a great extent accidental. There must be, however, some general principles or methods of influence ; and a study of the mutual relation of the two in a large number of instances must, it would seem, enable us to form some sort of generalization in the matter. At least, the experiment is one well worth trying. It is my purpose to illustrate by two or three prominent examples the influence of philosophy upon theology in the later history of Christianity.

It is in the later history of Christianity alone that the conditions exist as I have described them. During the early and mediæval history of the Church, theology and philosophy

were to a large extent one. Christianity gathered from the past life of the world the best results of its various civilizations. It blended the fairest products of the political economy of Rome, of the philosophy of Greece, and of the spirituality of the Hebrew. Starting with these elements, it formed a mighty and complex system, which grew ever into a fuller development of the whole and of every part. Philosophy was intensely active; but with few, and generally, as far as the history of the Church is concerned, unimportant exceptions, philosophy was strictly the handmaid of religion. It was willingly a servant. It was even unconscious of its servitude. It received the materials which the Church put into its hands, and elaborated them under its direction.

Had the development of the moral principle been in harmony with that of those already named, their common growth might, it would seem, have gone on indefinitely. In the lack of ethical completeness is found the source of the downfall of this imposing ecclesiastical structure. Its external authority was the first to give way. The immoralities of Rome and of its policy drove the honest German mind into revolt. The doctrinal development still continued for a short time even in the dismembered Church. This reached its highest point with Calvin. From this point, dogmatic disintegration followed in the steps of political disintegration.

There is something sad in watching the decay of any perfect organism, even when we know that it is to give place to something better than itself; and the mediæval Church was perhaps the most magnificent organism that the world has ever seen. Henceforth, however, the process of breaking up the results of its centuries of growth was to be universal and continuous. The intellectual history of the Church was to become as fragmentary as its external history. As there were to be churches instead of the Church, so there were to be systems in the place of the one great system of religious belief. And the succession of these systems was to be in general in one direction. It was to be away from the old dogmatism, from a pronounced and all-important supernaturalism, in the direction of secularism and naturalism.

In the general dismemberment, philosophy found itself emancipated. Though at first, like the newly-freed slave who brings to his old master the wonted loyalty and obedience, it maintained its old allegiance to the Church, yet the fact remained that it was free, and that henceforth its history must be an independent one. No matter what was the relation of the individual philosopher to the Church, philosophy itself had become an independent power, and henceforth must act upon the Church, not from within, but from without. Whether it would or not, it must henceforth contribute to that process of disintegration, which it often strove vainly to arrest.

In the person of Descartes, philosophy began its successful career of freedom. The change was at first, as I have already intimated, hardly noticeable. Descartes sought to strengthen the foundations of the religion of the Church. He sought to lay deep and strong the foundations of spiritual truth as the Church had accepted it. He believed that he had done this. What he had really done was to introduce a disturbing element, the results of which cannot even now be fully calculated. What had been accomplished was, in legal phrase, a change of venue. The questions which had before been decided by ecclesiastical authority were now brought before the bar of human reason. There had of course been already in the Church many attempts to support its doctrines by human argument. Through its whole history such attempts had formed a large and not the least brilliant portion of its literature. The work of Anselm may be cited as a striking example. But I think that never before within the Church had been asserted in such an absolute manner the right and intellectual necessity of throwing aside all beliefs that were not approved by reason or native to the soul. Before, human reason had been employed as an advocate. Now, it was seated on the bench, with full judicial authority. If at first its decisions shall be in accordance with the precedents established by the old tribunal, soon it will feel its own power, and establish precedents of its own. "Beware," cries Emerson, "when the great God lets loose a thinker on this

planet!" With Descartes, the race of thinkers was let loose.

It is interesting to see in the writings of Descartes how constantly this change of method makes itself felt. It is shown very clearly in the discussions which he carried on with the distinguished men to whom he had submitted his essays. They would sometimes use the old methods, would quote the ecclesiastical authorities and reason upon this basis. Descartes, in his reply, would sometimes, for a moment, fall in with their method, and answer them in kind. He would play a moment with their weapons, to show that he was master of them also; but soon he would throw them aside, and take his own. Even if ecclesiastical authority was on his side, he preferred to rest his case upon that of reason.

The change, which was hardly noticeable as manifested in Descartes, showed its full gravity and ominousness in the work of Spinoza. Descartes, in spite of his attempt to emancipate himself wholly from the beliefs in which he had been educated, so that nothing should remain that was not seen to be absolutely true, and in spite of his belief that he had done this, probably never succeeded, even for a moment, in thus placing himself over against his earlier faith. Such an achievement his whole previous mental history probably made impossible for him. Spinoza had been trained under different circumstances. Born a Jew, he had been excommunicated from the Jewish, and had never joined the Christian, Church. In reality, he had probably passed through the process of disencumbering himself from old beliefs much more thoroughly than Descartes, whose disciple he seems at first to have been to some extent. He soon saw the faults in the system of his master, if indeed he had not seen them from the first. Questions that Descartes treated as a theologian, Spinoza treated as a philosopher. With Descartes, God was one substance among other substances: with Spinoza, he was the one substance in which all things consist. With Descartes, God created all things according to his will: according to Spinoza, by the necessity of his nature.

The created universe, according to Spinoza, bears the same relation to God that the radii and sines of a circle bear to it. According to him, to attribute to God freedom of choice would be to attribute to him imperfection; for choice between two courses implies either lack of ability to accomplish both, or that one is not worthy of accomplishment; and to affirm that God has a thought that is unworthy of accomplishment is to imply an imperfection equivalent to that of inability to accomplish what is worthy. Spinoza denied that God wrought for an end, that is, he denied the influence of final causes in his action: for to act for a final cause implies that the means used for a proposed end are less worthy than it; and God can do nothing that has not in itself absolute worth. The idea of personality in relation to the Divine Being was to him meaningless. Spinoza held these views with a religiousness of faith which might seem, at first sight, somewhat foreign to them. When they were published to the world, they won for him the name of Atheist. Theologians could not sufficiently utter their horror of such godless speculation. Yet these views were to be adopted to a great extent into Christian speculation; and the stone which these builders rejected was to become the corner-stone of at least a very important portion of the new theology.

They obtained their entrance into the Christian Church through the medium of Schleiermacher. I do not say that Schleiermacher was, strictly speaking, a Spinozist. This he would deny. In his philosophy, he criticised freely the system of Spinoza. He introduced into his philosophy a refinement that he believed lacking to that of Spinoza. From a philosophical point of view, these distinctions are important; though, were I discussing the matter with a philosophical purpose, I should urge that his criticisms upon Spinoza were not wholly justifiable, and that his system was hardly an improvement upon that of his predecessor. But these differences do not concern us here. They were not such as affected materially his theology. They were certainly not such as to bring him nearer to the common religious thought of Christendom. His well-known apostrophe,

"Offer with me reverently a lock to the Shade of the holy and outcast Spinoza," and the glowing words which accompany it, show how filled he was with reverence for his great master. While in his philosophic flights he sought to rise to a realm of abstraction loftier than that reached by Spinoza, in practical relations, in the discussion of definite points of theology, he descended at least to his level. Strauss says, in effect, that Schleiermacher reduced both Spinozism and Christianity to so fine a powder for his mixture, that it needs a sharp eye to distinguish in it the component parts. I confess that the influence of Spinoza seems to me to be less disguised, though no less marked, than this statement would make it. There is hardly an element of Schleiermacher's theology that might not be an outgrowth of the philosophy of Spinoza, while the influence of the master is distinctly perceptible in special points, as in the discussion of the ideas of knowledge, of determining choice, and of final causation as applied to God.

We may ask, then: What sort of Christian theology could be constructed upon a basis like that furnished by the philosophy of Spinoza? What space would there be for the complications of doctrine, for discussing the Divine plan, schemes of salvation, and other like matters that fill out the creeds? What place would there be even for dogmatizing in regard to the Divine attributes? God is simply the absolute Being: with Schleiermacher, he was something more abstract than even this. Certainly, one's creed must step into the background. Something else must take its place. Religion cannot, then, be a thing of the intellect. It cannot be action; for what definite course of activity can be prescribed by this Divinity, who is too abstract even to be thought? The seat of religion must, then, be in the feeling. But what must be the nature of this feeling which is the basis and sum of religion? It cannot be that of adoration, for adoration implies adorable attributes. Spinoza, indeed, would have some relation of love between God and man, however difficult this may be to comprehend, if we take his teaching in the barest literalness. With Schleiermacher, this would be

even more difficult. But if we take even the coarser and more concrete substance of Spinoza, and try for ourselves what form of feeling we could naturally and obviously have in regard to the one substance in which all things consist by a mathematical necessity, I think we shall find that but one such feeling is possible; namely, the feeling of absolute dependence.

Thus we see that the position of Schleiermacher, that religion is simply the sense of absolute dependence, is one that was the logical result of his philosophical position. It is easy to see the effect of such teaching upon the dogmas of theology. So far as they relate to the attributes of God and his relations to man, they lose their objective validity. God is simply the infinite, in the most absolute use of this term. Whatever else we may say of him is simply a form of expressing our own subjective states, or describing events in our human history. Thus the holiness of God is his causality in establishing the conscience within us: his justice expresses the fact of the connection of evil with sin. The mercy of God is a phrase, we are told, chiefly fitted for poetical and homiletical use. Of course there is in strictness no place left for miracle, at least in the ordinary sense of the term. Schleiermacher contents himself with simply affirming that the miraculous events described in the New Testament stand in no necessary relation to our religious consciousness.

To the system of Schleiermacher there were two foci. The one, theoretical, which I have described; the other, historical,—namely, the doctrine of the person of Jesus. Of course the latter is wholly dependent for its significance upon the former. What characterized Jesus was perfect sinlessness; and, because sin is the dulling of the sense of absolute dependence, what distinguished Jesus was that in him this sense of dependence was absolute and perpetual. The work of Jesus is the bringing men into participation with this sense. The ecclesiastical terms still in part remain, but the strict ecclesiastical meaning is lost. We have sentiment instead of dogma, subjective processes instead of external machinery.

I have spoken of the system of Schleiermacher as being directly related to that of Spinoza. We cannot fail to see in it also the influence of other philosophers, especially that of Kant, with whom, however, Schleiermacher had far less in common. I would gladly, had I space, dwell at some length on the influence of Kant in the direction of liberalism in religion. Especially would I speak of the Rationalistic school which sprung from him. All that I can here say is that the critical and psychological nature of his philosophy prepared the way for, if it did not render necessary, a theology that should rest, like that of Schleiermacher, on a psychological rather than on a dogmatic basis.

The influence of Schleiermacher, and through him that of Spinoza, and less directly that of Kant, has been one of the most fundamental elements in the later German theology. Strauss wittily compares a part of the later German theology to sausage-meat,—the comparison, he tells us, is not more ignoble than the thing,—in which the orthodox tradition furnishes the solid portion, Schleiermacher the fat, and Hegel the spice. Schenkel, himself a most marked exception to the statement, tells us, more seriously, that since the pioneer work of Schleiermacher all presentations of dogmatic theology have been more or less dependent upon his conception of religion. This controls the entire new theology, so far as it rises above rationalism. Even those theologians who seek to convince themselves and others that it is absolutely necessary to go back to the faith of the Fathers cannot wholly escape from the mighty impulse that went forth from him. The overpowering might of his spirit works in them, even if unconsciously.

It is interesting, indeed, and somewhat singular to observe the variety of systems that base themselves upon the doctrine of Schleiermacher,—the various forms, more or less orthodox, into which this sense of absolute dependence may be cast.

The general tendency of the influence of Schleiermacher must, however, be in the direction of liberalism; for, when once this sense of dependence has been made the ground and

the test of dogma, whatever is artificially attached to it will have no root, and will be apt to wither. Terms that are suggested by custom, and have only the possibility of their use to sustain them, will tend to pass into disuse, when the force which caused the custom shall have spent itself.

Thus we have a very large portion of the modern German theology, somewhat conservative in tone, but wholly liberal in all its interpretations of doctrine. Of this, the system of Schweizer may serve as a good example, his sense of historic continuity and his love for it not standing in the way of the freest treatment of his material; while the system of Biedermann, to which I shall refer again in another connection, in its freer handling of traditional form and historical succession, may illustrate what appears to me to be the ultimate tendency of the general movement.

We need not trust merely to foreign examples of the influence of such teaching as we have considered. We can illustrate it by purely subjective experiment. The philosophy of Spencer, though it is, compared with that which has been occupying our thought, very crude, is yet as well fitted to suggest the sense of absolute dependence as that of Spinoza. The God of Schleiermacher is even more unknowable than the absolute of Herbert Spencer; for this, Spencer tells us, is a power, while the God of Schleiermacher is an abstraction higher than power. It would be as possible to construct upon the system of Herbert Spencer a system of theology that should bear a certain external resemblance to the ecclesiastical theology, as to construct such a one upon the system of Schleiermacher. It is easy to see, however, that such a system would be to a large extent artificial, that much of it would in time be swept away, that only the simplest expression of religious belief could maintain itself upon such a foundation. An elaborate theology requires something at least in some degree knowable. The structure that Mansell sought to build above the unknowable of Sir William Hamilton vanished amid the clouds, and a somewhat similar fate must attend similar attempts, however different their method.

The phrase that I quoted from Strauss shows what has

been the other philosophical element prominent in modern German theology, or, in other words, in modern liberalism. If the theology of feeling, vague and yielding as it is, may be compared to the unorganized fat, the sharp dialectic and the audacious utterances of Hegel may well be compared to the spice of the later theology; and the epigram of Strauss may show how widely the influence of this philosophy has made itself felt.

The first utterance of his system by Hegel was hailed with rapture by a large portion of the orthodox world. Here at last was the orthodox theology met by a philosophical system to which it could easily accommodate itself. The threefold process of Hegel furnished easy suggestion of the doctrines of the Trinity, of the atonement, and the other portions of the theologic scheme. You will nowhere find a picture of Christianity more beautiful than that given by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Religion*, in statements that can be accepted at once by the orthodox, if only he be not too orthodox, and by the liberal, if he be really liberal.

A very superficial acquaintance with history of modern philosophy and theology is sufficient to show how suddenly this joy was to be turned into mourning. The welcomed ally proved to be the most deadly foe that the old theology has been forced to grapple with. If it be said that this hostility grew not out of the Hegelian philosophy, properly so called, but out of a misconception of this, the general fact remains the same. This misconception, or transformation, grew out of the system itself. The original Hegelianism, if it were not identical with this destructive form of thought, was yet the source of it. This was introduced with it into the citadel of faith. It matters little to the farmer, who mercifully takes the freezing and starving she-wolf to his fire-side, whether the subsequent ravage be committed by her or by her brood. Not the moral, but solely the historical, connection at present concerns us. While the disastrous results that have come upon the old theology from the side of Hegelianism are familiar, perhaps the method by which these results were accomplished is less familiar. Beside

the historical importance of the question and its importance for our present theme, the process to which it refers might well excite our interest. This transformation of the system of Hegel from a friend to a most dreaded foe is as wonderful in its way as the transformation of the philosophy of Spinoza, at first regarded as a deadly enemy to Christianity; afterwards becoming, as we have seen, the foundation of a large part of modern Christian thought. I proceed, then, to point out some of the elements in the philosophy of Hegel which fit it for this twofold relation to Christianity.

The first of these elements that I would name is the part which *Vorstellungen* play in this system. I have used the word in its German form, because it is difficult to decide what English word to place as its equivalent, or rather because it has no English equivalent. The word "Conception," in some of its looser uses, might answer; but the word would be confusing, because it would not determine which of its varying uses were meant, and its strict use would mislead. The word "Representation" is a nearer translation; the difficulty being, however, that in this connection it would furnish, without explanation, absolutely no meaning to one unfamiliar with the original. *Vorstellungen* are our methods of representing truths to ourselves. They hover midway between abstract thought and concrete imagination. Perhaps the word "Symbol," in one of its common uses, may illustrate the meaning of the word we are considering.

We sometimes say of statements of belief that they are not absolutely true; yet we can use them as symbols of truth, inadequate, indeed, but yet practically sufficient. It may be seen at a glance that a view of religious expressions and beliefs represented by this use of the word "symbol," may work very naturally in either of two directions, according to the mood or purpose of him who uses it. It may take the form of Catholicity, leading one to accept widely different statements of belief in general, or any one form of belief in particular, as symbolically true; or it may lead one to reject the same statements as only symbolically true, and thus as actually false. This already may help to explain the relation,

at first friendly, then hostile, of the Hegelian philosophy to the older theology. This would be clearer, if we consider more definitely the nature of these representations, if I may use the term, and their relation to the system of philosophy we are considering.

In the first place, the philosophy brings to light the real truth contained in these representations, and thus apparently justifies them. The statements, even to the orthodox holder of them, come to have a meaning that they have not had before. He had taken them as they were given to him, and because they were given to him. They had perhaps been little more to him than shells or husks. But now suddenly he has found a kernel of meat in the shell. He sees for himself the meaning and the sacred truth that had been hidden in these traditional forms. Before, he had believed because he was told that the statements were true. Now, he believes because his reason tells him they are true. The fatal step is made, fatal to the permanent hold of these statements upon his mind, when he is content to let his faith rest upon the authority of the reasoning. For the next step is that these statements are seen to be only symbols. One of the first disturbing forces that this consciousness sets free is the knowledge that, being only symbols, they are not necessarily the only possible ones. Then, too, perhaps he may find that no symbols are necessary. One who has received certain forms of belief as sacred, and is troubled when these are attacked, finds a certain satisfaction in any reasoning that permits him honestly to use the old words. But one to whom they have never been thus sacred is less grateful for such a possibility. He can use the old creed, but he has no special desire to do this. If he is to have a creed, it must be one that naturally and necessarily grows out of his own fundamental conviction. Thus, as soon as any form of faith is shown to be merely a symbol,—that is, a form under which the mind can conveniently represent to itself some deeper and absolute truth,—so soon does this form of faith begin to lose its hold upon the hearts of men.

But, besides this negative effect upon a belief produced

by the changing of what had been regarded as statements objectively true into mere subjective representations of the truth, there is a positive element involved. These forms of statement are found to be logically inconsistent with one another, and, still worse, inconsistent with themselves. "You may use them," cries Philosophy; and, in consideration of our human weaknesses, she adds: "Perhaps, on the whole, you had better use them. They are not true, indeed. Moreover, you cannot affirm one without implicitly denying the rest; and, when you look closely at any one, you see that it dissolves into contradictions, and means nothing. But still they may be in some way comforting to you, and so on the whole you had better use them." Beliefs that are held on such conditions as these you may be very sure will not be held very firmly or very long.

This leads us to notice a second great element in the relation of the Hegelian philosophy to liberalism in religion. I mean the logical method of the philosophy, that terrible Hegelian dialectic. This is, perhaps, especially the element of spice to which Strauss refers as contributed by this philosophy to modern theology. It begins in the mildest and most tolerant manner possible. It accepts everything. It encourages you to state your thought, and it accepts it. It encourages you to defend it, to develop it. It helps you in the work. When you can go no farther, it comes to your aid. You think you have found an ally, and rejoice in the gain. But all this is only a terrible irony. As your thought is thus developed, it changes before your eyes. It dissolves into contradictory elements and disappears, or it becomes transformed into something else. You have nothing to say. It is your own thought and your own method carried out to their logical results. And then you are shown the inner kernel of it all, that which remains as the result of the process, or the higher truth of which your partial statement was a fragment. Perhaps you are not quite ready for this, or do not care for it. Perhaps you accept the new results gladly. In either case, the old creed has lost its strength.

In this school Strauss was trained. His *Christliche Glau-*

benslehre, or *Doctrine of Christian Faith*, is perhaps the most damaging blow that the old theology, if not all theology, in the strict use of the term, has as yet received. While his *Life of Jesus* has produced a more popular effect, I think that this has affected even more powerfully the theological world. The later works on theology seem to be endeavoring to recover their science from the effects of this onslaught. They seek forms of statement which have not felt his destructive touch, sometimes for the reason, perhaps, that they were not in existence at the moment of his attack; or they accept to a large extent his results, and seek to make the best of them. But Strauss did not so much attack the dogmas of theology as, by the method to which I have referred, let them follow out their own premises to their own results.

But, in the third place, the logical method of which I spoke is, after all, only one form of the mighty process which the Hegelian philosophy represents as going on in the universe, we might even say as constituting the universe. The universe, according to this system, is only the Hegelian dialectic embodied in measureless proportions. Especially is this true in the world of human life. The world in all its periods, and in a special manner our human history, throbs with the pulses of this infinite process. Personalities, even the mightiest, lose their importance in the presence of this mighty movement. They mark one of the stages it has reached, it embodies itself momentarily in them, it uses them, and leaves them behind it, as it seeks new embodiments and new instruments. Forms of life, forms of belief, thus have all their truth and their importance; but it is a truth that proves their partial falseness, an importance that remands them to a position of comparative insignificance. No result is final, yet none is wholly lost. Each is taken up into a higher and more perfect result that follows it. Its destruction and its preservation are parts of the same act, and may be expressed in the same word. We thus see how, from another point of view, Hegelianism may work in the direction of liberality. Dogmatism assumes perfect results

to have been accomplished once for all. The Bible is such a perfect result. It came in faultless perfection from the hand of God. It is in some absolute sense the word of God, God's Book. It has thus absolute authority for all after times and peoples. But such a hard, unyielding, and foreign perfectness cannot be left to stand amid the play of the infinite process of which I have spoken. It must become transparent and fluent. It also must thrill with the pulse-beats of the life of the world. This view tends very naturally to criticism like that of Baur. To him the New Testament writings represent opposing elements. These elements embody themselves in one and another of the great actors in this drama of fate, and dictate all their words. If Paul hopes to preach the gospel at Rome, it is from no human love and longing; it is not from the central power of Christian love. He speaks as an embodiment of one element in the process that was working itself out through him and the other personages that figure in this great moment of the history of the world. Peter, the logical antithesis of Paul, had preached at Rome his conception of Christian truth, and now Paul must be there to offset this statement by his own. It was positive and negative eternally at war, yet eternally attracting one another.

We thus begin to comprehend the most important and fundamental of the influences by which the philosophy of Hegel has worked in the direction of liberalism. It is found in the fact that by this philosophy, according to the method in which it has been generally interpreted, the idea of the supernatural, in the sense at least in which religious dogmatism has used this word, was rendered wholly impossible. This relation of his system to religious thought was recognized by Hegel himself, when he referred to the idea of a God existing over against the world as an example of the *Vorstellung*, or symbolic representation. This does not involve necessarily the extreme results reached by one large, if not the ruling, class of his followers, but it would seem to be wholly in antagonism with any interference in the course of the world by any supernatural power; and it is in the idea of such interferences that religious dogmatism has most

loved to intrench itself. We thus see that the tendency of the Hegelian philosophy is in the direction of an absolute naturalism. Nothing else than this, under some form or other, is indeed compatible with that infinite process, working through countless minor processes, which is fundamental to the system, and which is enthroned, by so many of its votaries, as God. This does not imply materialism. It is in fact absolutely opposed to materialism; yet, the human mind being constituted as it is,—seizing apparent results rather than nicely distinguishing between delicate methods,—it might easily, if not logically, lead to a *quasi* materialism.

It does not imply that God becomes self-conscious only in man, though it might easily suggest this belief. It does not necessarily imply that certain events, regarded as miraculous, did not occur, though this inference lies very near to it. It affirms only that the great movement of the process of the history of the world was never, and can never be, interfered with. The great play of forces, immaterial indeed, in a certain sense spiritual, goes its own way eternally. The world is objective thought, and thus akin to the life of thought within; but it moves by the laws of an iron logic of which Nature is the embodiment, a logic that presses toward its results with a pitiless and unyielding persistency. It is this element of the philosophy that we are considering which has worked under and through those which we have already considered. It was this that gave the impulse to distinguish between the concrete representation and the abstract thought. It was the impulse to let these concealed logical forces find free and open play—or, more strictly, perhaps it was the pressure of these forces to find free and open play—that led to the reduction of these representations into their inherent contradictions. It was the reverence for these logical forces which rule the world that led to the magnifying of them, until the personalities in which they had embodied themselves sank into comparative insignificance. It was this, finally, that led to the absolute reverence for the natural as contrasted with the supernatural, and to the exclusion from the possibility of thought of any interruption to the sweep of the great forces embodied in the universe.

In the realm of theological controversy, Strauss naturally presents himself as the most prominent representative of the naturalistic tendencies resulting from the philosophy of Hegel. Out of this sprung his *Life of Jesus*. The mythical origin to which he ascribes all occurrences which may be considered miraculous, and even his critical treatment of the stories of the so-called miraculous, would have little weight, were it not for the assumption that the time has come when such stories can no longer be believed.

We have thus studied, so far as circumstances permitted, chiefly, two illustrations of our general theme. We have considered the relation of the system of Spinoza practically taking form in the theology of Schleiermacher, and of the philosophy of Hegel in the direction of modern liberalism. The system of Schleiermacher and that of Hegel stood apparently in absolute contrast over against one another. It was one of those moments of dramatic interest which history seems as fond of producing as the dramatic art itself, when Schleiermacher and Hegel stood over against one another in Berlin, the one proclaiming a theology based upon feeling, the other, with equal earnestness and in sharp contrast, insisting upon a theology of thought. For the moment there seemed no possibility of reconciliation. But the theology of feeling and the theology of thought show themselves at last, like the difference between Paul and James, like so many other contrasts that have suggested bitter strife, to be a difference of emphasis rather than one of fundamental fact. Feeling cannot furnish a theology without thought, and thought would be nothing without the crude feeling which furnish us its material. These two opposite tendencies find at least their partial reconciliation in the theology of Biedermann. Trained in the school of Hegel, and also accepting the starting-point of the theological school of Schleiermacher, he finds no difficulty in blending the most important contributions of each into a common result. He is a strong writer and thinker. He writes like a philosopher rather than a theologian. His results may seem somewhat pale and cold to the warm religious heart.

Schenkel characterizes his position very well, when he tells us that, from the powder to which Strauss had ground the forms of faith, Biedermann has distilled an essence. I confess that to myself this outcome is far from satisfying. Yet I confess also that, after wandering among the subjectivities of the school of Schleiermacher, the attempt of Biedermann to find some statement of theologic thought that shall be objectively true, is thoroughly refreshing. It is like emerging from a cavern to the external world. It may be a very bare and barren landscape that the eye rests upon, but it is a landscape none the less. And I cannot but believe that at this point may be the beginning of a new era in the history of theology.

We have now to ask, What general principles in regard to the relation of philosophy to theology may be gathered from the facts which we have studied? The first of these principles which suggests itself to me is found in the fact that philosophy perhaps most naturally attacks the old dogma, not by directly setting itself in opposition to it, but by taking away the logical necessity from which it had sprung. Men rejoice to find that they can still utter something very like the old expressions, with something not wholly different from the old meaning. That dogma they think has passed a crisis in the history of thought, and it still stands unmoved. They do not know that it has been severed from its root. A creed that one simply can utter is not a creed that lives. A creed, to have permanence, needs behind it an absolute necessity of utterance, like the "Here I stand: I cannot do otherwise. God help me. Amen" of Luther. When this necessity is removed, the ultimate doom of the creed is sealed. By such insidious processes, by such irony of toleration, have the old dogmas been to a great degree destroyed. Not till a later stage has come the fierce onslaught which is the most stern method of applying the principles of the same philosophical system.

A more important suggestion which appears to me to arise from the facts that have passed before us, as well as from others to which I have not had space to refer, is that

it is philosophy that has been the great instrument in the growth of the liberal thought of modern times. This, however commonplace it may seem at the first utterance of it, is a statement directly opposed to one of the fundamental assumptions of the popular thought of to-day. This assumes that the progress of liberalism is due to science alone. The popular thought represents Theology as holding her positions firmly, until she is crowded from them step by step by the pressure of a constantly advancing and pitiless science. I am inclined to think that many professed representatives of science would be a little surprised to find how small a part physical science has played in the history of theology. It has affected strongly the popular mind, and its influence has been in the direction of naturalism; but the great movement of theology—the theology of the theologians—has been accomplished with little aid from it.

It is philosophy that has given to modern theology the naturalistic direction which it is now to so large an extent taking. It was Spinoza who laid the foundations of naturalism broad and deep. It was Kant who corrected a certain extravagance of speculation, and by directing attention to psychological analysis prepared the way for new achievements in philosophic thought. It was Hegel who contributed the most to make strong the sense of the invariable processes which control and manifest themselves in the changes in the world and in history; and it was the interpretation that the most numerous portion of his followers gave to his system that especially stimulated the naturalistic tendency which marks the habit of thought of Germany. Science is a product, not the cause of the tendency that we are considering.

It is important that this point should be fully understood. Many, considering that it is physical science which has given the great impulse to the present tendencies of theologic thought, look upon it as being in some way the arbiter in regard to all questions relating to spiritual things. If a man be distinguished as a scientist, if he be familiar with the laws that control the relations of matter, it is taken for granted

that he has some special authority in regard to spiritual matters, and his utterances on these themes are listened to as oracles. One might as well interrogate the sailor on the lookout at the bows as to the course which the ship is to follow. If you wish to know this, ask the helmsman; or rather ask the captain, who, aloof and apparently unconcerned, controls the whole. Philosophy, however much decried at present by those who are most controlled, however indirectly, by her influence, will be in the future, as she has been in the past, the great ruler of the thought of the world.

In this essay I have spoken, as I promised, chiefly as an historian. It has been necessary to touch upon many grave questions. Chief among these are those which arise in regard to the natural and the supernatural, the meaning of the terms and their relation to one another. These questions are too grave to be treated as adjuncts to another theme. I have had simply to recognize existing facts in the history of thought, and to seek their cause. Especially do I regret that the negative character of the theme leaves no place to do justice to the very important positive results of the work of Schleiermacher.

One point, however, the theme forces upon our consideration. This is the general relation of religion to philosophy. Religion must be recognized as one of the essential and fundamental facts of life. It is a fact that does not ask either of philosophy or science leave to be. It is a fact to be recognized both by philosophy and science. For the reason already referred to,—namely, the abstract nature of philosophy,—no system of philosophy can be expected to do absolute justice to religion. Religion may well accept and even seek whatever explanation or help philosophy can offer. But so soon as it attempts to rest its claim to acceptance upon any system of philosophy, so soon does it lose its true strength. So far as it attempts to cut itself down to meet the standard of any philosophical system, so far does it sacrifice something of its fulness. Even Schleiermacher, basing, as he claimed to do, his theology upon religious feeling, yet, I

cannot but believe, left out of the account much that is essential to the completeness of religion, owing to the requirements of the philosophical system which he had adopted. Religion represents the fulness of the nature, each system of philosophy represents only a part of the nature.

"Our little systems have their day,
They have their day and cease to be,"

but religion is an eternal factor in the life of the soul. Theology should still maintain her old position as queen of philosophy as well as of science. All the more important is it that she should develop from her own principles, and by the methods of the science which belongs to her, results which shall include nothing foreign to religion, but all that belongs to it. If this is done, the partial tendencies of philosophy will be corrected. Philosophy will become more and more the worthy ally of religion. Already we see philosophy beginning to occupy a higher position than she has done of late. Especially does the later school of the interpreters of Hegel promise rich results in this direction. This is not the place to discuss what wing best represents the views of Hegel himself. There can be no question, however, that, under the interpretation referred to, the philosophy shows itself capable of producing richer fruits than it has before borne.

But, whatever this or that system may do for her, Religion, leaning upon none, using the best results of all, maintaining her central position in the fulness of its beauty and strength, will lack neither the interpretations of philosophy nor the illustrations of science.

9

THE INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY UPON CHRISTIANITY.

By FRANCIS E. *Ellingwood* ABBOT.

WHEN, by the courtesy of your committee, I was invited to prepare a paper for this session of the Ministers' Institute, the first of the topics they suggested was — "The Influence of Certain Schools of Philosophy upon Christianity." I have ventured to modify this title so far as to omit the words — "of certain schools," and to treat of the more general question — "The Influence of Philosophy upon Christianity." Permit me to say at the outset, as indeed justice to the Institute requires me to say, that I understand myself to have been invited to discuss this subject, not because I represent the views of the Institute or of any of its members, but on the contrary because I represent views not yours — views which I suppose to be shared by no one in your membership. If I do not entirely misconceive the spirit and object of the invitation, I appear in this pulpit to lay before you a calm, fair, and friendly statement of opinions with which you have no intellectual sympathy, but which, nevertheless, you are desirous to hear with candor, and to discuss with impartiality in the love of truth. Here, most assuredly, you and I occupy common ground; and I congratulate you on the broad and catholic basis of an organization which not only tolerates, but even invites, the presentation of both sides of a question so momentous and fundamental as that on which I am now to address you. Believe me, the generous hospitality which you thus extend to convictions profoundly at variance with your own shall not be abused. It may well be that these convictions, as convic-

tions, may cause some pain, for I doubt not that your unlike convictions are as dear to you as mine are to me. But it will be in utter unconsciousness, and in deeply regretted contradiction of my purpose, if I drop a single careless expression that shall wound the reverence of the tenderest and most religious spirit here. If I were capable of entertaining a desire to inflict such wounds, surely the fraternal confidence implied in your invitation would have disarmed me of it. It shall be my aim to prove that your confidence has not been misplaced. If I cherish a reciprocal confidence that you will listen to me without prejudice and will receive whatever may be thoughtfully said with the respect which is due to thought, I believe that my own confidence will be equally justified. Without further preface I will address myself to my subject.

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

In considering the influence of philosophy upon Christianity, the first thing to be done is to determine what we mean by those two terms. Probably we shall not differ much in our conception of the former. Without going into an abstruse discussion of the different definitions which have been made of philosophy, I think I may here describe it with sufficient accuracy as the endeavor of the intellect to rationalize the universe—to render the universe as a whole intelligible and comprehensible by reason. Philosophy seeks simply to know the truth about the universe—to understand the relations of part to part and of all the parts to the whole—to discover how the One can be Many, and how the Many can be One. It seems to me to be the essential object of philosophy to introduce unity into our thoughts of the universe, and to make an orderly intellectual system corresponding to and explaining the complex world of inner and outer reality. Hence the history of philosophy has been from the beginning a history of successive systems. All the great original thinkers who have written their names imperishably in the records of human thought have been system-makers; the rest have been merely imitators, or eclectics, or critics. But this is not all. No intellectual system of the universe is

entitled to be called philosophic which has been constructed by any other instrument than human reason. Philosophy constructs only by the laws of thought; the introduction of any foreign element, such as revelation, removes the work at once to a different class of constructions. Only the rationalizing spirit is recognized as philosophic; only the reasoned systems which the human mind has built find place in the history of philosophy as such. It is not a little significant that the use of the Greek word *κοσμος* to denote the universe dates, according to Plutarch [2: 886 C] and Diogenes Laërtius [8: 48], from Pythagoras, in the earliest and semi-mythical age of Greek philosophy, being chosen to express the dawning conception of the universe as "order" or system, in contradistinction to the *rudis indigestaque moles* of chaos.

If this notion of philosophy, therefore, is correct, the influence of philosophy will be discernible in every attempt to introduce *rational order or system* into human thought. That is its essential characteristic and sure indication, for the reason that philosophy is simply the application of the intellect to phenomena, with a view to render them intelligible by detecting their causes and mutual relations. In a word, philosophy is the endeavor of man to rationalize the universe and systemize his own thought concerning it. In this I suppose we shall all substantially agree.

DEFINITION OF CHRISTIANITY.

With reference to Christianity, however, I do not expect agreement, but solicit your candid and indulgent attention to the explanation of a distinction which seems to me a very important one. Whatever more it may be (and it certainly is a great deal more), Christianity is a system of thought respecting the universe as a whole. It would be foreign to our present purpose to consider Christianity in its other aspects; but, if one of its aspects were not that of a system of thought, then this whole discussion would be meaningless. The influence of philosophy is to affect thought. If Christianity creates no thought, of course philosophy cannot influ-

ence it at all. But if Christianity does create thought, then it is a proper question to inquire how far and in what way philosophy affects that thought. I beg you, therefore, not to imagine me blind or indifferent to the emotional, moral, spiritual, and other important aspects of Christianity, if in this discussion I assume that it has also an intellectual aspect, and confine myself to a consideration of the influence of philosophy upon that.

With this preliminary statement, I must point out that, at the present day, Christianity offers to the world at least two very different systems of thought. Not to consume time uselessly in discussing minor differences, I cannot avoid the recognition of this deep and broad difference.

CHRISTIANITY PROPER AND NEO-CHRISTIANITY.

On the one hand, Christianity presents the venerable system of thought known as Orthodoxy, which I shall now treat as one system, since the differences among the various Orthodox communions, Catholic, Protestant, and Greek, are entirely overshadowed by their greater doctrinal agreements.

On the other hand, it presents a much less clearly defined, yet still clearly recognizable system of thought known as Liberal Christianity. This latter system is comparatively of modern origin, at least under that name. I am well aware that its adherents regard it as substantially identical with the system of thought preached by Jesus himself, and that they therefore describe it not infrequently as "Primitive Christianity." In this view I am unable to coincide. The system of thought which Jesus preached as the intellectual framework of his gospel centred in the doctrine of his own Messianic mission; if the gospels as we have them contain anything that may be fairly considered historical (and this I do not doubt), all his ethical and spiritual teachings rested on this Messianic doctrine as their broad and underlying ground. On this point James Martineau, than whom Liberal Christianity has no more distinguished, candid, or able expositor, writes thus:—

"The whole difference [between Judaism and Christianity]

arose from two causes scarcely appreciable in their earliest action: the personal characteristics of Christ's divine humanity, and the Pauline doctrine of a heavenly and universal Redeemer. In these is contained the living essence of the new religion; and their intense power cannot be adequately estimated till we fully picture to ourselves the original identity, which they have so absolutely destroyed, between the Hebrew and the Christian ideas. In its earliest aspect Christianity was no new or universal religion: Judaism had found the person of its Messiah, but else remained the same. . . . Whoever can read the New Testament with a fresh eye must be struck with the prominence everywhere of the Messianic idea. It seems to be the ideal framework of the whole—of history, parable, dialogue; of Pauline reasoning; of Apocalyptic visions. 'Art thou he that should come?' this question gives the ideal standard by which, on all hands, on the part of disciples, relations, enemies, of Saul the persecutor and Paul the apostle,—the person and pretensions of Christ are tried. His birth, his acts, his sufferings, are so disposed as to 'fulfil what was spoken' by the prophets: so that the whole programme of his life would seem to have pre-existed in the national imagination." [National Review, April, 1863.]

This is the testimony of one of the most brilliant, scholarly, and universally venerated representatives of Liberal Christianity; and I believe no one can read the New Testament through in course, with single reference to the degree of prominence therein assigned to the Messianic mission of Jesus, without confessing it to be the truth. Yet no Liberal Christian, not even Dr. Martineau himself, accepts this Messianic mission in the plain, earnest, intense meaning of the Testament, with its swarming and vivid descriptions of the second coming in the clouds of Heaven, the Day of Judgment, the Separation of the Sheep and the Goats, and the lasting doom of the one class to Heaven and the other to Hell. All this is explained away by *allegorical interpretation* as simply parabolic; all its dread reality as Jesus preached it is evaporated away as mere poetic imagery; nothing is left

of the central, burning, victorious, and blood-attested faith which mounted the throne of the Cæsars save a few mild moral aphorisms and a few sweet pictures of a beautiful example. That Liberal Christianity is indeed the revival of the Primitive Christianity of Jesus and his apostles, is a proposition which I am unable to accept; for I see that it carefully cuts out the core of that early faith, and allegorizes away its most vital convictions. For this reason I must regard Liberal Christianity, which is far more rational, pure, and elevated than the burning Messianic faith which it allegorizes and spiritualizes away, as by no means identical with, or even similar to, the Primitive Christianity of the gospels. It is evidently a new and very modern system of thought, created by combining certain beautiful ethical teachings of Jesus with the enlightened views of modern science and philosophy. It is strikingly analogous to the new and often allegorical interpretations put upon the teachings of Plato by the Neo-Platonists, Philo, Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, Proclus, and the rest; and for this reason it may be best described, in contrast with Orthodoxy, or Christianity proper, as NEO-CHRISTIANITY. Orthodoxy is the system of thought which grew up gradually and conquered the whole Western world in the name of the Catholic Christian Church; and I see no fairness in refusing to that Church the right to decide what meaning shall be given to the name Christianity, when the history of that name is identical for at least fifteen hundred years with its own history. The Protestant churches still profess to accept substantially the same system of thought, and assign no other doctrinal significance to the Christian name.

For myself, therefore, I simply accept, as the proper doctrinal definition of Christianity, that which has been fixed by history: namely, Christian Orthodoxy. I make no new definition of it whatever; I concede, as in my opinion incontestable, the right of the Christian Church as a whole to define what Christianity is; and the Christian Church as a whole has decided, by a history of eighteen hundred years, that Christianity, in its intellectual aspect, is Orthodoxy.

For the sake of distinguishing accurately between the two widely differing systems of thought, presented on the one hand by the Orthodox Catholic and Protestant churches, and on the other hand by the various Liberal Christian churches, I shall call the former Christianity and the latter Neo-Christianity; and you will please not misunderstand me to mean the one when I name the other.

ORTHODOXY THE PRODUCT OF CHRISTIAN EVOLUTION.

Between philosophy and Christianity, therefore, there exists a profound difference of method, which it is indispensable to note in estimating the influence of one upon the other. Philosophy judges all things by the test of reason; it builds all its systems by reason alone, criticises them by reason alone, destroys them by reason alone, and replaces them with new systems by reason alone. But Christianity, while largely employing reason in the construction of its system, introduced also another element which was superior to reason: namely, revelation. These two elements, reason and revelation, entered equally into the gradual creation of the Christian system of thought—sometimes consciously, and sometimes not. It was the element of revelation which caused the fixity of this system, when once developed, and gave a semblance of truth to the proud, ancient boast of Rome: "*Semper Eadem.*" It was the element of reason, however, which caused this system to grow up gradually, and to have a history of doctrinal development. If revelation had been all, there would have been no historical development of the system; if reason had been all, there would have been no fixity or finality about it. Nothing but this rational, human element renders Christianity capable of being influenced by philosophy; launched into the world as a completed system of revelation alone, like Minerva from the brain of Jupiter, it could have possessed no flexibility, no development, no history. This necessity of development in all things human, and therefore in Christianity so far as it is human, is quite forgotten by those Neo-Christians who dream of it as given to the world by Jesus in full, divine perfection, *totus, teres*

atque rotundus, incapable of improvement or growth, and capable only of deterioration and corruption during these eighteen long centuries, until it should be first comprehended by themselves. No mind possessed of the "historic sense" can easily persuade itself, even in the absence of all investigation, that the great doctrinal system of Orthodoxy, which has had enough vitality to weather the storms of nearly two *millennia*, and shows even yet no signs of near dissolution, could possibly have been all the time a vast mass of mere accretions, corruptions, and degenerations, gathered about the nucleus of the perfected gospel, the original revelation of Jesus. But such a persuasion would seem to be an utter impossibility to any one who has ever studied the history of Christian doctrine, and intelligently followed the course of its constant logical development from age to age, beginning with the germ of the Messianic belief and culminating in the ripened systems of Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin.

This point is fundamental to the present discussion. Philosophy can have had no influence whatever upon Christianity, if the latter has had no development. What then was the nature of the intellectual movement which steadily and irresistibly pressed the human mind forward in the gradual growth and universal spread of Orthodoxy? Was it a mental disease, more potent to ruin than the originally perfected revelation of Jesus was to regenerate? If so, then "carnal reason" has richly deserved all the maledictions that have ever been heaped upon it, and the revelation of Primitive Christianity, being addressed to a race intellectually too infirm and imbecile to profit by it, was a melancholy mistake in the Revealer.

To such paradoxical conclusions one would seem to be reduced, who should urge that the primitive gospel alone was Christianity in its purity, and that the growth of Orthodoxy was a corruption, not a development, of it. Orthodoxy itself is driven to no such conclusions; for, while it contends on the one hand that Jesus revealed all the truth necessary to salvation, it equally contends on the other hand that human

reason has simply unfolded this revealed truth, and performed a legitimate work in developing it logically into the form of Orthodox theology. Simply as between these two positions — that of the Christian, who recognizes the necessary development of Christianity as a system of thought, and that of the Neo-Christian, who tells me that no such development was needed, but that Christianity was born full-grown and continued to be sick almost unto death until this nineteenth century came in,—how can I, as a believer in the law of evolution in all human affairs, refrain from giving my suffrage to the opinion of the former? I think he holds much the stronger position, intellectually considered, of the two. Perhaps no better statement of it can be quoted than these words of Origen: “The Apostles taught only what was necessary; many doctrines were not announced by them with perfect distinctness; they left the more precise determination and demonstration of many dogmas to the disciples of science, who were to build up a scientific system on the basis of the given articles of faith.” Hagenbach begins his *Compendium of the History of Doctrines* with a strikingly similar statement:—

“The incarnation of our Redeemer, and the introduction of Christianity into the world, may be considered as the germ of the history of doctrines. The object of all further investigations is, in the positive point of view, to develop this germ; in the negative, to guard it against all foreign additions and influences. Accordingly, we assume as an apologetical axiom, that Jesus Christ brought to light something which, in relation to the past, was new and original, *i.e.*, a revelation, and, in relation to the future, is theoretically perfect, and does not stand in need of any correction or improvement. This is the principle on which the history of doctrines proceeds, and according to which we judge of all its phenomena. . . . There is therefore no room within the history of doctrines for a new revelation, which could supersede that system of which Jesus is the founder. . . . Jesus is not the author of a dogmatic theology but the author and finisher of faith, not the founder of a school but emphatically the

founder of religion and of the church. On this account he did not propound dogmas dressed in a scientific garb, but he taught the word of God in a simply human and popular manner, for the most part in parables and sentences. . . . It is the common object of evangelical interpretation, of the history of the life of Jesus, of apologetics and biblical theology, to ascertain their peculiar contents, and to reduce them to certain fundamental ideas and one uniform principle."

This, then, is the Christian or Orthodox view of Christianity as a system of thought: namely, *a germ of infallible, divine revelation developed and unfolded by human reason*. It appears to be certainly more harmonious with the law of evolution than the Neo-Christian view that the original infallible revelation was perfectly developed at the outset, and was only corrupted by human reason in the attempt to develop it. If no element of infallible revelation is conceded at all, then the view taken is neither Christian nor Neo-Christian, but really Anti-Christian; for it denies the very essence and existence of the Christian revelation. As a matter of fact, the history of Christian doctrines proves that the successive changes they underwent in the lapse of time were successive advances, not only in logical consistency, completeness, and precision, but also in spiritual power. It would be tedious to illustrate the fact at length; it is enough to mention the doctrine of the person of Christ, beginning with the simple Messianic epithet, "Son of Man," and ending with that masterpiece of speculative genius and audacity, the "*Symbolum Quicunque*"—miscalled the Athanasian Creed. This doctrine, combining the Hebrew notion of the Messiah with the Alexandro-Hellenic notion of the Logos, became, says Hagenbach, "the proper spring of all Christian theology." The New Testament itself, in the fourth gospel and the writings of Paul, contains abundant evidence of the early germinal union of these two ideas. The subsequent history of the doctrine was one of successive stages of enlargement, made necessary by the rational demand for unity, consistency, and logical concatenation.

What is true of this central doctrine is true of the whole Christian system of thought. The simple and undeveloped *πίστις*, or "faith," of the first Christians grew normally and healthily into the Christian *γνώσις*, or scientifically perfected body of doctrine of subsequent ages. The whole process was one of development, dominated throughout by the desire to achieve a rational system of Christian thought; and the conquest of the world by this system was proof of its adaptation, not only to the *practical* needs of humanity at that period, but also to its *rational* needs as well.

RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO CHRISTIANITY.

Viewed, therefore, as a system of thought in which the primitive revelation of Jesus and his apostles was normally developed by the steady and long-continued application of reason into the great doctrinal whole known as Orthodoxy, Christianity has from the beginning been influenced and intellectually formed by philosophy. The view in question is not mine alone; it is that of history. No history of philosophy stands higher than that of Ueberweg, and this is his testimony:—

"The philosophic thought of Christian times has been mainly occupied with the theological, cosmological, and anthropological postulates of the Biblical doctrine of salvation, the foundation of which is the consciousness of the law, of sin, and of redemption. . . . In the Patristic period, philosophic thought stands in the closest union with theological speculation, and co-operates in the development of Christian dogma. In the Scholastic period, it passes into the service of theology, being employed merely to reduce to scientific form a body of dogmatic teaching for the most part already at hand, by introducing a logical arrangement and bringing to its support philosophical doctrines from ante-Christian antiquity. In Modern Philosophy it gradually acquires, with reference to Christian theology and ancient philosophy, the character of an independent science, as regards both form and content. . . . The dogmas of the Church were developed in the course of the contest waged by its defenders against

Jews and Greeks, against Judaizers, Gnostics, and heretics of all sorts. To this development philosophical thought lent its aid, being employed before the Council of Nice in elaborating and perfecting the fundamental doctrines, and subsequently in expanding them into a comprehensive complex of dogmas. Whatever was new and peculiar in the doctrine of Augustine was the result of the contest in which he was engaged, either inwardly or outwardly, against the doctrines of the Manicheans, Neo-Platonists, Donatists, and Pelagians. But when the belief of the Church had been unfolded into a complex of dogmas, and when these dogmas had become firmly established, it remained for the School to systematize and verify them by the aid of a corresponding reconstruction of ancient philosophy: in this lay the mission of Scholasticism." [1: 261,262.]

In this view of the subject Ueberweg is supported by every other historian of repute. In all candor, friendliness, and love of truth, I would put this question for your serious consideration: do not the proven facts abundantly justify me in the distinction I have drawn *between* CHRISTIANITY, *as identical with Orthodoxy, and* NEO-CHRISTIANITY, *as a very modern departure both from the undeveloped primitive gospel of Jesus and from the developed gospel of the Orthodox Christian Church?*

Leaving this question to your thoughtful consideration, and assuming the justice of my distinction between Christianity and Neo-Christianity, I will proceed briefly to trace the past influence of philosophy upon Christianity as defined, and to indicate its probable influence in the future.

PRE-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy is older than Christianity by many centuries. Without venturing into the vastness and obscurity of oriental speculations, we all know that Greek thought endeavored to rationalize the universe long before the authentic records of its history begins. Three great periods may be distinguished in Greek speculation prior to the advent of Christianity. The first of these may be characterized as the Objective

Period, in which the philosophic mind occupied itself mainly with constructing cosmological theories and attempting to create a scientific conception of the unity of the universe before the development of science had rendered such a conception possible. The Ionic School, the Pythagorean School, the Eleatic School, and the later Natural Philosophers (Empedocles and Anaxagoras, Lucippus and Democritus) belong to this period. The second was the Subjective Period, in which attention was largely turned from cosmology to anthropology,—more particularly to ethics and logic as sciences based on the laws of thought itself. To this period belong the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno the Stoic, Epicurus, and the Sceptics. The third was the Transcendental or Theosophical Period, in which the doctrine of the transcendence of the Deity eclipsed the claims of Nature and Man to the attention of thinkers, and made Theology the absorbing interest of philosophy. The Neo-Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists, together with the Græco-Judaic school of Alexandria, belong to this third period. Theosophy was a strictly legitimate development of Greek thought, which thus inevitably came into direct contact with nascent Christianity. From this time forth philosophy and Christianity stood in close relation to each other, exerting a powerful reciprocal influence. What has been the character of this influence?

THE FOUR PERIODS.

Philosophy, as we have seen, is essentially the endeavor of the human mind to rationalize the universe: *i.e.*, to explain it by reason alone, determining both the facts and their connections by the laws of reason alone. But Christianity, as a system of thought, is the endeavor of the human mind to rationalize, not the *universe* as reason apprehends it, but *revelation* as God and Jesus Christ have given it. That is the essential difference between the two. Philosophy ceases to be philosophy as such, and becomes theology, the moment it accepts the contents of revelation as a fixed point of departure in its speculations; yet this is precisely what Christianity demands that it shall do. At the very outset,

Christianity made this demand, and has never ceased to make it. How has philosophy met this demand? That is essentially the question to be answered, and the answer is shortly this:—

1. Philosophy at first *resisted* the demand of Christianity.
2. It *submitted and obeyed*.
3. It *rebelled and won its freedom*.
4. It now demands in turn that *Christianity shall submit revelation to reason* and abide by the result. Christianity to-day resists; I believe it will yet submit and obey. In Neo-Christianity it has already done so.

Now here are four great periods to be distinguished with reference to the relation which philosophy has borne to Christianity, the period of Resistance, the period of Subjection, the period of Revolt, and the period of Conquest. The first three are in the past; the fourth is in the present and the future. I will touch upon the history of these four periods as briefly as possible.

THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE.

Neo-Platonism had its origin in the "Platonic principle of transcendence" [Ueb. I: 234], which was renewed and further developed by Eudorus and Arius Didymus in the time of Augustus as an offset to Stoic Pantheism and Epicurean Naturalism, and which was developed still further by the Neo-Platonists themselves. Plato's attempt to translate Oriental mysticism into scientific speculation ended, according to Robert Zimmermann, in the re-translation by Neo-Platonism of thought into images. The Oriental element thus introduced into Greek philosophy by Plato himself was the seed of the theosophic ecstasy, rhapsody, and enthusiasm that came later. A fusion was effected between Judaism and Hellenism in the Jewish-Alexandrian school. The vague speculations of Aristobulus concerning the Divine *δυναμις*, and of the Pseudo-Solomon concerning the Divine *σοφία*, culminated in Philo, who introduced the distinction between God and his world-building forces, which in their totality constituted the Divine *λόγος*. Here the approximation of

Philo to Christianity stopped. Holding to the doctrine of the essential impurity of matter, it was logically impossible to accept the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos, or to identify the Logos with the expected Messiah. "The incarnation of the Logos in Christ," says Ueberweg, "forms the fundamental speculative . . . doctrine by which Christianity separated from Alexandrian theosophy." At this point, therefore, philosophy made a stubborn resistance to Christianity.

The founder of Neo-Platonism proper was Ammonius Saccas, who lived about 175 to 250 A.D. His most distinguished disciple was Plotinus, who carried the doctrine of the Divine transcendence so far as to teach that the Supreme Essence, the Good *per se*, transcended the category of Being; and, affirming that it was exalted above the rational nature, he even denied to it the faculty of thought. Here again philosophy resisted Christianity.

The most eminent of the later Neo-Platonists was Proclus, born about 411 A.D. In opposition to the Christian Trinity, he taught the doctrine of a mystical Triad of the intelligible, intelligible-intellectual, and intellectual essences. But his opposition, no less than that of Porphyry and the other Neo-Platonists, proved abortive. In the year A.D. 529, the Emperor Justinian closed the School at Athens, and interdicted the giving of instruction in philosophy altogether.

THE PERIOD OF SUBJECTION.

None the less, however, while Pagan philosophy fought a losing battle against Christianity, was Christianity itself unable to dispense with philosophy in the construction of its own dogmatic edifice. In vain did the fiery Tertullian denounce philosophy as the mother of heresies, and exclaim with vehemence — "*Credo quia absurdum est.*" even he was obliged to maintain that "the divine mysteries cannot, in the last analysis, be opposed to reason."

There was no help for it. The systemizing reason asserted its rights as far as it could, and, being forced to accept the data of revelation as its unquestionable first principles, pro-

ceeded to erect on this foundation a new system of thought, scientific and philosophic at least in form.

Says Ueberweg: "In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers we see principally the fundamental doctrines, theoretical and practical, of Christianity being developed in the struggle with Judaism and Paganism." [1: 274.] "The so-called Gnostics, in their endeavor to advance from Christian faith to Christian knowledge, made the first attempt to construct a religious philosophy on the Christian basis. The Gnostic speculation was less logical than imaginative, the various abstract elements of religious belief being realized in the form of personal beings, forming a Christian or rather semi-Christian mythology, underneath which lay hidden the germs of a correct historical and scientific appreciation of Christianity." [1: 280.] So also says Lipsius: "Gnosticism was the first comprehensive attempt to construct a philosophy of Christianity; owing, however, to the immense reach of the speculative ideas which pressed themselves on the attention of the Gnostics, but with which they were wholly lacking the scientific ability to cope, this attempt ended only in mysticism, theosophy, mythology, in short, in a thoroughly unphilosophical system."

There were men of a philosophical turn of mind among the early Christians, however, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, teachers in the school for catechists in that city, who represented a better class of Gnostics and strove to reduce the principles of the gospel to philosophic form without departing from the catholic faith of the Church. They found fault with the Gnosis of the heretics for the sake of a better one. "Alexandria," says Baur, "the original home of *Gnosis*, is also the birth-place of Christian theology, which, in its first form, itself aimed to be nothing else than a Christian Gnosis." Although, as Hagenbach points out, the germs of a dogmatic theology are contained in the New Testament itself,— "the central point of John's theology," he says, "is the incarnation of the Logos in Christ; the fundamental principle of the Pauline doctrine is justification by faith,"—still there existed no system of Christian doctrine

prior to Origen. The teachers at the school of catechists were the first to perceive and feel the practical necessity for such a system. Clement collected the materials of it, and Origen reduced them to something like order in his book *περὶ ἀρχῶν*—of which only fragments remain.

Origen's attempt was the first, but not the last. Gregory of Nyssa (331–394 A.D.) developed the Christian doctrine in systematic order in his book *λόγος κατηχητικός*, by which he rendered the most important service. But it was by Augustine (354–430 A.D.) that the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Patristic Period was developed in its most complete and perfect form. His works were numerous and elaborate, and have given him permanent fame as the great philosophical organizer of the Christian religion in the West. In the Eastern church Neo-Platonic and other philosophical speculations on Christian doctrines were made by Synesius of Cyrene, born A.D. 375; Nemesius, Æneas of Gaza, Zacharias Scholasticus, Johannes Philoponus, the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, and others; while Johannes Damascenus (about 750 A.D.), in his work on “The Source of Knowledge,” gave a minute and systematic exposition of Orthodox Dogmatics, which still retains great authority in the Greek Church. He, however, unlike Augustine, contributed nothing to the development of Christian doctrine, which he regarded as completed; and he is therefore entitled to be considered only a careful and orderly compiler.

Philosophy had now substantially completed its task of accomplishing the intellectual organization of Christianity. It had created Orthodoxy, the completed system of thought which reason had logically developed out of the unsystemized data of revelation. But the period of its service was not yet ended. From the ninth to the fifteenth or sixteenth century, under the name of Scholasticism, it continued to be the *ancilla theologiæ*, a mere handmaid of the Orthodoxy which it had itself created. During that long period it had many great names to boast of: Johannes Scotus Erigena, Roscellinus, Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, William

of Occam,—the list is too long for enumeration ; and it had great questions to deal with — none greater than the controversy between Realism and Nominalism, which, as Tennemann well says, was “never definitely settled.” It is destined to come up again for settlement when the reform in philosophic method now going on shall have been at last completed.

“Scholasticism was philosophy in the service of established and accepted theological doctrines, or at least, in such subordination to them that, where philosophy and theology trod on common ground, the latter was received as the absolute norm and criterion of truth. More particularly, it was the reproduction of ancient philosophy under the control of ecclesiastical doctrine, with an accommodation, in cases of discrepancy, of the former to the latter.” As during the Patristic period philosophy had been made to construct the great dogmatic edifice of Christianity, so during the Scholastic period it was made to fortify it, defend it against attack, and compel even Aristotle himself to do duty as a good Catholic. There is no occasion here to rehearse the details of this long slavery of the human mind. The Scholastic period at last drew to a close, and the Modern Period began to dawn.

THE PERIOD OF REVOLT.

“Unity, servitude, freedom — these are the three stages,” says Ueberweg, “through which the philosophy of the Christian era has passed, in its relation to ecclesiastical theology.” Modern philosophy is simply a revolt against an intellectual authority always unnatural, and at last become intolerable. It is the definite refusal of the human mind to endure that element of revelation which Christianity so long forced upon it. It is the affirmation of reason's right of eminent domain over the whole world of thought — of her right to rationalize the universe in accordance with her own laws alone. This revolt of philosophy against the claim of Christianity to dictate the premises of philosophic thinking is more than a revolt ; it is a revolution, and the revolution is already an accomplished fact. Philosophy is to-day totally emancipated

from its long subjection to Christianity; it no longer builds upon the basis of revelation, but of experience. Its independence is complete, if not unquestioned; even if some philosophers of repute retain the element of revelation to some extent in their speculations, they justify it solely on the ground that reason sanctions it, and this is to deny the essential character of revelation, which is sanctioned by authority, not by reason. The spirit of all Christian faith is expressed by Augustine, who believed that the Church was inspired directly by the Holy Spirit: "I should not believe the gospel, unless the authority of the Church Universal constrained me." The spirit of all Christian philosophy is expressed in the saying of the Scholastic Abelard: "If we suppose Aristotle, the leader of the Peripatetics, to have been in fault, what other authority shall we receive in matters of this kind?" Slavish dependence upon authority of some kind was the central principle of Christian philosophy; but modern philosophy fails even to understand the word, as applied to persons. It recognizes no authority as valid but that of experience, of facts, of verified truth, of the Consensus of the Competent.

A revolution so vast could, of course, come about only by degrees. There was a period of transition, full of confusion and contradiction, before philosophy learned to know its own rights to their full extent. It is not my task now to trace the stages of this great change, but only its influence upon Christianity.

The Protestant Reformation, in itself considered, was less a revolution in theology than in church government; for the great features of the system of thought known as Orthodoxy have not been substantially altered by it. Nevertheless, Protestantism was the beginning of disintegration in this system, and a fruitful cause of it. Piece by piece, the doctrinal unity of Christianity has been crumbling away under its influence, reinforced as this has been by the influence of philosophy and of science—which are at bottom one. The Latin, Greek, and various Protestant churches, however, embracing a vast majority of Christian believers, adhere still,

in its main features, to the Orthodox system of thought which is justly entitled to be called Christianity. But the influence of philosophy, especially in the form of modern science, has not only detached immense multitudes from these communions, but powerfully affected the belief of multitudes that remain within them. There is not a single Christian doctrine, whether concerning God, Nature, or Man, that has escaped this invisible but potent influence.

In my judgment, the most striking visible effect produced by the disintegrating influence of philosophy upon Christianity has been the appearance of Neo-Christianity. All the Evangelical sects of Protestantism retain the fundamental and distinctive characteristics of Christianity; but the changes in its system of thought wrought by the Neo-Christian movement are so vital and profound, that scarcely a vestige of it remains. Were it not for the aid of allegorical interpretations, by which utterly new ideas are introduced into the ancient symbols of Christian belief, and by which their almost total rejection of the Christian belief is effectually concealed from the Neo-Christians themselves and from others,* the Neo-Christian movement would appear to be what it really is: namely, fundamentally and sweepingly ANTI-CHRISTIAN. The system of thought which they cherish, their philosophical conceptions of the universe, its cause, its laws, and its relations to themselves, are substantially as broad and enlightened as those which characterize modern philosophy and modern science; and the effectual concealment of the true relation they hold to the ancient and long developed Christian system is only one more illustration of the wondrous witchery of words. Michael Servetus, Lælius and Faustus Socinus, Priestley and Belsham, Schleiermacher and the Coquerels, Channing and Parker, and the host of other honored names which lend lustre to the Neo-Christian movement, represent an interpretation of the Christian gospel far more radically unlike the thought of Jesus and his

* The "brilliant opening sermon" of the Institute, by Rev. Mr. Calthrop, was parenthetically mentioned by the essayist as a strikingly pertinent illustration of this allegorizing tendency.

apostles than the interpretation of Platonism by Philo, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus was unlike the thought of Plato. The disintegrating influence of philosophy upon Christianity is more strikingly illustrated by the emergence of this new interpretation of the Christian gospel than by any other phenomenon of the past three centuries. Neo-Christianity, with its rational and enlightened views, its pure ethics, its earnest humanitarian spirit, its cheerful and genial temper, its elevating and ennobling spirituality, is one of the best results of the influence which philosophy in the modern period has exerted upon the Christian system of thought. It only needs emancipation from the deceitful witcheries of a name to know itself, and be known by all, for what it is in fact—the child of reason rather than of faith, and the heir of a great and noble future.

For fifteen centuries the servant and bondsman of Christianity, to-day, after a long and arduous struggle, philosophy stands free and independent. What is to be the influence which henceforth it must exert on the Christian system of thought? What is henceforth to be the relation of philosophy to Christianity?

THE PERIOD OF CONQUEST.

I have shown that philosophy is the endeavor of the human mind to rationalize the universe by the laws of reason alone, and that Christianity, as a definite historical system of thought, has already rationalized the universe on a fixed and unchangeable basis of revelation. If these conceptions of the two are correct, amity between them is impossible. To Christianity, philosophy must appear as a blasphemous denier of her own corner-stone of revelation. To philosophy, Christianity must appear as an inflexible denier of her own dearest rights. Peace on such terms is impossible. An irrepressible conflict must continue to exist until either one or the other is the sole mistress of human thought. Which shall it be? Let us look closer at the issue here made.

Christianity is the most complete illustration of *personalism*, as the basis of a system of thought. It exalts a single

human individual as the Divine Ruler of the universe and the Savior of every human soul that cleaves to him with unquestioning faith. Its supreme law is the law of love — love to God in Christ and love to the neighbor for his sake. Its supreme authority is the word of God in Christ, as the revealed and absolute norm of truth.

Philosophy is the most complete illustration of *impersonalism*, as the basis of a system of thought. Its supreme authority is reason, and its supreme law is the law of truth.

The profound and irreconcilable antagonism between the two is created by the demand of Christianity that every human mind shall accept the revelation of God in the words of Christ as absolute truth, without criticism or correction or abatement, in the spirit of unquestioning faith. This is a demand to which philosophy cannot yield without committing suicide. Hence the irrepressible conflict between the two. It is the conflict between head and heart, caused (I think most unwisely) by the heart's usurpation of the head's natural prerogative of deciding what is truth. The intellect alone is the faculty by which truth is determined; it cannot abdicate in favor of sentiment without deep and damning disloyalty to the very nature of things. Whatever can be stated in the form of a proposition, with subject and predicate, is and must be a question of truth as such, to be affirmed or denied by the intellect, the sole judge of evidence; and it is immoral in the last degree to affirm or deny it on the warrant of mere feeling. Philosophy is compelled to confront Christianity with rejection of her supreme demand, not flippantly or wilfully, but with solemn consciousness that she must defend the rights of thought and the cause of intellectual rectitude against unwarranted aggression. The heart makes a woful mistake in assuming to do the work of the head; it should follow, not lead, and the consequences are most disastrous if it undertakes to lead. The function of the head is to think, not to feel; the function of the heart is to feel, not to think. Reverence for the integrity of human nature and solicitude for the highest interests of the human soul command philosophy to be steadfast in refusing the unnatural demand of Chris-

tianity to accept revelation as a substitute for proof. It is a demand she cannot grant without deep dishonor to reason and deep disaster to the cause of truth.

No—the cause of philosophy is the cause of the human mind itself. In the long run, the heart always adapts itself to the conclusions of the head. Consciously or unconsciously, it has always done so; and it always will. The time has now arrived to do it with full consciousness. The clinging sentiments of the human soul, once Pagan, adapted themselves gradually to the Christian system of thought, as Orthodoxy was gradually developed by reason out of the assumed revelation of the gospel; and the so-called “Christian consciousness” was the result of this adaptation. Now the educated reason of mankind, or philosophy, gravely asserts its right to discard revelation altogether, and to build up a new, scientific system of thought on the basis of experience; and the clinging sentiments of the human soul will again adapt themselves to the change. The “Christian consciousness” will slowly and gradually, but surely and irrevocably, transform itself into a rational consciousness; it is already doing so, and the process must go on. Philosophy, long the slave of Christianity, and afterwards a power independent of and unrelated to it, now begins to claim dominion over it; and the claim will prove to be irresistible. All the uneasy attempts of Orthodoxy to adjust itself to the discoveries of science are so many confessions of the fact. Orthodoxy is melting away like an iceberg in southern seas; and Neo-Christianity is the form it takes just before it disappears from sight. Henceforth the empire of philosophy is to grow like the Roman Empire, swallowing up province after province of belief until all human thought obeys in all its departments the one imperial law of reason. There is no room left in the modern world for revelation. But the human soul will still remain the same, with all its sweet affections and lofty aspirations and poetic, religious sentiments. All these will yet adapt themselves, completely and happily, to whatever reason shall show to be the discovered truth of things. The universe is still here, in all its mystery and majesty;

the human soul is still here, in all its beauty and its tenderness. Reason alone can ever re-establish harmony between the two. Christianity in its day created a truly universal or catholic unity of human thought on the basis of revelation, and named its rationalized system of the universe Orthodoxy. Reason is to-day creating a new catholic unity of human thought on the basis of science or experience; and the name of this new rationalized system of the universe is Philosophy. Nothing that was true, useful, or good in the one will be lost, when the other shall have taken its place. Let us fear no more the rising sun of reason!

Gentlemen, I have spoken with great plainness of speech, but, I trust, with no spirit or purpose incongruous with the spirit and purpose of your generous invitation. My endeavor has been to be faithful both to truth and to you. If I have failed in either duty, I crave forgiveness. That Christianity is a great deal more than a mere system of thought,—that it has ministered, and still ministers, to the moral and spiritual wants of countless souls,—that it has done, and is still doing, incalculable service to man in many ways,—I have not forgotten and rejoice to admit. But, for all that, it remains a system of thought still, and must remain so; and it concerned my subject to treat it in no other light. Do me the justice, I beg you, to acquit me of insensibility to the tenderer aspects of Christianity, though unable to touch upon them here. High and imperative obligations rest upon him who would tell the truth in the spirit of love; and obligations no less high and imperative rest upon all who would listen in the spirit of candor and love of truth. That I have been faithful to mine, I hope: that you will be faithful to yours, I know. I thank you for this opportunity, after an interval of thirteen years since our paths divided for conscience' sake at Syracuse, of meeting you once more with mutual confidence and respect; and I cannot but believe that, however widely divergent these paths have been with regard to intellectual convictions, we are all still working side by side for the religion of truth, of righteousness, and of love.

MONOTHEISM AND THE JEWS.

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I HAVE not been unmindful of the difficulties that surround the task I have undertaken. The first arises from the large number of questions that have to be brought under discussion. This I have tried to meet, by limiting myself to the simplest statements, remembering the rule of my teachers, the Talmudic doctors: "For the wise, a hint suffices." Again, my relation to the subject with which I have to deal has imposed upon me the strictest watchfulness and a constant self-control. As a lineal descendant, not according to the flesh only, but to the spirit also, of that race with whose destinies and mission we shall concern ourselves, my natural sympathy might carry me to conclusions not fully warranted by the facts on which they are based; for the Masters have warned me that love, not less than hatred, is liable to transgress the line of justice. And to this danger a Jew is always exposed, when he looks back upon the history of his people. If their steadfastness excites the admiration, their sufferings, the pity of every unprejudiced and feeling heart,—what must be the effect upon one who is linked to their memory by the ties of blood and kinship and the community of faith and hope? I have, however, honestly tried to preserve that calmness of judgment on which a successful search after truth depends. Should I, nevertheless, now and then betray the warmth of my feelings, you will not, therefore, deny me an impartial hearing. I think you would

rather have me come to you such as I am, and perhaps not be disinclined to accept these involuntary expressions of feelings as proofs that Judaism is, as yet, far from being that fossil state which is so often ascribed to it.

Then I shall have to touch upon ground where contradiction is most distasteful, and liable to assume the nature of a personal injury. The religious faith of an honest soul is to me something so sacred and so vital to its well-being, that I shrink from disturbing the peace of the sanctuary, where a heart worships its God after its own needs. But here, again, I sustain myself by the recollection that I shall speak to men who are resolved to look truth straight in the face, and who give practical evidence of their belief in the words which the Evangelist puts into the mouth of his ideal Master: "And the truth shall make you free."

I have designated my subject "Monotheism and the Jews." I ought rather to have said, "and Judaism"; for it is my purpose to set these two into their proper historic relation. I have not, however, thought it necessary to enter upon a discussion of the *origin* of monotheism, a question that has of late excited much attention. Renan was one of the first to set the inquiry on foot.* He traces it to an instinct of the Semitic race, fostered by natural surroundings; but his theory, which was not received with favor by such scholars as Max Müller, Chvolson, Tiele, may now be said to have been abandoned. In spite of his apodictic; *On n'invente pas le monothéisme*, it has been declared to be the child of political necessity in the struggle for the unification of the tribes. Other writers take the mythological view, and think of a gradual condensation of the nebulous heathen deities into men of flesh and blood. The latest exponent of this theory is Julius Popper in his *Ursprung des Monotheismus*.†

I shall simply state what appears to me the historic relation between Monotheism and Judaism; and to that end it

* In his *Histoire générale des Langues Semitiques*, 1858, p. 3; further elaborated in *Journal Asiatique*, 1859, pp. 214-282, 417-450.

† Berlin, 1879.

will be necessary, at the outset, to define the precise meaning of the latter term.

There was a time when the favorite description of Judaism with Christians was: The blank page between the Old and the New Testament. The inventor of this phrase spoke more truly than he knew. There was a blank somewhere, only not where he supposed it to be: it was not in history, but in the minds of those who thus tried to get rid of Judaism, and save themselves the trouble of examining. But a truer method of constructing history has been adopted since the days of DeWette,* George,† and especially Vatke,‡ the weight of the ever-swelling evidence making their deductions almost irresistible. To these critics, a blank in the history of mind is as inadmissible as in that of matter. A leap from Malachi to Matthew, over near six centuries, is simply an absurdity. The thread that connects the literature of the Old with that of the New Testament must be sought, if either is to be rightly understood; and the history of the rise of Judaism proper must be entered on "the blank page," so as to obtain the hitherto missing link. For there was a farther guess at the truth in the "blank-page" theory. That phase of Israel's religion which is now marked by the name of Judaism§ is indeed the creation of the centuries intervening between the supposed close of the Old Testament canon and the opening of the New. Its fathers were Ezekiel, the prophet, and Ezra, the scribe. All that preceded it furnished only material for the structure, with the exception of the Reformation under Josiah, which may be called its preparatory stage. To speak now of a Judaism of Abraham, of Moses, of David, involves an anachronism as glaring as if we were to speak of Roman Catholicism in the days of John the Baptist, or of American republicanism of the time of Columbus or William Penn. Of course we may use the term as a mere generic name for the religion of

* *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testamente.* Halle, 1806-7.

† *Die älteren Jüd. Feste.* Berlin, 1835. ‡ *Die Bibl. Theologie.* Berlin, 1835.

§ *Vide* Jost, *Geschichte des Judenthums*, I. 3, ff.; Wellhausen, *Geschichte Israel's*, I. p. 350, ff.

Israel from the patriarchal age to the present, and may justify our application by the undeniable fact that, as the oak sleeps in the acorn, Judaism was implied in the first command which Abraham received to quit his father's house, and migrate into Canaan. But then we obliterate its great historic significance as a name for a distinct and most pregnant era in the development of monotheism ; in fact, ignore one of the cardinal points on which hinge the reconstructing labors of the critical school.

To be more explicit : I suppose my hearers are sufficiently acquainted with the method, and the general results of historical study of the Bible. Mr. Chadwick's book furnishes a lucid *compte rendu*. It is indeed as he says : a complete revolution has taken place in the arrangement of the various books and of their different contents, so that the first have become the last, and the last the first. The first book of Moses is no longer Genesis, but Deuteronomy, which is supposed to have originally included most of the present book of Joshua. It is not denied that in the other books are preserved documents older than Deuteronomy. Kuenen holds that the Decalogue is of Mosaic origin. Wellhausen, one of the latest writers, and most unsparing in his microscopic analysis, admits that portions of what is now termed the Code of the priest, the compilation of which he places considerably later than the return from the exile, embodies very ancient forms of sacerdotal ritual, that have floated down from pre-exile centuries. But, as regards reputed Mosaic authorship, Deuteronomy is the first in the chronological order, and, let us add, the first in historic significance. For its discovery or composition — which shall we say ? — by Hilkiah fanned the zeal of the king to such a flame that it almost devoured the idols and their shrines, and made room for the government of Jehovah as the sole God of Israel ; but the movement was premature, and failed, leaving the state tottering to its end. The Reformation passed away, almost without a trace, except the Book ; an invaluable possession, from which Judaism really started, and that is the reason why I called the time of its appearance a preparatory stage.

Under this mode of treatment, the Bible came from being a history of revelation to be a *revelation of history*. We are now construing a story of the ancient Hebrew times that lie rather behind than within the Bible. We must learn to read between the lines,—a task the more difficult, because we are seeing persons and things as in a glass darkly; namely, through the minds of the compilers and chroniclers, whose share in the work was very different to what it was formerly supposed to have been. The oracles of old were understood to answer questions of the hour. The lips of the holy prophets were charged with such words of instruction as were then anxiously sought for; their authority was invoked to bend the will of the people to the laws and ordinances through which the truths of which the leaders had become more deeply conscious should be grafted upon the heart of every child of the covenant, and become the common property of the people. The great reverence, however, in which the literary bequests of former ages were held, happily kept the correcting and adjusting hands of the editors within bounds; so that, through the maze of legend, and in spite of much antedating, we are still able to discern clearly two distinct phases of development in the religious life of Israel preceding that of Judaism, which may be fitly distinguished by the names Hebraism and Israelism: the representative of the first is Moses; of the second, Samuel.

The characteristic feature of Hebraism is *tribal independence* in politics and religion. The leadership in both appertains to the Shophet, rather inadequately rendered "Judge" in our versions. Only under the pressure of necessity did several tribes range themselves under his banner, resuming their independence at his death. None of the judges founded a dynasty. That the original of the Canaanite ruler was The Judge is evident from the fact that the same title (Suffetes) is found amongst the Phœnicians. In the middle books of the Pentateuch, the Tribes form a marked feature: here we have elaborate statements of their military contingents, their order of encampment and of marching.

In Exodus xxiv., we have a description of the solemnities under which the covenant between God and Israel was finally ratified; yet even here twelve pillars, "according to the twelve tribes, were builded" next to the altar of Jehovah. It is a sign of the great antiquity of the two blessings, that of Jacob and of Moses, that they are based on the tribal division of the people: they evidently lay particular stress on the characteristics of each, and may have been protests against the growing tendency toward centralization, put into the mouths of Jacob as the bodily, and Moses as the spiritual, father of the tribes; something like their political testaments, in which the character and the favorite pursuits of each tribe were urged as reasons against centralizing schemes.*

The twelve stones, commemorative of the passage over the Jordan, the minute description of the boundaries of the allotments under Joshua, the whole history of the period of the Judges, show that tribal co-ordination was the recognized form of government under which the conquerors of Canaan lived for several centuries; and the religion corresponded to it. Of a central sanctuary, of an hereditary and exclusive cast of priests, of a ritual regulated by an acknowledged law,—we find no trace; of a God common to all, a remembrance starts up in periods of calamity, but passes away again with the hero who breaks the yoke of oppression. "Every one did as seemed best in his eyes," is the highly characteristic summing up of the later historian. It did seem best to all to worship the native idols and to live by the low standards of Canaanite morality. And, although we are accustomed to receive that sentence upon the generations of the time of the Judges as a censure, it is not unlikely that originally it was a triumphant exclamation of those who looked back and said, What a happy time it was when every one could do as he pleased!—an experience that is not foreign to American political life.

Of Samuel, the man who inaugurated the second period,

* For a full discussion of the historic bearings and a new translation of these ancient relics, see Heilprin, *The Historical Poetry of the Hebrews*, Part I. p. 31, ff., and p. 101, ff.

—Israelism,—we know, unfortunately, but little, yet the fragments of biography that have been saved strike the beholder as the limbs of a colossal statue: a giant mind, a granite will, a prophet of the God of hosts,—a very significant expression, first heard in his days. Here was a judge of whom it was said for the first time that “he went from year to year, in circuit, to Bethel and Gilgal and Mizpah, and judged Israel in all those places (I. Sam. vii., 16). To measure such a man and his great work by the standards of our school-morality is evidently unjust. To weld the conflicting elements of the land, whose discords sometimes led to wars of extermination, into something like a unit, able to resist the often combined onslaughts of the aboriginal chieftains, was an undertaking which required a hand as strong and will as firm as that of the iron Chancellor of the German Empire. Samuel shrank from no measure that seemed to him commanded by the pressing needs of his people. Indeed, he succeeded but too well for his own plan, which aimed at a theocracy under a prophet-judge, as mediator between the invisible King in heaven and his earthly subjects. The people had been so thoroughly roused to the wisdom of his policy as to demand its consolidation through the founding of a monarchy; nay, before he retired from the scene of his active life, all power had been wrenched from his hands, and Israelism was started on its way. As a religion, Israelism became a compromise between Jahovism and paganism; a distinct recognition of the former, without an abandonment of the latter; the Ashera next to the altar of Jehovah; a latitudinarian sort of religion; a spurious liberalism, the nature of which is illustrated in the life and death of the northern kingdom, which assumed the name of Israel: and who can doubt, had there been no other departure in any section of the country, that Israel would have passed away like all other nations, and been swallowed up in the floods of conquests that swept over Asia since the days of ancient Babylon? The ten tribes were speedily absorbed in the countries whither they had been led captives: they had no spiritual possession to sustain them; no

idea that inspired them to resistance; nothing peculiar that was worth defending; nothing that could raise them above the level of the seething mass of races and religions that were huddled together in the great cities of the ancient empires. In vain had the prophets, trained in the schools founded by Samuel, tried to stem the tide of corruption and degeneracy, in vain had they even imbued their hands in royal and priestly blood. *The God of hosts succumbed to the host of gods*; and he might have passed out of the memory of men, had not Saul's successor to the throne of the then united Israel conceived the idea of rearing his house on Zion. That David became the ideal king was due, not only to the brilliancy of his victories, but also, and perhaps eminently so, to his idea of raising the first visible monument of the supremacy of Jehovah over all other gods. No shrine was to equal Jehovah's in magnificence, and therefore no god could be equal to Him in power and majesty. A central sanctuary visibly taught a central Deity, a highest God, an El Eljon; and, further, since the completion of the Temple was contemporaneous with the highest degree of prosperity the old state had ever known, the idea that the welfare of Israel depended upon the fidelity to Jehovah taught people to comprehend, in their own way, what seers and poets were proclaiming as spiritual certainties. Unfortunately, Solomon's despotism caused the isolation of Judah from the rest of the tribes, and left her too weak for an independent career; she had to seek alliances, now with the great foreign powers, now with the rival state; and this it was that prevented the idea of David from resulting into a lasting victory of Jehovah. Still, the spirit which he had infused into his tribe continued to operate within the narrow limits of the southern kingdom; and the rise of Jerusalem to a great and powerful city, a centre of culture and intellectual activity, and the seat of a centralizing government, trained the people to a feeling of unity, strong enough to survive the captivity. As Judah they went, as Judah they returned. Moreover, the central sanctuary led to the establishment of an organized priesthood, an institution that has its undeniable perils,

but equally undeniable advantages. Their excesses, their supineness to the court and its minions, combined with the sins of the people at large, wakened the thunders of the prophets, which are still able, although millennia have rolled on over their graves, to purify the moral atmosphere wherever they are heard. But save the state they could not, nor insure the recognition of Jehovah as the only God. No mere moralists, however high their ideal, can do that. Means of coarser stuff than eloquence are required, in this roughshod world, to carry the struggle for existence to a successful issue: material force, practical sagacity, comprehension of the needs and the capacities of the people; and in these qualities the prophets were deficient. We do not know of many of their predictions that came true. They were true in their moral essence, but politically, perhaps, worth no more than would be a philosopher's advice to the Americans how they should govern themselves. We are always ready to inveigh against the priests: our present temper makes us very impatient of their sacerdotal zeal; but we ought, in fairness, not to overlook that, while the prophet is able to kindle an enthusiasm, he as often only consumes and destroys. It is the priest that builds up. An hereditary priesthood has its bright side. It is a wonderful thing to be born to a sacred calling, and to be told from childhood that we are consecrated for a high and holy office. Whilst the prophet chastises, it is the priest that learns how to correct, how to help the weakness of men. He lives with them, is liable to their errors and their sins, but for that very reason knows better how to overcome them. Notwithstanding the terrible charges that stand recorded against him, he may claim an honorable place in the annals of human progress; the priesthood of Judæa were probably no exception to the general rule. And this fact comes to view: that not until the prophet joined hand with the priest did monotheism become a living and controlling force.

The Babylonian captivity is usually considered as the time of a general conversion to the true religion. From this supposition, it is assumed that the work of Ezra and his co-

adjutors was a comparatively easy one; but I can find no evidence of such a deep-going change. Ezekiel's denunciations are as bitter as those of his predecessors in the prophetic office; and the "Great Unknown," as Ewald calls the author of the second part of Isaiah, finds it necessary to take up the burden of the first part in his invectives against the still prevailing idolatry.

The truly faithful, whom he represents under the name of "servant of God," were evidently small in number; and, from his wonderful portraiture in the fifty-third chapter, we learn that they were held in contempt and derision, despised by their conquerors and shunned by their fellow-captives. It was they who greeted with delight the edict of release which God's messiah, Cyrus, issued, and who formed the nucleus of those who actually returned to Palestine. Had the conversion been indeed as universal as is supposed, the "acceptable year of the Lord" would have seen an exodus of far larger proportions.

In passing, I will mention an ingenious hypothesis of the historian Grätz, according to which we possess, in the one hundred and seventh Psalm, the song of deliverance of that period, as a parallel to that which Moses is supposed to have sung on the borders of the Red Sea.

A lasting change of heart was effected *after* the captivity by Ezra and his successors, under the influence of *Judaism*, of which it would be saying too little if we called it a reformation: we ought rather to call it a new religion, — new in spirit, new in aims, new in method. What, indeed, was there to reform in the old faith? It was too deeply involved in heathenism for offering any scope for improvement.

An entire change of front had to be made, if the people were not to relapse into their old errors. The praise which later generations lavished on Ezra was not unmerited: he was indeed a second Moses. It was said of him that he restored to the crown of the law its ancient lustre.

He organized Judaism. The period of its growth — that is, from Ezra to the Maccabeus — is covered with much obscurity. Sufficient, however, is known to justify the thesis: No Judaism, — in our sense of the word, — no monotheism.

It is, therefore, not a little surprising to find so able a writer as Mr. James Freeman Clarke (and I choose him in preference to others, because I know that he will hear me, and thus be able to correct me on the spot if I misconstrue his words) treating the period of the most decisive advance in monotheistic faith, with a few, sometimes even depreciatory, remarks, while its preceding stages receive the amplest attention. It is as if a writer on the history of America should devote his labor to the description of what happened before 1776, and then dismiss the following century with a few notes on the rise and growth of the United States. Mr. Clarke admits that the study of the Talmud is necessary for the right understanding of the rise of Christianity. Let us hope that henceforth no one will venture to give an opinion on that great question without having first consulted that storehouse of the ill-reputed traditions of the fathers; especially that no one will hastily condemn the Hebrew masters before he has heard them in their own defence. But a knowledge of Hebrew tradition is as necessary for the proper understanding of the Old as it is for the New Testament. Guided by it, we shall no longer speak of a Judaism of Abraham, of Moses, or of David; nor shall we any longer designate the religion of the latter as "the personal worship of a Friend and a Father." The voices that strike us as the outpourings of souls animated by such a faith come from hearts that have been attuned to their songs by the devoted labors of the Scribes.

Many of the most touching of those prayers and outcries for the living God were first heard in the synagogues. Ewald, who at the present day, must be called conservative, finds, in all, but sixteen Psalms which he classes under the heading "David and *his time*." Sixty-one he assigns to the second, or pre-exile, and seventy-two to the post-exile, period; among the latter, such gems as the one hundred and third, one hundred and fourth, one hundred and seventh. Hitzig places seventy-two as late as the Maccabean restoration, and holds that the last additions to our present collection were made about the year 85 before our era.

The famous second Psalm, the messianic *par excellence*, is, according to him, the last addition to the Hymnal. Professor Robertson Smith claims Davidic authorship for two Psalms only,—the seventeenth and the eighteenth. The conclusion at which Mr. Chadwick arrives is correct,—that we owe the preservation of the Psalms to the scribes, “of whom we are accustomed to say only hard things.” But we must go further,—not the preservation only, but in many instances, their production. So that the Christian Church worships to this day her God in the spirit and in the words of those very men who, in homily and exposition, are held up as types of zealotism, hypocrisy, and superstition.

The sources which Mr. Chadwick consulted convinced him that “never, at any time, did a more active principle of change preside over the fortunes of the Jewish people. And the change was as important as it was immense,—important for prospective Christianity as well as present Judaism. No Jewish synagogue, no Christian church; no Jewish scribe, no Christian minister; no Jewish gehenna, possibly no Christian hell,” etc.*

This conviction leads him to seek for the missing link between the Old and New Testament writings; and he discovers it in the Apocryphal Books. But, apart from the question whether the material suffices for the “forging of the link,” we must not forget that a literature does not spring out of nothing; that it is the culmination of antecedent stages of intellectual life, the garnered fruit from fields that needed the toil of generations.

The most momentous step which Ezra and his school took was the gathering up of the remains of the ancient literature, and forming them into a sacred library. The national history and the teachings of prophets and poets were thus not only saved from oblivion, but were brought within the reach of the people, and made the common possession of all. An unfailing source of patriotic and religious inspiration was thus opened, an intellectual basis for religion was laid,

* *The Bible of To-day*, p. 155.

and—what can hardly be overrated, and for which the Scribes never yet received any credit—the authority of the priesthood as mediator between God and man received a wholesome check. Their oracles grew fainter and fainter, when the Book itself began to speak; and with them the age of prophecy closed also, and that of Chochmah, or wisdom, began. A most momentous change, since neither priest nor prophet reasoned, whilst the Chacham did. Argument, not prediction, was henceforth the measure of authority.

From the beginning, an open Bible proved a strong incentive to intellectual culture, and a safeguard against sacerdotal presumption. Copies of the sacred writings were disseminated all over the land, and rituals devised and perfected by which their contents were held continually before the eyes of the faithful.

Sabbath, festivals, new moons, were no longer distinguished only by more numerous offerings in the Temple, but became days for searching the Scriptures. Twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays, the peasantry brought their produce to the market-places: these were also the days when the law courts held their sittings. The opportunity was improved by inviting the country folk to the synagogues to hear the weekly section of the Law read and expounded. But those who had no such occasion for leaving their homes were not forgotten. Certain portions, setting forth the chief duties of believers (among them, that great command, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, soul, and might," etc.) were selected for daily recitation. By and by, short, pithy prayers were added. These ancient liturgies, in their original forms (I say *original*, because in course of time they were overlaid with less commendable accretions), are marked by the same simplicity, directness, and unaffected piety that have endeared the prayer: Our Father . . . to Christians and to non-Christians. Instruction and devotion were thus made, from the beginning, the two chief elements of Jewish worship, and have remained so to this day. The reading, however, was then no privilege of the

spiritual head. At each meeting, a number of laymen — if I may use that term — were called upon to recite parts of the weekly pericope, and invited to comment upon its contents. Before and after each reading was offered a short benediction for the spiritual blessing vouchsafed in the Law. The same is still retained in the synagogue. One reads as follows: "We give thanks unto thee, O Eternal God, Ruler of the world, that thou hast chosen us from among all nations, bestowed upon us thy Law, and planted eternal life in us." That shows us what was understood by the term "eternal life." At first, the lessons were taken from the book of the Law only, but later from the prophets, also. This explains the scene at the synagogue at Nazareth, where Jesus was offered a scroll, and read the messianic prediction of Isaiah.

When the Hebrew began to yield to the Aramaic dialect, the Meturgeman, or interpreter, was placed by the side of the reader, and verse by verse he rendered the sacred text into the vernacular; and thus was the word of God delivered to the attentive congregation. Colleges and schools were opened in cities and villages, and attendance at them pronounced a most meritorious service of God. All these things did the Scribes of the school of Ezra. Is it, then, so dark a sin in them that they spoke contemptuously of the Am Häaretz, the ignorant boor; that they placed him under a sort of social ban; that they honored one who was well versed in the Scriptures, though a stigma attach to his birth, — above the priest who could boast nothing but the length of his pedigree and the distinction of his office? And who fell under this condemnation? Not the unlettered generally, but those who wilfully *refused* to be taught; those, for instance, who would not recite the Sh'ma, or daily acceptance of the kingdom of God, or who neglected from sheer worldliness to wear the Tephilin. What did such a one deserve? *

* Their saying, that no ignorant man can be pious, is often quoted against them, and as often misunderstood. The piety here referred to is not that of the *heart*, but scrupulosity in ceremonial observances: the ordinary Israelite is warned against the temptation of emulating the strictness of the learned pietist, lest he make himself ridiculous by his inability to discriminate between essentials and non-essentials. Enough for him to obey the rules laid down for general conduct.

By these and similar means, reverence for the Scriptures sank deep into the heart of the people ; and can we wonder at their reluctance to admit into its hallowed circle books written long after it had been authoritatively closed,—books, moreover, which are anti-national in spirit, and employ a phraseology which, to say the least, has a polytheistic ring in it.

The popularization of the ancient writings led to various decisive results. It was to the Samaritan woman that Jesus is made to say that a time would come when God would be worshipped neither on Zion nor on Gerizim, but everywhere, in spirit and in truth. To her sect, that was a new doctrine. Not so to the Jews : these had learned it in Babylon, and in other countries of the Diaspora. But also in Palestine ; in spite of the overshadowing grandeur of the Temple, the country was fairly studded with synagogues where God was so adored : they had virtually superseded the Temple. Jerusalem herself is said to have had four hundred such meeting-houses. The artisans' and laborers' guilds had their own ; so, also, the Jews of different countries, that came to the national capital either for the celebration of festivals or on private business ; nay, so powerful had their influence grown, that they forced their way into the very precincts of the Temple itself. In one of its largest halls, the daily services of prayer and praise and reading of Scriptures were performed. The sacrificial rites of the Temple were looked upon more in the light of a national institution, symbolizing national unity, and as such they were mainly honored, and their desecration by venal priests or foreign conquerors resisted. But the heart's affections centred around the places where God was worshipped otherwise than by the offering of bulls and rams, and where the living word of instruction was dispensed by learned and pious teachers. Of this, no better evidence can be required than that which the New Testament writings themselves afford. The constantly growing familiarity with the Scriptures brought the chief topics of prophetic teaching into greater prominence. Their bearings upon the questions of the day became the subjects of

inquiries in the academies, and themes of discussion in the synagogues. Interest in them was yet stimulated by friction with foreign ideas, which flowed into Palestine from the various countries with which the Jews had come into contact, either by war or by the intercourse with the brethren that had settled there, and who made pilgrimages to the national shrine, or were drawn thither as the centre of commerce or the home of theological learning.

The ethical spirit of the sacred traditions began to permeate the nation. A high ideal of morality was perfected, in which righteousness and charity formed the chief features. The contrast between the demands of their own religion and those of other systems engendered a natural feeling of superiority; and the high vocation of God's chosen servants, depicted in the glowing words of the ancient seers, was slowly being realized, and developed into a powerful impulse. The covenant of the fathers, established with Abraham, renewed under the thunders of Sinai, and loaded with blessings for the faithful and terrible curses for the faithless, solemnly re-affirmed under Ezra and Nehemiah, as the foundation of the new order of things, created, as it were, a new national conscience. The indifferent and the apostates were looked upon as traitors to the pledged fidelity of the ancestors. Religion assumed a more awful aspect: life and death were involved in her fate.

National misfortunes and humiliating proscriptions of the worship of Jehovah by foreign conquerors, brought the weight of outward pressure to bear upon the inward conviction; and the blood of martyrs, which then commenced to flow, deepened the faith and quickened the energies of resistance in the hearts of the best of the nation. Rites and usages, which, at first, were but of minor importance, assumed greater holiness in the eyes of the pious and the patriotic, as marks of fidelity, until it became a rule, as the Talmud relates, that any ceremony for the observance of which Israel had suffered martyrdom must remain inviolable forever. Suppose those who are so quick to condemn, —and who is not?—yea, to ridicule the Jews for their stub-

born attachment to the traditions of the fathers, placed themselves in their position, and tried to answer the question whether it was an easy matter for them to tear their hearts away from the hallowed reminiscences of the nation; whether it would have been honorable in them to surrender, at the first challenge, be it from friend or foe, the citadel, reared at such fearful cost, for the safety of the faith delivered unto the fathers; whether it was, indeed, but "narrow bigotry" that kept them within the walls of their peculiar laws.* These laws, it is true, had grown to enormous proportions, and often engrossed the attention and exercised the ingenuity of the Rabbis in disquisitions that appear to us worthless. But, then, these generations were under the spell of a high enthusiasm, carried away by a zeal for an ideal that imparted a profound meaning to every tittle of the Law. God had indeed become a passion for them: his will was to sanctify every step, every act, every feeling, every word. Life was to be made a perpetual service to the Most High.

And, further,—we may ask,—was there not a kernel of spiritual truth of the utmost moment to mankind, to be guarded by these towering fences? Was there no reason to tremble for it amid the moral degeneracy into which the most cultivated nations had lapsed; the gross and degrading idolatries that prevailed everywhere, and appealed so forcibly to the weaker side of the human heart? Farrar, the fanatic and sermonizing historian,† calls the world in

* George Eliot is, to my knowledge, the first English writer who takes a just view; and she exclaims, with a courage that does her honor, "For my part, I share the spirit of the Zealots." —*Impressions of Theophrastus Such, chap. viii.*

† Two examples out of hundreds will suffice to justify this opinion of him. Page 196, he says: "Strange, if honesty, candor, sensibility, were utterly dead among them [the Jews]. Even among rulers, scribes, Pharisees, and wealthy members of Synhedrin, Christ found believers and followers," which amounts to this: that "honesty, candor, sensibility," are denied to all those who did not "believe and follow Christ," from whatever motive it be. Can bigotry go further? Part I. p. 262, he writes: "If the Jews had not acted in the spirit of hatred, we should not have had the charges against them in Tacitus: '*adversus omnes alios hostile odium*'; and in Juvenal: '*Non monstrare viam eadem nisi sacra colenti*.'" Has he forgotten that of the Christians it was said, *odium generis humani*, which Merivale and Lecky interpret, They, the Christians, bear hatred towards all men; has he forgotten that the various sects of Christians charged upon each other the most revolting crimes and shocking barbarities and obscenities? (See Lecky.) Only one more instance of his ignorance or wilful perversion. Speaking of the bodily

which the Jews lived "guilty and weary," and yet exhausts the vocabulary in vituperations against those who avoided contact with that world, and submitted themselves to the stern discipline of an exacting and burdensome law, so that they might save their souls alive, and keep themselves free from the pollutions of the world! What obloquy has not been heaped on these lawyers and doctors and scribes and — I must now pronounce the hateful word — the Pharisees, those archetypes of hypocrisy, vanity, and intolerance! In the whole range of human history, their equals are not to be found. Eighteen centuries of abuse have stamped an indelible stigma on that name, and it is a hopeless task to attempt to erase it. It will probably remain to the end of days.

The Christian believer will, of course, cite the authority of the Gospels for his justification. To him I have nothing to say. But to the Christian *thinker* I have. I would ask him to pay some little attention to the following points, before he repeats his accusations.

1. The Epistles are the earliest literary documents of the new faith. If I remember rightly, no charge of hypocrisy or wickedness against the scribes or Pharisees is preferred in them. If it is objected that these letters were addressed to Gentiles, and offered, therefore, no occasion for alluding to the Jewish doctors, I answer, We have an Epistle to the Hebrews. Its Pauline authorship is more than questionable.† Not so the date of composition, which is fixed, with tolerable agreement, at C.E. 60; that is, only thirty years after the events narrated in the Gospels.

It is not likely that within that period the religious state of things had undergone any material change. If anything,

sigh of the covenant, he says: "Thus early did Christ suffer for our sakes, to teach us the spiritual circumcision, the circumcision of the heart," etc. Six centuries before, the Deuteronomist and Jeremiah distinctly spiritualize that ancient rite. See Deut. x., 16; xxx., 6; Jeremiah iv., 4. He cites approvingly St. Bonaventura: "We Christians have baptism, a rite of fuller grace, and *free from pain*." And since the Jew would not be "free from pain," he is blind and worldly. One of the Moody and Sankey hymns begins with this noble exclamation, "I am free of the law!"

† It has been recently reasserted by the learned Dr. Bierenenthal, *Das Trostschreiben des Ap. Paulus an die Hebräer*. Leipzig. 1879.

the influence of Phariseeism had grown more decisive and commanding, more rigorous through the stress of time. Yet we hear no such charges brought against the spiritual leaders and heads of schools as abound in the Gospels. If Paul was the author of the Epistle, he, better than any one else, must have known the true inwardness of the party; yet he is not ashamed to call himself, elsewhere, a Pharisee of the Pharisees,—a name of which he would have been justly ashamed, had it indeed been a synonyme for hypocrisy and moral corruption.

Next in authenticity come the Acts. These, too, although they tell us so much of the conflict between the rulers of the Jewish party and the preachers of the young faith, are far more moderate in their language than the latest portions of the New Testament,—the Gospels.

Now, as regards these latter, we have first the direct charges of Jesus himself, in the woes which he denounces against the Pharisees. Whether they are consonant with the character of a gentle, conciliatory, and compassionate preacher of a gospel of grace, I must leave others to judge.

Then we have the statements of the narrators; and, in reference to these, two things must strike us as singular, to say the least.

First, that the accusations impugn the *motives* rather than the actions. The actions, up to the arraignment before the court, seem perfectly proper and becoming men who seek instruction from the lips of the Galilean teacher. But their *arrière-pensées* are always wicked and deceitful. They did so and so, we read, to find a cause against him,—to entrap and entangle him in his own professions. How did the writers come to that knowledge of the hidden things of the heart? Whence had they the power to read, with unerring certainty, the intentions of the interlocutors? Unless revealed by God himself they could not possibly have known them. The crafty Pharisee will guard his secret better than that.

Secondly, the Pharisees are very conspicuous in the Gospels,—in fact, play, next to the hero himself, the most

important part in the drama. With one or two exceptions, why have they remained nameless?*

The events occurred in the broad daylight of a literary age, often in the presence of multitudes of disciples and admirers. Why do we always meet with this ominous phrase: "Certain scribes and Pharisees" or, "The scribes and Pharisees"? The omission becomes more vexing, when we consider that "Pharisee" was not a title of dignity, like scribe, or of office, like priest, but the name of a party. How did it get into that connection at all? A Scribe was a Pharisee just as the Roman Pontiff is a Catholic. Would any one, for instance, use a phrase like this,— "The ministers and deacons, and the Unitarians"? That would lead us to believe that minister and deacon were not Unitarians. It cannot be reasonably assumed that the word *other* is understood. Why should so simple a word, by which all mis-construction might be avoided, be so persistently omitted? How is it that not one of the celebrated heads of schools is mentioned by name? No Hillel, whom Renan supposes to have been the teacher of Jesus, no Shammai,—both men whose names were then in everybody's mouth, and whose academies were thronged with disciples; no Jochanan ben Saccai, a commanding figure, the friend of the Romans, who must then have approached the prime of manhood; no Jonathan ben Uziel, the translator of the Bible, "held in boundless honor," and many others.† Did none of these take any notice of what their associates (Chabarim,—that was the name by which they knew one another,—not Pharisees) were doing, or what the innovating Galilean was teaching about the observance of the Sabbath, concerning the law of marriage and divorce, eating with unwashed hands, or fasting?

In ancient times, the Jews refused to eat with publicans and sinners: in modern times, publicans and sinners refuse to eat with the Jews.

* Bruno Bauer, *Christus und die Caesaren*, p. 9, speaking of the opponents of Jesus: the Pharisees, Sadducees, Herodians, and groups of people, calls them "*unerklärte Namensfiguren*," unexplained figures of names.

† Enumerated by Farrar himself, I. p. 76.

How different a being do we see, when one appears on the scene whom we do know from other sources, Rabbi Gamaliel, for instance, the preacher of the finest gospel of toleration ever proclaimed! * And, further, the doctrinal views of the Pharisees, those by which they were distinguished from other parties, and for which they naturally contended with special rigor, were precisely those on which alone the Christian dogma could be built. So that Mr. Chadwick's chain of "Noes" must have a link added to: *No Pharisaism, no Christianity*. Take only what Josephus tells us of the different tenets of the parties. The Pharisees, he says, ascribe all to fate (or, rather, providence, as Grätz translates), † and yet allow that to do what is right, or the contrary, is principally in the power of men, although fate does co-operate in every action. The Sadducees denied this: they may act as they please, says Josephus. On which of these two views rests the atonement? "They [the Pharisees] teach that all souls are incorruptible,—but that the souls of the good men are only removed into other bodies, but that the souls of the bad men are subjected to eternal punishment."

Of the Sadducees, he says: they also take away the belief of the immortal duration of souls, punishment and reward in Hades. ‡

The bearing of this divergence on the belief of heaven and hell, and of the incoming kingdom of God, is obvious. The Pharisees affirmed, their opponents denied the validity of the tradition. This means, as Geiger and others have shown, that the first were progressive, the second reactionary; the former democratic, the latter aristocratic; the former the teachers of the synagogues and popular houses of instruction, the latter the proud upholders of the exclusive rights of the Temple and its priesthood. The former inclined toward leniency in the administration of penal laws, the other insisted on their literal fulfilment. The eye for eye theory, for instance, often cited as proof of the

* Acts vi., 34-40.

† *Geschichte der Juden* vi., p. 508.

‡ *Antiquities* xviii., 1-4; xiii., 5-9.

merciless rigor of Pharisee justice, was one of the practical points on which the two parties split. It was the Sadducees who took the Mosaic rule literally, while the Pharisees decided for a money indemnity.

To which of these sides does Christianity, in its best mood, claim kinship?

If then the law, as Rabbi Paul of Tarsus taught, was "a schoolmaster unto Christ," it was so in its *Pharisaic* interpretation and development. Supposing, then, this to have been its function, has the schoolmaster no claim upon the gratitude of his pupils? none upon their respectful treatment, even when his services are required no longer? Who said to him: Well done, thou good servant of the Lord? It was not an easy task for him: he suffered much for his steadfastness, and gave his heart's blood in the defence of his office. What recompense has he ever received?

But it is said that was exactly the schoolmaster's fault: that he would not retire at the right time,—that he held on to his place, when he ought to have yielded to one greater than himself, and thus well-nigh undid his own work. In plainer words, Judaism ought to have ceased when Christianity arose.

Before telling you how we look upon this demand, let me say one word more regarding the schoolmaster. He has not continued his labors altogether in vain. His first pupils remain under his tutorship to this day, still walking by his light,—under conditions so desperate that their mere existence is allowed to be one of the most astounding miracles of history. Their record is not a dishonorable one. At times, when priest-ridden Europe was sunk in ignorance, superstition, and abject servitude, the disciples of the Pharisees enjoyed intellectual freedom, in single-handed combat resisted the haughty pretensions of the Church to the absolute dominion over reason and conscience; and, under the most merciless persecutions and the most degrading social ostracism, preserved their self-respect, their moral ideal, their religious faith and hope; at times became the torch-bearers of science to the Christian world and

leaders in philosophic thought, as you may read in Draper, Lecky, Schleiden, and others. Well, if the witness of history is invoked to prove the greatness of the daughter (and I have no intention to gainsay it), need the mother blush and shrink before it?

But now let me tell you why we think that the school-master had very substantial reasons for being so tenacious of his office. And, in order that I may be sure to state the case against him fairly, let me quote the very words of the indictment.

Mr. Clarke says,* "When the Jews rejected Christ, they ceased from their providential work; and their cousins, the Arabs, took their place." This is a brief but very incisive verdict. What, indeed, can be more humiliating to us than to be told that our fathers have wilfully renounced their high calling, and have, as it were, persisted in living and working against Providence; and that we, in spite of all the warnings we have had, friendly and otherwise, continue in their blind course to this day?

Surely no fault can be found with us, if we try an appeal. Our first defence is furnished by Mr. Clarke himself. Between the supposed "rejection of Christ" (and I shall have to say a word on that presently) and the unfolding of the standard of the Arabian prophet, there intervened near six hundred years. His religion drew its life-blood from Judaism. Speaking of Mohammed's flight to Medina, Mr. Clarke says:† "At Medina and its neighborhood there had long been numerous and powerful tribes of Jewish proselytes. In their conflicts with the idolaters, they had often predicted the speedy coming of a prophet like Moses. The Jewish influence was great at Medina. Now it must be remembered that at that time Mohammed taught a kind of modified Judaism. He came to revive the religion of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He continually referred to the Old Testament and the Talmud for authority. . . . The semi-Judaized pilgrims from Medina to Mecca were quite prepared to accept his teachings."

* *Ten Great Religions*, p. 20.

† p. 462.

He then relates the vision or dream in which Mohammed was carried by Gabriel on a winged steed to Jerusalem, to meet all the prophets of God, and thence to the seventh heaven,—an admission, on the prophet's part, that he derived the highest sanction for his religion from the Hebrew. In spite of Mr. Clarke's depreciating estimate of Mohammedanism, he allows "that it was needed when it came, and has done good service in its time."* But that "good service" is largely due to the Jews, and their continued submission "to the schoolmaster," without which they could never have paved the way for the conversion of hundreds of millions to the monotheistic belief. Their "providential mission" did not cease with the supposed "rejection of Christ."

Again, that the monotheism of the orthodox churches is not of the perfect kind may be assumed in this assembly; and, further, that it is a matter of vital consequence for the development of that which is best and most healthful in Christianity whether that foundation truth is recognized in its purity or obscured by the shadows of lingering polytheism. This is the root of your dissent from the popular creeds: for this you have borne their scorn, and their denial of Christian fellowship.† Now, since it was the Jews that have all along raised their protest against the Trinitarianism of the Church, they have clearly fought the battle of Christianity against the enemies of her own household. Their "providential mission" must, at all events, have continued until their religious cousins, the Unitarians, took their place.

Now as to the "rejection of Christ." I understand what the phrase means in the mouth of a Catholic or an orthodox Protestant. With these, it is equivalent to rejecting God,

* Is that time passed?

† Dr. Channing's famous sermon, "Unitarian Christianity most favorable to Piety," has for text the very words which still form the chief doctrine of the synagogue: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." "As you would feel the full influence of God upon your soul, guard sacredly, keep unobscured and unsullied that fundamental and glorious truth that there is one, and only one, Almighty Agent in the universe,—one Infinite Father," said the Christian sage, in the spirit of Hebrew prophecy.

and the only chance of saving one's soul alive. But with the liberal, the Unitarian Christian, what does it mean? Jesus preached no new God, never thought of abolishing the Law; nor am I willing to admit (though his biographers make it appear so) that he was so wanting in patriotism, and so deficient in devotion to his people's cause against the foreign oppressor,—that he would have counselled a loosening of the national bonds at a time when nothing but the most determined and concentrated resistance could save both country and religion from the iron grasp of the conqueror. If he was not the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world," if he did not claim to be "a national Messiah,"—that is, a Kossuth or a Bismarck,—then he was a teacher, and no more. Suppose him to be, as is claimed, the greatest and best of all,—what then? Can his "rejection" have the fatal effect of turning the whole course of a people's history from a "providential" to an anti-providential end? He shared the fate of all moralists. Some were made better by him, the generality went their accustomed ways. But I deny that the people ever did reject him. On the showing of the Gospels themselves, he was everywhere received with respect, listened to with attention and delight. He and his disciples were hospitably entertained wherever they appeared. I maintain that the bearing of the Jews toward the Galilean preacher was that of an educated, intelligent, tolerant, and kind-hearted people, trained by their religious teachers to reverence those who expounded the word of God to them. Free speech, says Zunz, had found a home in Palestine. The people, as such, had no share in his tragic fate. Jost, our distinguished historian, denies even that he was sentenced by a properly constituted Synhedrin. If Israel, by his death, suffered a great loss, it was their misfortune, not their guilt. They are as little accountable for the sentences of their courts as for the wild clamor for blood of the rabble in a great city, in times of popular excitement. What the Jews did reject was the deified Jesus of later years,—the Son of God that was before the foundation of the world, the Eternal

Word that was made flesh,—and that they were in duty bound to do: that they did, not in *contravention*, but in *faithful obedience* to their mission.

Let us now listen to Kuenen's summing up of his great work on the religion of Israel. He says: "Christians have much too long, in spite of history, regarded the fall of Jerusalem as a divine retribution for the murder of the Messiah. It is time that the last remnant of that view should disappear." Certainly, for if the fall of Jerusalem is an argument against Judaism, then the death of Jesus is an argument against Christianity; and the deaths of Huss and Servetus and Giordano Bruno, against the freedom of reason and conscience for which they gave their lives.

Kuenen then goes on to say "that the condemnation of the prophet of Nazareth was a powerful protest against Universalism, an energetic assertion of the legal and strictly national principle."

Now, on the subject of Universalism as antagonistic to Jewish nationalism, a great deal is said that seems to me ill-considered and superficial; more like attempts to explain Judaism away, and to find a basis for the opposition of Christianity to it, than an honest, truthful verdict on the evidence of history. One should think that the idea of One God over all could never be otherwise than universal; it all depends upon how many nations are willing or prepared to accept it.

What of separatism there is in a religion that makes that faith its corner-stone appertains to its temporary expression only. The question, how much or how little of it is to be tolerated, at what time it ought to be exchanged for other forms, is one of which those most immediately concerned with the preservation of the central truth are not only the best, but the sole, judges. We, viewing the struggle from so great a distance, unable to realize the agonies of a Jewish heart when the alternatives were placed before it,—law or no law, country or no country, freedom or bondage, Jerusalem or Rome,—find it easy enough to take our side. When shall we learn to practise the simple rules of justice,

to say nothing of gratitude, towards those by whose wounds we were healed?

Wherein, indeed, did Judaism differ from the Church of to-day? Its gates were open to all: proselytes were accepted, converts welcomed,—nay, sought,—as early as the Babylonian captivity; for, in the latter Isaiah, words of encouragement are spoken to them.* That submission to the Jewish Law was demanded was a necessity in a world steeped in idolatry and immorality, as the experience of the Apostle to the Gentiles proves. For we find that, as soon as his controlling presence was withdrawn from his new plantations, they were invaded by vicious practices and obscenities, which the pagans were accustomed to connect with their worship. In looking over the first three or four centuries of the Church, nothing strikes one so much as the helplessness of the professors of the new faith to find a rule of conduct consonant with it; and we know into what extravagances and inhumanities they fell.

Judaism said, "I have a faith and a rule of life, and offer both freely to the Gentiles." Its missionary work was not, however, limited to the actual acceptance of both. A leaven of monotheistic faith permeated society wherever the Jews had settled. Mr. Huidekoper† has proved this, with a commanding array of evidence which would have been made stronger still, had he not, for unaccountable reasons, systematically ignored all Jewish authorities, except Josephus, Philo, and the Sibylline Poems. He further shows that the Jewish influence was enlisted on the liberal side of politics; that the Jews were the mechanics of the empire; and that, wherever they settled in sufficient numbers, a healthier moral tone is distinctly perceptible.

The Jews were on the way to denationalize their monotheism by a natural process, and would have continued it, had their work not been arrested by the ascending power of the Church. They were driven back, first from their outposts, then from their encampments, and had finally to fall back upon their ancient stronghold; and, having no

* Isaiah lvi., 3.

† *Judaism at Rome*. New York: James Miller. 1876.

mind to show the white flag, made it more impregnable than ever.

Christianity has her national churches to this day, with as rigid a government and as iron a discipline as was ever known in Judæa. And what shall we say of the Church of Rome, the mistress of the largest area of Christendom? Is her universalism preferable to that of ancient Hebrew nationalism? The Hebrew constitution had a heart for the stranger, securing for him food, shelter, and raiment, and protection from oppressive legislation.* The keys of St. Peter close the door against him, and consign him to hell-fire. The Talmud teaches, in so many words: the righteous of all nations shall be heirs to the future world. How many churches are there to-day that will subscribe to that? And a righteous Gentile was he who obeyed the so-called seven Noachian commandments, which contain the abjuration of idolatry, and the first principles of morality. Some go so far as to assert that any Gentile who forsakes idols, though he be but darkly feeling after the truth, deserves to be called a Jew. Again I ask: How many Christian churches to-day can boast so much universalism? Kuenen also ventures upon this astounding assertion: "Had the majority of the people been able to take the road indicated by Jesus, perhaps the struggle of life and death might have been prevented." Does he mean that the Jewish nation would have perished ingloriously without it, or that they would have preserved their independence? Let him point to a single instance where the moral and religious elevation of a people released the iron arm of Rome, or influenced her merciless policy of conquest and spoliation. On the contrary, an increase of national strength would have brought on the deadly conflict much sooner. And what was the fate of those who "took the road indicated by Jesus" so fully that they called themselves by his name? Did they live in peace with Rome? And these were people without any political aspirations. Why were they persecuted and martyred?

Kuenen closes his work with these words: "Her religion

* An anathema is pronounced in the Pentateuch against him who "perverteth the judgment of the stranger" (Deut. xxvii., 19).

was to kill Judah. But when the Temple burst into flames, her religion had already spread its wings, and gone out to conquer an entire world."

That is true not for Christianity only, but for Judaism as well. It, too, had long before found refuge in distant lands,—in Egypt, in Babylonia, throughout Asia Minor, all along the Mediterranean coast, the banks of the Rhine, in the heart of Germany,—not to conquer, to be sure, but to suffer for the steadfast and heroic profession of the One God, whom Christianity soon began to materialize and paganize. And yet not only to suffer. The prevailing idea is still that the Jew, during the long and dreary centuries of his persecutions, did nothing but drag along his rabbinical chains, burying his face in the Talmud; that money-making and cursing the Christians were his only occupation. That it was far otherwise must have been the startling discovery of those who read Schleiden's admirable papers on the services rendered by the Jews to science, and, more recently, the learned discussion of Mr. Jacobs, in *The Nineteenth Century*, on the "God of Israel"; or those who have looked at the Bodleian Library and the British Museum, with their thousands of Hebrew works, "the congealed thought" of the Hebrew mind, since the disruption of the national unity. It never ceased to think; it never wearied of searching after the most perfect way of serving God and sanctifying life. Nor was the lyre of Judah silenced. Songs of immortal beauty, in the accents of the prophets and bards of old, swept over its chords. The woes of Israel's heavy heart found vent in tearful elegies, and also indited wild outcries to God for his avenging arm,—blame them who may. Men of towering intellect, graced by the most childlike piety, meet the eye in all centuries, the darkest not excepted; heroes of faith and of thought both, whose fervent word and noble example sustained their brethren in their unparalleled trials. Had it not been so, would the Jew of to-day be what he is? Would he evince that mental vigor and moral healthfulness which enable him to obtain the position he holds in science, literature, art, politics?

Do I then say, Judaism is *the* perfect religion? I confess my inability to understand how any religionist who has looked about him can ever lay this flattering unction to his soul. What, indeed, do we know of other religions? Hardly more than the merest outside. By what process can we look into the soul of a Buddhist, when, wearied with this life, he cries out for Nirvana; or comprehend the rapture with which the faithful Arab approaches the Caaba, and makes his seven circuits, or listens to the exquisite Koran, intelligible only to him, and to no mere philologist? Or how can a Jew feel the awe with which the believing Christian looks up to the thorn-crowned face of his crucified Redeemer? Or how, on the other hand, can the Christian sound the depth of feeling with which the Jew hears the great battle-cry of his race? Was he by the bedside of father and mother who, with that solemn profession, sealed their last blessing, and resigned their spirits into the hands of the Creator? Was his mind filled with pictures of men, women, and children rushing into the flames of the Inquisition, crying the same words into the ears of their tormentors? You must have experienced Christianity to appreciate its grandeur and beauty; but cannot Buddhist, Mohammedan, Jew, say the same?

All religions are the offspring of human needs, and bear in them the imperfections of their origin. They are the products of the strongest and the weakest sides of our nature, and have much to do with that dark spot in our brain of which Goethe speaks, and which the most intrepid philosopher cannot light up. Mine is no exception; but it is best for me. It pleases me best, because it is free and progressive, and takes me right to my God, throws me at his feet, and shows me the merciful face of a father without any intercession of man or angel.

But you may say, Is that the God of the Old Testament? He is fashioned rather in the likeness of an Oriental tyrant than a loving parent,—*ein Donnergott*, as the German Rationalists have surnamed him. Suppose it were true, what of that? The Bible is, with us, the beginning of our belief, not its end; the starting point, not its con-

summation. There it bursts forth in all its primitive freshness and impetuosity, and we go there for our invigoration ; but we do not feel bound to lie down by its side and refuse to draw for our thirst from other wells. But is it true ?

The God of Nature,—does he not thunder, not send forth his lightnings ? Do his storms not uproot forests, and hurl ships to the bottom of the sea, and open the earth to swallow up the dwellers thereon ? All we say of him as “a Father and Friend” are words of faith, but too sadly conflicting with the “lessons from nature.” Do we understand his counsels ? Has the Christian found out more about the hidden things of God than we ? What one does not understand he may call either whim or unfathomable wisdom : faith chooses the latter ; and there is no expression of divine love and mercy, but may be read in the Old Testament as well as in the New, and that is enough for us.

Have we learned nothing from Christianity ? I hope we have. I think we are fully entitled to it, in return for what it received from us. I trust we shall learn yet more. We are ready to receive light from whatever quarter it breaks forth. The relations between mother and daughter have passed through several stages : for a long time there was open warfare ; then, as days grew brighter with the light of humanity, it was changed into armed neutrality ; to this succeeded our present state of a friendly neutrality.

But I, and many with me, long to see it changed into something better still : a cordial fellowship in all things that lead us on toward an increase of light and a more perfect life in goodness and righteousness ; not that we pare down our faiths until they all become alike in their nothingness. We may remain what we are, and yet become better than we are, and achieve more glorious triumphs of love and toleration than have already been achieved. As far as I can see, there is but one body of Christians that has advanced far enough for such a providential mission : it is the Unitarian ; to you then I say, in the words of him who is of my kindred and whom you acknowledge as your master, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.”

THE IDEA OF GOD.

BY REV. JOHN W. ^{White}CHADWICK.

CERTAINLY, it is not with any expectation of satisfying you or myself with what I have to say this morning concerning the highest of all themes, that I venture to approach it, and invite your company. The wisest here, however satisfactory they may be to others, will not be so to themselves. They will be less so in the future than they have been in the past. As knowledge widens with the lapse of time, less and less satisfactory will be men's speech concerning God. Language does not keep pace with thought and feeling. Two or three thousand, and even two or three hundred, years ago, men had but little difficulty in finding words to express all they knew, or thought they knew, about God. Now it is different: the wisest lay a hushing finger on their lips.

"Thought is deeper than all speech,
Feeling deeper than all thought;
Souls to souls can never teach
What unto themselves is taught."

Meantime, the air is thick with talk of atheism, with doleful prophecies and dreadful warnings. With the spread of atheism, we are assured, there will be a fearful moral revolution. Men will seek evil, and pursue it. They have done right so far, because they have felt God's eye to be upon them, or because they have expected to give an account of their actions in another world. Such is the doctrine; and, if it is true to any great extent, it would seem that there must follow some enfeeblement of the moral life. But it may be doubted whether the efficacy of the fear of hell, as "a

hangman's whip to hold the wretch in order," has not, of late, been overrated, and equally the dread of God's omniscience. It may also be doubted whether there is as much real atheism in the community as our terrorists insist. Men are silent, or speak little, because anything they can say seems so inadequate to express the sense of mystery which presses on their hearts. Many who are considered atheists do not consider themselves so, although they may prefer being considered so to having their attitude confounded with that of the majority. What they object to is not so much belief as definition. When Joubert says, "It is not a difficult matter to believe in God, if we are not asked to define him," it is not that he would be at liberty to believe in him as little as possible, but that he would be left free to expand his thought and feeling without bound; because *defined* is *confined*. So, too, when Matthew Arnold says: "We, too, would say God, if the moment we said God you would not pretend that you know all about him." The majority of reputed atheists are men whose thought and feeling about God transcend all ordinary statements, all popular definitions. Henry Thoreau said, "It would seem as if atheism must be comparatively popular with God." Why, but because the so-called atheists are often men who reverence God too much to put their thought or feeling about him into any form of words? It is not to be denied, however, that there are those who not only consider themselves atheists, but wish to be considered so by others, insisting that they have no right to claim immunity from any odium which properly attaches to this designation. But this, in many cases, is only a concession of the right of the majority to determine the significance of words. In others, it is a sort of vanity. In perfect frankness, it must be allowed that there are those in every community who consider atheism something *smart*. The satisfaction which such persons take in their atheism implies the God whom they deny. He must exist, in order that they may have the distinction of saying to him, "Don't flatter yourself: *we* do not believe in you." Their imagination affirms him, in order that their vanity may have the satisfaction of denying him to

his face. But, among earnest, thoughtful men, real atheism is so rare a bird that few have ever seen its raven plumage, or heard the utter melancholy of its cry.

"Man cannot be God's outlaw if he would;
Nor so abscond him in the caves of sense
But nature still shall search some crevice out,
With messages of splendor from that source
Which, dive he, soar he, baffles still, and lures!"

Even the would-be materialist, of the most unqualified stamp, who insists that there is but one substance in the world, and that this one substance is matter, only succeeds in spelling the name of his deity with six letters, instead of three: M-a-t-t-e-r, instead of G-o-d. For, as Tyndall long ago declared, "If life and thought are the very flower of matter, any definition of matter which omits life and thought must be inadequate, if not untrue." "No man has seen God at any time," says the New Testament. And this is just as true of him if you spell his name with six letters as if you spell it with three. No man has seen Matter at any time. What we call matter is in reality "mind-stuff," argues the late Prof. Clifford. Emerson is hardly less God-intoxicated than Spinoza; and yet his saying, "The divinity is in the atoms," is only a more poetic and impressive form of Büchner's suicidal confession that matter, as such, has "a tendency to combine."

The silence of some men concerning God seems to me vastly more reverent than the garrulity of others. Here a nameless thought, and there a multitude of words. Thoreau's idea about atheism being comparatively popular with God was also Plutarch's, who expressed it with greater fullness. "I, for my own part," he said, "had much rather men should say that there is not, and never was, any such person as Plutarch, than that they should say Plutarch is an unsteady, fickle, froward, vindictive, and touchy fellow." And so he inferred that God would rather have men deny his existence, than speak of him as unsteady, fickle, and so on. But, then, Plutarch was a pagan, and had pagan deities* in

* As libellous caricatures of the one God of his philosophy.

mind. Christians would not, perhaps, be open to such criticism. Do they ever represent their God as unsteady, fickle, or vindictive? But Plutarch's simile assumes that God is not the actual of the popular ideal. Were he the actual of Calvin's, I can fancy he would still appreciate the refusal of a man to believe him to be this, at its just value, even as a mortal man, although a conscious knave, would still appreciate a neighbor's misplaced confidence in his veracity and honor. Meantime is there not more of real reverence in these six lines of Goethe than in all the creeds of all the sects? —

"Him who dare name
And yet proclaim,
Yes, I believe?
Who that can feel
His heart can steel
To say, I disbelieve?"

"Can man by searching find out God?" asks the Old Testament; and the New Testament of Modern Science repeats the question with an accent of yet deeper sadness. But our case is not so pitiful as it would be if God did not find *us* out, whether we search for him or not. The most that all our searching does is generally to find, not God, but some excuse or reason for the ineradicable faith in him, which is implanted in the most of us so deeply that I do not wonder that many have mistaken it for a primitive datum of consciousness. I doubt if any man ever consciously argued himself, or was argued, into any real faith in God,—into aught more than some skin-deep belief in him. Faith in God is literally "the faith that is in us." How came it there? By supernatural revelation, shall we say? But revelation presupposes a revealer. Faith in a revelation presupposes faith in God. For the message to be sent, there must be a sender. For the message to be completely trusted, it must be impossible for God to lie. Thus, antecedent to all revelation, we must have the assurance of a veracious God. Moreover, with the advance of knowledge, it becomes more and more unlikely that there has ever been any such thing as supernatural revelation. The genesis of the belief, common to all religions, is easily accounted for

without the intervention of a single supernatural fact. The argument of Hume, "It is more likely that evidence should be false than 'that a miracle should be true,'" has never yet been proved fallacious, and grows in strength as men more clearly recognize that evidence, in order to be false, need not be consciously so. To evade the force of this argument by admitting that the miracle is natural is to discharge the miracle of all authoritative significance. It must be supernatural, in order to be invested with a divine authority. But, if "the faith which is in us"—in the most of us, surely—did not come by revelation, how does it come? A very common answer is, By intuition. But what is an intuition? A necessary truth, answers the transcendentalist,—a necessary truth, perceived by the reason without any assistance from the understanding. But intuitions of this sort do not enjoy the high repute to-day which they did formerly. It begins to be doubted whether there are any such intuitions; whether the mind can be split up into reason and understanding, or, at least, whether—to parody a saying of Herbert Spencer's, "Expression is feature in the making"—the understanding is not reason in the making. The philosophy of experience inclines to the opinion that even "necessary truths" are discovered to be such by observation and experiment and reflection, that they do not inhere in mind as such. This philosophy also talks of intuitions, but its intuitions are not like those of the transcendentalist,—a kind of *super-rational* revelation, privately communicated to each individual soul. They are the products of ancestral and race-experience organized in us. Let us proceed upon this understanding.

Our faith in God, then, is an intuition,—the flower of an hereditary experience, whose roots are buried in an immemorial past. Thanks for its beauty and its fragrance, as it opens in the hushed seclusions of our hearts! But, evidently, an intuition of this sort, a product of inherited experience, can have no such authority as would the intuition of the transcendentalist, if this were all which it was formerly conceived to be. Some, indeed, may be so constituted that they

can enjoy the great inheritance on which they enter here, without ever thinking or wondering how it came to them, and whether it is lawfully theirs. The majority are, in fact, so constituted. But there are not a few who, once they know that the faith which is in them is no supernatural gift, no organic necessity, but an inheritance from the past, must set about to find the title-deeds, must know, if possible, how the estate was earned,—what work was done, what battles fought, before it was entailed to them. This is the meaning of a world of patient study, in these latter days, into the origin and development of men's religious ideas. Tylor and Spencer and Coulange and Lubbock and the rest, what are they but patient searchers of our title-deeds, in order that we may know whether our right is indefeasible in this estate of faith in God which has come down to us from immemorial times? Honor to those who, finding themselves unable to make out their title to their own satisfaction, vacate the premises; albeit, for them to do so is to go forth, like Abraham, not knowing whither. For such, also, believe me, there is "a city that hath foundations." But happy they who dare believe that their inheritance, however dubious the title of their remotest ancestors, has in the course of centuries been fairly earned; and that, when superstition's every lien upon it has been discharged, it will still be ample for the free soul to revel and rejoice in, without fear of any interdict of science or any challenge that the lords of reason can oppose to her possession.

It cannot be denied that an element of unreality enters very largely into the primitive idea of God, if the genesis of this idea has been correctly made out by the most learned anthropologists and sociologists. There are those who think that, when the genesis of this idea has been shown to be involved in misconceptions almost innumerable, the idea has itself been relegated to the sphere of childish superstition. If the phenomena of sleep and trance first suggested to mankind the idea of "an inner man,"—a soul; if the analogy of sleep and death suggested that the soul was still alive when its "last sleep" had settled on the body; if the ances-

tral ghosts thus arrived at, from being at first regarded as mere human ghosts to be invoked, placated, and so on, came at length to be regarded as gods, the ghost-food passing over into sacrifice, the invocations into prayers; if, further on, stones and trees, then clouds, and heat and cold, and wind, and sun and moon and stars,—all came to be regarded as the seats of ghostly power; if this is a correct interpretation of the phenomena of primitive religion, does not the idea of God engendered in this ghostly atmosphere become itself as “thin as a ghost”? How from the midst of so much unreality could ever come, by any legitimate process, the idea of that Supreme Reality which we of modern times mean to suggest, as often as we speak of God?

My answer is that, if the beginning of the God-idea was such as I have tried to indicate,—and I believe that it was so,—we ought not to confound the essence of the feeling out of which it came with the irrational psychology with which it was associated. The essence of the feeling was a sense of the mysteriousness of human life. That which oppressed the primitive man with awe and wonder was essentially the same face before which our latest science stands abashed,—the connection between mind and body. It was the mystery attaching to the thought of ghostly ancestors, peopling the forest-haunts with shadowy denizens, that made it possible for the sentiment of worship to go out to them from the poor savage heart; and, however trivial the psychology, the mystery was real enough: so that to say that the first step in the evolution of the God-idea was unreal is to mistake its formal accident for its essential character. And so, further along, grant that the indwelling life ascribed to tree or stone, which constituted these objects fetiches, or to sun and moon and stars in the next stage, which we call nature-worship; grant that this indwelling life was made up to the imagination of the savage of one or more of the great company of ghosts which, by this time, had quite forgotten, as it were, their human relations,—the fact remains that, antecedent to this theory of ghostly life, there must have been the sense of life to be accounted for. What

the savage did was to account for it by the only life with which he felt himself to be acquainted. His intentions were excellent. He thought he was proceeding from the known to the unknown. In the strictest sense, it may be said that the god-idea was not fairly born until the world of ghosts had gradually become a vast mysterious realm of life, an incalculable store of energy on which the savage mind could draw in order to account for any natural phenomenon that appealed to it for a solution of the mystery of its seeming life. The key of his position, meanwhile, was his sense of seeming life to be accounted for. The god he really worshipped was this seeming life. His ghostly explanation was, no doubt, entirely insufficient. But it was not his explanation that he worshipped. It was the seeming life which he endeavored to explain.

The next step beyond nature-worship in the development of the God-idea was polytheism; the worship of many gods, not in objective forms as in fetichism and nature-worship, but as imaginary beings, whose genesis is to be accounted for in various ways. As the phenomena of nature and society were rudely classified, a single spirit was imagined as the controlling deity of each separate class. The choice of this deity was variously determined. "To him that hath shall be given," was a controlling principle. As the big fish eat up the little ones, so the big gods devoured their smaller rivals. The favorite gods of nature-worship became the gods of polytheism, to the exclusion of their less significant companions. Another source of income to the polytheistic pantheon was the apotheosis of distinguished chiefs, warriors, medicine-men, and so on, for whom the attributes of the nature myths had a remarkable affinity. But in this polytheistic stage of the god-idea the noticeable thing is this, that what was really worshipped was the hidden life, which was the background of phenomenal existence. The gods of polytheism were but so many explanations of this life, then the most reasonable that could be had. But the real object of worship was the hidden life; the Power that made the trees wave and the waters flow, the sun and moon and

stars to shine, the earth to rise out of her wintry grave clad in the spring-time beauty. The only unreality was in the explanation. The mystery which polytheism endeavored to explain was *a bona fide mystery*. It might well make men's hearts tremble with fear or swell with rapture, or dilate with joy.

From polytheism, the worship of many gods, to monotheism, the worship of one, was the next step in the development of the god-idea. Here also the principle, "To him that hath shall be given," had, no doubt, great influence. The favorite god tended to be the only one, little by little crowding the others from their thrones. Different tribes had different favorites, and the strongest tribe demanded exclusive worship for its deity, and was able to enforce the claim. Natural selection operated here as in the physical world. There was a struggle for existence, and a preservation of the fittest; the fittest here not necessarily meaning the best, but, as often in the physical world, only the strongest, the ablest to survive. Midway between polytheism and monotheism we have monolatry, the exclusive worship of one deity without denying the existence of others. But gods not worshipped cease to be regarded as realities. The god exclusively worshipped tends to be the only god to whom existence is allowed. And hence a monotheistic god-idea.

At this stage of development, as at every earlier, it must be admitted that there are elements of unreality involved in every step of the advance. But here again, as at every previous stage, the unreality was in the explanation, not in the thing explained. The real object of worship here, as before, was the mystery of life behind phenomena. The dawning sense of unity in these, the beginning of all science and philosophy, suggested the unity of the underlying mystery. I grant you that the monotheistic god was at first dreadfully anthropomorphic: "a non-natural man," "a man of war"; to the Semite a Bedouin Sheik at first, and then a king,—the earthly monarchy always tending to produce a heavenly counterpart in human thought. But, again, the

noticeable thing is that the real object of awe and wonder and worship was not the man-like deity, — that he was not revered and worshipped for his man-likeness, — but as the mysterious Power adequate to produce the world of nature and humanity. The man-likeness was a necessity of childish thought, of undevelopment, of survival in culture; but it could not successfully impeach the reality of the Mysterious Power of which it was the concrete symbol, nor the reality of the worship honestly accorded to this Power.

With the development of monotheism, the god-idea reaches its highest point of evolution, except as this idea, once generated, is capable of indefinite purification. And the most notable feature in this process is the transference of man's awe and wonder from the exceptional in his experience to the regular and orderly. From the lowest fetich-worshipper up to the average Christian monotheist of this nineteenth century, the most potent suggestions of deity have come from the apparently exceptional and abnormal. The disposition of the untutored savage to choose for his fetich the most grotesque object — tree or stone — that he can find is absolutely identical with the disposition of the cultured modern Christian to seek for God in some miraculous interposition rather than in the invariable order of the world, "staring with wonder to see water turned into wine, and heedless of the stupendous fact of his own personality." So pertinacious has been the resolution of the religious world to find God only in the apparently abnormal and inconsequent, that, by force of association, it came at length to be regarded as an axiom that, if God is not a sort of "Prince of misrule," then he is nothing. Parallel with the development of religion for hundreds of years, there has been a development of science. But the tendency of science has been to everywhere dissipate the wonder inhering in the apparently abnormal and inconsequent by including it in its generalizations of law and order. Sure of his axiom, "The more law, the less God," the religionist has contemplated this process with unqualified dismay. Province after province has been wrested from the domain of personal agency

and annexed to the domain of law, till it has seemed only a question of time whether every vestige of the Deity would not finally be expelled from the universe. But while, little by little, the old sense of mystery, inhering in the apparently exceptional and abnormal, has been going out, a new sense of mystery, slowly but surely, has been coming in, — a sense of mystery inhering in the uniformities of natural phenomena. The more law, the more God, — the more mystery, wonder, awe and trust, — has been the growing conviction which has kept pace with this development. "As fast as science transfers more and more things from the category of irregularities to the category of regularities, the mystery that once attached to the superstitious explanation of them becomes a mystery attaching to the scientific explanation of them; there is a merging of many special mysteries in one general mystery."* "So that," says Herbert Spencer, "beginning with the germinal idea of mystery which the savage gets from a display of [anomalous] power, . . . and the germinal sentiment of awe accompanying it, the progress is towards an ultimate recognition of a mystery behind every act and appearance, and a transfer of the awe from something special and occasional to something universal and unceasing"; which something is the infinite God of scientific faith.

If now I have accomplished my purpose, I have made it plain that no unreality attaching to the earliest development of religion, or to any subsequent stage, has prejudiced the value of the god-idea in its present form, or indeed in any form it has assumed from the beginning of its long and painful march from puerile animism up to the glorious consciousness of One who,

be he what he may,
Is yet the fountain light of all our day,
Is yet the master-light of all our seeing.†

This has been proved by showing that, at every stage, a *bonâ fide* mystery has been involved in the idea; and that the real object of awe and reverence and worship has been this mys-

* Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, p. 310.

† Adapted from Wordsworth's "Ode on Immortality."

tery, and not the explanation of it, varying with every stage of culture.

How then? Do I erect an altar "to the unknown God," and bid you come and worship? I answer Yes and No. "Unknown and yet well known" is a Pauline phrase with which we may complement the inscription which the apostle found on the Athenian altar: *Unknown and yet well known!* "The Sum of the Unknown" has been suggested as the best possible definition of God, a definition which neither defines nor confines. Such a definition would indefinitely postpone the advent of atheism; for, though "the sum of the unknown" is being steadily abridged by the discoveries of science, there is no immediate danger of its being wholly conquered and annexed to the domain of knowledge. And then, too, while "the sum of the unknown" is always growing smaller, it is always growing larger to our apprehension. The more we know, the better do we realize what realms of mystery still unexplored challenge our patience and our courage. But, remote as is the possibility, I do not relish the idea that, if we could know everything, we could write God's epitaph; that the increase of knowledge is a gradual elimination of the unknown quantity, God, from the equation of our thought and feeling. Moreover, the unknown which has elicited the awe and reverence of men's hearts has never been a simple negative. It has been wonderful to them, and awful and reverent as the mysterious background of something known or felt to be so. And, with the advance of science, what makes the ever vaster amplitude of the unknown so quickening to our awe, our gladness, and our trust, is that the little we do know is so wonderful, so marvellous; and we proceed to people all the vast unknown with the benignant forms and forces which have been openly revealed to us. It is as when I stand upon the rocky headlands of my native shore, and look out upon that "glorious mirror, where the Almighty's form glasses itself in tempests."

"Eastward as far as the eye can see,
Eastward, eastward, endlessly,
The sparkle and tremor of purple sea."

Surely what fills me with a joy so keen that it is almost pain is not alone the flashing tumult of the great expanse of waters: it is also that, beyond where sky and water meet, with my mind's eye I see the mighty ocean reaching on and on, and beautiful with the same unspeakable beauty as the little space that lies within my field of vision. It is the beauty of the known that makes the beauty of the unknown so sure and so entrancing. And just as surely my soul's "normal delight in the infinite God" is not produced by any purely negative unknown. No more is it by any positive known. No; but by my warrantable conviction that all the infinite unknown is equally with the little territory which I know the haunt of nameless beauty, order, symmetry, and law. And so to those among us, and they are not few, who are endeavoring to convince us that a purely negative mystery, an absolute unknown, is adequate to all the functions of a God whom we may reverence and adore, I answer in the words of England's greatest living theologian:—

Far be it from us to deal lightly with the sense of mystery. It mingles largely with all devout apprehension, and is the great redeeming power that purifies the intellect of its egotism and the heart of its pride. But you cannot constitute a religion out of mystery alone, any more than out of knowledge alone, nor can you measure the relation of doctrines to humility and piety by the mere amount of conscious darkness that they leave. All worship, being directed to what is above us and transcends our comprehension, stands in the presence of a mystery. But not all that stands before a mystery is worship. The abyss must not be one of total gloom—of neutral possibilities—of hidden glories or hidden horrors, we know not which. . . . Such a pit of indeterminate contingencies will bend no head, and melt no eye that may turn to it. Some rays of clear light must escape from it, some visions of solemn beauty gleam within it, ere the darkness itself can be "visible" enough to deliver its awfulness upon the soul. . . . To fling us into bottomless negation is to drown us in mystery and leave us dead. True reverence can breathe and see, only on condition of some alternation of light and darkness, of inner silence and a stir of "upper air."

Nor is there any thing in the necessities of the most rigid scientific thought which violates this condition, which precludes this happy alternation. "Though-unknown, yet well known." Is he not this,—the god of scientific apprehension? In any scientific sense, it must be granted that in himself he is unknown, unknowable, and must remain so.

always. But until I can know some one thing in the universe *in itself*, be that thing clod of earth or soul of man, I will not fret because I cannot know in itself the Infinite and Everlasting One. For what does my ignorance signify but that an unmanifested infinite can never be found out, that an everlasting silence would be totally inaudible. "Vapid words," we say with Martineau, "in a universe full of visions and of voices."

Meanwhile, though I acknowledge, unreservedly, that the unspeakable majesty is in itself unknown, I insist that our ignorance should not, cannot be interpreted as describing absolute nonentity of perception and apprehension. Our very ignorance affirms the existence of an incomprehensible substance of which the phenomenal universe is the perpetual manifestation. Our knowledge of God is of exactly the same nature as our knowledge of our neighbors and ourselves. We know him by the manifestations of his inscrutable life. If we are not so garrulous as men were formerly about his attributes, we know a great deal more about his laws, the habits of his infinite life. What he determined in the most secret counsels of the Trinity before the beginning of time, the Calvins and the Edwardses have sufficiently discussed ; and all who care for their results are welcome to embrace them. What we are sure of is that the unseen power was adequate to the production of this universe, such as it is. He has put himself into his world as painters sometimes put themselves into their pictures ; not by painting himself, like Raphael, in a corner, but by expressing his stupendous energy in every part. As much as we know of the universe, so much we know of God. Truly it is not much in comparison with what we do not know. "Lo, these are parts of his ways, but how little is yet known of him." And yet, though relatively little, absolutely much, and more with every new discovery of any fact or law. Now, indeed, for the first time Theology makes good her boast, *Scientia scientiarum*, the science of sciences ; but not in the old sense of being superior to all others ; rather in the sense of including all others. Henceforth all other sciences are fragments

of theology; for all of them are busy with the manifestations of the one eternal substance in which all phenomena inhere.

Modern science is unitarian, monotheistic, as never was the creed of Moses or Mohammed. She teaches us that all these nerves whose play upon the surface of the universe irradiate it with such various expression go back into one central ganglion, and evermore report its perfect sanity. From all the peaks, from all the depths and heights, the different forms and forces of the world are signalling across to one another with fraternal salutations. A thousand and ten thousand various lines of force run back into one central stream whose ceaseless energy supplies them all. What was the wonder of that old *homöousion*, one substance of the Son and Father, a barren abstraction, to this *homoiousion*, like substance of all worlds, which modern astronomy has proved? From every quarter comes the news of this same unity and sympathy and harmony in the make of things. "It thunders all around." A universal solidarity bespeaks a central and abiding oneness at the heart of things.

"That one face does not vanish; rather grows;
Or decomposes but to recompose,
Become my universe that feels and knows."

But *does* it feel and know? Whether the infinite power, the infinite life, the infinite One, is personal or impersonal, is one of the questions about which those who are least qualified to speak are generally the most voluble. Can any one of them tell us what personality is? And, till they can, what right have they to say, "God cannot be a person," or "A god who is not personal is no god at all." The first use of this word "person" was to designate one *per-sonating*, sounding through a mask the dramatic situations of some poet's verse. And as in the great amphitheatre at Athens the person and poet were sometimes the same,—even Sophocles speaking from behind the mask his own majestic words,—so always in this amphitheatre whose circle is the circle of the universe, whose "centre is everywhere, whose

circumference nowhere," the person and the poet are one: it is his own poem, neither tragedy nor comedy, but an epic which includes them both, and many a lyric passage of sweetness unimaginable till heard, that the Infinite recites, less, it may be, for our delight, than because irresistibly self-stirred to self-expression. But, I am well aware, the sticklers for personality will not be put off with any such metaphor as this. If only we could all agree upon the meaning of personality, there might be less divergence in our thought than there is now. With some, a person is an individual, a local deity. Such expect to see God when they die, and to recognize him by his resemblance to the conventional portraiture of Jesus, unaware that this is based upon an antique bust of Plato, which for a long time was supposed to be a bust of Christ. Many who declare that they do not believe in a personal god mean little more than that they do not believe in any such individual god as this, in any localized deity. But many who insist that God is personal are far enough from this pathetic puerility. What they mean by personality is conscious mind, or simply mind. The new psychology is making it a little easier for us to conceive of personality, in this sense, as universally diffused. It refuses to locate the thinking apparatus solely in the brain. Rather every part of us seems to think, or, at least, to be concerned in thinking.

"Her pure and eloquent blood
Spoke in her cheeks, and so distinctly wrought
That one might almost say her body thought."

So it becomes a little easier to conceive of infinite mind, of infinite thought and will, not here or there, but all-pervading, as logically but not locally central, as they are with us. In this sense, shall we then say that God is personal? or shall we rather say that mind and thought and will and love, all personal words, are the least inadequate symbols that we have, or can have, of the Infinite Power, and try, always, to remember that they are symbols, not exact expressions for that which cannot be expressed? "God's thoughts

are not our thoughts; neither are his ways our ways." That is a real prophetic word,—prophetic of our wisest modern thought. Only let us not forget what follows: "For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his thoughts *higher* than our thoughts, and his ways than our ways." There are those who seem to think that to deny personality to God is to assert that he is something less than personal. And with the materialist, if there be any such, who really imagines that out of mere dead matter, without any God-like energy behind it, came this sublime and awful universe, the denial of personality to God may be to affirm that he is something less than personal. But this sort of a materialist is hard to find. He has only a verbal existence. My friend assures me we are looking up over our heads for an explanation which we should look for down under our feet. But no. If matter is the ultimate reality, then matter is not down under our feet, but up over our heads. The less does not produce the greater. There is an infinite element involved in every step of evolution. The ascending series can be accounted for only by supposing a higher than its highest, antecedent to its lowest term. But to deny personality to God is not necessarily to affirm that he is something less than personal. It may be to affirm that he is infinitely more. There are those who think the Infinite altogether such a one as themselves, as Caliban his "dam's god, Setebos"; and such regard with pity and contempt, because they cannot say that God is personal, men who have each one of them religion enough to set up a whole army of their assailants. But there are those who cannot say that God is personal, because they dare not apply to the Eternal the limitations of our human personality. Not because they conceive of God as less than personal, but because they conceive of him as infinitely more, do they decline to call him so. If they were sure their words would be accepted as symbolical, then they might say, as I do, that personality is a far better symbol than impersonality of the inexpressible fact. But I should do injustice to those who contend most wisely and acutely for the idea of infinite personality, if I did not make haste

to say that it is possible for these as well as for their opponents to affirm that God is more than personal. To affirm personality is not necessarily to affirm that this designation is exhaustive of the fulness of the infinite life. It is only to affirm that there are manifestations of this life which compel this designation, in the absence of a better. There may at the same time be other manifestations, incalculably vast, which demand either a different designation or that silence which is golden. This should not be forgotten. It is too often by those who refuse to speak of God as personal because he is to them more than personal. He may be more than personal to those who affirm his personality with the utmost confidence.

The idea of consciousness as included in the idea of personality is often felt, on the one hand, to be the greatest stumbling-block, and, on the other, the most absolute desideratum. In the latter case, is not the tendency conspicuous to make God "altogether such an one as ourselves"? Yet though I do not see that the alternative of consciousness is "a blind force," that bugbear of the popular theology, one thing, at least, is certain,—that the non-ability to scientifically discover consciousness in the universe is no sign it is not there, nor even a hint that it is not. We are so sure of nothing else as of our own consciousness, and yet what scientific evidence have we of its existence? Not a particle. The saying of Lawrence, that his scalpel found no soul in the brain, has been thought by would-be atheists a confirmation of Laplace's saying, that his telescope, scanning the whole heavens, found no trace of God. In fact, it negatives it altogether. If the scalpel had found a soul, we might perhaps expect the telescope to find a God. The fact that it has not, while still we know that it exists, establishes a vast presumption in favor of a universal mind. But if an infinite mind, says Du Bois-Reymond, then too an infinite brain. Well, one of the atomic philosophers has said that, if we could see the dance of atoms, it would be not unlike the dance of constellations. Whereupon Mr. Martineau turns round upon Reymond, and says: "If the structure

and movement of atoms do but repeat in little those of the heavens, what hinders us from inverting the analogy, and saying that the ordered heavens repeat the rhythm of the cerebral particles? You need an embodied mind? Lift up your eyes and look upon the arch of night as the brow of the Eternal, its constellations as the molecules of the universal consciousness and its ethereal waves as media of omniscient thought." As an *argumentum ad hominem*, this could not be better; but Mr. Martineau knows as well as anybody that, once sure of such a cosmic brain, the philosophers would immediately attribute it to "some cosmic megatherium," not to the great first cause. Doubtless, if this is conscious, its consciousness, like gravitation, reports itself at every point, and is not central, but ubiquitous. Enough that infinite consciousness can never be disproved, and that, if there be no such consciousness, then there is something better; for this I hold to be self-evident, that no idea of the infinite can emerge in us more perfect than it actually is, because the less cannot produce a greater than itself in thought or fact.

If it could be generally understood that the language of religion is not scientific, but poetical, we might freely make use of various expressions which now it seems almost our duty to avoid: we might, for example, speak of the creation of the world, and of God as the Creator, as naturally as we now speak of the sun's rising and setting, although we know our words entirely fail to represent the fact. "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." Then the beginning is not over yet, for he is still at work upon his world. The old doctrine of creation pictured an eternal being, dwelling in loneliness until about six thousand years ago, when suddenly he awoke and became active, created matter out of nothing, and the universe out of matter, and then relapsed again into quiescence. Harried by geologist and astronomer, the expounders of this scheme agreed to interpret liberally the six days of creation, and put back the beginning to some infinitely distant past. But no such concession can relieve the scheme of its essential incoherence

and absurdity. Philosophy opposes its incorrigible *ex nihilo nihil*,—nothing from nothing; and science brings a thousand arguments to prove the indestructibility and consequent eternity of matter. The conception of matter as a “datum objective to God,” a finite substance lying over against his infinite, is inconceivably absurd. It but remains for us to consider the material universe as in no sense foreign to God.

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole;
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.”

If this is Pantheism, it is no worse for being so. For, in one form or another, Pantheism has always been the doctrine of the most religious souls. The idea of a mechanical Creator coalesces at no single point with this conception. He was supposed to be outside the universe, working upon it like a watchmaker at work upon a watch. But the watch proves to be so big that there is no room outside of it, no outer darkness. “This thing was not done in a corner.”

“God dwells in all, and moves the world, and moulds,
Himself and Nature in one form enfolds.”

This is the new doctrine of creation. Only it is not creation. It is evolution. God is no builder, no architect, no infinite mechanician. A rose upon its stem in June is a more adequate symbol of his unfolding life than any Christopher Wren or Michel Angelo. From within outwards, not from without inwards, is the procession of the Holy Spirit.

“The flower horizons open,
The blossom vaster shows,
We hear the wide worlds echo,
‘See how the lily grows!’”

Friends, I have kept you long; and still there are a hundred things to say. But they will keep against another time and for a better man. The one thing I have tried to do this morning is to clear the god-idea of that appearance of unreality which attaches to its earliest forms; to show you that at every step the unreality inhered not in the essence, but in the accidents of the idea; to show you that, as it has come

down to us, it is no mere survival of an ancient superstition, but the legitimate product of men's enraptured recognition of the mysterious Power which manifests itself in all the marvellous uniformities of universal nature and life. Further than this, I have endeavored to turn a ray of light on some of the more prominent questions which are engaging the attention of the most thoughtful persons of our time; to show you that a purely negative mystery is by no means equal to the proper function of the god-idea, that it can rightfully demand no reverence, inspire no sacred awe, beget no holy trust; and, finally, to suggest that even such shibboleths as "personality" and "creation" can be pronounced shibboleth, or remain quite unspoken, and the protesting mind still entertain the god-idea in a more worthy form than that of its conventional exponents. But, after all that has been said, how infinitesimal it seems in contrast with the supreme idea it has sought to honor. O God, we thank thee that our joy and peace and satisfaction and delight in thee are not dependent on our ability to speak of thee aright; that deeper than all speech, all thought, the sense abides in us of thy ineffable mystery, thy glorious power, thy steadfast law, thine everlasting faithfulness, thy constant presence, and thy perfect love!

"Thy voice is on the rolling air,
I hear thee where the waters run,
Thou standest in the rising sun,
And in the setting thou art fair.

"What art thou, then? I cannot guess;
But, though I seem in star and flower
To feel the same diffusive power,
I do not therefore love thee less.

"Far off thou art, but ever nigh;
I have thee still, and I rejoice;
I prosper, circled by thy voice;
I shall not lose thee, though I die."

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL:

EXTERNAL EVIDENCES.

BY PROF. EZRA ABBOT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE problem of the Fourth Gospel — that is, the question of its authorship and historical value — requires for its complete solution a consideration of many collateral questions which are still in debate. Until these are gradually disposed of by thorough investigation and discussion, we can hardly hope for a general agreement on the main question at issue. Such an agreement among scholars certainly does not at present exist. Since the "epoch-making" essay (to borrow a favorite phrase of the Germans) of Ferdinand Christian Baur, in the *Theologische Jahrbücher* for 1844, there has indeed been much shifting of ground on the part of the opponents of the genuineness of the Gospel; but among scholars of equal learning and ability, as Hilgenfeld, Keim, Scholten, Hausrath, Renan, on the one hand, and Godet, Beyschlag, Luthardt, Weiss, Lightfoot, on the other, opinions are yet divided, with a tendency, at least in Germany, toward the denial of its genuineness. Still, some of these collateral questions of which I have spoken seem to be approaching a settlement. I may notice first one of the most important, the question whether the relation of the Apostle John to Jewish Christianity was not such that it is impossible to suppose the Fourth Gospel to have proceeded from him, even at a late period of his life. This is a fundamental postulate of the theory of the Tübingen School, in regard to

* Read, in part, before the "Ministers' Institute," at Providence, R. I., Oct. 23, 1879.

the opposition of Paul to the three great Apostles, Peter, James, and John. The Apostle John, they say, wrote the Apocalypse, the most Jewish of all the books of the New Testament; but he could not have written the anti-Judaic Gospel. Recognizing most fully the great service which Baur and his followers have rendered to the history of primitive Christianity by their bold and searching investigations, I think it may be said that there is a wide-spread and deepening conviction among fair-minded scholars that the theory of the Tübingen School, in the form in which it has been presented by the coryphæi of the party, as Baur, Schwegler, Zeller, is an extreme view, resting largely on a false interpretation of many passages of the New Testament, and a false view of many early Christian writings. Matthew Arnold's protest against the excessive "vigour and rigour" of the Tübingen theories brings a good deal of plain English common-sense to bear on the subject, and exposes well some of the extravagances of Baur and others.* Still more weight is to be attached to the emphatic dissent of such an able and thoroughly independent scholar as Dr. James Donaldson, the author of the *Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine*, a work unhappily unfinished. But very significant is the remarkable article of Keim on the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem, in his latest work, *Aus dem Urchristenthum* ("Studies in the History of Early Christianity"), published in 1878, a short time before his lamented death. In this able essay, he demolishes the foundation of the Tübingen theory, vindicating in the main the historical character of the account in the Acts, and exposing the misinterpretation of the passage in the Epistle to the Galatians, on which Baur and his followers found their view of the absolute contradiction between the Acts and the Epistle. Holtzmann, Lipsius, Pfeiderer, and especially Weizsäcker had already gone far in modifying the extreme view of Baur; but this essay of Keim's is a re-examination of the whole question with reference to all the recent discussions. The still later work of Schenkel,

* See his *God and the Bible*, Preface, and chaps. v., vi.

published during the present year (1879), *Das Christusbild der Apostel und der nachapostolischen Zeit* ("The Picture of Christ presented by the Apostles and by the Post-Apostolic Time"), is another conspicuous example of the same reaction. Schenkel remarks in the Preface to this volume:—

Having never been able to convince myself of the sheer opposition between Petrinism and Paulinism, it has also never been possible for me to get a credible conception of a reconciliation effected by means of a literature sailing between the contending parties under false colors. In respect to the Acts of the Apostles, in particular, I have been led in part to different results from those represented by the modern critical school. I have been forced to the conviction that it is a far more trustworthy source of information than is commonly allowed on the part of the modern criticism; that older documents worthy of credit, besides the well-known *We*-source, are contained in it; and that the Paulinist who composed it has not intentionally distorted (*entstellt*) the facts, but only placed them in the light in which they appeared to him and must have appeared to him from the time and circumstances under which he wrote. He has not, in my opinion, artificially brought upon the stage either a Paulinized Peter, or a Petrinized Paul, in order to mislead his readers, but has portrayed the two apostles just as he actually conceived of them on the basis of his incomplete information. (Preface, pp. x., xi.)

It would be hard to find two writers more thoroughly independent, whatever else may be said of them, than Keim and Schenkel. Considering their well-known position, they will hardly be stigmatized as "apologists" in the contemptuous sense in which that term is used by some recent writers, who seem to imagine that they display their freedom from partisan bias by giving their opponents bad names. On this subject of the one-sidedness of the Tübingen School, I might also refer to the very valuable remarks of Professor Fisher in his recent work on *The Beginnings of Christianity*, and in his earlier volume on *The Supernatural Origin of Christianity*. One of the ablest discussions of the question will also be found in the Essay on "St. Paul and the Three," appended to the commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, by Professor Lightfoot, now Bishop of Durham, a scholar who has no superior among the Germans in breadth of learning and thoroughness of research. The dissertation of Professor

Jowett on "St. Paul and the Twelve," though not very definite in its conclusions, also deserves perusal.*

In regard to this collateral question, then, I conceive that decided progress has been made in a direction favorable to the possibility (to put it mildly) of the Johannean authorship of the Fourth Gospel. We do not know anything concerning the theological position of the Apostle John, which justifies us in assuming that twenty years after the destruction of Jerusalem he could not have written such a work.

Another of these collateral questions, on which a vast amount has been written, and on which very confident and very untenable assertions have been made, may now, I believe, be regarded as set at rest, so far as concerns our present subject, the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. I refer to the history of the Paschal controversies of the second century. The thorough discussion of this subject by Schürer, formerly Professor Extraordinarius at Leipzig, and now Professor at Giessen, the editor of the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, and author of the excellent *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte*, has clearly shown, I believe, that no argument against the Johannean authorship of the Fourth Gospel can be drawn from the entangled history of these controversies. His essay, in which the whole previous literature of the subject is carefully reviewed, and all the original sources critically examined, was published in Latin at Leipzig in 1869 under the title *De Controversiis Paschalibus secundo post Christum natum Saeculo exortis*, and afterwards in a German translation in Kahn's *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie* for 1870, pp. 182-284. There is, according to him, absolutely *no* evidence that the Apostle John celebrated Easter with the Quartodecimans on the 14th of Nisan in commemoration, as is so often assumed, of the day of the *Lord's Supper*. The choice of the day had no reference

* In his work on *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans*, 2d ed. (London, 1859), i. 417-477; reprinted in a less complete form from the first edition in Noyes's *Theol. Essays* (1856), p. 357 ff. The very judicious remarks of Mr. Norton on the difference between Paul and the other Apostles, and between the Jewish and Gentile Christians, in his article on the "Authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews," in the *Christian Examiner* for May, 1829, vol. vi. p. 200 ff., are still worth reading.

to that event, nor on the other hand, as Weitzel and Steitz maintain, to the supposed day of Christ's death, but was determined by the fact that the 14th was the day of the Jewish Passover, for which the Christian festival was substituted. The celebration was Christian, but the *day* adopted by John and the Christians of Asia Minor generally was the *day* of the Jewish Passover, the 14th of Nisan, on whatever day of the week it might fall, while the Western Christians generally, without regard to the day of the month, celebrated Easter on Sunday, in commemoration of the day of the resurrection. This is the view essentially of Lücke, Gieseler, Bleek, De Wette, Hase, and Riggenbach, with differences on subordinate points; but Schürer has made the case clearer than any other writer. Schürer is remarkable among German scholars for a calm, judicial spirit, and for thoroughness of investigation; and his judgment in this matter is the more worthy of regard, as he does not receive the Gospel of John as genuine. A good exposition of the subject, founded on Schürer's discussion, may be found in Luthardt's work on the *Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, of which an English translation has been published, with an Appendix by Dr. Gregory of Leipzig, giving the literature of the whole controversy on the authorship of the Gospel far more completely than it has ever before been presented.

Another point may be mentioned, as to which there has come to be a general agreement; namely, that the very late date assigned to the Gospel by Baur and Schweigler, namely, somewhere between the years 160 and 170 A.D., cannot be maintained. Zeller and Scholten retreat to 150; Hilgenfeld, who is at last constrained to admit its use by Justin Martyr, goes back to between 130 and 140; Renan now says 125 or 130; Keim in the first volume of his *History of Jesus of Nazara* placed it with great confidence between the years 110 and 115, or more loosely, A.D. 100-117.* The fatal consequences of such an admission as that were, however, soon perceived; and in the last volume of his *History*

* *Geschichte Jesu von Nazara*, i. 155, comp. 146 (Eng. trans. i. 211, comp. 199).

of *Jesus*, and in the last edition of his abridgment of that work, he goes back to the year 130.* Schenkel assigns it to A.D. 115-120.†

This enforced shifting of the date of the Gospel to the earlier part of the second century (which I may remark incidentally is fatal to the theory that its author borrowed from Justin Martyr instead of Justin from John) at once presents very serious difficulties on the supposition of the spuriousness of the Gospel. It is the uniform tradition, supported by great weight of testimony, that the Evangelist John lived to a very advanced age, spending the latter portion of his life in Asia Minor, and dying there in the reign of Trajan, not far from A.D. 100. How could a spurious Gospel of a character so peculiar, so different from the earlier Synoptic Gospels, so utterly unhistorical as it is affirmed to be, gain currency as the work of the Apostle both among Christians and the Gnostic heretics, if it originated only twenty-five or thirty years after his death, when so many who must have known whether he wrote such a work or not were still living?

The feeling of this difficulty seems to have revived the theory, put forward, to be sure, as long ago as 1840 by a very wild German writer, Lützelberger, but which Baur and Strauss deemed unworthy of notice, that the Apostle John was never in Asia Minor at all. This view has recently found strenuous advocates in Keim, Scholten, and others, though it is rejected and, I believe, fully refuted by critics of the same school, as Hilgenfeld. The historical evidence against it seems to me decisive; and to attempt to support it, as Scholten does, by purely arbitrary conjectures, such as the denial of the genuineness of the letter of Irenæus to Florinus, can only give one the impression that the writer has a desperate cause.‡

* *Geschichte Jesu . . . für weitere Kreise*, 3^e Bearbeitung, 2^e Aufl. (1875), p. 40.

† *Das Charakterbild Jesu*, 4^e Aufl. (1873), p. 370.

‡ See Hilgenfeld, *Hist. Krit. Einleitung in d. N. T.* (1875), p. 394 ff.; Bleek, *Einkl. in d. N. T.*, 3^e Aufl. (1875), p. 167 ff., with Mangold's note; Fisher, *The Beginnings of Christianity* (1877), p. 327 ff. Compare Renan, *L'Antechrist*, p. 557 ff.

Thus far we have noticed a few points connected with the controversy about the authorship of the Fourth Gospel in respect to which some progress may seem to have been made since the time of Baur. Others will be remarked upon incidentally, as we proceed. But to survey the whole field of discussion in an hour's discourse is impossible. To treat the question of the historical evidence with any thoroughness would require a volume; to discuss the internal character of the Gospel in its bearings on the question of its genuineness and historical value would require a much larger one. All therefore which I shall now attempt will be to consider some points of the historical evidence for the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel, as follows:—

1. The general reception of the Four Gospels as genuine among Christians in the last quarter of the second century.
2. The question respecting the inclusion of the Fourth Gospel in the Apostolical Memoirs of Christ appealed to by Justin Martyr.
3. Its use by the various Gnostic sects.
4. The attestation to this Gospel which has come down to us appended to the book itself.

I begin with the statement, which cannot be questioned, that our present four Gospels, and no others, were received by the great body of Christians as genuine and sacred books during the last quarter of the second century. This appears most clearly from the writings of Irenæus, born not far from A.D. 125–130, whose youth was spent in Asia Minor, and who became Bishop of Lyons in Gaul, A.D. 178; of Clement, the head of the Catechetical School at Alexandria about the year 190, who had travelled in Greece, Italy, Syria, and Palestine, seeking religious instruction; and of Tertullian, in North Africa, who flourished toward the close of the century. The four Gospels are found in the ancient Syriac version of the New Testament, the Peshito, made in the second century, the authority of which has the more weight as it omits the Second and Third Epistles of John, Second Peter, Jude, and the Apocalypse, books whose authorship was disputed in the early Church. Their existence in the Old Latin version also

attests their currency in North Africa, where that version originated some time in the second century. They appear, moreover, in the Muratorian Canon, written probably about A.D. 170, the oldest list of canonical books which has come down to us.

Mr. Norton in his work on the *Genuineness of the Gospels* argues with great force that, when we take into consideration the peculiar character of the Gospels, and the character and circumstances of the community by which they were received, the fact of their universal reception at this period admits of no reasonable explanation except on the supposition that they are genuine. I do not here contend for so broad an inference: I only maintain that this fact proves that our four Gospels could not have originated at this period, but must have been in existence long before; and that some very powerful causes must have been at work to effect their universal reception. I shall not recapitulate Mr. Norton's arguments; but I would call attention to one point on which he justly lays great stress, though it is often overlooked; namely, that the main evidence for the genuineness of the Gospels is of an altogether different kind from that which can be adduced for the genuineness of any classical work. It is not the testimony of a few eminent Christian writers to their private opinion, but it is the evidence which they afford of the belief of the whole body of Christians; and this, not in respect to ordinary books, whose titles they might easily take on trust, but respecting books in which they were most deeply interested; books which were the very foundation of that faith which separated them from the world around them, exposed them to hatred, scorn, and persecution, and often demanded the sacrifice of life itself.

I would add that the greater the differences between the Gospels, real or apparent, the more difficult it must have been for them to gain this universal reception, except on the supposition that they had been handed down from the beginning as genuine. This remark applies particularly to the Fourth Gospel when compared with the first three.

The remains of Christian literature in the first three quar-

ters of the second century are scanty, and are of such a character that, assuming the genuineness of the Gospels, we have really no reason to expect more definite references to their writers, and more numerous quotations from or allusions to them than we actually do find or seem to find. A few letters, as the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, now made complete by the discovery of a new MS. and of a Syriac version of it; the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, now complete in the original; the short Epistle of Polycarp to the Philipians, and the Epistles (of very doubtful genuineness) attributed to Ignatius; an allegorical work, *the Shepherd* of Her- mas, which nowhere quotes either the Old Testament or the New; a curious romance, the *Clementine Homilies*; and the writings of the Christian Apologists, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras, Hermias, who, in addressing heathens, could not be expected to talk about Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, which would be to them names without significance,—these few documents constitute nearly all the literature of the period. As we should not expect the Gospels to be quoted by name in the writings of the Apologists, though we do find John expressly mentioned by Theophilus, so in such a discussion as that of Justin Martyr with Trypho the Jew, Justin could not cite in direct proof of his doctrines works the authority of which the Jew would not recognize, though he might use them, as he does, in attestation of historic facts which he regarded as fulfilling prophecies of the Old Testament.

The author of *Supernatural Religion*, in discussing the evidence of the use of our present Gospels in the first three quarters of the second century, proceeds on two assumptions: one, that in the first half of this century vast numbers of spurious Gospels and other writings bearing the names of Apostles and their followers were in circulation in the early Church; and the other, that we have a right to expect great accuracy of quotation from the Christian Fathers, especially when they introduce the words of Christ with such a formula as "he said" or "he taught." Now this last assumption admits of being thoroughly tested, and it

contradicts the most unquestionable facts. Instead of such accuracy of quotation as is assumed as the basis of his argument, it is beyond all dispute that the Fathers often quote very loosely, from memory, abridging, transposing, paraphrasing, amplifying, substituting synonymous words or equivalent expressions, combining different passages together, and occasionally mingling their own inferences with their citations. In regard to the first assumption, a careful sifting of the evidence will show, I believe, that there is really no *proof* that in the time of Justin Martyr (with the possible exception of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, which in its primitive form may have been the Hebrew original from which our present Greek Gospel ascribed to Matthew was mainly derived) there was a single work, bearing the title of a Gospel, which as a *history of Christ's ministry* came into competition with our present four Gospels, or which took the place among Christians which our Gospels certainly held in the last quarter of the second century. Much confusion has arisen from the fact that the term "Gospel" was in ancient times applied to speculative works which gave the writer's view of the Gospel, *i.e.*, of the doctrine of Christ, or among the Gnostics, which set forth their *gnosis*; *e.g.*, among the followers of Basilides, Hippolytus tells us, "the Gospel" is ἡ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων γνώσις, "the knowledge of supermundane things" (*Adv. Hær.* vii. 27). Again, the apocryphal Gospels of the Nativity and the Infancy, or such works as the so-called Gospel of Nicodemus, describing the descent of Christ into Hades, have given popular currency to the idea that there were floating about in the middle of the second century a great number of Gospels, rival histories of Christ's ministry; which these apocryphal Gospels, however, are not and do not pretend to be. Other sources of confusion, as the blunders of writers like Epiphanius, I pass over. To enter into a discussion and elucidation of this subject here is of course impossible: I will only recommend the reading of Mr. Norton's full examination of it in the third volume of his *Genuineness of the Gospels*, which needs, to be sure, a little supplementing, but the main positions of which I believe to be impregnable.

Resting on these untenable assumptions, the author of *Supernatural Religion* subjects this early fragmentary literature to a minute examination, and explains away what seem to be quotations from or references to our present Gospels in these different works as borrowed from some of the multitudinous Gospels which he assumes to have been current among the early Christians, especially if these quotations and references do not present a perfect verbal correspondence with our present Gospels, as is the case with the great majority of them. Even if the correspondence is verbally exact, this proves nothing, in his view; for the quotations of the words of Jesus might be borrowed from other current Gospels which resembled ours as much as Matthew, Mark, and Luke resemble each other. But, if the verbal agreement is *not* exact, we have in his judgment a strong proof that the quotations are derived from some apocryphal book. So he comes to the conclusion that there is no certain trace of the existence of our present Gospels for about one hundred and fifty years after the death of Christ; *i.e.*, we will say, till about A.D. 180.

But here a question naturally arises: How is it, if no trace of their existence is previously discoverable, that our four Gospels are suddenly found toward the end of the second century to be received as sacred books throughout the whole Christian world? His reply is, "It is totally unnecessary for me to account for this."* He stops his investigation of the subject just at the point where we have solid facts, not conjectures, to build upon. When he comes out of the twilight into the full blaze of day, he shuts his eyes, and refuses to see anything. Such a procedure cannot be satisfactory to a sincere inquirer after the truth. The fallacy of this mode of reasoning is so well illustrated by Mr. Norton, that I must quote a few sentences. He says:—

About the end of the second century the Gospels were revered as sacred books by a community dispersed over the world, composed of men of different nations and languages. There were, to say the least, sixty thousand copies of them in existence; they were read in the

* *Supernatural Religion*, 6th edition (1875), and 7th edition (1879), vol. i. p. ix. (Preface.)

churches of Christians; they were continually quoted, and appealed to, as of the highest authority; their reputation was as well established among believers from one end of the Christian community to the other, as it is at the present day among Christians in any country. But it is asserted that before that period we find no trace of their existence; and it is, therefore, inferred that they were not in common use, and but little known, even if extant in their present form. This reasoning is of the same kind as if one were to say that the first mention of Egyptian Thebes is in the time of Homer. He, indeed, describes it as a city which poured a hundred armies from its hundred gates; but his is the first mention of it, and therefore we have no reason to suppose that, before his time, it was a place of any considerable note.*

As regards the general reception of the four Gospels in the last quarter of the second century, however, a slight qualification is to be made. Some time in the latter half of the second century, the genuineness of the Gospel of John was denied by a few eccentric individuals (we have no ground for supposing that they formed a sect), whom Epiphanius (*Hær.* li., comp. liv.) calls *Alogi* (*Ἀλόγοι*), a nickname which has the double meaning of "deniers of the doctrine of the Logos," and "men without reason." They are probably the same persons as those of whom Irenæus speaks in one passage (*Hær.* iii. 11. § 9), but to whom he gives no name. But the fact that their difficulty with the Gospel was a doctrinal one, and that they appealed to no tradition in favor of their view; that they denied the Johannean authorship of the Apocalypse likewise, and absurdly ascribed both books to Cerinthus, who, unless all our information about him is false, could not possibly have written the Fourth Gospel, shows that they were persons of no critical judgment. Zeller admits (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1845, p. 645) that their opposition does not prove that the Gospel was not generally regarded in their time as of Apostolic origin. The fact that they ascribed the Fourth Gospel to Cerinthus, a heretic of the first century, contemporary with the Apostle John, shows that they could not pretend that this Gospel was a recent work.

Further, while the Gnostics generally agreed with the

* *Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels*, second edition, vol. i. pp. 195, 196.

Catholic Christians in receiving the four Gospels, and especially the Gospel of John, which the Valentinians, as Irenæus tells us, used *plenissime* (*Hær.* iii. 11. § 7), the Marcionites are an exception. They did not, however, question the genuineness of the Gospels, but regarded their authors as under the influence of Jewish prejudices. Marcion therefore rejected all but Luke, the Pauline Gospel, and cut out from this whatever he deemed objectionable. We may note here, incidentally, that the author of *Supernatural Religion*, in the first six editions of his work, contended, in opposition to the strongest evidence, that Marcion's Gospel, instead of being, as all ancient testimony represents it, a mutilated Luke, was the earlier, original Gospel, of which Luke's was a later amplification. This theory was started by Semler, that *varium, mutabile et mirabile capitulum*, as he is called by a German writer (*Matthæi, N.T. Gr.*, i. 687); and after having been adopted by Eichhorn and many German critics was so thoroughly refuted by Hilgenfeld in 1850, and especially by Volkmar in 1852, that it was abandoned by the most eminent of its former supporters, as Ritschl, Zeller, and partially by Baur. But individuals differ widely in their power of resisting evidence opposed to their prejudices, and the author of *Supernatural Religion* has few equals in this capacity. We may therefore feel that something in these interminable discussions is settled, when we note the fact that *he* has at last surrendered. His conversion is due to Dr. Sanday, who in an article in the *Fortnightly Review* (June, 1875, p. 855, ff.), reproduced in substance in his work on *The Gospels in the Second Century*, introduced the linguistic argument, showing that the very numerous and remarkable peculiarities of language and style which characterize the parts of Luke which Marcion retained are found so fully and completely in those which he rejected as to render diversity of authorship utterly incredible.

But to return to our first point,—the unquestioned reception of our present Gospels throughout the Christian world in the last quarter of the second century, and that, I add, without the least trace of any previous controversy on the

subject, with the insignificant exception of the Alogi whom I have mentioned. This fact has a most important bearing on the next question in order; namely, whether the Apostolical Memoirs to which Justin Martyr appeals about the middle of the second century were or were not our four Gospels. To discuss this question fully would require a volume. All that I propose now is to place the subject in the light of acknowledged facts, and to illustrate the falsity of the premises from which the author of *Supernatural Religion* reasons.

The writings of Justin consist of two Apologies or Defences of Christians and Christianity addressed to the Roman Emperor and Senate, the first written most probably about the year 146 or 147 (though many place it in the year 138), and a Dialogue in defence of Christianity with Trypho the Jew, written somewhat later (*Dial.* c. 120, comp. *Apol.* i. c. 26).*

In these writings, addressed, it is to be observed, to unbelievers, he quotes, not in proof of doctrines, but as authority for his account of the teaching of Christ and the facts in his life, certain works of which he commonly speaks as the "Memoirs" or "Memorabilia" of Christ, using the Greek word, Ἀπομνημονεύματα, with which we are familiar as the designation of the Memorabilia of Socrates by Xenophon. Of these books he commonly speaks as the "Memoirs by the Apostles," using this expression eight times; † four times he calls them "the Memoirs" simply; ‡ once, "Memoirs made by the Apostles which are called Gospels" (*Apol.* i. 66); once, when he cites a passage apparently from the Gospel of Luke, "Memoirs composed by the Apostles of Christ and their companions,"—literally, "those who followed with them" (*Dial.* c. 103); once again (*Dial.* c. 106), when he speaks of our Saviour as changing the name of Peter, and of his giving to James and John the name Boanerges, a fact only mentioned

* See Engelhardt, *Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers* (1828), p. 71 ff.; Renan, *L'Eglise chrétienne* (1879), p. 367, n. 4.

† *Apol.* i. 67; *Dial.* cc. 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106 bis: τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων (τῶν ἀποστ. ἀντοῦ, sc. Χριστοῦ, 5 times).

‡ *Dial.* cc. 105 ter, 107.

so far as we know in the Gospel of Mark, he designates as his authority "Peter's Memoirs," which, supposing him to have used our Gospels, is readily explained by the fact that Peter was regarded by the ancients as furnishing the materials for the Gospel of Mark, his travelling companion and interpreter.* Once more, Justin speaks in the plural of "those who have written Memoirs," *οἱ ἀπομνημονεύσαντες*, "of all things concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, whom we believe" (*Apol.* i. 33); and, again, "the Apostles wrote" so and so, referring to an incident mentioned in all four of the Gospels (*Dial.* c. 88).

But the most important fact mentioned in Justin's writings respecting these Memoirs, which he describes as "composed by Apostles of Christ and their companions," appears in his account of Christian worship, in the sixty-seventh chapter of his First Apology. "On the day called Sunday," he says, "all who live in cities or in the country gather together to one place, and the Memoirs by the Apostles or the writings of the Prophets are read, as long as time permits. When the reader has finished, the president admonishes and exhorts to the imitation of these good things." It appears, then, that, at the time when he wrote, these books, whatever they were, on which he relied for his knowledge of Christ's teaching and life, were held in at least as high reverence as the writings of the Prophets, were read in the churches just as our Gospels were in the last quarter of the second century, and formed the basis of the hortatory discourse that followed. The writings of the Prophets might alternate with them in this use; but Justin mentions the Memoirs first.

These "Memoirs," then, were well-known books, distin-

* I adopt with most scholars (*versus* Semisch and Grimm) the construction which refers the *αὐτοῖς* in this passage not to Christ, but to Peter, in accordance with the use of the genitive after *ἀπομνημονεύματα* everywhere else in Justin. (See a note on the question in the *Christian Examiner* for July, 1854, lvi. 128 f.) For the statement in the text, see Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* iv. 5.: *Licet et Marcus quod edidit [evangelium] Petri affirmetur, cujus interpres Marcus.* Jerome, *De Vir. ill.* c. 1.: *Sed et Evangelium juxta Marcum, qui auditor ejus [sc. Petri] et interpres fuit, hujus dicitur.* Comp. *ibid.* c. 8, and *Ep.* 120 (al. 150) *ad Hedib.* c. 11. See also Papias, ap. Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* iii. 39; Irenæus, *Har.* iii. 1, § 1 (ap. Euseb. v. 8); 10, § 6; Clement of Alexandria ap. Euseb. ii. 15; vi. 14; Origen ap. Euseb. vi. 25; and the striking passage of Eusebius, *Dem. Evang.* iii. 3, pp. 120^d-122^a, quoted by Lardner, *Works* iv. 91 ff. (Lond. 1829).

guished from others as the authoritative source of instruction concerning the doctrine and life of Christ.

There is one other coincidence between the language which Justin uses in describing these books and that which we find in the generation following. The four Gospels as a collection might indifferently be called, and were indifferently cited as, "the Gospels" or "the Gospel." We find this use of the expression "the Gospel" in Theophilus of Antioch, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Hippolytus, the Apostolical Constitutions, Tertullian, and later writers generally.* Now Justin represents Trypho as saying, "I know that your precepts in what is called the Gospel (ἐν τῷ λεγόμενῳ εὐαγγελίῳ) are so wonderful and great as to cause a suspicion that no one may be able to observe them." (*Dial.* c. 10.) In another place, he quotes, apparently, Matt. xi. 27 (comp. Luke x. 22) as being "written in the Gospel."† No plausible explanation can be given of this language except that which recognizes in it the same usage that we constantly find in later Christian writers. The books which in one place Justin calls "Gospels," books composed by Apostles and their companions, were in reference to what gave them their distinctive value *one*. They were the record of the Gospel of Christ in different forms. No *one* of our present Gospels, if these were in circulation in the time of Justin, and certainly no *one* of that great number of Gospels which

* See Justin or Pseudo-Justin, *De Res.* c. 10.—Ignat. or Pseudo-Ignat. *Ad Philad.* cc. 5, 8; *Smyrn.* cc. 5(?), 7.—Pseudo-Clem. 2 *Ep. ad Cor.* c. 8.—Theophil. iii. 14.—Iren. *Har.* i. 7. § 4; 8. § 4; 20. § 2; 27. § 2. ii. 22. § 5; 26. § 2. iii. 5. § 1; 9. § 2; 10. §§ 2, 6; 11. §§ 8 (τετράμορφον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), 9; 16. § 5. iv. 20. §§ 6, 9; 32. § 1; 34. § 1.—Clem. *Al. Paid.* i. c. 5, pp. 104, 105, *bis* ed. Potter; c. 9, pp. 143, 145 *bis*, 148. ii. 1, p. 169; c. 10, p. 235; c. 12, p. 246. *Strom.* ii. 16, p. 467. iii. 6, p. 537; c. 11, p. 544. iv. 1, p. 564; c. 4, p. 570. v. 5, p. 664. vi. 6, p. 764; c. 11, p. 784 *bis*; c. 14, p. 797. vii. 3, p. 836. *Ecl. proph.* cc. 50, 57.—Origen, *Cont. Cels.* i. 51. ii. 13, 24, 27, 34, 36, 37, 61, 63 (Opp. I. 367, 398, 409, 411, 415, 416 *bis*, 433, 434 ed. Delarue). *In Joan.* tom. i. §§ 4, 5. v. § 4. (Opp. IV. 4, 98.) Pseudo-Orig. *Dial. de recta in Deum fide*, sect. 1 (Opp. I. 807).—Hippol. *Not.* c. 6.—Const. Ap. i. 1, 2 *bis*, 5, 6. ii. 1 *bis*, 5 *bis*, 6 *bis*, 8, 13, 16, 17, 35, 39. iii. 7. v. 14. vi. 23 *bis*, 28. vii. 24.—Tertull. *Cast.* c. 4. *Pudic.* c. 2. *Adv. Marc.* iv. 7. *Hermog.* c. 20. *Resurr.* c. 27. *Prax.* cc. 20, 21.—PLURAL, Muratorian Canon (also the sing.).—Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* iii. 12, τὰ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τῶν εὐαγγελίων.—Clem. *Al. Strom.* iv. 6. p. 582. Hippol. *Adv. Har.* vii. 38, p. 259, τῶν δὲ εὐαγγελίων ἢ τοῦ ἀποστόλου, and later writers everywhere.—Plural used where the passage quoted is found in only one of the Gospels, Basilides ap. Hippol. *Adv. Har.* vii. 22, 27.—Const. Ap. ii. 53.—Cyril of Jerusalem, *Procat.* c. 3; *Cat.* ii. 4; x. 1; xvi. 16.—Theodoret, *Quæst. in Num.* c. xix. q. 35; Migne lxxx. 385; *In Ps.* xlv. 16, M. lxxx. 1197; *In 1 Thess.* v. 15, M. lxxxii. 649, and so often.

† On this important passage see Note A at the end of this essay.

the writer of *Supernatural Religion* imagines to have been current at that period, could have been so distinguished from the rest as to be called "*the Gospel*."

It has been maintained by the author of *Supernatural Religion* and others that Justin's description of the Gospels as "Memoirs composed by *the* Apostles and those who followed with them" (to render the Greek verbally) cannot apply to works composed by *two* Apostles and two companions of Apostles: "*the* Apostles" must mean *all* the Apostles, "the collective body of the Apostles." (*S. R.* i. 291.) Well, if it must, then the connected expression, "those that followed with them" (τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων), where the definite article is used in just the same way in Greek, must mean "all those that followed with them." We have, then, a truly marvellous book, if we take the view of *Supernatural Religion* that the "Memoirs" of Justin was a single work; a Gospel, namely, composed by "the collective body of the Apostles" and the collective body of those who accompanied them. If the "Memoirs" consist of several different books *thus* composed, the marvel is not lessened. Now Justin is not responsible for this absurdity. The simple fact is that the definite article in Greek in this case distinguishes the two *classes* to which the writers of the Gospels belonged.*

To state in full detail and with precision all the features of the problem presented by Justin's quotations, and his references to facts in the life of Christ, is here, of course, impossible. But what is the obvious aspect of the case?

It will not be disputed that there is a very close correspondence between the history of Christ sketched by Justin, embracing numerous details, and that found in our Gospels: the few statements not authorized by them, such as that Christ was born in a cave, that the Magi came from Arabia, that Christ as a carpenter made ploughs and yokes,

* For illustrations of this use of the article, see Norton's *Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels*, 1st ed. (1837), vol. i. p. 190, note. Comp. 1 Thess. ii. 14 and Jude 17, where it would be idle to suppose that the writer means that *all* the Apostles had given the particular warning referred to. See also Origen, *Cont. Cels.* i. 51, p. 367, μετὰ τὴν ἀναγεγραμμένην ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰησοῦ μαθητῶν ἱστορίαν; and ii. 13, παραπλήσια τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν μαθητῶν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ γραφεῖσιν. See, further, Note B at the end of this essay.

present little or no objection to the supposition that they were his main authority. These details may be easily explained as founded on oral tradition, or as examples of that substitution of *inferences* from facts for the facts themselves, which we find in so many ancient and modern writers, and observe in every-day life.* Again, there is a substantial correspondence between the teaching of Christ as reported by Justin and that found in the Gospels. Only one or two sayings are ascribed to Christ by Justin which are not contained in the Gospels, and these may naturally be referred, like others which we find in writers who received our four Gospels as alone authoritative, to oral tradition, or may have been taken from some writing or writings now lost which contained such traditions.† That Justin actually used all our present Gospels is admitted by Hilgenfeld and Keim. But that they were not his main authority is argued chiefly from the want of exact verbal correspondence between his citations of the words of Christ and the language of our Gospels, where the meaning is essentially the same. The untenableness of this argument has been demonstrated, I conceive, by Norton, Semisch, Westcott, and Sanday, *versus* Hilgenfeld and *Supernatural Religion*. Its weakness is illustrated in a Note at the end of this essay, and will be further illustrated presently by the full discussion of a passage of special interest and importance. Justin nowhere expressly

* Several of Justin's additions in the way of detail seem to have proceeded from his *assumption* of the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies, or what he regarded as such. See Semisch, *Die apost. Denkwürdigkeiten des Märtyrers Justinus* (1848), p. 377 ff.; Volkmar, *Der Ursprung unserer Evangelien* (1866), p. 124 f.; Westcott, *Canon of the N. T.*, p. 162, 4th ed. (1875), and Dr. E. A. Abbott, art. *Gospels* in the ninth ed. of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (p. 817), who remarks: "Justin never quotes any rival Gospel, nor alleges any words or facts which make it probable he used a rival Gospel; such non-canonical sayings and facts as he mentions are readily explicable as the results of lapse of memory, general looseness and inaccuracy, extending to the use of the Old as well as the New Testament, and the desire to adapt the facts of the New Scriptures to the prophecies of the Old." (p. 818).

† See Westcott, "On the Apocryphal Traditions of the Lord's Words and Works," appended to his *Introd. to the Study of the Gospels*, 5th ed. (1875), pp. 453-461, and the little volume of J. T. Dodd, *Sayings ascribed to our Lord by the Fathers*, etc., Oxford, 1874. Compare Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., i. 220 ff. The stress which the author of *Supernatural Religion* lays on the word πάντα in the passage (*Apol.* i. 33) where Justin speaks of "those who have written memoirs of *all things* concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ" shows an extraordinary disregard of the common use of such expressions. It is enough to compare, as Westcott does, Acts i. 1. For illustrations from Justin (*Apol.* ii. 6; i. 45; *Dial.* cc. 44, 121) see Semisch, *Die apost. Denkwürdigkeiten* u. s. w., p. 404 f.

quotes the "Memoirs" for anything which is not substantially found in our Gospels; and there is nothing in his deviations from exact correspondence with them, as regards matters of fact, or the report of the words of Christ, which may not be abundantly paralleled in the writings of the Christian Fathers who used our four Gospels as alone authoritative.

With this view of the state of the case, and of the character of the books used and described by Justin though without naming their authors, let us now consider the bearing of the indisputable fact (with which the author of *Supernatural Religion* thinks he has no concern) of the general reception of our four Gospels as genuine in the last quarter of the second century. As I cannot state the argument more clearly or more forcibly than it has been done by Mr. Norton, I borrow his language. Mr. Norton says:—

The manner in which Justin speaks of the character and authority of the books to which he appeals, of their reception among Christians, and of the use which was made of them, proves these books to have been the Gospels. They carried with them the authority of the Apostles. They were those writings from which he and other Christians derived their knowledge of the history and doctrines of Christ. They were relied upon by him as primary and decisive evidence in his explanations of the character of Christianity. They were regarded as sacred books. They were read in the assemblies of Christians on the Lord's day, in connection with the Prophets of the Old Testament. Let us now consider the manner in which the Gospels were regarded by the contemporaries of Justin. Irenæus was in the vigor of life before Justin's death; and the same was true of very many thousands of Christians living when Irenæus wrote. But he tells us that the four Gospels are the four pillars of the Church, the foundation of Christian faith, written by those who had first orally preached the Gospel, by two Apostles and two companions of Apostles. It is incredible that Irenæus and Justin should have spoken of different books. We cannot suppose that writings, such as the Memoirs of which Justin speaks, believed to be the works of Apostles and companions of Apostles, read in Christian Churches, and received as sacred books, of the highest authority, should, immediately after he wrote, have fallen into neglect and oblivion, and been superseded by another set of books. The strong sentiment of their value could not so silently, and so unaccountably, have changed into entire disregard, and have been transferred to other writings. The copies of them spread over the world could not so suddenly and mysteriously have disappeared,

that no subsequent trace of their existence should be clearly discoverable. When, therefore, we find Irenæus, the contemporary of Justin, ascribing to the four Gospels the same character, the same authority, and the same authors, as are ascribed by Justin to the Memoirs quoted by him, which were called Gospels, there can be no reasonable doubt that the Memoirs of Justin were the Gospels of Irenæus.*

It may be objected to Mr. Norton's argument, that "many writings which have been excluded from the canon were publicly read in the churches, until very long after Justin's day." (*S.R.* i. 294.) The author of *Supernatural Religion* mentions particularly the Epistle of the Roman Clement to the Corinthians, the Epistle of Soter, the Bishop of Rome, to the Corinthians, the "Pastor" or "Shepherd" of Hermas, and the Apocalypse of Peter. To these may be added the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas.

To give the objection any force, the argument must run thus: The writings above named were at one time generally regarded by Christians as sacred books, of the highest authority and importance, and placed at least on a level with the writings of the prophets of the Old Testament. They were afterwards excluded from the canon: therefore a similar change might take place among Christians in their estimate of the writings which Justin has described under the name of "Memoirs by the Apostles." In the course of thirty years, a different set of books might silently supersede them in the whole Christian world.

The premises are false. There is no proof that any one of these writings was ever regarded as possessing the same authority and value as Justin's "Memoirs," or anything like it. From the very nature of the case, books received as authentic records of the life and teaching of CHRIST must have had an importance which could belong to no others. On the character of the teaching and the facts of the life of Christ as recorded in the "Memoirs," Justin's whole argument rests. Whether he regarded the Apostolic writings as "inspired" or not, he unquestionably regarded CHRIST as inspired, or rather as the divine, inspiring Logos (*Apol.* i.

* *Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., vol. i. pp. 237-239.

33, 36; ii. 10); and his teaching as "the new law," universal, everlasting, which superseded "the old covenant." (See *Dial.* cc. 11, 12, etc.) The books that contained this were to the Christians of Justin's time the very foundation of their faith.

As to the works mentioned by *Supernatural Religion*, not only is there no evidence that any one of them ever held a place in the Christian Church to be compared for a moment with that of the Gospels, but there is abundant evidence to the contrary. They were read in some churches for a time as edifying books,—the Epistle of Clement of Rome "in very many churches" according to Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* iii. 16),—and a part of them were regarded by a few Christian writers as having apostolic or semi-apostolic authority, or as divinely inspired. One of the most definite statements about them is that of Dionysius of Corinth (*cir.* A.D. 175–180), who, in a letter to the church at Rome (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 23), tells us that the Epistle of Soter (d. 176?) to the Christians at Corinth was read in their church for edification or "admonition" (*νομιθεῖσθαι* is the word used) on a certain Sunday, and would continue to be so read from time to time, as the Epistle of Clement had been. This shows how far the occasional public reading of such a writing in the church was from implying its canonical authority.—Clement of Alexandria repeatedly quotes the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas as the work of "Barnabas the Apostle," but criticises and condemns one of his interpretations (*Strom.* ii. 15, p. 464), and in another place, as Mr. Norton remarks, rejects a fiction found in the work (*Pæd.* ii. 10, p. 220, ff.).—"The Shepherd" of Hermas in its *form* claims to be a divine vision; its allegorical character suited the taste of many; and the Muratorian Canon (*cir.* A.D. 170) says that it ought to be read in the churches, but not as belonging to the writings of the prophets or apostles. (See Credner, *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanon*, p. 165.) This was the general view of those who did not reject it as altogether apocryphal. It appears in the Sinaitic MS. as an appendix to the New Testament.—The Apocalypse of Peter appears to have imposed upon some

as the work of the Apostle. The Muratorian Canon says, "Some among us are unwilling that it should be read in the church." It seems to have been received as genuine by Clement of Alexandria (*Ecl. proph.* cc. 41, 48, 49) and Methodius (*Conv.* ii. 6). Besides these, the principal writers who speak of it are Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* iii. 3. § 2; 25. § 4; vi. 14. § 1), who rejects it as uncanonical or spurious, Jerome (*De Vir. ill.* c. 1), who puts it among apocryphal writings, and Sozomen (*Hist. Eccl.* vii. 19), who mentions that, though rejected by the ancients as spurious, it was read once a year in some churches of Palestine.*

It appears sufficiently from what has been said that there is nothing in the limited ecclesiastical use of these books, or in the over-estimate of their authority and value by some individuals, to detract from the force of Mr. Norton's argument. *Supernatural Religion* here confounds things that differ very widely.†

At this stage of the argument, we are entitled, I think, to come to the examination of the apparent use of the Gospel of John by Justin Martyr with a strong presumption in favor of the view that this apparent use is real. In other words, there is a very strong presumption that the "Memoirs" used by Justin and called by him "Gospels" and collectively "the Gospel," and described as "composed by Apostles of Christ and their companions," were actually our present Gospels, composed by two Apostles and two companions of Apostles. This presumption is, I believe, greatly strengthened by the evidence of the use of the Fourth Gospel by writers between the time of Justin Martyr and Irenæus, and also by the evidences of its use before the time of Justin by the Gnostic sects. But, leaving those topics for the present, we will consider the direct evidence of its use by Justin.

The first passage noticed will be examined pretty thoroughly: both because the discussion of it will serve to illustrate the false reasoning of the author of *Supernatural Relig-*

* See, on this book, Hilgenfeld, *Nov. Test. extra canonem receptum* (1866), iv. 74, ff.

† On this whole subject, see Semisch, *Die apostol. Denkwürdigkeiten des Märt. Justinus*, p. 61, ff.

ion and other writers respecting the quotations of Justin Martyr which agree in substance with passages in our Gospels while differing in the form of expression; and because it is of special importance in its bearing on the question whether Justin made use of the Fourth Gospel, and seems to me, when carefully examined, to be in itself almost decisive.

The passage is that in which Justin gives an account of Christian baptism, in the sixty-first chapter of his First Apology. Those who are ready to make a Christian profession, he says, "are brought by us to a place where there is water, and in the manner of being born again [*or regenerated*] in which we ourselves also were born again, they are born again; for in the name of the Father of the universe and sovereign God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, they then receive the bath in the water. For Christ also said, Except ye be born again, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven (*Ἄν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθῃτε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*). But that it is impossible for those who have once been born to enter into the wombs of those who brought them forth is manifest to all."

The passage in the Gospel of John of which this reminds us is found in chap. iii. 3-5: "Jesus answered and said to him [Nicodemus], Verily, verily I say unto thee, Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God (*Ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ*). Nicodemus saith to him, How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born? Jesus answered, Verily, verily I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (*Ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, οὐ δύναται εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ*). Compare verse 7, "Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born anew" (*ὅτι ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν*); and Matt. xviii. 3, "Verily I say unto you, Except ye be changed, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven" (*οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθῃτε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*).

I have rendered the Greek as literally as possible; but it

should be observed that the word translated "anew," *ἀνωθεν*, might also be rendered "from above." This point will be considered hereafter.

Notwithstanding the want of verbal correspondence, I believe that we have here in Justin a free quotation from the Gospel of John, modified a little by a reminiscence of Matt. xviii. 3.

The first thing that strikes us in Justin's quotation is the fact that the remark with which it concludes, introduced by Justin as if it were a grave observation of his own, is simply silly in the connection in which it stands. In John, on the other hand, where it is not to be understood as a serious question, it admits, as we shall see, of a natural explanation as the language of Nicodemus. This shows, as everything else shows, the weakness (to use no stronger term) of Volkmar's hypothesis, that John has here borrowed from Justin, not Justin from John. The observation affords also, by its very remarkable peculiarity, strong evidence that Justin derived it, together with the declaration which accompanies it, from the Fourth Gospel.

It will be well, before proceeding to our immediate task, to consider the meaning of the passage in John, and what the real difficulty of Nicodemus was. He could not have been perplexed by the figurative use of the expression "to be born anew": that phraseology was familiar to the Jews to denote the change which took place in a Gentile when he became a proselyte to Judaism.* But the unqualified language of our Saviour, expressing a universal necessity, implied that even the Jewish Pharisee, with all his pride of sanctity and superior knowledge, must experience a radical change, like that which a Gentile proselyte to Judaism underwent, before he could enjoy the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom. This was what amazed Nicodemus. Pretending therefore to take the words in their literal meaning, he asks, "How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter," etc. He imposes an absurd and ridiculous sense on the

* See Lightfoot and Wetstein, or T. Robinson or Wünsche, on John iii. 3 or 5.

words, to lead Jesus to explain himself further.* Thus viewed, the question is to some purpose in John; while the language in Justin, as a serious proposition, is idle, and betrays its non-originality.

The great difference in the form of expression between Justin's citation and the Gospel of John is urged as decisive against the supposition that he has here used this Gospel. It is observed further that all the deviations of Justin from the language of the Fourth Gospel are also found in a quotation of the words of Christ in the Clementine Homilies; and hence it has been argued that Justin and the writer of the Clementines quoted from the same apocryphal Gospel, perhaps the Gospel according to the Hebrews or the Gospel according to Peter. In the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), the quotation runs as follows: "For thus the prophet swore unto us, saying, Verily I say unto you, except ye be born again by living water into the name of Father, Son, Holy Spirit, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven." But it will be seen at once that the author of the Clementines differs as widely from Justin as Justin from the Fourth Gospel, and that there is no plausibility in the supposition that he and Justin quoted from the same apocryphal book. The quotation in the Clementines is probably only a free combination of the language in John iii. 3-5 with Matt. xxviii. 19, modified somewhat in form by the influence of Matt. xviii. 3.† Such combinations of different passages, and such quotations of the words of Christ according to the sense rather than the letter, are not uncommon in the Fathers. Or, the Clementines may have used Justin.

I now propose to show in detail that the differences in form between Justin's quotation and the phraseology of the Fourth Gospel, marked as they are, all admit of an easy and natural explanation on the supposition that he really borrowed from it, and that they are paralleled by similar variations in the

* See Norton, *A New Trans. of the Gospels, with Notes*, vol. ii. p. 507.

† On the quotations from the Gospel of John as well as from the other Gospels in the Clementine Homilies, see Sanday, *The Gospels in the Second Century*, pp. 288-295; comp. pp. 161-187. See also Westcott, *Canon of the N. T.*, pp. 282-288; and comp. pp. 150-156.

quotations of the same passage by Christian writers who used our four Gospels as their exclusive authority. If this is made clear, the fallacy of the assumption on which the author of *Supernatural Religion* reasons in his remarks on this passage, and throughout his discussion of Justin's quotations, will be apparent. He has argued on an assumption of verbal accuracy in the quotations of the Christian Fathers which is baseless, and which there were peculiar reasons for not expecting from Justin in such works as his Apologies.†

Let us take up the differences point by point :—

1. The solemn introduction, "Verily, verily I say unto thee," is omitted. But this would be very naturally omitted : (1) because it is of no importance for the sense ; and (2) because the Hebrew words used, 'Αμὴν ἁμὴν, would be unintelligible to the Roman Emperor, without a particular explanation (comp. *Apol.* i. 65). (3) They are usually omitted by Christian writers in quoting the passage : so, for example, by the DOCETIST in HIPPOLYTUS (*Adv. Hær.* viii. 10, p. 267), IRE-NÆUS (Frag. 35, ed. Stieren, 33 Harvey), ORIGEN, in a Latin version (*In Ex. Hom.* v. 1, Opp. ii. 144, ed. Delarue ; *In Ep. ad Rom.* lib. v. c. 8, Opp. iv. 560), the APOSTOLICAL CONSTITUTIONS (vi. 15), EUSEBIUS twice (*In Isa.* i. 16, 17, and iii. 1, 2 ; Migne xxiv. 96, 109), ATHANASIUS (*De Incarn.* c. 14, Opp. i. 59, ed. Montf.), CYRIL OF JERUSALEM twice (*Cat.* iii. 4 ; xvii. 11), BASIL THE GREAT (*Adv. Eunom.* lib. v. Opp. i. 308 (437), ed. Benedict.), PSEUDO-BASIL three times (*De Bapt.* i. 2. §§ 2, 6 ; ii. 1. § 1 ; Opp. ii. 630 (896), 633 (899), 653 (925)), GREGORY NYSSEN (*De Christi Bapt.* Opp. iii. 369), EPHRAËM SYRUS (*De Pœnit.* Opp. iii. 183), MACARIUS ÆGYP-

† On the whole subject of Justin Martyr's quotations, I would refer to the admirably clear, forcible, and accurate statement of the case in Norton's *Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., vol. i. pp. 200-239, and Addit. Note E, pp. ccxiv.-ccxxviii. His account is less detailed than that of Semisch, Hilgenfeld, and *Supernatural Religion*, but is thoroughly trustworthy. I have noticed only one oversight : Mr. Norton says that "Justin twice gives the words, *Thou art my son ; this day have I begotten thee*, as those uttered at our Saviour's baptism ; and in one place says expressly that the words were found in the Memoirs by the Apostles." This last statement seems to me incorrect. The quotations referred to will be found in *Dial. c. Tryph.* cc. 88, 103 ; but in neither case does Justin say, according to the grammatical construction of his language, that the words in question were found in the Memoirs. The discussion of Justin's quotations by Professor Westcott and Dr. Sanday in the works referred to in the preceding note is also valuable, especially in reference to the early variations in the text of the Gospels.

TIVUS (*Hom.* xxx. 3), CHRYSOSTOM (*De consubst.* vii. 3, Opp. i. 505 (618), ed. Montf.; *In Gen. Serm.* vii. 5, Opp. iv. 681 (789), and elsewhere repeatedly), THEODORET (*Quæst. in Num.* 35, Migne lxxx. 385), BASIL OF SELEUCIA (*Orat.* xxviii. 3, Migne lxxxv. 321), and a host of other writers, both Greek and Latin,—I could name *forty*, if necessary.

2. The change of the indefinite *τις*, in the singular, to the second person plural: "Except *a man* be born anew" to "Except *ye* be born anew." This also is unimportant. This is shown, and the origin of the change is partially explained (1) by the fact, not usually noticed, that it is made *by the speaker himself in the Gospel*, in professedly repeating in the seventh verse the words used in the third; the indefinite singular involving, and being equivalent to, the plural. Verse 7 reads: "Marvel not that I *said* unto thee, *Ye* must be born anew." (2) The second person plural would also be suggested by the similar passage in Matt. xviii. 3, "Except *ye* be changed and become as little children, *ye* shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven." Nothing was more natural than that in a quotation from memory the language of these two kindred passages should be somewhat mixed; and such a confusion of similar passages is frequent in the writings of the Fathers. This affords an easy explanation also of Justin's substituting, in agreement with Matthew, "shall in no wise enter" for "cannot enter," and "kingdom of heaven" for "kingdom of God." The two passages of John and Matthew are actually mixed together in a somewhat similar way in a free quotation by CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, a writer who unquestionably used our Gospels alone as authoritative,—"*the four Gospels, which,*" as he says, "*have been handed down to us*" (*Strom.* iii. 13, p. 553).*

(3) This declaration of Christ would often be quoted in the early Christian preaching, in reference to the importance of baptism; and the second person plural would thus be natu-

* Clement (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, c. 9, p. 69) blends Matt. xviii. 3 and John iii. 3 as follows: "Except ye again become as little children, and *be born again* (*ἀναγεννηθῆτε*), as the Scripture saith, ye will in no wise receive him who is truly your Father, and will in no wise ever enter into the kingdom of heaven."

rally substituted for the indefinite singular, to give greater directness to the exhortation. So in the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES (xi. 26), and in both forms of the CLEMENTINE EPITOME (c. 18, pp. 16, 134, ed. Dressel, Lips. 1859). (4) That this change of number and person does not imply the use of an apocryphal Gospel is further shown by the fact that it is made twice in quoting the passage by Jeremy Taylor, who in a third quotation also substitutes the plural for the singular in a somewhat different way.* (See below, p. 158.)

3. The change of *ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν*, verse 3 (or *γεννηθῇ* merely, verse 5), "Except a man be born anew," or "over again," into *ὅν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῇτε*, "Except ye be born again," or "regenerated"; in other words, the substitution of *ἀναγεννᾶσθαι* for *γεννᾶσθαι ἄνωθεν*, or for the simple verb in verse 5, presents no real difficulty, though much has been made of it. (1) It is said that *γεννᾶσθαι ἄνωθεν* cannot mean "to be born *anew*," but must mean "to be born *from above*." But we have the clearest philological evidence that *ἄνωθεν* has the meaning of "anew," "over again," as well as "from above." In the only passage in a classical author where the precise phrase, *γεννᾶσθαι ἄνωθεν*, has been pointed out, namely, Artemidorus on Dreams, i. 13, ed. Reiff (al. 14), it cannot possibly have any other meaning. Meyer, who rejects this sense, has fallen into a strange mistake about the passage in Artemidorus, showing that he cannot have looked at it. Meaning "from above" or "from the top" (Matt. xxvii. 51), then "from the beginning" (Luke i. 3), *ἄνωθεν* is used, with *πάντα* to strengthen

* Professor James Drummond well remarks: "How easily such a change might be made, when verbal accuracy was not studied, is instructively shewn in Theophylact's paraphrase [I translate the Greek]: 'But I say unto thee, that both thou and every other man whatsoever, unless having been born from above [*or* anew] and of God, ye receive the true faith [*lit.* the worthy opinion] concerning me, are outside of the kingdom.'" Chrysostom (also cited by Prof. Drummond) observes that Christ's words are equivalent to *ἐὰν σὺ μὴ γεννηθῇ κ.τ.λ.*, "Except thou be born," etc., but are put in the indefinite form in order to make the discourse less offensive. I gladly take this opportunity to call attention to the valuable article by Prof. Drummond in the *Theological Review* for October, 1875, vol. xii. pp. 471-488, "On the alleged Quotation from the Fourth Gospel relating to the New Birth, in Justin Martyr, *Apol.* i. c. 61." He has treated the question with the ability, candor, and cautious accuracy of statement which distinguish his writings generally. For the quotation given above, see p. 476 of the *Review*. I am indebted to him for several valuable suggestions; but, to prevent misapprehension as to the extent of this indebtedness, I may be permitted to refer to my note on the subject in the American edition of Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii. p. 1433, published in 1869, six years before the appearance of Prof. Drummond's article.

it, to signify "again from the beginning," "all over again" (Gal. iv. 9, where see the passages from Galen and Hippocrates cited by Wetstein, and Wisd. of Sol. xix. 6, where see Grimm's note), like *πάλιν ἐκ δευτέρου* or *δευτέρου* (Matt. xxvi. 42, John xxi. 16), and in the classics *πάλιν αὖ*, *πάλιν αὖθις*, *πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*. Thus it gets the meaning "anew," "over again"; see the passages cited by McClellan in his note on John iii. 3.* (2) *Ἀνωθεν* was here understood as meaning "again" by the translators of many of the ancient versions; namely, the Old Latin, "denuo," the Vulgate, Coptic, Peshito Syriac (*Sup. Rel.*, 6th edit., is mistaken about this), Æthiopic, Georgian (see Malan's *The Gospel according to St. John*, etc.). (3) The Christian Fathers who prefer the other interpretation, as Origen, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, recognize the fact that the word may have either meaning. The ambiguity is also noticed by Chrysostom. (4) *Ἀναγεννησθαι* was the common word in Christian literature to describe the change referred to. So already in 1 Pet. i. 3, 23; comp. 1 Pet. ii. 2; and see the context in Justin. (5) This meaning best suits the connection. Verse 4 represents it as so understood by Nicodemus: "Can he enter *a second time*," etc. The fact that John has used the word *ἄνωθεν* in two other passages in a totally different connection (viz. iii. 31, xix. 11) in the sense of "from above" is of little weight. He has nowhere else used it in reference to the new birth to denote that it is a birth from above: to express that idea, he has used a differ-

*The passages are: Joseph. *Ant.* i. 18, § 3; Socrates in Stobæus, *Flor.* cxxiv. 41, iv. 135 Meineke; Harpocration, *Lex.* s. v. *ἀναδικάζασθαι*; Pseudo-Basil, *De Bapt.* i. 2. § 7; Can. Apost. 46, al. 47, al. 39; to which add Origen, *In Joan.* tom. xx. c. 12, Opp. iv. 322, who gives the words of Christ to Peter in the legend found in the Acts of Paul: *ἄνωθεν μετ' ὧ στανρωθῆναι* = "*iterum crucifigi*." I have verified McClellan's references (*The N.T.* etc. vol. 1. p. 284, Lond. 1875), and given them in a form in which they may be more easily found.

Though many of the best commentators take *ἄνωθεν* here in the sense of "from above," as Bengel, Lücke, De Wette, Meyer, Clausen, and so the lexicographers Wahl, Bretschneider, Robinson, the rendering "anew" is supported by Chrysostom, Nonnus, Euthymius, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Wetstein, Kypke, Krebs, Knapp (*Scripta var. Arg.* i. 184, ed. 2da), Kuinoel, Credner (*Beiträge*, i. 253), Olshausen, Tholuck, Neander, Norton, Noyes, Alford, Ewald, Hofmann, Luthardt, Weiss, Godet, Farrar, Watkins, Westcott, and the recent lexicographers, Grimm and Cremer. The word is not to be understood as merely equivalent to "again," "a second time," but implies an entire change. Compare the use of *εἰς τέλος* in the sense of "completely," and the Ep. of Barnabas, c. 16. § 8 (cited by Bretschneider): "Having received the forgiveness of our sins, and having placed our hope in the Name, we became new men, created again from the beginning" (*πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*).

ent expression, γεννηθῆναι ἐκ θεοῦ or ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, "to be born [or begotten] of God," which occurs once in the Gospel (i. 13) and nine times in the First Epistle, so that the presumption is that, if he had wished to convey that meaning here, he would have used here also that unambiguous expression.

But what is decisive as to the main point is the fact that Justin's word ἀναγεννηθῆναι is actually substituted for γεννηθῆναι ἀνωθεν in verse 3, or for the simple γεννηθῆναι in verse 5, by a large number of Christian writers who unquestionably quote from John; so, besides the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES (xi. 26) and the CLEMENTINE EPITOME in both forms (c. 18), to which exception has been taken with no sufficient reason, IRENÆUS (Frag. 35, ed. Stieren, i. 846), EUSEBIUS (*In Isa.* i. 16, 17; Migne xxiv. 96), ATHANASIUS (*De Incarn.* c. 14), BASIL (*Adv. Eunom.* lib. v. Opp. i. 308 (437)), EPHRAEM SYRUS (*De Pœnit.* Opp. iii. 183 (ἀναγεννηθῆναι ἀνωθεν)), CHRYSOSTOM (*In 1 Ep. ad Cor.* xv. 29, Opp. x. 378 (440)), CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA (*In Joann.* iii. 5, ἐξαναγεννηθῆναι δι' ὕδατος κ.τ.λ., so Pusey's critical ed., vol. i. p. 219; Aubert has γεννηθῆναι ἐξ ὕδ.), and so, probably, ANASTASIUS SINAITA preserved in a Latin version (*Anagog. Contemp. in Hexaëm.* lib. iv., Migne lxxxix. 906, *regeneratus*; contra, col. 870 *genitus*, 916 *generatus*), and HESYCHIUS OF JERUSALEM in a Latin version (*In Levit.* xx. 9, Migne xciii. 1044, *regeneratus*; but col. 974, *renatus*). In the Old Latin version or versions and the Vulgate, the MSS. are divided in John iii. 3 between *natus* and *renatus*, and so in verse 4, 2d clause, between *nasci* and *renasci*; but in verse 5 *renatus fuerit* is the unquestionable reading of the Latin versions, presupposing, apparently, ἀναγεννηθῆναι in the Greek. (See Tischendorf's 8th critical edition of the Greek Test. *in loc.*) The Latin Fathers, with the exception of Tertullian and Cyprian, who have both readings, and of the author *De Rebaptismate* (c. 3), in quoting the passage, almost invariably have *renatus*.

We occasionally find ἀναγεννηθῆναι, "to be born again," for γεννηθῆναι, "to be born," in the first clause of verse 4; so EPHRAEM SYRUS (*De Pœnit.* Opp. iii. 183), and CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA (*Glaph. in Exod.* lib. iii. Opp. i. a. 341).

From all that has been said, it will be seen that the use of

ἀναγεννηθῆτε here by Justin is easily explained. Whether ἀνωθεν in John really means "from above" or "anew" is of little importance in its bearing on our question: there can be no doubt that Justin *may* have understood it in the latter sense; and, even if he did not, the use of the term ἀναγεννησθαι here was very natural, as is shown by the way in which the passage is quoted by Irenæus, Eusebius, and many other writers cited above.

4. The next variation, the change of "*cannot see*" or "*enter into*" (οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν or εἰσελθὲν εἰς, *Lat.* non potest videre, or intrare or introire in), into "*shall not*" or "*shall in no wise see*" or "*enter into*" (οὐ μὴ ἰδῇ, once ἰδοῦ, or οὐ μὴ εἰσελθῇ or εἰσελθῆτε εἰς, once οὐκ εἰσελεύσεται εἰς, *Lat.* non videbit, or intrabit or introibit in), is both so natural (comp. Matt. xviii. 3) and so trivial as hardly to deserve mention. It is perhaps enough to say that I have noted *sixty-nine* examples of it in the quotations of this passage by *forty-two* different writers among the Greek and Latin Fathers. It is to be observed that in most of the quotations of the passage by the Fathers, verses 3 and 5 are mixed in different ways, as might be expected.

5. The change of "*kingdom of God*" into "*kingdom of heaven*" is perfectly natural, as they are synonymous expressions, and as the phrase "*kingdom of heaven*" is used in the passage of Matthew already referred to, the language of which was likely to be more or less confounded in recollection with that of this passage in John. The change is actually made in several Greek MSS. in the 5th verse of John, including the Sinaitic, and is even received by Tischendorf into the text, though, I believe, on insufficient grounds. But a great number of Christian writers in quoting from John make just the same change; so the DOCETIST in HIPPOLYTUS (*Adv. Hær.* viii. 10, p. 267), the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES (xi. 26), the RECOGNITIONS (i. 69; vi. 9), the CLEMENTINE EPITOME (c. 18) in both forms, IRENÆUS (Frag. 35, ed. Stieren), ORIGEN in a Latin version twice (*Opp.* iii. 948; iv. 483), the APOSTOLICAL CONSTITUTIONS (vi. 15), EUSEBIUS twice (*In Isa.* i. 16, 17; iii. 1, 2; Migne xxiv. 96, 109), PSEUD-ATHANASIUS (*Quæst. ad Antioch.* 101, *Opp.* ii. 291),

EPHRAEM SYRUS (*De Pœnit.* Opp. iii. 183), CHRYSOSTOM five times (*Opp.* iv. 681 (789); viii. 143^d (165), 144^d (165), 144^b (166)), THEODORET (*Quæst. in Num.* 35, Migne lxxx. 385), BASIL OF SELEUCIA (*Orat.* xxviii. 3), ANASTASIUS SINAITA in a Latin version three times (Migne lxxxix. 870, 906, 916), HESYCHIUS OF JERUSALEM in a Latin version twice (Migne xciii. 974, 1044), THEODORUS ABUCARA (*Opuscc.* c. 17, Migne xcvi. 1541), TERTULLIAN (*De Bapt.* c. 13), ANON. *De Rebaptismate* (c. 3), PHILASTRIUS (*Hær.* 120 and 148, ed. Oehler), CHROMATIUS (*In Matt.* iii. 14, Migne xx. 329), JEROME twice (*Ep.* 69, al. 83, and *In Isa.* i. 16; Migne xxii. 660, xxv. 35), AUGUSTINE seven times (*Opp.* ii. 1360, 1361; v. 1745; vi. 327; vii. 528; ix. 630; x. 207, ed. Bened. 2da), and a host of other Latin Fathers.

It should be observed that many of the writers whom I have cited *combine* three or four of these variations from John. It may be well to give, further, some additional illustrations of the freedom with which this passage is sometimes quoted and combined with others. One example has already been given from Clement of Alexandria. (See No. 2.) TERTULLIAN (*De Bapt.* 12) quotes it thus: "The Lord says, Except a man shall be born of water, he *hath not life*,"—Nisi natus ex aqua quis erit, non *habet vitam*. Similarly ODO CLUNIACENSIS (*Mor. in Job.* iii. 4, Migne cxxxiii. 135): "Veritas autem dicit, Nisi quis *renatus* fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu *sancto*, non *habet vitam æternam*." ANASTASIUS SINAITA, as preserved in a Latin version (*Anagog. Contempl. in Hexaëm.* lib. v., Migne lxxxix. 916), quotes the passage as follows: "dicens, Nisi quis fuerit generatus ex aqua et Spiritu *qui fertur super aquam*, non *intrabit in regnum cælorum*." The APOSTOLICAL CONSTITUTIONS (vi. 15) as edited by Cotelier and Ueltzen read: "For the Lord saith, Except a man be *baptized* with (βαπτισθῇ ἐν) water and the Spirit, he *shall in no wise* enter into the kingdom of *heaven*." Here, indeed, Lagarde, with two MSS., edits γεννηθῇ for βαπτισθῇ, but the more difficult reading may well be genuine. Compare EUTHYMIUS ZIGABENUS (*Panopl.* pars ii. tit. 23, Adv. Bogomilos, c. 16, in the Latin version in Max. Bibl. Patrum, xix.

224), "Nisi quis *baptizatus* fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu *sancto*, non *intrabit in* regnum Dei," and see Jeremy Taylor, as quoted below. DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA gives as the words of Christ (*εἶπεν δι*), "Ye must be born *of water*" (*De Trin.* ii. 12, p. 250, Migne xxxix. 672). It will be seen that all these examples purport to be express quotations.

My principal object in this long discussion has been to show how false is the assumption on which the author of *Supernatural Religion* proceeds in his treatment of Justin's quotations, and those of other early Christian writers. But the fallacy of his procedure may, perhaps, be made more striking by some illustrations of the way in which the very passage of John which we have been considering is quoted by a modern English writer. I have noted nine quotations of the passage by Jeremy Taylor, who is not generally supposed to have used many apocryphal Gospels. All of these differ from the common English version, and only two of them are alike. They exemplify *all* the peculiarities of variation from the common text upon which the writers of the Tübingen school and others have laid such stress as proving that Justin cannot have here quoted John. I will number these quotations, with a reference to the volume and page in which they occur in Heber's edition of Jeremy Taylor's Works, London, 1828, 15 vols. 8vo, giving also such specifications as may enable one to find the passages in any other edition of his complete Works; and, without copying them all in full, will state their peculiarities. No. 1. Life of Christ, Part I. Sect. IX. Disc. VI. Of Baptism, part i. § 12. Heber, vol. ii. p. 240.—No. 2. *Ibid.* Disc. VI. Of baptizing Infants, part ii. § 26. Heber, ii. 288.—No. 3. *Ibid.* § 32. Heber, ii. 292.—No. 4. Liberty of Prophesying, Sect. XVIII. § 7. Heber, viii. 153.—No. 5. *Ibid.* Ad 7. Heber, viii. 190.—No. 6. *Ibid.* Ad 18. Heber, viii. 191.—No. 7. *Ibid.* Ad 18. Heber, viii. 193.—No. 8. Disc. of Confirm. Sect. I. Heber, xi. 238.—No. 9. *Ibid.* Heber, xi. 244.

We may notice the following points:—

1. He has "unless" for "except," uniformly. This is a trifling variation; but, reasoning after the fashion of *Super-*

natural Religion, we should say that this uniformity of variation could not be referred to accident, but proved that he quoted from a different text from that of the authorized version.

2. He has "kingdom of *heaven*" for "kingdom of *God*" six times; viz., Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.

3. "*Heaven*" simply for "kingdom of God" once; No. 6.

4. "*Shall not enter*" for "*cannot enter*" four times; Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8; comp. also No. 6.

5. The second person plural, *ye*, for the third person singular, twice; Nos. 3, 7.

6. "*Baptized with water*" for "*born of water*" once; No. 7.

7. "*Born again by water*" for "*born of water*" once; No. 6.

8. "*Both of water and the Spirit*" for "*of water and of the Spirit*" once; No. 9.

9. "*Of*" is *omitted* before "the Spirit" six times; Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8.

10. "*Holy*" is *inserted* before "Spirit" twice; Nos. 1, 8.

No. 1 reads, for example, "*Unless a man be born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.*"

Supernatural Religion insists that, when Justin uses such an expression as "Christ said," we may expect a verbally accurate quotation.* Now nothing is more certain than that the Christian Fathers frequently use such a formula when they mean to give merely the substance of what Christ said, and not the exact words; but let us apply our author's principle to Jeremy Taylor. No. 3 of his quotations reads thus:

"Therefore our Lord hath defined it, *Unless ye be born of water and the Spirit, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.*"

No. 6 reads, "Though Christ said, *None but those that are born again by water and the Spirit shall enter into heaven.*"

No. 7 reads, "For Christ never said, *Unless ye be baptized*

* "Justin, in giving the words of Jesus, clearly professed to make an exact quotation."—*Supernatural Religion*, ii. 309, 7th ed.

with fire and the Spirit, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven, but of water and the Spirit he did say it."

I will add one quotation from the Book of Common Prayer, which certainly must be quoting from another apocryphal Gospel, different from those used by Jeremy Taylor (he evidently had several), inasmuch as it professes to give the very words of Christ, and gives them *twice* in precisely the same form:—

"Our Saviour Christ saith, *None can enter into the kingdom of God except he be regenerate and born anew of water and of the Holy Ghost.*" (*Public Baptism of Infants, and Baptism of those of Riper Years.*)

It has been shown, I trust, that in this quotation of the language of Christ respecting regeneration the verbal differences between Justin and John are not such as to render it improbable that the former borrowed from the latter. The variations of phraseology are easily accounted for, and are matched by similar variations in writers who unquestionably used the Gospel of John.

The positive reasons for believing that Justin derived his quotation from this source are, (1) the fact that in no other report of the teaching of Christ except that of John do we find this figure of the new birth; (2) the insistence in both Justin and John on the necessity of the new birth to an entrance into the kingdom of heaven; (3) its mention in both in connection with baptism; (4) and last and most important of all, the fact that Justin's remark on the impossibility of a second natural birth is such a platitude in the form in which he presents it, that we cannot regard it as original. We can only explain its introduction by supposing that the language of Christ which he quotes was strongly associated in his memory with the question of Nicodemus as recorded by John.* Other evidences of the use of the Fourth Gospel by Justin are the following:—

(a) While Justin's conceptions in regard to the Logos were undoubtedly greatly affected by Philo and the Alexandrian

* Engelhardt in his recent work on Justin observes: "This remark sets aside all doubt of the reference to the fourth Gospel."—*Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers*, Erlangen, 1878,

philosophy, the doctrine of the *incarnation* of the Logos was utterly foreign to that philosophy, and could only have been derived, it would seem, from the Gospel of John. He accordingly speaks very often in language similar to that of John (i. 14) of the Logos as "made flesh,"* or as "having become man."† That in the last phrase he should prefer the term "man" to the Hebraistic "flesh" can excite no surprise. With reference to the deity of the Logos and his instrumental agency in creation, compare also especially *Apol.* ii. 6, "through him God created all things" (δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐκτίσθαι), *Dial.* c. 56, and *Apol.* i. 63, with John i. 1-3. Since the Fathers who immediately followed Justin, as Theophilus, Irenæus, Clement, Tertullian, unquestionably founded their doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos on the Gospel of John, the presumption is that Justin did the same. He professes to hold his view, in which he owns that some Chris-

p. 350. Weizsäcker is equally strong.—*Untersuchungen über die evang. Geschichte*, Gotha, 1864, pp. 228, 229.

Dr. Edwin A. Abbott, in the very interesting article *Gospels* in vol. x. of the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, objects that Justin cannot have quoted the Fourth Gospel here, because "he is arguing for baptism by *water*," and "it is inconceivable that . . . he should not only quote inaccurately, but omit the very words [John iii. 5] that were best adapted to support his argument." (p. 821.) But Justin is not addressing an "argument" to the Roman Emperor and Senate for the necessity of baptism by water, but simply giving an account of Christian rites and Christian worship. And it is not the mere rite of baptism by water as such, but the necessity of the new birth through repentance and a voluntary change of life on the part of him who dedicates himself to God by this rite, on which Justin lays the main stress,— "the baptism of the soul from wrath and covetousness, envy and hatred." (Comp. *Dial.* cc. 13, 14, 18.) Moreover, the simple word ἀναγεννηθῆναι, as he uses it in the immediate context, and as it was often used, includes the idea of baptism. This fact alone answers the objection. A perusal of the chapter in which Justin treats the subject (*Apol.* i. 61) will show that it was not at all necessary to his purpose in quoting the words of Christ to introduce the ἐξ ὕδατος. It would almost seem as if Dr. Abbott must have been thinking of the Clementine Homilies (xi. 24-27; xiii. 21), where excessive importance is attached to the mere element of water.

* σαρκοποιήεις; e.g., *Apol.* c. 32, ὁ λόγος, ὃς τίνα τρόπον σαρκοποιήεις ἀνθρώπος γέγονεν. So c. 66 bis; *Dial.* cc. 45, 84, 87, 100. Comp. *Dial.* cc. 48 ("was born a man of like nature with us, having flesh"), 70 ("became embodied").

† ἀνθρώπος γενομενος; *Apol.* i. cc. 5 ("the Logos himself who took form and became man"), 23 bis, 32, 42, 50, 53, 63 bis; *Apol.* ii. c. 13; *Dial.* cc. 48, 57, 64, 67, 68 bis, 76, 85, 100, 101, 125 bis. I have availed myself in this and the preceding note of the references given by Professor Drummond in his article "Justin Martyr and the Fourth Gospel," in the *Theol. Review* for April and July, 1877; see vol. xiv., p. 172. To this valuable essay I am much indebted, and shall have occasion to refer to it repeatedly. Professor Drummond compares at length Justin's doctrine of the Logos with that of the proem to the Fourth Gospel, and decides rightly, I think, that the statement of the former "is, beyond all question, in a more developed form" than that of the latter. In John it is important to observe that λόγος is used with a meaning derived from the sense of "word" rather than "reason," as in Philo and Justin. The subject is too large to be entered upon here.

tians do not agree with him, "because we have been commanded by Christ himself not to follow the doctrines of men, but those which were proclaimed by the blessed prophets and *taught by HIM.*" (*Dial.* c. 48.) Now, as Canon Westcott observes, "the Synoptists do not anywhere declare Christ's pre-existence." * And where could Justin suppose himself to have found this doctrine taught by Christ except in the Fourth Gospel? Compare *Apol.* i. 46: "That Christ is the first-born of God, being the Logos [the divine Reason] of which every race of men have been partakers [comp. John i. 4, 5, 9], we *have been taught* and have declared before. And those who have lived according to Reason are Christians, even though they were deemed atheists; as, for example, Socrates and Heraclitus and those like them among the Greeks."

(b) But more may be said. In one place (*Dial.* c. 105) Justin, according to the natural construction of his language and the course of his argument, appears to refer to the "Memoirs" as the source from which he and other Christians had learnt that Christ as the Logos was the "only-begotten" Son of God, a title applied to him by John alone among the New Testament writers; see John i. 14, 18; iii. 16, 18. The passage reads, "For that he was the only-begotten of the Father of the universe, having been begotten by him in a peculiar manner as his Logos and Power, and having afterwards become man through the virgin, as we have learned from the Memoirs, I showed before." It is *possible* that the clause, "as we have learned from the Memoirs," refers not to the main proposition of the sentence, but only to the fact of the birth from a virgin; but the context as well as the natural construction leads to a different view, as Professor Drummond has ably shown in the article in the *Theological Review* (xiv. 178-182) already referred to in a note. He observes:—

"The passage is part of a very long comparison, which Justin institutes between the twenty-second Psalm and the recorded events of

* "Intro. to the Gospel of St. John," in *The Holy Bible . . . with . . . Commentary*, etc., ed. by F. C. Cook, *N. T.* vol. ii. (1880), p. lxxxiv.

Christ's life. For the purposes of this comparison he refers to or quotes "the Gospel" once, and "the Memoirs" ten times, and further refers to the latter three times in the observations which immediately follow. . . . They are appealed to here because they furnish the successive steps of the proof by which the Psalm is shown to be prophetic."

In this case the words in the Psalm (xxii. 20, 21) which have to be illustrated are, "Deliver my soul from the sword, and my only-begotten [Justin perhaps read "*thy* only-begotten"] from the power of the dog. Save me from the mouth of the lion, and my humiliation from the horns of unicorns." "These words," Justin remarks, "are again in a similar manner a teaching and prophecy of the things that belonged to him [τῶν ὀντων αὐτῷ] and that were going to happen. For that he was the only-begotten," etc., as quoted above. Professor Drummond well observes:—

"There is here no ground of comparison whatever except in the word μονογενής ["only-begotten"]. . . . It is evident that Justin understood this as referring to Christ; and accordingly he places the same word emphatically at the beginning of the sentence in which he proves the reference of this part of the Psalm to Jesus. For the same reason he refers not only to events, but to τὰ ὄντα αὐτῷ ["the things that belonged to him"]. These are taken up first in the nature and title of μονογενής, which immediately suggests λόγος and δύναμις ["Logos" and "power"], while the events are introduced and discussed afterwards. The allusion here to the birth through the virgin has nothing to do with the quotation from the Old Testament, and is probably introduced simply to show how Christ, although the only-begotten Logos, was nevertheless a man. If the argument were,—These words allude to Christ, because the Memoirs tell us that he was born from a virgin,—it would be utterly incoherent. If it were,—These words allude to Christ, because the Memoirs say that he was the only-begotten,—it would be perfectly valid from Justin's point of view. It would not, however, be suitable for a Jew, for whom the fact that Christ was μονογενής, not being an historical event, had to rest upon other authority; and therefore Justin changing his usual form, says that he had already explained to him a doctrine which the Christians learned from the Memoirs. It appears to me, then, most probable, that the peculiar Johannine title μονογενής existed in the Gospels used by Justin.*

In what follows, Prof. Drummond answers Thoma's ob-

* Justin also designates Christ as "the only-begotten Son" in a fragment of his work against Marcion, preserved by Irenæus, *Her.* iv. 6. § 2. Comp. Justin, *Apol.* i. c. 23; ii. c. 6; *Dial.* c. 48.

jections* to this view of the passage, correcting some mis-translations. In the expression, "as I showed before," the reference may be, not to c. 100, but to c. 61 and similar passages, where it is argued that the Logos was "begotten by God before all creatures," which implies a unique generation.

(c) In the Dialogue with Trypho (c. 88), Justin cites as the words of John the Baptist: "I am not the Christ, but the voice of one crying"; οὐκ εἰμι ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ βοῶντος. This declaration, "I am not the Christ," and this application to himself of the language of Isaiah, are attributed to the Baptist only in the Gospel of John (i. 20, 23; comp. iii. 28). Hilgenfeld recognizes here the use of this Gospel.

(d) Justin says of the Jews, "They are justly upbraided . . . by Christ himself as knowing neither the Father nor the Son" (*Apol.* i. 63). Comp. John viii. 19, "Ye neither know me nor my Father"; and xvi. 3, "They have not known the Father nor me." It is true that Justin quotes in this connection Matt. xi. 27; but his language seems to be influenced by the passages in John above cited, in which alone the Jews are directly addressed.

(e) Justin says that "Christ healed those who were blind from their birth," τοὺς ἐκ γενετῆς πηροὺς (*Dial.* c. 49; comp. *Apol.* i. 22, ἐκ γενετῆς πονηροὺς, where several editors, though not Otto, would substitute πηροὺς by conjecture). There seems to be a reference here to John ix. 1, where we have τῷ ᾧ ἐκ γενετῆς, the phrase ἐκ γενετῆς, "from birth," being peculiar to John among the Evangelists, and πηρός being a common synonyme of τῷ ᾧ; comp. the Apostolical Constitutions v. 7. § 17, where we have ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός in a clear reference

* In Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol.*, 1875, xviii. 551 ff. For other discussions of this passage, one may see Semisch, *Die apost. Denkwürdigkeiten* u.s.w., p. 188 f.; Hilgenfeld, *Krit. Untersuchungen* u.s.w., p. 300 f. (*versus* Semisch); Riggenbach, *Die Zeugnisse f. d. Ev. Johannis*, Basel, 1866, p. 163 f.; Tischendorf, *Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst?* p. 32, 4e Aufl. But Professor Drummond's treatment of the question is the most thorough.

Grimm (*Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1851, p. 687 ff.) agrees with Semisch that it is "in the highest degree arbitrary" to refer Justin's expression, "as we have learned from the Memoirs," merely to the participial clause which mentions the birth from a virgin; but like Thoma, who agrees with him that the reference is to the designation "only-begotten," he thinks that Justin has in mind merely the confession of Peter (Matt. xvi. 16), referred to in *Dial.* c. 100. This rests on the false assumption that Justin can only be referring back to c. 100, and makes him argue that "the Son" merely is equivalent to "the only-begotten Son."

to this passage of John, and the Clementine Homilies xix. 22, where *περὶ τοῦ ἐκ γενετῆς πηροῦ* occurs also in a similar reference.* John is the only Evangelist who mentions the healing of any congenital infirmity.

(f) The exact coincidence between Justin (*Apol.* i. 52; comp. *Dial.* cc. 14 (quoted as from *Hosea*), 32, 64, 118) and John (xix. 37) in citing Zechariah xii. 10 in a form different from the Septuagint, *ὁψονται εἰς ὃν ἐξεκέντησαν*, "they shall look on him whom they pierced," instead of *ἐπιβλέψονται πρὸς μὲν αὐτὸν ὃν κατωρχήσαντο*, is remarkable, and not sufficiently explained by supposing both to have borrowed from Rev. i. 7, "every eye shall see him, and they who pierced him." Much stress has been laid on this coincidence by Semisch (p. 200 ff.) and Tischendorf (p. 34); but it is possible, if not rather probable, that Justin and John have independently followed a reading of the Septuagint which had already attained currency in the first century as a correction of the text in conformity with the Hebrew.†

(g) Compare *Apol.* i. 13 (cited by Prof. Drummond, p. 323), "Jesus Christ who became our teacher of these things and *was born to this end* (*εἰς τοῦτο γεννηθέντα*), who was crucified under Pontius Pilate," with Christ's answer to Pilate (John xviii. 37), "To this end have I been born, *εἰς τοῦτο γενένημαι*, . . . that I might bear witness to the truth."

(h) Justin says (*Dial.* c. 56, p. 276 D), "I affirm that he never did or spake any thing but what he that made the world, above whom there is no other God, willed that he should both do and speak"; ‡ comp. John viii. 28, 29: "As

*The context in Justin, as Otto justly remarks, proves that *πηροῖς* must here signify "blind," not "maimed"; comp. the quotation from Isa. xxxv. 5, which precedes, and the "causing this one to see," which follows. Keim's exclamation—"not a blind man at all!"—would have been spared, if he had attended to this. (See his *Gesch. Jesu von Nazara*, i. 139, note; i. 189, Eng. trans.)

† See Credner, *Beiträge* u.s.w., ii. 293 ff.

‡ Dr. Davidson (*Introd. to the Study of the N.T.*, London, 1868, ii. 370) translates the last clause, "intended that he should do and to associate with" (sic). Though the meaning "to converse with," and then "to speak," "to say," is not assigned to *ὁμιλεῖν* in Liddell and Scott, or Rost and Palm's edition of Passow, Justin in the very next sentence uses *λαλεῖν* as an equivalent substitute, and this meaning is common in the later Greek. See Sophocles, *Greek Lex.* s.v. *ὁμιλέω*. Of Dr. Davidson's translation I must confess my inability to make either grammar or sense.

the Father taught me, I speak these things; and . . . I always do the things that please him"; also John iv. 34; v. 19, 30; vii. 16; xii. 49, 50. In the language of Trypho which immediately follows (p. 277 A), "We do not suppose that you represent him to have *said* or done or *spoken* anything contrary to the will of the Creator of the universe," we are particularly reminded of John xii. 49,—"The Father who sent me hath himself given me a commandment, what I should *say* and what I should *speak*."

(i) Referring to a passage of the Old Testament as signifying that Christ "was to rise from the dead on the third day after his crucifixion," Justin subjoins (*Dial.* c. 100), "which he received from his Father," or more literally, "which [thing] he has, having received it from his Father," ὃ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς λαβὼν ἔχει. A reference here to John x. 18 seems probable, where Jesus says respecting his life, "I have authority (ἐξουσίαν) to lay it down, and I have authority to receive it again (πάλιν λαβεῖν αὐτήν); this charge I received from my Father" (ἐλάβον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου).

(k) Justin says, "We were taught that the bread and wine were the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh." (*Apol.* i. c. 66.) This use of the term "flesh" instead of "body" in describing the bread of the Eucharist suggests John vi. 51-56.

(l) Professor Drummond notes that Justin, like John (iii. 14, 15), regards the elevation of the brazen serpent in the wilderness as typical of the crucifixion (*Apol.* i. c. 60; *Dial.* cc. 91, 94, 131), and in speaking of it says that it denoted "salvation to those who flee for refuge to him who sent his crucified Son into the world" (*Dial.* c. 91).* "Now this idea of God's sending his Son into the world occurs in the same connection in John iii. 17, and strange as it may appear, it is an idea which in the New Testament is peculiar to John." Prof. Drummond further observes that "in the four instances in which John speaks of Christ as being sent into the world, he prefers ἀποστέλλω, so that Justin's phrase is

* Or, as it is expressed in *Dial.* c. 94, "salvation to those *who believe in him* who was to die through this sign, the cross," which comes nearer to John iii. 15.

not entirely coincident with the Johannine. But the use of *πέμψω* ["to send"] itself is curious. Except by John, it is applied to Christ in the New Testament only twice, whereas John uses it [thus] twenty-five times. Justin's language, therefore, in the thought which it expresses, in the selection of words, and in its connection, is closely related to John's, and has no other parallel in the New Testament." (*Theol. Rev.* xiv. 324.) Compare also *Dial.* c. 140, "according to the will of the Father who sent him," etc., and *Dial.* c. 17, "the only blameless and righteous Light sent from God to men."

(m) Lücke, Otto,¹ Semisch, Keim, Mangold, and Drummond are disposed to find a reminiscence of John i. 13 in Justin's language where, after quoting from Genesis xlix. 11, he says, "since his blood was not begotten of human seed, but by the will of God" (*Dial.* c. 63; comp. the similar language *Apol.* i. 32; *Dial.* cc. 54, "by the power of God"; 76). They suppose that Justin referred John i. 13 to Christ, following an early reading of the passage, namely, *ὃς . . . ἐγεννήθη*, "who *was* born" [*or* "begotten"] instead of "who *were* born." We find this reading in Irenæus (*Hær.* iii. 16. § 2; 19. § 2), Tertullian (*De Carne Christi* cc. 19, 24), Ambrose once, Augustine once, also in Codex Veronensis (b) of the Old Latin, and some other authorities. Tertullian indeed boldly charges the Valentinians with corrupting the text by changing the singular to the plural. Rönisch, whom no one will call an "apologist," remarks, "The citation of these words . . . certainly belongs to the proofs that Justin Martyr knew the Gospel of John." * I have noticed this, in deference to these authorities, but am not confident that there is any reference in Justin's language to John i. 13.

(n) Justin says (*Dial.* c. 88), "The *Apostles* have written" that at the baptism of Jesus "as he came up from the water the Holy Spirit as a dove lighted upon him." The descent of the Holy Spirit as a dove is mentioned by the Apostles Matthew and John (Matt. iii. 16; John i. 32, 33). This is

* *Das neue Testament Tertullians*, Leipz. 1871, p. 654.

the only place in which Justin uses the expression "the Apostles have written."

(o) Justin says (*Dial.* c. 103) that Pilate sent Jesus to Herod *bound*. The binding is not mentioned by Luke; but if Justin used the Gospel of John, the mistake is easily explained through a confusion in memory of Luke xxiii. 7 with John xviii. 24 (comp. ver. 12); and this seems the most natural explanation; see however Matt. xxvii. 2; Mark xv. 1. Examples of such a confusion of different passages repeatedly occur in Justin's quotations from the Old Testament, as also of his citing the Old Testament for facts which it does not contain.*

(p) The remark of Justin that the Jews dared to call Jesus a magician (comp. Matt. ix. 34; xii. 24) and a *deceiver of the people* (*λαοπλανον*) reminds one strongly of John vii. 12; see however also Matt. xxvii. 63. — "Through his stripes," says Justin (*Dial.* c. 17), "there is healing to those who through him come to the Father," which suggests John xiv. 6, "No man cometh to the Father but through me"; but the reference is uncertain; comp. Eph. ii. 18, and Heb. vii. 25 with the similar expression in *Dial.* c. 43. — So also it is not clear that in the *προσκυνούμεν, λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμώντες* (*Apol.* i. 6) there is any allusion to John iv. 24. † — I pass over sundry passages where Bindemann, Otto, Semisch, Thoma, Drummond and others have found resemblances more or less striking between the language of Justin and

* See, for example, *Apol.* i. 44, where the words in Deut. xxx. 15, 19, are represented as addressed to Adam (comp. Gen. ii. 16, 17); and *Apol.* i. 60, where Justin refers to Num. xxi. 8, 9 for various particulars found only in his own imagination. The extraordinary looseness with which he quotes Plato here (as elsewhere) may also be noted (see the *Timæus* c. 12, p. 36 B, C). On Justin's quotations from the Old Testament, which are largely marked by the same characteristics as his quotations from the Gospels, see Credner, *Beiträge* u.s.w., vol. ii. (1838); Norton, *Genuineness* etc., i. 213 ff., and Addit. Notes, p. ccxviii. ff., 2d ed., 1846 (1st ed. 1837); Semisch, *Die apost. Denkwürdigkeiten* u.s.w. (1848), p. 239 ff.; Hilgenfeld, *Krit. Untersuchungen* (1850), p. 46 ff.; Westcott, *Canon*, p. 121 ff., 172 ff., 4th ed. (1875); Sanday, *The Gospels in the Second Century* (1876), pp. 40 ff., 111 ff.

† Grimm, however, finds here "an unmistakable reminiscence" of John iv. 24. He thinks Justin used *λόγῳ* for *πνεύματι* and *τιμώντες* for *προσκυνούντες* because *πνεῦμα* and *προσκυνούμεν* immediately precede. (*Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1851, p. 691.) But *λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ* seem to mean simply, "in accordance with reason and truth"; comp. *Apol.* i. 68, cited by Otto, also c. 13, *μετὰ λόγον τιμώμεν*.

John, leaving them to the not very tender mercies of Zeller * and Hilgenfeld. †

(q) Justin's vindication of Christians for not keeping the Jewish Sabbath on the ground that "God has carried on the same administration of the universe during that day as during all others" (*Dial.* c. 29, comp. c. 23) is, as Mr. Norton observes, "a thought so remarkable, that there can be little doubt that he borrowed it from what was said by our Saviour when the Jews were enraged at his having performed a miracle on the Sabbath:—'My Father has been working hitherto as I am working.'" — His argument also against the observance of the Jewish Sabbath from the fact that circumcision was permitted on that day may (*Dial.* c. 27) have been borrowed from John vii. 22, 23.

(r) I will notice particularly only one more passage, in which Professor Drummond proposes an original and very plausible explanation of a difficulty. In the larger Apology (c. 35), as he observes, the following words are quoted from Isaiah (lviii. 2), αἰτοῦσι με νῦν κρίσιν, "they now ask of me judgment"; and in evidence that this prophecy was fulfilled in Christ, Justin asserts, "they mocked him, and set him on the judgment-seat (ἐκάθισαν ἐπὶ βήματος), and said, Judge for us." This proceeding is nowhere recorded in our Gospels, but in John xix. 13 we read, "Pilate therefore brought Jesus out, and sat on the judgment-seat" (καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐπὶ βήματος). But the words just quoted in the Greek, the correspondence of which with those of Justin will be noticed, admit in themselves the rendering, "and *set him* on the judgment-seat"; and what was more natural, as Prof. Drummond remarks, than that Justin, in his eagerness to find a fulfilment of the prophecy, should take them in this sense? "He might then add the statement that the people said κρίνον ἡμῖν ['judge for us'] as an obvious inference from the fact of Christ's having been placed on the tribunal, just as in an earlier chapter (c. 32) he appends to the synoptic account the circum-

* *Die äusseren Zeugnisse . . . des vierten Evang.*, in the *Theol. Jahrbücher* (Tübingen) 1845, p. 600 ff.

† *Kritische Untersuchungen* u.s.w., p. 302 f.

stance that the ass on which Christ rode into Jerusalem was bound to a vine, in order to bring the event into connection with Genesis xlix. 11." (*Theol. Review*, xiv. 328.)

These evidences of Justin's use of the Gospel of John are strengthened somewhat by an indication, which has been generally overlooked, of his use of the First Epistle of John. In 1 John iii. 1 we read, according to the text now adopted by the best critics, as Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Alford, Westcott and Hort, "Behold what love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God; and we are so"; ἵνα τέκνα θεοῦ κληθώμεν, καὶ ἴσμεν. This addition to the common text, καὶ ἴσμεν, "and we are," is supported by a great preponderance of external evidence. Compare now Justin (*Dial.* c. 123): "We are both called true children of God, and we are so"; καὶ θεοῖν τέκνα ἀληθινὰ καλοῖμεθα καὶ ἴσμεν. The coincidence seems too remarkable to be accidental. Hilgenfeld takes the same view (*Einleit. in d. N. T.*, p. 69), and so Ewald (*Die johan. Schriften*, ii. 395, Anm. 4).

It also deserves to be considered that, as Justin wrote a work "Against all Heresies" (*Apol.* i. 26), among which he certainly included those of Valentinus and Basilides (*Dial.* c. 35), he could hardly have been ignorant of a book which, according to Irenæus, the Valentinians used *plenissime*, and to which the Basilidians and apparently Basilides himself also appealed (Hippol. *Ref. Hær.* vii. 22, 27). Credner recognizes the weight of this argument.* It can only be met by maintaining what is altogether improbable, that merely the *later* Valentinians and Basilidians made use of the Gospel, — a point which we shall examine hereafter.

In judging of the indications of Justin's use of the Fourth Gospel, the passages cited in addition to those which relate to his Logos doctrine will strike different persons differently. There will be few, however, I think, who will not feel that the one first discussed (that relating to the new birth) is in itself almost a decisive proof of such a use, and that the one relating to John the Baptist (c) is also strong. In regard to

* *Geschichte des neutest. Kanon* (1860), p. 15 f.; comp. pp. 9, 12.

not a few others, while the *possibility* of accidental agreement must be conceded, the probability is decidedly against this, and the accumulated probabilities form an argument of no little weight. It is not then, I believe, too much to say, that the strong presumption from the universal reception of our four Gospels as sacred books in the time of Irenæus that Justin's "Memoirs of Christ composed by Apostles and their companions" were the same books, is decidedly confirmed by these evidences of his use of the Fourth Gospel. We will next consider the further confirmation of this fact afforded by writers who flourished between the time of Justin and Irenæus, and then notice some objections to the view which has been presented.

The most weighty testimony is that of Tatian, the Assyrian, a disciple of Justin. His literary activity may be placed at about A.D. 155-170 (Lightfoot). In his "Address to the Greeks" he repeatedly quotes the Fourth Gospel, though without naming the author, in one case using the expression (τὸ εἰρημένον) which is several times employed in the New Testament (*e.g.* Acts ii. 16; Rom. iv. 18) in introducing a quotation from the Scriptures; see his *Orat. ad Græc.* c. 13, "And this then is that which hath been said, The darkness comprehendeth [*or* overcometh] not the light" (John i. 5); see also c. 19 (John i. 3); c. 4 (John iv. 24).^{*} Still more important is the fact that he composed a Harmony of our Four Gospels which he called the *Diatessaron* (*i.e.* "the Gospel made out of Four"). This fact is attested by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* iv. 29),† Epiphanius (*Hær.* xlv. 1), who, however, writes from hearsay, and Theodoret, who in his work on Heresies (*Hær. Fab.* i. 20) says that he found more than two hundred copies of the book held in esteem in his diocese, and substituted for it copies of our Four Gospels.

^{*} Even Zeller does not dispute that Tatian quotes the Fourth Gospel, and ascribed it to the Apostle John. (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1847, p. 158.)

† An expression used by Eusebius (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως, literally, "I know not how") has been misunderstood by many as implying that he had not seen the work; but Lightfoot has shown conclusively that this inference is wholly unwarranted. It only implies that the plan of the work seemed strange to him. See *Contemporary Review* for May, 1877, p. 1136, where Lightfoot cites 26 examples of this use of the phrase from the work of Origen against Celsus.

He tells us that Tatian, who is supposed to have prepared the Harmony after he became a Gnostic Encratite, had "cut away the genealogies and such other passages as show the Lord to have been born of the seed of David after the flesh." But notwithstanding this mutilation, the work seems to have been very popular in the orthodox churches of Syria as a convenient compendium. The celebrated Syrian Father, Ephraem, the deacon of Edessa, who died A.D. 373, wrote a commentary on it, according to Dionysius Bar-Salibi, who flourished in the last part of the twelfth century. Bar-Salibi was well acquainted with the work, citing it in his own Commentary on the Gospels, and distinguishing it from the Diatessaron of Ammonius, and from a later work by Elias Salamensis, also called Aphthonius. He mentions that it began with John i. 1 — "In the beginning was the Word." (See Assemani, *Biblioth. Orient.* ii. 158 ff.) Besides Ephraem, Aphraates, an earlier Syrian Father (A.D. 337) appears to have used it (*Hom.* i. p. 13 ed. Wright); and in the *Doctrine of Addai*, an apocryphal Syriac work, written probably not far from the middle of the third century, which purports to give an account of the early history of Christianity at Edessa, the people are represented as coming together "to the prayers of the service, and to [the reading of] the Old Testament and the New of the Diatessaron." * The *Doctrine of Addai* does not name the author of the *Diatessaron* thus read; but the facts already mentioned make the presumption strong that it was Tatian's. A scholion on Cod. 72 of the Gospels cites "Tatian's Gospel" for a remarkable reading of Matt. xxvii. 49 found in many ancient MSS.; and

* In Cureton's *Ancient Syriac Documents* (Lond. 1864) the text, published from a MS. in the British Museum, is here corrupt, reading *Ditonron*, a word without meaning; comp. Pratten's *Syriac Documents* (1871), p. 25, note, in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vol. xx. Cureton conjectured that the true reading was *Diatessaron* (see his note, p. 158), and his conjecture is confirmed by the St. Petersburg MS. published by Dr. George Phillips, *The Doctrine of Addai*, London, 1876; see his note, p. 34 f. Cureton's Syriac text (p. 15), as well as his translation (p. 15), reads *Ditonron*, not *Diornon*, as Lightfoot, Pratten, and Phillips erroneously state, being misled by a misprint in Cureton's note. Phillips gives the reading correctly in the note to his Syriac text (p. 36). Moesinger, in the work described below, is also misled, spelling the word *Diathurnun* (Præf. p. iv). The difference between *Ditonron* and *Diatessaron* in the Syriac is very slight, affecting only a single letter.

it is also cited for a peculiar reading of Luke vii. 42.* So far the evidence is clear, consistent, and conclusive; but on the ground of a confusion between Tatian's Harmony and that of Ammonius on the part of a Syrian writer of the thirteenth century (Gregorius Abulpharagius or Bar-Hebræus), and of the two *persons* by a still later writer, Ebed-Jesu, both of which confusions can be traced to a misunderstanding of the language of Bar-Salibi, and for other reasons equally weak, † the fact that Tatian's work was a Harmony of our Four Gospels has been questioned by some German critics, and of course by *Supernatural Religion*. But the whole subject has been so thoroughly discussed and its obscurities so well cleared up by Bishop Lightfoot, in an article in the *Contemporary Review* for May, 1877, that the question may be regarded as settled. ‡ Lightfoot's view is confirmed by the recent publication of Ephraem's Commentary on the

* See Tischendorf, *N.T. Gr.* ed. 8va, on Matt. xxvii. 49, and Scholz, *N.T. Gr.*, vol. i., p. cxlix., and p. 243, note x.

† Such as that Victor of Capua (A.D. 545) says that it was called *Diapente* (i.e., "made out of five"). But this is clearly a slip of the pen of Victor himself, or a mistake of some scribe; for, as Hilgenfeld (*Einleit.* p. 79, note) and Lightfoot remark, Victor is simply reporting Eusebius's account of it, and not only does Eusebius say that Tatian called it the *Diatessaron*, but Victor himself has just described it as "*unum ex quatuor*." The strange mistake, for it can be nothing else, may possibly be accounted for by the fact that *Diatessaron* and *Diapente* being both musical terms, one might naturally recall the other, and lead to an unconscious substitution on the part of some absent-minded copyist. Under no circumstances can any inference about the composition of the work be drawn from this *Diapente*, for Victor derives his information from Eusebius, and not only do all the Greek MSS. in the passage referred to read *Diatessaron*, but this reading is confirmed by the very ancient, probably contemporary, Syriac version of Eusebius, preserved in a MS. of the sixth century, and by the Latin version of Rufinus, made a century and a half before Victor wrote. (See Lightfoot, p. 1143.) The mistake ascribed to the Syriac lexicographer Bar-Bahlul is proved to be due to an interpolator. (See Lightfoot, p. 1139, note.) The statement of Epiphanius, the most untrustworthy and blundering of the Fathers, that "it is called by some the Gospel according to the Hebrews" (*Hær.* xlii. 1), if it had any foundation beyond a mere guess of the writer, may have originated from the omission of the genealogies, which were omitted also in one form of the Gospel according to the Hebrews (Epiph. *Hær.* xxx. 13, 14). The supposition that it *was* that Gospel contradicts all our information about the two works except the circumstance just mentioned; and that it had *additions* from that Gospel is a conjecture for which we have not a particle of evidence. (See Lightfoot, p. 1141; Lipsius in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.* ii. 714.)

‡ To Lightfoot's article I am much indebted. The other writers who treat of the subject most fully are Credner, *Beiträge u.s.w.*, i. 437-451, who has thrown more darkness upon it than anybody else: Daniel, *Tatianus der Apologet* (Halle, 1837), pp. 87-111, who has refuted Credner's arguments; Semisch, *Tatiani Diatessaron*, Vratisl. 1856; Hilgenfeld, *Einleit. in d. N.T.* (1875), pp. 75-79; *Supernatural Religion*, vol. ii., pp. 148-159, 7th ed. 1 and E. B. Nicholson, *The Gospel according to the Hebrews* (London, 1879), p. 16 f., and pp. 126-133, who does not appear to have seen Lightfoot's article, but exposes independently many of the errors and fallacies of *Supernatural Religion*. See also Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, iii. 292 ff.

Diatessaron, to which I have already had occasion to refer.* This exists only in an Armenian version of the Syriac, made, it is supposed, in the fifth century. The Armenian text was published in the second volume of the collected Works of St. Ephraem in Armenian, printed at Venice in 1836 (4 vols. 8vo); but Aucher's Latin translation of the Commentary, revised and edited by G. Moesinger, who compared it with another Armenian manuscript, first appeared at Venice in 1876, and the work has hitherto been almost unnoticed by scholars.† It should be observed that Ephraem's commentary is only on select passages of the Harmony, unless the work which has come down to us is merely an abridgment. But there seems to be no ground for questioning the genuineness of the work ascribed to Ephraem; and little or no ground for doubting that the Harmony on which he is commenting is Tatian's, in accordance with the account of Dionysius Bar-Salibi.‡ It agrees with what we know of Tatian's in omitting the genealogies and in beginning with the first verse of the Gospel of John. Further, the character of the text, so far as we can judge of it from a translation of a translation, is such as to lend confirmation to the view that it is Tatian's. It presents some very ancient various readings which accord remarkably with those of Justin Martyr and other early writers, and with the Curetonian Syriac where it differs from the later Peshito. ||

* See Note A in the February number of this *Review*, p. 162, no. 4.

† The volume is entitled: *Evangelii concordantis Expositio facta a Sancto Ephraemo Doctore Syro. In Latinum translata a R. P. Joanne Baptista Aucher Mechitarista cujus Versionem emendavit, Adnotationibus illustravit et edidit Dr. Georgius Moesinger.* Venetiis, Libraria PP. Mechitaristarum in Monasterio S. Lazari. 1876. 8vo. pp. xii., 292. Lipsius, art. *Gospels, Apocryphal*, in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, vol. ii. (London, 1880), p. 713, is not even aware that the Armenian translation has been published.

‡ See Moesinger, *ubi supra*, Præf. p. ii. ff.

|| We find, for example, the very ancient punctuation or construction which ends the sentence in John i. 3 with *oûti êv*, "not even one thing," connecting *ô ðéγοννεν* with ver. 4. (See Moesinger's edition, p. 5.) This accords with the citation of the passage by Tatian (*Orat. ad Græc.* c. 19). In Matt. i. 25, we read "sancte (*or* in sanctitate) habitabat cum ea" (Moesinger, pp. 23, 25, 26); so the Curetonian Syriac. In Matt. viii. 10 (p. 74), it reads, "*Non in aliquo in Israël tantam fidem inveni*," with Cod. Vaticanus (B), several of the best cursives, the MSS. a g1. k q of the Old Latin, the Curetonian Syriac, Sahidic, Coptic, and Æthiopic versions, the Harclean Syriac in the margin, Augustine once, and the "*Opus Imperfectum*" on Matt. In Matt. xi. 27 (Moesinger, pp. 117, 216), it agrees with Justin, the Clementine Homilies, and the Gnostics in Irenæus, in the transposition of the clauses relating to the Father and the Son. (See

We may regard it then, I conceive, as an established fact that Tatian's *Diatessaron* was a Harmony of our four Gospels. So difficult and laborious a work would hardly have been undertaken, except to meet a want which had been widely felt. It implies that the four books used were recognized by those for whom it was intended as authoritative, and as possessing equal authority. Can we then believe that Tatian's Harmony represented a different set of books from the "Memoirs called Gospels" of his master Justin, which were read at the meetings for public worship in churches all over the Christian world as the authentic records of the life and teaching of Christ, the production of Apostles and their companions? Does not Tatian's unquestionable use of the Gospel of John in particular confirm the strong presumption from other facts that this Gospel was included in the "Memoirs" used by his master and by Christians generally twenty years before?

This presumption receives further confirmation from other testimonies to the existence and use of the Fourth Gospel between the time of Justin Martyr and Irenæus.

The treatise or fragment *On the Resurrection*, which Otto with many others ascribes to Justin, if not genuine, probably belongs to this period. In c. 1 we read, "The Logos of God, who was [*or* became] his Son, came to us clothed in flesh, revealing both himself and the Father, giving to us in himself the resurrection from the dead and the eternal life which follows." The allusions here to John i. 1, 14; xiv. 9; xi. 25, 26, seem unmistakable. So in c. 9, "He permitted them to handle him, and showed in his hands the marks of the nails," we have a reference to John xx. 25, 27, as well as to Luke xxiv. 39.

Melito, bishop of Sardis (*cir.* A.D. 165), in a fragment from

Note A, under no. 4.) In Matt. xix. 17, the text is given in Ephraem's commentary in different forms, but it seems to be, substantially, "Unus tantum est bonus, Pater (*or* Deus Pater) qui in cælis" (Moesinger, pp. 169, 170, 173); similarly, Justin Martyr once (*Dial.* c. 101), the Naassenes in Hippolytus (*Adv. Hær.* v. 7, p. 102), the Marcosians in Irenæus (*Hær.* i. 20. § 2), and the Clementine Homilies (xviii. 1, 3); see, for the numerous variations of reading here, Tischendorf's *N. T. Gr.* ed. 8va, *in loc.* Notice also the reading of John vii. 8 ("Non ascendo," Moesinger, p. 167); John iii. 13, quoted without the last clause of *text. recept.* (pp. 187, 189, comp. 168); John x. 8 (*ante me*, p. 200); Luke xxii. 44 ("et factus est sudor ejus ut guttæ sanguinis," p. 235; comp. Justin, *Dial.* c. 103).

his work on the Incarnation preserved by Anastasius Sinaita, speaks of Christ as "giving proof to us of his deity by signs [wrought] in the three years after his baptism, and of his humanity in the thirty years before his baptism." * This assignment of a duration of three years to his ministry must have been founded on the Gospel of John, which mentions three Passovers (ii. 13; vi. 4; xi. 55) besides the "feast of the Jews" referred to in John v. 1.

Claudius Apollinaris, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia (*cir.* A.D. 166), in a treatise on the Paschal Festival, refers to the apparent difference between John and the Synoptic Gospels as to the time of the death of Jesus. Apollinaris, relying on the Gospel of John, held that it was on the day on which the paschal lamb was killed, the 14th of Nisan; his opponents, appealing to the Gospel of Matthew, maintained that it was on the day following. Both Gospels were evidently received as authoritative by both parties.† He also refers in the same work to the piercing of the side of Jesus and the effusion of water and blood, mentioned only by John (xix. 34).‡

The Epistle of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons in Gaul to those of Asia and Phrygia, giving an account of their persecutions (A.D. 177), quotes the following as the words of the Lord: "There shall come a time in which whosoever killeth you shall think that he is offering a religious service to God," *λατρείαν προσφέρειν τῷ θεῷ*. The expression in the last clause is the same which is inadequately rendered in the common version "doeth God service" (John xvi. 2).|| The use of the word *παράκλητος* a little before in the Epistle, "having the

* See Anast. Sinait. *Hodeg.* or *Via Dux*, c. 13, in Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* lxxxix. col. 229, or Melito, Frag. vi. in Otto, *Corp. Apol. Christ.*, vol. ix. (1872), p. 416.

† *Chronicon Paschale*, vol. i., pp. 13, 14, ed. Dindorf; Apollinaris in Routh's *Rel. sacræ*, ed. alt. (1846), i. 160; or Otto, *Corp. Apol. Christ.*, ix. 486 f.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 14, ed. Dindorf; Routh, *ibid.* p. 161; Otto, *ubi supra*. For a full view of the evidence of Melito and Apollinaris, and of the considerations which give it weight, see Lightfoot's article, "The Later School of St. John," in the *Contemporary Review* for February, 1876, xxvii. 471 ff.

|| The letter is preserved in large part by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* v. cc. 1-4. It may be consulted conveniently in Routh, *Rel. sacræ*, i. 295 ff., ed. alt. For the quotation, see *Epist.* c. 4; Routh, p. 300; Euseb. v. i. § 15.

Paraclete within him," also suggests the Gospel of John; comp. John xiv. 16, 17.*

Athenagoras the Athenian (*cir.* A.D. 176), in his *Plca for Christians* addressed to M. Aurelius and Commodus, speaking of "the Logos of God the Father," says that "through him all things were made" (*δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο*), the Father and the Son being one; and the Son being in the Father, and the Father in the Son"; language which seems evidently founded on John i. 3; x. 30, 38; xiv. 10, 11; xvii. 21, 22.†

Theophilus, bishop of Antioch A.D. 169–181, in his work in defence of Christianity addressed to Autolycus (A.D. 180), says, "The Holy Scriptures teach us, and all who were moved by the Spirit, among whom John says, 'In the beginning was the word [*or* Logos], and the Word was with God.'" He proceeds to quote John i. 3.‡

The Muratorian Canon (*cir.* A.D. 170), as has already been mentioned, ascribes the Gospel to the Apostle John, and gives an account of the circumstances under which it was written, fabulous doubtless in some of its details, but having probably a basis of truth. ||

Celsus, the celebrated heathen adversary of Christianity (A.D. 178, Keim), professedly founds his statements concerning the history of Christ on "the writings of his disciples";** and his accounts are manifestly based on our four Gospels,††

* *Epist.* c. 3; Routh, p. 298; Euseb. v. 1. § 10. In the same section we have other expressions apparently borrowed from John xv. 13 and 1 John iii. 16. See, further, Lightfoot's article, "The Churches of Gaul," in the *Contemp. Review* for August, 1876, xxviii. 405 ff. An English translation of the Fragments of Melito and Apollinaris, and of the Epistle of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, will be found appended to vol. ii. of Lactantius, in vol. xxii. of the Ante-Nicene Christian Library.

† *Suppl. pro Christ.* c. 10, p. 46, ed. Otto.

‡ *Ad Autol.* ii. 22, pp. 118–120, ed. Otto.

|| See on this subject Lightfoot in the *Contemp. Review* for October, 1875, xxvi. 835 ff.; Matthew Arnold, *God and the Bible*, p. 248 (Eng. ed.); and Westcott, "Introd. to the Gospel of St. John," in *The Holy Bible . . . with . . . Commentary*, etc., ed. by F. C. Cook, V.T., vol. ii. p. xxxv.

** Origen, *Cels.* ii. 13, 74; comp. 32, 53. He quotes these writings as possessing among Christians unquestioned authority: "We need," says he, "no other witness; for you fall upon your own swords" (ii. 74).

†† See fully in Lardner, *Testimonies of Ancient Heathens*, ch. xviii., *Works*, vii. 210–278; Kirchhofer, *Quellensammlung zur Gesch. des neutest. Canons* (1844), pp. 330–349; Keim, *Celsus' Wahres Wort* (1873), pp. 223–230. Comp. Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, i. 142 ff.; E. A. Abbott, art. *Gospels*, in the *Encyc. Britannica*, 9th ed., x. 818.

though he does not name their authors. He refers to several circumstances peculiar to the narrative of John, as the blood which flowed from the body of Jesus at his crucifixion,* and the fact that Christ "after his death arose, and showed the marks of his punishment, and how his hands had been pierced."† He says that "some relate that one, and some that two angels came to the sepulchre, to announce that Jesus was risen."‡ Matthew and Mark speak of but one angel, Luke and John mention two. He says that the Jews "challenged Jesus *in the temple* to produce some clear proof that he was the Son of God."|| He appears also to allude to the cry of Jesus, "I thirst," recorded only by John.** Referring to a declaration of Jesus, he satirically exclaims, "O Light and Truth!" designations of Christ characteristic of John's Gospel.†† He says that Jesus "after rising from the dead showed himself secretly to one woman only, and to his boon companions."‡‡ Here the first part of the statement seems to refer to John's account of the appearance of Christ to Mary Magdalene.

The heretical writings of this period clearly recognize the Fourth Gospel. Notwithstanding several apparent quotations or allusions, it was formerly maintained that the author of the Clementine Homilies could not possibly have used this Gospel, it being in such opposition to his opinions. But since the discovery of the Codex Ottobonianus, containing the missing portion of the book (first published by Dressel in his edition of the Homilies in 1853), there has been a change of view. That portion contains so clear a quotation of John ix. 1-3 (*Hom.* xix. 22) that Hilgenfeld has handsomely retracted his denial;||| and, though Scholten and *Supernatu-*

* Origen, *Cels.* ii. 36, also i. 66; comp. John xix. 34.

† Origen, *Cels.* ii. 55, 59; John xx. 25, 27.

‡ Origen, *Cels.* v. 52, 56; John xx. 12; comp. Luke xxiv. 4, 23.

|| Origen, *Cels.* i. 67; John ii. 18; comp. x. 23, 24. (*Matt.* xxi. 23.)

** Origen, *Cels.* ii. 37; John xix. 28.

†† Origen, *Cels.* ii. 49; John viii. 12; ix. 5; xii. 46; xiv. 6.

‡‡ Origen, *Cels.* ii. 70; John xx. 14-18. Compare, however, the Addition to Mark, xvi. 9.

||| *Einleit. in d. N.T.*, p. 43 f., note; comp. Matthew Arnold, *God and the Bible*, p. 277. Volkmar also recognizes the use of the Fourth Gospel here, but only as "an unapostolic *novum*"

ral Religion still resist the evidence, there can be little doubt about the final verdict of impartial criticism. Besides this passage and that about the new birth,* the Gospel of John seems to be used twice in *Hom.* iii. 52, once in a free quotation: "I am the gate of life; he that entereth in through me entereth into life, for there is no other teaching that can save" (comp. John x. 9, 10); and again, "My sheep hear my voice" (comp. John x. 27).

More important, and beyond any dispute, is the evidence of the use of the Fourth Gospel as the work of the Apostle John by the Gnostics of this period. Ptolemy, the disciple of Valentinus, in his Epistle to Flora, preserved by Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxxiii. 3), quotes John i. 3 as what "the Apostle says";† and, in the exposition of the Ptolemæo-Valentinian system given by Irenæus, a long passage is quoted from Ptolemy or one of his school in which he is represented as saying that "John, the disciple of the Lord, supposes a certain Beginning," etc., citing and commenting on John i. 1-5, 14, 18, in support of the Valentinian doctrine of the Ogdoad.‡ The Valentinians, indeed, as we are told by Irenæus elsewhere, used the Gospel of John most abundantly (*Hær.* iii. 11. § 7). Heracleon, another disciple of Valentinus, wrote a commentary on it, large extracts from which are preserved by Origen.|| The book commonly cited as *Excerpta Theodoti* or *Doctrina Orientalis*, a compilation (with criticisms) from the writings of Theodotus and other Gnostics of the second century, ascribed to Clement of Alexandria and

(*Ursprung uns. Evv.*, 1866, p. 62 f., 134 f.). The question is well treated by Sanday, *The Gospels in the Second Century*, pp. 293 ff. It is to be observed that the incident of "the man blind from his birth" is introduced in the Homilies (xix. 22) as it is in the Apostolical Constitutions (v. 7. § 17) with the use of the definite article, as something well-known to the readers of the book. How does this happen, if the writer is taking it from "an unapostolic *novum*"? Drummond and Sanday have properly called attention to this use of the article.

* *Hom.* xi. 26; see the March number of this *Review*, p. 242.

† I follow the text of Dindorf in his edition of Epiphanius, vol. ii., pp. 199, 200, who reads τὰ τε πάντα for ἀτε πάντα and γεγενῆσθαι οὐδέν for γέγονεν οὐδέν.

‡ *Iren. Hær.* i. 8. § 5. The old Latin version of Irenæus, which is often more trustworthy than the Greek as preserved by Epiphanius, ends the section referred to with the words: *Et Ptolemæus quidem ita*. For the Greek, generally, see Epiphanius, *Hær.* xxxi. 27, in Dindorf's edition, which gives the best text.

|| These are collected in Grabe's *Spicilegium SS. Patrum*, etc., ii. 85-117, 237, ed. alt. (1714), and in Stieren's *Irenæus*, i. 938-971.

commonly printed with his works, contains many extracts from one or more writers of the Valentinian school, in which the Gospel of John is quoted and commented upon as the work of the Apostle. (See particularly cc. 6-8, also 3, 9, 13, 17-19, 26, 41, 45, 61, 62, 65, 73.)

The literature of the third quarter of the second century is fragmentary, but we have seen that it attests the use of the Fourth Gospel in the most widely separated regions of the Christian world, and by parties diametrically opposed in sentiment. The fact that this Gospel was used by those to whose opinions it was or seemed to be adverse—by the author of the Clementine Homilies, by Quartodecimans and their opponents, and especially by the Gnostics, who were obliged to wrest its language so violently to accommodate it to their systems—shows that to have won such a reception at that time it must have come down from an earlier period with commanding authority. Its use in Tatian's Diatessaron also makes this evident. It must have belonged to those "Memoirs" to which Justin appealed fifteen or twenty years before, and which were recognized by the Christians generally of his day as the authentic sources of information respecting the life and teaching of Christ. The particular evidence we have been examining, limited as it is by the scantiness of the literature, strengthens the general conclusion before drawn from the universal reception of our four Gospels in the time of Irenæus, and from the direct indications of the use of the Fourth Gospel by Justin. The evidence that this Gospel was one of his "Memoirs" is thus cumulative, and, unless it is countervailed by some very strong objections, must be regarded as decisive. Let us then consider the main objections which have been urged against this conclusion.

The first is that, according to *Supernatural Religion*, "The description which Justin gives of the manner of the teaching of Jesus excludes the idea that he knew the Fourth Gospel. 'Brief and concise were the sentences uttered by him: for he was no Sophist, but his word was the power of God.'

No one could for a moment assert that this applies to the long and artificial discourses of the Fourth Gospel." *

Here we may observe, in the first place, that Justin's Greek is not quite accurately translated. † The word rendered "sentences" is without the article; and Prof. Drummond translates the clause more correctly, "Brief and concise sayings have proceeded from him," remarking that "Justin is describing not the universal, but only the prevailing and prominent character of his teaching." ‡ And it is not a description of the teaching in the Fourth Gospel in particular, but a general statement, not inconsistent with the fact that the character of the discourses in the Fourth Gospel is in some respects peculiar. But, as to "brief and concise sayings" of Jesus, Professor Drummond, in glancing over the first thirteen chapters of John, finds no less than fifty-three to which this description would apply. He observes that "the book contains in reality very little connected argumentation; and even the longest discourses consist rather of successive pearls of thought strung on a thread of association than of consecutive discussion and proof." || But it may be greatly doubted whether Justin means here by *βραχεῖς λόγοι*, as Tayler supposes, simply "short, aphoristic maxims." The reference to the Sophists, that is, rhetoricians, leads one rather to suppose that Justin is contrasting the *λόγοι*, "discourses," of Christ in general with the long, artificial, argumentative, and rhetorical *λόγοι* of the Sophists among his earlier or later contemporaries, such as Dion Chrysostomus, Herodes Atticus, Polemo and Aristides, whom Philostratus describes in his biographies. As for brevity, the discourses in the Fourth Gospel are generally short: the longest continuous discourse there recorded

* *Sup. Rel.*, ii. 314; similarly J. J. Tayler, *An Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel* (1867), p. 64; Davidson, *Introd. to the Study of the N.T.* (1868), ii. 386, and many others.

† *Apol.* i. 14: *βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν*. It may be thought, perhaps, that *οἱ* has dropped out after *σύντομοι*, which might easily have happened. But, even if the article had been used, the argument would be worthless. Such general propositions are seldom to be taken without qualification.

‡ *Theol. Review*, July, 1877, xiv. 330.

|| *Ibid.* pp. 330, 331.

would hardly occupy five minutes in the reading. The Sermon on the Mount as given by Matthew is much longer than any unbroken discourse in John. But what characterizes the teaching of Christ in the Gospels, as Justin intimates, is the divine authority and spiritual power with which he speaks; and this is not less striking in the Fourth Gospel than in the Synoptists. (Comp. Matt. vii. 29; Luke iv. 32; John vii. 26, 46.)

A more plausible objection is this. If Justin knew and used the Fourth Gospel at all, why has he not used it more? Why has he never appealed to it in proof of his doctrine of the Logos and of the pre-existence of Christ? He has expressly quoted but one saying of Christ recorded in it, and one of John the Baptist, and has referred to but one incident peculiar to it, unless we adopt the view of Professor Drummond respecting his reference to John xix. 13. (See above, p. 168.) His account of Christ's life and teaching corresponds substantially with that given in the Synoptic Gospels, which he follows (so it is affirmed) where they differ, or seem to differ, from John. Albrecht Thoma, in an article in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, comes to the conclusion, after a minute examination of the subject, that Justin "knows and uses almost every chapter of the Logos-Gospel, and in part very fully." But such considerations as I have mentioned convince him, notwithstanding, that he did not regard it as apostolic, or historically authentic. He finds Justin's relation to the Apostle Paul very similar. Justin shows himself well acquainted with Paul's writings, he often follows him in his citations from the Old Testament where they differ from the Septuagint, he borrows largely his thoughts and illustrations and language, but never quotes him expressly and by name; and so Mr. Thoma thinks he cannot have regarded him as an Apostle.*

This argument forgets the nature of Justin's writings. Were he addressing a Christian community in defence of his

* See the article, "Justins literarisches Verhältniss zu Paulus und zum Johannes-Evangelium," in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wissenschaft. Theologie*, 1875, xviii. 383 ff., 490 ff. The quotation in the text is from p. 553.

doctrine of the pre-existence and subordinate deity of Christ in opposition to the Ebionites, these objections would be valid. But he was writing for unbelievers. In his Apologies addressed to the Emperor and Senate and people of Rome, he cannot quote the Christian writings in *direct* proof of the truth of Christian doctrines, and makes no attempt to do so. In giving the account which he does of the teaching of Christ, he draws mainly from the Sermon on the Mount, and in his sketch of the Gospel history follows mainly the guidance of Matthew, though also using Luke, and in two or three instances Mark. That is exactly what was to be expected. Justin's chief argument is derived from the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies, and in this he naturally follows the Gospel of Matthew, which is distinguished from the others by its reference to them. Where Matthew's citations differ from the Alexandrine version of the Old Testament, Justin often appears to borrow from Matthew rather than from the Septuagint.* The discourses of Christ as they are given in the Synoptic Gospels were obviously much better fitted for his purpose of presenting to heathens a general view of Christ's teaching than those in the Gospel of John. Similar remarks apply to the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew. Here Dr. Davidson thinks it strange that Justin should not have quoted the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, and such a passage as "Before Abraham was, I am," in proof of Christ's divinity and pre-existence.† But the Jew with whom Justin was arguing would not have accepted an assertion of John or a declaration of Christ as a proof of its truth. So in the case of Paul's writings. Paul was not so popular among the Jews that his name would recommend the arguments or illustrations which Justin borrows from him; still less could Justin quote his Epistles in proof of doctrine in a discussion with a Jew, or in a defence of Christianity addressed to heathens.

* See Semisch, *Die apost. Denkwürdigkeiten* u.s.w., pp. 110-120; examples are also given by Norton, *Genuineness*, etc., vol. i. Addit. Notes, pp. ccxx., ccxxii., cccxxxii. f.

† Davidson's *Introd. to the Study of the N. T.* (1868), ii. 385. Compare Volkmar, *Ueber Justin den Märtyrer* u.s.w. (Zürich, 1853), p. 20 f.; *Ursprung uns. Evang.* (1866), p. 107 f.; Thoma, *ubi supra*, p. 556.

The correctness of this explanation is confirmed by an indisputable fact. Justin certainly believed that the Apostle John was the author of the Apocalypse; *Supernatural Religion* (i. 295) thinks that this was the only book of the New Testament which he regarded as "inspired"; Thoma (p. 563, note 1) even supposes that it was read in the churches in Justin's time together with the "Memoirs" and the Prophets of the Old Testament. How, then, does it happen that he has not a single quotation from this book which calls Christ "the Word [Logos] of God" (Rev. xix. 13), "the beginning of the creation of God" (iii. 14), "the first and the last and the living one" (i. 17, comp. ii. 8), "the searcher of the reins and hearts" (ii. 23), and, apparently (though according to Alford and Westcott not really), "the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end" (xxii. 13)? In speaking of the different opinions among Christians about the resurrection, Justin once refers to the book as agreeing with the prophets in predicting the Millennium, and mentions the name of the author (*Dial.* c. 81; the passage will be cited below); but, as I have said, he nowhere *quotes* this work, which he regarded as inspired, apostolic, prophetic, though it contains so much which might seem to favor his view of the person of Christ. Were it not for that almost accidental reference to it, it might be plausibly argued that he was ignorant of its existence. In one place in the Dialogue with Trypho (c. 18), Justin half apologizes for subjoining "some brief sayings" of the Saviour to the words of the Prophets, on the ground that Trypho had acknowledged that he had read the precepts of Christ "in the so-called Gospel" (*Dial.* c. 10). But he does not introduce them there as arguments.

It should be observed, further, that the course pursued by Justin in abstaining from quoting the Gospels in proof of doctrines, and in not mentioning the Evangelists by name, in writings addressed to unbelievers, is simply that which was followed, with slight exceptions, by a long line of Christian Apologists from his time down to that of Eusebius.*

* See Norton, *Gen. of the Gospels*, i. 218 ff.; Westcott, *Canon of the N.T.*, p. 116 ff.; E. S. Foulkes, art. *Fathers*, in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, ii. 456 f.

It may still be said that this applies only to quotations made in proof of *doctrines*. It may be asked, and there is some force in the question, Why has not Justin used John as he has used the Synoptic Gospels, as an authority for historical facts, for facts which he supposed to be predicted in the Old Testament? To take one example which has been urged: Justin has quoted from the Old Testament, in precisely the same form as John (differing from the established text of the Septuagint), the words, "They shall look on me whom they pierced":* but instead of referring to the incident which led John to quote it,—the thrusting of a spear into our Saviour's side by a Roman soldier,—he seems to apply it to the crucifixion generally. How could he do this, if he accepted the Gospel of John?†

This case presents little difficulty. The verbs in the quotation, it will be observed, are in the plural. If Justin regarded the prophecy as including the act of the Roman soldier, he could not have restricted it to that: he must have regarded the language of the Old Testament as referring also to the piercing of the hands and the feet of Jesus on the part of the soldiers who nailed him to the cross. It is not strange, therefore, that he should quote the passage without referring to the particular act mentioned by John. He applies the prophecy, moreover, to the Jews, who *caused* the death of Jesus, and not to the Roman soldiers, who were the immediate agents in the crucifixion.‡

But there is a stronger case than this. Justin, who speaks of Christ as "the passover" or paschal lamb, symbolizing the deliverance of Christian believers from death, "as the blood of the passover saved those who were in Egypt" (*Dial.* c. 111, comp. 40), has not noticed the fact recorded by John alone, that the legs of Christ were not broken by the Roman soldiers at the crucifixion. This the Evangelist regards as a fulfilment of the scripture, "A bone of him shall not be

* Zech. xii. 10; John xix. 37; Justin, *Apol.* i. 52. See above, p. 494 f.

† Thoma, pp. 542 f., 556; comp. Engelhardt, *Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers* (1878), p. 350.

‡ *Apol.* i. 52; *Dial.* cc. 14, 32, 64, 118; comp. *Dial.* cc. 85, 93, etc.; Acts ii. 23; x. 39.

broken"; and this quotation is commonly referred to the direction respecting the paschal lamb (Ex. xii. 46; Num. ix. 12). How, it may be asked, could Justin, with his fondness for types, have neglected such a fulfilment as this, when the Evangelist had already pointed it out? This argument is plausible, and has some weight. Let us consider it.

In the first place, I must venture to doubt whether there is any reference in John to the paschal lamb at all. The Evangelist says nothing whatever to indicate such a reference, though some explanation would seem to be needed of the transformation of a precept into a prediction. The language of Ps. xxxiv. 20 (Sept. xxxiii. 21) corresponds more closely with the citation; and, considering the free way in which passages of the Old Testament are applied in the New, the fact that in the connection in which the words stand in the Psalm protection of life is referred to does not seem a very serious objection to the supposition that the Evangelist had this passage in mind. He may well have regarded the part of the Psalm which he quotes as fulfilled in the case of "Jesus Christ the righteous" in the incident which he records, and the preceding verse as fulfilled in the resurrection. And some eminent scholars take this view of his meaning; so, *e.g.*, Grotius, Wetstein, Bishop Kidder, Hammond, Whitby, Brückner, Bäumlein, Weiss; * others, as Lenfant and Le Clerc, leave the matter doubtful; and some, as Vitringa and Bengel, suppose the Evangelist to have had both passages in mind. But, waiving this question, I would say, once for all, that very little importance is to be attached to this sort of *a priori* reasoning. We may be surprised that Justin should not have been led by the Fourth Gospel to find here a fulfilment of prophecy of some sort, and to use it in his argument; but a hundred cases equally surprising might be cited of the neglect of a writer to use an argument or to recognize a fact which we should have confidently expected that he would use or recognize. To take the first that lies at hand. I have before me the work of Dr. Sanday,

* *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.*, 3^e Aufl. (1880), p. 638; comp. his *Der Johanneische Lehrbegriff* (1862), p. 114, note. So R. H. Hutton, *Essays, Theol. and Literary*, 2d ed. (1880), i. 195.

The Gospels in the Second Century, a learned, elaborate, and valuable treatise in reply to *Supernatural Religion*. He adduces from all sources the evidence of the use of the Gospels by writers who flourished in the period from Clement of Rome to Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, including those whose references to the Gospel are very slight and doubtful, or of whom mere fragments remain. Appended to the work is a chronological and analytical table of these authors. But, on looking it over, we find no mention of Theophilus, bishop of Antioch A.D. 169–181; and Dr. Sanday has nowhere presented the testimony of this writer, though we have from him an elaborate “Apology” or defence of Christianity in three books, in which he quotes several passages from the Gospel of Matthew with the introduction, “The evangelic voice teaches” so and so, or “the Gospel says,”* and though, as we have seen, he quotes the Gospel of John (ch. i. 1, 3), naming the Evangelist, and describing him as one moved by the Spirit of God (see above, p. 176 f.) He is in fact the earliest writer who does thus expressly quote the Fourth Gospel as the work of John. Now suppose Dr. Sanday was a Father of the third or fourth century who had composed a treatise with the purpose of collecting the evidences of the use of the Gospels by early Christian writers. What would the author of *Supernatural Religion* say to the facts in this case? Would he not argue that Sandæus could not possibly have been acquainted with this work of Theophilus, and that the pretended “Apology” was probably spurious? And, if he found in Sandæus (p. 303) a single apparent allusion to that writer, would he not maintain that this must be an interpolation?—Or to take another example. Sandæus is examining the question about Justin Martyr’s use of the Gospels, and observes that “he says emphatically that all the children (πάντας ἀπλῶς τοὺς παῖδας) in Bethlehem were slain, without mentioning the limitation of age given in St. Matthew” (p. 106; comp. Justin, *Dial.* c. 78). Now in our present texts of Justin there is another

* *Ad Autol.* lib. iii. cc. 13, 14, ed. Otto; comp. *Matt.* v. 28, 44, 46; vi. 3.

reference to the slaughter of the innocents, in which Herod is represented as "destroying all the children born in Bethlehem *at that time*." * But here *Supernatural Religion* might argue, It is certain that this qualifying phrase could not have been in the copy used by Sandæus, who takes no notice of the passage, though his aim is to meet the objections to the genuineness of our Gospels. Is it not clear that the words were interpolated by some one who wished to bring Justin into harmony with Matthew? Would Justin be so inconsistent with himself as that addition would make him?

A multitude of questions may be asked, to which no particular answer can be given, in reference to the use which Justin and writers in all ages have made of our Gospels. We cannot say why he has quoted this saying of Jesus and not that, or referred to this incident in the history and not that; why, for example, in his account of Christ's teaching in his First Apology, he makes no allusion to any of the parables which form so remarkable a feature of it, and quotes from them in but one place in his Dialogue with Trypho (*Dial.* c. 125). We can only say that he had to stop somewhere; † that he has used the Gospels much more freely than any other of the many Christian Apologists whose writings have come down to us from his day to that of Lactantius and Eusebius; that his selection of the sayings of Christ seems on the whole judicious and natural, though many pearls of great price are missing; that the historical incidents by which he supports his special argument from the fulfilment of prophecy are for the most part what might be expected; and that it was natural that in general he should follow the Synoptic Gospels rather than that of John. ‡ But one needs only to try experiments on particular works by almost any writer to find that great caution is required in drawing inferences from what he has *not* done.

* *Dial.* c. 103: ἀνελόντος πάντας τοὺς ἐν Βηθλεὲμ ἐκείνου τοῦ καιροῦ γεννηθέντας παῖδας.

† *Comp. Apol.* i. 53: "Here we conclude, though we have many other prophecies to produce."

‡ See on this point Meyer, *Komm. über d. Ev. Joh.*, 5^e Aufl. (1869), p. 8 f., note (Eng. trans., p. 8 f., note 3); comp. Weissäcker, *Untersuchungen über d. evang. Geschichte*, p. 229.

As to the case before us, Justin may not have thought of the incident peculiar to the Fourth Gospel, or he may have considered, and very reasonably too, that an argument for the typical character of the paschal lamb founded on the direction given in the Pentateuch about the bones, or an argument *assuming* the Messianic reference of the passage in the Psalms, was not well adapted to convince unbelievers. Perhaps he had urged this argument in the actual dialogue with Trypho, and had encountered objections to its validity which he did not find it easy to answer. This may seem more probable than the supposition of forgetfulness. But will you say that such a failure of memory as has been suggested is incredible? Let us compare a case. One of the most distinguished scholars of this country, in an article published in the *American Biblical Repository*, remarks, in the course of an elaborate argument:—

The particulars inserted or omitted by different Evangelists vary exceedingly from each other, some inserting what others omit, and some narrating at length what others briefly touch. *E. g.*, compare the history of the temptation by Mark, and even by Matthew and Luke; and where is the history of the *transfiguration* to be found, except in Matthew?*

Could anything be *a priori* more incredible than that an eminent Biblical scholar, who when this was written had held the office of Professor of Sacred Literature in the Andover Theological Seminary for nearly thirty years, should have forgotten that both Mark and Luke have given full accounts of the transfiguration, the latter especially mentioning a number of important particulars not found in Matthew?† If Professor Stuart was occasionally guilty of oversights,—as who is not?—he certainly had a clearer head and a better memory than Justin Martyr, who in quoting and referring to the Old Testament makes not a few extraordinary mistakes.‡

I admit that some weight should be allowed to the argu-

* *American Biblical Repository*, October, 1838, xii. 341.

† Compare Mark ix. 2-8 and Luke ix. 28-36 with Matt. xvii. 1-8.

‡ See the references already given, p. 167, note*; also *Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr*, by John (Kaye), Bishop of Lincoln, 3d ed. (1853), pp. 139 f., 148; comp. p. 129 f.

ment we have been examining, so far as reference to the history in the Gospel of John is concerned ; but it does not seem to me that much importance should be attached to it. The tradition in the Synoptic Gospels represents without doubt the substance of the apostolic preaching ; it was earlier committed to writing than that contained in the Fourth Gospel ; the incidents of the threefold narrative were more familiar ; and the discourses, especially, as has already been remarked, were far better fitted for illustrating the general character of Christ's teaching than those of the Fourth Gospel. It would have been very strange, therefore, if in such works as those of Justin the Synoptic Gospels had not been mainly used.

Engelhardt, the most recent writer on Justin, is impressed by the facts which Thoma presents respecting Justin's relation to John, but comes to a different conclusion. He thinks Justin could never have made the use of John's Gospel which he has done, if he had not regarded it as genuine. It purports to be a work of the beloved disciple. The conjecture that by "the disciple whom Jesus loved" Andrew was intended (Lützelberger), or Nathanael (Spaeth), or a personified ideal conception (Scholten), was reserved for the sagacity of critics of the nineteenth century : there is no trace that in Christian antiquity this title ever suggested any one but John. The Gospel must have been received as his work, or rejected as fictitious. Engelhardt believes that Justin received it, and included it in his "Memoirs" ; but he conjectures that with it there was commonly read in the churches and used by Justin a Harmony of the first three Gospels, or at least of Matthew and Luke, while the Fourth Gospel, not yet incorporated into the Harmony, stood in the background.* I do not feel the need of this hypothesis ; but it may deserve consideration.

It is objected further that Justin's statements repeatedly contradict the Fourth Gospel, and that he cannot therefore have regarded it as apostolic or authentic. For example, he follows the Synoptic Gospels, so Hilgenfeld and David-

* See Engelhardt, *Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers*, pp. 345-352.

son and *Supernatural Religion* affirm, in placing, in opposition to John, the death of Christ on the 15th of Nisan, the day after the paschal lamb was killed.

The argument that Justin cannot have accepted the Gospel of John because he has followed the Synoptists in respect to the day of Christ's death hardly needs an answer. If the discrepancy referred to, whether real or not, did not prevent the whole Christian world from accepting John and the Synoptic Gospels alike in the last quarter of the second century, it need not have hindered Justin from doing so at an earlier date. But it is far from certain that Hilgenfeld and Davidson have correctly interpreted the language of Justin: "It is written that you seized him on the day of the passover, and in like manner crucified him at [or during] the passover (*ἐν τῇ πάσχα*)."* Meyer understands this as placing the death of Jesus on the day of the passover; † Otto in an elaborate note on the passage in his *third* edition of Justin's Works maintains the same view; ‡ Thoma regards the language as ambiguous. || I will not undertake to pronounce an opinion upon so difficult a question, as the objection is futile on any supposition.

Again, *Supernatural Religion* asserts that "Justin contradicts the Fourth Gospel, in limiting the work of Jesus to one year." (*S. R.* ii. 313.) Dr. Davidson makes the same statement; ** but neither he nor *S. R.* adduces any proof of it. I know of no passage in Justin which affirms or implies this limitation. But, if such a passage should be found, the argument against Justin's reception of the Fourth Gospel would

* *Dial.* c. 111. See Hilgenfeld, *Der Paschastreit der alten Kirche* (1860), pp. 205-209; Davidson, *Introd. to the Study of the N.T.* (1868), ii. 384; *Sup. Rel.*, ii. 313; comp. Wieseler, *Beiträge* (1869), p. 240. — Note here the use of *γίγνεται*.

† *Komment. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*, 5^e Aufl. p. 24 f. (Eng. trans. i. 24 f.) Steitz, who formerly agreed with Hilgenfeld, afterwards adopted the view of Meyer; see the art. *Pascha* in Herzog's *Real-Encyk. f. Prot. u. Kirche*, xi. 151, note *.

‡ *Iustini . . . Martyris Opera*, tom. i. pars ii., ed. tert. (1877), p. 395 f. Otto cites *Dial.* c. 99, where the agony in Gethsemane is referred to as taking place "on the day on which Jesus was to be crucified," as showing that Justin followed the Jewish reckoning of the day from sunset to sunset. Davidson takes no notice of this. If Meyer and Otto are right, we have here a strong argument for Justin's use of the Fourth Gospel.

|| *Ubi supra*, p. 535 f.

** *Introd. to the Study of the N.T.*, ii. 387.

be worthless. The opinion that Christ's ministry lasted but one year, or little more, was held by many in the early Church who received the Gospel of John without question. It was maintained by the Basilidians, the Valentinians, and the author of the Clementine Homilies, by Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Julius Africanus, Pseudo-Cyprian, Archelaus, Lactantius, Ephraem Syrus apparently, Philastrius, Gaudentius, Q. Julius Hilarianus, Augustine apparently, Evagrius the presbyter, and others among the Fathers, and has been held by modern scholars, as Bentley, Mann, Priestley (*Harmony*), Lant Carpenter (*Harmony*), and Henry Browne (*Ordo Sæclorum*).^{*} The Fathers were much influenced by their interpretation of Isa. lxi. 2, — "to preach the acceptable year of the Lord," — quoted in Luke iv. 19. It is true that John vi. 4 is against this view; but its defenders find means, satisfactory to themselves, of getting over the difficulty.

Other objections urged by Dr. Davidson and *Supernatural Religion* seem to me too weak to need an answer. I will, however, notice one which is brought forward with great confidence by Thoma, who says "Justin directly contradicts the Fourth Gospel" (p. 556), and after him by F. C. J. van Goens, who introduces it with the words *enfin et surtout*.†

^{*}The Basilidians, see Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 21, p. 408.—Valentinians, see Iren. *Hær.* i. 3. (al. 5), § 3; ii. 20. (al. 36), § 1; 22. (al. 38–40), §§ 1–6.—Clem. Hom. xvii. 19.—Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 21, p. 407; vi. 11, p. 783, l. 40; comp. v. 6, p. 668; vii. 17, p. 898.—Tertull. *Adv. Jud.* c. 8; *Marc.* i. 15 (but here are different readings).—Origen, *De Princip.* iv. 5, Opp. i. 160; *In Levit. Hom.* ix. c. 5, Opp. ii. 239; *In Luc. Hom.* xxxii., Opp. iii. 970; contra, *In Matt. Comm. Ser.*, c. 40, Opp. iii. 859, "fere tres annos"; comp. *Cels.* ii. 12, Opp. i. 397, οὐδὲ τρία ἔτη.—Jul. Africanus *Chron. frag.* l. ap. Routh, *Rel. Sacra*, ii. 301 f., ed. alt.—Pseudo-Cyprian, *De Paschæ Comp.* (A.D. 243), c. 22.—Archelai et Manetis Disp., c. 34.—Lactant. *Inst.* iv. 10. (*De Morte Persec.* c. 2.)—Ephraem, *Serm.* xiii. in *Nat. Dom.*, Opp. Syr. ii. 432.—Philast. *Hær.* 106.—Gaudent. *Serm.* iii., Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* xx. 865.—Hilarianus, *De Mundi Dur.* (A.D. 397) c. 16; *De Die Paschæ*, c. 15; Migne, xlii. 1104, 1114, or Gallandi, *Bibl. Patr.* viii. 238, 748.—Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xviii. 54, Opp. vii. 866; *Ad Herych. Epist.* 199 (al. 80), § 20, Opp. ii. 1122; contra, *De Doct. Christ.* ii. 42 (al. 28), Opp. iii. 66.—Evagrius presbyter (*cir.* A.D. 423), *Allec. inter Theoph. Christ. et Sim. Jud.*, Migne xx. 1176, or Gallandi, ix. 254.—So also the author of the treatise *De Promissis et Prædictionibus Dei* (published with the works of Prosper Aquitanus), pars i. c. 7; pars v. c. 2; Migne, li. 739 c, 855 b.—Browne, *Ordo Sæclorum* (Corrections and Additions), also cites Cyril of Alexandria, *In Isa.* xxxii. 10, Opp. ii. 446 d e, but this rests on a false inference; see, contra, Cyril, *In Isa.* xxix. 1, Opp. ii. 408 b. Besides the works of Nicholas Mann, *De veris Annis Jesu Christi natali et æmortalit.*, Lond. 1752, p. 158 ff., Greswell, *Dissertations*, etc., i. 438 ff., 2d ed. (1837), and Henry Browne, *Ordo Sæclorum*, Lond. 1844, p. 80 ff., one may consult especially F. X. Patritius (*i.e.* Patrizi), *De Evangelii* (Friburg. Brigov. 1853), lib. iii., diss. xix., p. 171 ff.

† *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, Lausanne, 1878, xi. 92 f.

Justin speaks of Christ as "keeping silence and refusing any longer to make any answer to any one before Pilate, as has been declared in the Memoirs by the Apostles" (*Dial.* c. 102). M. van Goens remarks, "No one who had ever read the Fourth Gospel could speak in this way." What does M. van Goens think of Tertullian, who says,* "Velut agnus coram tondente se sine voce, sic non aperuit os suum. Hic enim *Pilato interrogante nihil locutus est*"? If Justin had even said that Christ made no answer when Pilate questioned him, this would be sufficiently explained by John xix. 9, to which Tertullian perhaps refers. But the expressions "no longer" and "before Pilate" lead rather to the supposition that Justin refers to Matt. xxvii. 11-14 and Mark xv. 2-5 (*οὐκ ἔτι οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίθη*, "he no longer made any answer"), which certainly there is nothing in John to contradict.

Finally, the author of *Supernatural Religion* urges, generally, that in citing the Old Testament Justin, according to Semisch's count, refers to the author by name or by book one hundred and ninety-seven times, and omits to do this only one hundred and seventeen times. On the other hand, in referring to the words of Christ or the facts of Christian history for which he relied on the "Memoirs," he never cites the book (*S. R.* regards the "Memoirs" as one book) by the name of the author, except in a single instance, where he refers to "Peter's Memoirs" (*Dial.* c. 106).† "The inference," he says, "must not only be that he attached small importance to the Memoirs, but was actually ignorant of the author's name" (*S. R.* i. 297). That Justin attached small importance to the "Memoirs by the Apostles" on which he professedly relied for the teaching and life of Christ, and this, as *S. R.* contends, to the exclusion of oral tradition (*S. R.* i. 298), is an "inference" and a proposition which would surprise us in almost any other writer. The inference, moreover, that Justin "was actually ignorant of the author's name," when in one instance, according to *S. R.*,

* *Adv. Jud.* c. 13, *Opp.* ii. 737, ed. Ehler.

† See above, p. 138 f.

"he indicates Peter" as the author (*S. R.* i. 285), and when, as *S. R.* maintains, "the Gospel according to Peter," or "the Gospel according to the Hebrews" (which he represents as substantially the same work), was in all probability the source from which the numerous quotations in his works differing from our Gospels are taken,* is another specimen of singular logic. So much for generalities. But a particular objection to the conclusion that the Gospel of John was one of Justin's "Memoirs" is founded on the fact that he has never quoted or referred to it under the name of the author, though he has named the Apostle John as the author of the Apocalypse. (*S. R.* i. 298.) Great stress is laid on this contrast by many writers.

Let us see to what these objections amount. In the first place, the *way* in which Justin has mentioned John as the author of the Apocalypse is in itself enough to explain why he should not have named him in citing the "Memoirs." In his Dialogue with Trypho, after having quoted prophecies of the Old Testament in proof of his doctrine of the Millennium, — a doctrine in which he confesses some Christians did not agree with him, — he wishes to state that his belief is supported by a Christian writing which he regards as inspired and prophetic. He accordingly refers to the work as follows: "And afterwards also a certain man among us, whose name was John, one of the Apostles of Christ, in a revelation made by him prophesied that the believers in our Christ should spend a thousand years in Jerusalem," etc. (*Dial.* c. 81.) The Apostle John was certainly as well known outside of the Christian body as any other of the Evangelists; but we see that he is here introduced to Trypho as a stranger. Still more would he and the other Evangelists be strangers to the Roman Emperor and Senate, to whom the Apologies were addressed. That Justin under such circumstances should quote the Evangelists by name, assigning this saying or incident to "the Gospel according to Matthew," that to "Luke," and the other to "the Gospel according to John,"

* *Supernatural Religion*, i. 321; comp. pp. 312, 323, 332, 398, 416, 418-427; ii. 311, 7th ed.

as if he were addressing a Christian community familiar with the books, would have been preposterous. Justin has *described* the books in his First Apology as Memoirs of Christ, resting on the authority of the Apostles, and received by the Christians of his time as authentic records. That was all that his purpose required: the names of four unknown persons would have added no weight to his citations. In the Dialogue, he is even more specific in his description of the "Memoirs" than in the Apology. But to suppose that he would quote them as he quotes the books of the Old Testament with which Trypho was familiar is to ignore all the proprieties and congruities of the case.

This view is confirmed and the whole argument of *Supernatural Religion* is nullified by the fact that the general practice of Christian Apologists down to the time of Eusebius corresponds with that of Justin, as we have before had occasion to remark. (See above, p. 183.) It may be added that, while in writings addressed to Christian readers by the earlier Fathers the Old Testament is often, or usually, cited with reference to the author or book, the cases are comparatively very rare in which the Evangelists are named. For example, Clement of Alexandria, according to Semisch, quotes the Old Testament writers or books far oftener than otherwise by name, while in his very numerous citations from the Gospels he names John but three times, Matthew twice, Luke twice, and Mark once; in the countless citations of the Gospels in the Apostolical Constitutions, the Evangelists are never named; and so in the numerous quotations of the Gospels in Cyprian's writings, with the exception of a single treatise (the *Testimonia* or *Ad Quirinum*), the names of the Evangelists are never mentioned. But it cannot be necessary to expose further the utter futility of this objection, which has so often been inconsiderately urged.*

In this view of the objections to the supposition that Justin used the Gospel of John and included it in his

* See Semisch, *Die apostol. Denkwürdigkeiten*, u. s. w., p. 84 ff.; and compare Norton, *Genuineness*, etc., i. 205 ff., 2d ed.

"Memoirs," I have either cited them in the precise language of their authors, or have endeavored to state them in their most plausible form. When fairly examined, only one of them appears to have weight, and that not much. I refer to the objection that, if Justin used the Fourth Gospel at all, we should expect him to have used it more. It seems to me, therefore, that there is nothing of importance to countervail the very strong presumption from different lines of evidence that the "Memoirs" of Justin Martyr, "composed by Apostles and their companions," were our four Gospels.

A word should perhaps be added in reference to the view of Dr. E. A. Abbott, in the valuable article *Gospels* contributed to the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. He holds that Justin's "Memoirs" included the first three Gospels, and these only. These alone were received by the Christian community of his time as the authentic records of the life and teaching of Christ. If so, how can we explain the fact that a pretended Gospel so different in character from these, and so inconsistent with them as it is supposed to be, should have found universal acceptance in the next generation on the part of Christians of the most opposite opinions, without trace of controversy, with the slight exception of the Alogi previously mentioned? *

I have not attempted in the present paper a thorough discussion of Justin Martyr's quotations, but only to illustrate by some decisive examples the false assumptions on which the reasoning of *Supernatural Religion* is founded. In a full treatment of the subject, it would be necessary to consider the question of Justin's use of apocryphal Gospels, and in particular the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" and the "Gospel according to Peter," which figure so prominently in what calls itself "criticism" (*die Kritik*) as the pretended source of Justin's quotations. This subject has already been

* See above, p. 136. The work of Hippolytus, of which we know only the title found on the cathedra of his statue at Rome, "On [or "In defence of" (*i:πi:ρ*)] the Gospel according to John and the Apocalypse," may have been written in answer to their objections. See Bunsen's *Hippolytus*, 2d ed. (1854), i. 460. On the Alogi see also Weizsäcker, *Untersuchungen über d. evang. Geschichte*, p. 226 f., note.

referred to;* but it is impossible to treat it here in detail. In respect to "the Gospel according to the Hebrews" I will give in a Note some quotations from the article *Gospels, Apocryphal*, by Professor R. A. Lipsius, of Jena, in the second volume of Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, published in the present year, with extracts from other recent writers, which will sufficiently show how groundless is the supposition that Justin's quotations were mainly derived from this Gospel.† Lipsius certainly will not be suspected of any "apologetic" tendency. Credner's hypothesis that the "Gospel according to Peter," which he regards as the Gospel used by the Jewish Christians generally, and strangely identifies with the *Diatessaron* of Tatian, was the chief source of Justin's quotations, was thoroughly refuted by Mr. Norton as long ago as the year 1834 in the *Select Journal of Foreign Periodical Literature*, and afterwards in a Note to the first edition of his work on the Genuineness of the Gospels.‡ It is exposed on every side to overwhelming objections, and has hardly a shadow of evidence to support it. Almost our whole knowledge of this Gospel is derived from the account of it by Serapion, bishop of Antioch near the end of the second century (A.D. 191-213), who is the first writer by whom it is mentioned.|| He "found it for the most part in accordance with the right doctrine of the Saviour," but containing passages favoring the opinions of the Docetæ, by whom it was used. According to Origen, it represented the "brethren" of Jesus as sons of Joseph by a former wife.** It was evidently a book of very little note. Though it plays a conspicuous part in the speculations of modern German scholars and of *Supernatural Religion* about

* See above, p. 133 f.

† See Note C, at the end of this article.

‡ *Select Journal*, etc. (Boston), April, 1834, vol. iii., part ii., pp. 234-242; *Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels*, vol. i. (1837), Addit. Notes, pp. ccxxxii.-cciv. See also Bindemann, who discusses ably the whole question about Justin Martyr's Gospels, in the *Theol. Studien u. Kritiken*, 1842, pp. 355-482; Semisch, *Die apostol. Denkwürdigkeiten* u. s. w., pp. 43-59; on the other side, Credner, *Beiträge* u. s. w., vol. i. (1832); Mayerhoff, *Hist.-crit. Einleitung in die petrinischen Schriften* (1835), p. 234 ff.; Hilgenfeld, *Krit. Untersuchungen* u. s. w., p. 259 ff.

|| Serapion's account of it is preserved by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* vi. 12.

** Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* t. x. § 17, Opp. iii. 462 f.

the origin of the Gospels and the quotations of Justin Martyr, *not a single fragment of it has come down to us*. This *nominis umbra* has therefore proved wonderfully convenient for those who have had occasion, in support of their hypotheses, "to draw unlimited cheques," as Lightfoot somewhere expresses it, "on the bank of the unknown." Mr. Norton has shown, by an acute analysis of Serapion's account of it, that in all probability it was not an historical, but a doctrinal work.* Lipsius remarks: "The statement of Theodoret (*Hær. Fab.* ii. 2) that the Nazarenes had made use of this Gospel rested probably on a misunderstanding. The passage moreover in Justin Martyr (*Dial. c. Tryph.* 106) in which some have thought to find mention of the *Memorials of Peter* is very doubtful. . . . Herewith fall to the ground all those hypotheses which make the *Gospel of Peter* into an original work made use of by Justin Martyr, nigh related to the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, and either the Jewish Christian basis of our canonical St. Mark [so Hilgenfeld], or, at any rate, the Gospel of the Gnosticizing Ebionites" [Volkmar]. † To this I would only add that almost the only fact of which we are directly informed respecting the contents of the so-called "Gospel of Peter" is that it favored the opinions of the Docetæ, to which Justin Martyr, who wrote a book against the Marcionites (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 11. § 8), was diametrically opposed.

Glancing back now over the ground we have traversed, we find (1) that the general reception of our four Gospels as sacred books throughout the Christian world in the time of Irenæus makes it almost certain that the "Memoirs called Gospels," "composed by Apostles and their companions," which were used by his early contemporary Justin Martyr, and were read in the Christian churches of his day as the authoritative records of Christ's life and teaching, were the same books; (2) that this presumption is confirmed by the actual use which Justin has made of all our Gospels, though

* *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., vol. iii (1848), pp. 255-260; abridged edition (1867), pp. 362-366.

† Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, ii. 712.

he has mainly followed, as was natural, the Gospel of Matthew, and his *direct* citations from the Gospel of John, and references to it, are few; (3) that it is still further strengthened, in respect to the Gospel of John, by the evidences of its use between the time of Justin and that of Irenæus, both by the Catholic Christians and the Gnostics, and especially by its inclusion in Tatian's *Diatessaron*; (4) that, of the two principal assumptions on which the counter-argument is founded, one is demonstrably false and the other baseless; and (5) that the particular objections to the view that Justin included the Gospel of John in his "Memoirs" are of very little weight. We are authorized then, I believe, to regard it as in the highest degree probable, if not morally certain, that in the time of Justin Martyr the Fourth Gospel was generally received as the work of the Apostle John.

WE pass now to our third point, the use of the Fourth Gospel by the various Gnostic sects. The length to which the preceding discussion has extended makes it necessary to treat this part of the subject in a very summary manner.

The Gnostic sects with which we are concerned became conspicuous in the second quarter of the second century, under the reigns of Hadrian (A.D. 117-138) and Antoninus Pius (A.D. 138-161). The most prominent among them were those founded by Marcion, Valentinus, and Basilides. To these may be added the Ophites or Naassenes.

Marcion has already been referred to.* He prepared a Gospel for his followers by striking from the Gospel of Luke what was inconsistent with his system, and treated in a similar manner ten of the Epistles of Paul. He rejected the other Gospels, not on the ground that they were spurious, but because he believed their authors were under the influence of Jewish prejudices.† In proof of this, he appealed to the passage in the Epistle to the Galatians on which Baur

* See above, p. 137.

† See Irenæus, *Har.* iii. 12. § 12.

and his school lay so much stress. "Marcion," says Tertullian, "having got the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians, who reproves even the Apostles themselves for not walking straight, according to the truth of the Gospel, . . . endeavors to destroy the reputation of those Gospels which are truly such, and are published under the name of Apostles, or also of apostolic men, in order that he may give to his own the credit which he takes away from them." * In another place, Tertullian says, addressing Marcion: "If you had not rejected some and corrupted others of the Scriptures which contradict your opinion, the Gospel of John would have confuted you." † Again: "Of those historians whom we possess, it appears that Marcion *selected* Luke for his mutilations." ‡ The fact that Marcion placed his rejection of the Gospels on this ground, that the Apostles were but imperfectly enlightened, shows that he could not question their apostolic authorship. His reference to the Epistle to the Galatians indicates also that the "pillar-apostles" (Gal. ii. 9), Peter and John, were particularly in his mind: Peter, it will be remembered, was regarded as having sanctioned the Gospel of Mark. (See above, p. 139.)

It has been asserted by many modern critics, as Hilgenfeld, Volkmar, Scholten, Davidson, and others, that, if Marcion had been acquainted with the Gospel of John, he would have chosen that, rather than Luke, for expurgation, on account of its marked anti-Judaic character. But a careful comparison of John's Gospel with Marcion's doctrines will show that it contradicts them in so many places and so

* *Adv. Marc.* iv. 3. *Comp. Præscr.* cc. 22-24. See also Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., iii. 206 ff., 303 ff.; or abridged edition, pp. 332 ff., 392 ff.

† *De Carne Christi*, c. 3.

‡ *Adv. Marc.* iv. 2. "Lucam videtur Marcion elegisse quem cæderet." On account of the use of *videtur* here, Dr. Davidson, following some German critics, says, "Even in speaking about Marcion's treatment of Luke, Tertullian puts it forth as a conjecture." (*Introd. to the Study of the N. T.*, ii. 305.) A conjecture, when Tertullian has devoted a whole book to the refutation of Marcion from those passages of Luke which he retained! The context and all the facts of the case show that no doubt can possibly have been intended; and Tertullian often uses *videri*, not in the sense of "to seem," but of "to be seen," "to be apparent." See *Apol.* c. 19; *De Orat.* c. 21; *Adv. Præscr.* cc. 26, 29; *Adv. Jud.* c. 5, from Isa. i. 12; and *De Præscr.* c. 38, which has likewise been misinterpreted.

absolutely that it would have been utterly unsuitable for his purpose.*

The theosophic or speculative Gnostics, as the Ophites, Valentinians, and Basilidians, found more in John which, by ingenious interpretation, they could use in support of their systems.†

It is however to be observed, in regard to the Marcionites, as Mr. Norton remarks, "that their having recourse to the mutilation of Luke's Gospel shows that no other history of Christ's ministry existed more favorable to their doctrines; that, in the first half of the second century, when Marcion lived, there was no Gnostic Gospel in being to which he could appeal."‡

We pass now to Valentinus. It has already appeared that the later Valentinians, represented by Ptolemy, Heracleon, and the *Excerpta Theodoti*, received the Gospel of John without question. || The presumption is therefore obviously very strong that it was so received by the founder of the sect.** That this was so is the representation of Tertullian. He contrasts the course pursued by Marcion and Valentinus. "One man," he says, "perverts the Scriptures with his hand, another by his exposition of their meaning. For, if it appears that Valentinus uses the entire document,—*si Valentinus integro instrumento uti videtur*,—he has yet done violence to the truth more artfully than Marcion." For Marcion, he goes on to say, openly used the knife, not the pen; Valentinus has spared the Scriptures, but explains them away, or thrusts false meanings into them.††

* See on this point Bleek, *Eint. in d. N. T.*, 3d ed. (1875), p. 158, ff., with Mangold's note, who remarks that "it was simply impossible for Marcion to choose the fourth Gospel" for this purpose; also Weizsäcker, *Untersuchungen über d. evang. Geschichte* (1864), p. 230, ff.; Luthardt, *Die johan. Ursprung des vierten Ev.* (1874), p. 92, or Eng. trans., p. 108 f.; Godet, *Comm. sur l'évangile de St. Jean*, 2d ed., tom. i. (1876), p. 270 f., or Eng. trans., i. 222 f.

† On the use of the N.T. by the Valentinians, see particularly G. Heinrici, *Die valentinianische Gnosis und die Heilige Schrift*, Berlin, 1871.

‡ *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., iii. 304; abridged ed., p. 392 f.

|| See above, p. 178 f.

** On this point, see Norton, *Genuineness*, etc., 2d ed., iii. 321 f.; abridged ed., p. 403 f.

†† Tertullian, *Præsc.* c. 38. On the use of the word *videtur*, see above, p. 199, note †. The context shows that no doubt is intended. If, however, the word should be taken in the sense

The testimony of Tertullian is apparently confirmed by Hippolytus, who, in a professed account of the doctrines of Valentinus (*Ref. Hæc.* vi. 21-37, or 16-32, Eng. trans.; comp. the introduction, § 3), says: "All the prophets, therefore, and the Law spoke from the Demiurgus, a foolish God, he says, [and spoke] as fools, knowing nothing. Therefore, says he, the Saviour says, 'All who have come before me are thieves and robbers' (John x. 8); and the Apostle, 'The mystery which was not made known to former generations'" (Eph. iii. 4, 5). Here, however, it is urged that Hippolytus, in his account of Valentinus, mixes up references to Valentinus and his followers in such a manner that we cannot be sure that, in the use of the *φησι*, "he says," he is not quoting from some one of his school, and not the master. A full exhibition of the facts and discussion of the question cannot be given here. I believe there is a strong presumption that Hippolytus *is* quoting from a work of Valentinus: the regular exposition of the opinions of his disciples, Secundus, Ptolemy, and Heracleon, does not begin till afterwards, in c. 38, or c. 33 of the English translation; but it is true that, in the present text, *φησι* is used vaguely toward the end of c. 35, where the opinions of the Italian and Oriental schools are distinguished in reference to a certain point. I therefore do not press this quotation as *direct* proof of the use of the Fourth Gospel by Valentinus himself.

Next to Marcion and Valentinus, the most eminent among the founders of early Gnostic sects was Basilides, of Alexandria. He flourished about A.D. 125. In the Homilies on Luke generally ascribed to Origen, though some have questioned their genuineness, we are told, in an account of apocryphal Gospels, that "Basilides had the audacity to write a Gospel according to Basilides."* Ambrose and Jerome copy this account in the prefaces to their re-

of "seems," the contrast must be between the ostensible use of the Scriptures by Valentinus and his virtual rejection of them by imposing upon them a sense contrary to their teaching. Comp. Irenæus, *Hæc.* iii. 12. § 12: "scripturas quidem confitentes, interpretationes vero convertunt." So *Hæc.* i. 3. § 6; iii. 14. § 4.

* So the Greek: Origen, *Hom. i. in Luc.*, Opp. iii. 932, note; the Latin in Jerome's translation reads, "Ausus fuit et Basilides scribere evangelium, et suo illud nomine titolare."

spective commentaries on Luke and Matthew; but there is no other notice of such a Gospel, or evidence of its existence, in all Christian antiquity, so far as is known. The work referred to could not have been a history of Christ's ministry, set up by Basilides and his followers in opposition to the Gospels received by the catholic Christians. In that case, we should certainly have heard of it from those who wrote in opposition to his heresy; but he and his followers are, on the contrary, represented as appealing to our Gospels of Matthew, Luke, and John;* and Hippolytus states expressly that the Basilidian account of all things concerning the Saviour subsequent to the birth of Jesus agreed with that given "in the Gospels."† The origin of the error is easily explained: a work in which Basilides set forth his view of the Gospel, *i.e.* of the teaching of Christ, might naturally be spoken of as "the Gospel according to Basilides."‡ We have an account of such a work. Agrippa Castor, a contemporary of Basilides, and who, according to Eusebius, wrote a very able refutation of him, tells us that Basilides "composed twenty-four books on the Gospel," εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. || Clement of Alexandria, who is one of our principal authorities for his opinions, cites his Ἐξηγητικά, "Expositions," or "Interpretations," quoting a long passage from "the twenty-third book."** In the "Dispute between Archelaus and Manes," the "thirteenth treatise" of Basilides is cited, containing an explanation of the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus.†† I agree with Dr. Hort in thinking it exceedingly probable that the work of Basilides which Hippolytus cites so often in his account of his opinions is the same which is quoted by Clement and Archelaus, and mentioned by Agrippa Castor.‡‡ Lipsius remarks:—

* Besides the work of Hippolytus, to be further noticed, see the passages from Clement of Alexandria and Epiphanius in Kirchhofer's *Quellensammlung*, p. 415 f.

† *Ref. Hær.* c. 27, or c. 16, Eng. trans.

‡ On this use of the term "Gospel," see Norton, *Genuineness*, etc., iii. 224 ff., or abridged edition, p. 343 f.

|| Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 7. §§ 6, 7.

** *Strom.* iv. 12, p. 599 f.

†† *Archelai et Manetis Disputatio*, c. 55, in Routh, *Rel. sacræ*, ed. alt., v. 197.

‡‡ See the art. *Basilides* in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, vol. i. (1877), p. 271.

In any case, the work must have been an exposition of some Gospel by whose authority Basilides endeavored to establish his Gnostic doctrine. And it is anyhow most unlikely that he would have written a commentary on a Gospel of his own composition. Of our canonical Gospels, those of Matthew, Luke, and John, were used in his school; and from the fragments just referred to we may reasonably conclude that it was the Gospel of Luke on which he wrote his commentary.*

On this it may be observed, that the phrase of Agrippa Castor, "twenty-four books on *the* Gospel," excludes the idea that any particular Gospel, like that of Luke, could be intended. Such a Gospel would have been named or otherwise defined. The expression τὰ εὐαγγέλιον, if it refers to any book, must signify, in accordance with that use of the term which has before been illustrated,† "the Gospels" collectively. It is so understood by Norton,‡ Tischendorf, Luthardt, Godet, and others. It would not in itself *necessarily* denote precisely our *four* Gospels, though their use by Justin Martyr, and the fact that Luke and John are quoted and commented on by Basilides, and Matthew apparently referred to by him, would render this extremely probable.

There is, however, another sense of the word "Gospel" as used by Basilides,—namely, "the knowledge (*gnosis*) of supermundane things" (Hippol. *Ref. Hær.* vii. 27); and "the Gospel" in this sense plays a prominent part in his system as set forth by Hippolytus. The "twenty-four books on the Gospel" mentioned by Agrippa Castor, the "Expositions" or "Interpretations" of Clement, may perhaps have related to "the Gospel" in this sense. We cannot therefore, I think, argue confidently from this title that Basilides wrote a Commentary on our Four Gospels, though it naturally suggests this. It is evident, at any rate, that he supported his *gnosis* by far-fetched interpretations of the sayings of Christ as recorded in our Gospels; and that the supposition that he had a Gospel of his own composition, in the sense of a history of Christ's life and teaching, has not only no positive support of any strength, but is on various

* See the art. *Gospels* in the work just cited, ii. 715.

† See above, p. 140.

‡ See Norton's *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., iii. 235-239, or abridged edition, p. 351 ff.

accounts utterly improbable. That he used an apocryphal Gospel *not* of his own composition is a supposition for which there is not a particle of evidence of any kind whatever.

I have spoken of Basilides as quoting the Gospel of John in the citations from him by Hippolytus. The passages are the following: "And this, he says, is what is said in the Gospels: 'The true light, which enlighteneth every man, was coming into the world.'" (*Ref. Hær.* vii. 22, or c. 10, Eng. trans.) The words quoted agree exactly with John i. 9 in the Greek, though I have adopted a different construction from that of the common version in translating. Again, "And that each thing, he says, has its own seasons, the Saviour is a sufficient witness, when he says, 'My hour is not yet come.'" (*Ref. Hær.* vii. 27, al. 15; John ii. 4.)

Here two objections are raised: first, that we cannot infer from the *φησι*, "he says," that Hippolytus is quoting from a treatise by Basilides himself; and, secondly, that the system of Basilides as set forth by Hippolytus represents a later development of the original scheme,—in other words, that he is quoting the writings and describing the opinions of the disciples of the school, and not of its founder.

To analyze the account of Hippolytus and give the reasons for taking a different view would require an article by itself, and cannot be undertaken here. But on the first point I will quote a writer who will not be suspected of an "apologetic" tendency, Matthew Arnold. He says:—

It is true that the author of the *Philosophumena* [another name for the "Refutation of all Heresies" commonly ascribed to Hippolytus] sometimes mixes up the opinions of the master of a school with those of his followers, so that it is difficult to distinguish between them. But, if we take all doubtful cases of the kind and compare them with our present case, we shall find that it is not one of them. It is not true that here, where the name of Basileides has come just before, and where no mention of his son or of his disciples has intervened since, there is any such ambiguity as is found in other cases. It is not true that the author of the *Philosophumena* wields the *subjectless he says* in the random manner alleged, with no other formula for quotation both from the master and from the followers. In general, he uses the formula *according to them* (*κατ' αὐτοῖς*) when he quotes from the school, and the formula *he says* (*φησι*) when he gives the dicta of the master. And

in this particular case he manifestly quotes the dicta of Basileides, and no one who had not a theory to serve would ever dream of doubting it. Basileides, therefore, about the year 125 of our era, had before him the Fourth Gospel.*

On the second point, the view that Hippolytus as contrasted with Irenæus has given an account of the system of Basilides himself is the prevailing one among scholars : it is held, for example, by Jacobi, Bunsen, Baur, Hase, Uhlhorn, Möller, Mansel, Pressensé, and Dr. Hort. The principal representative of the opposite opinion is Hilgenfeld, with whom agree Lipsius, Volkmar, and Scholten.† Dr. Hort has discussed the matter very ably and fairly in his article *Basilides* in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*; and, so far as I can judge, his conclusions are sound.

In view of all the evidence, then, I think we have good reason for believing that the Gospel of John was one of a collection of Gospels, probably embracing our four, which Basilides and his followers received as authoritative about the year 125.

The first heretics described by Hippolytus are the Oriental Gnostics,—the Ophites, or Naassenes, and the Peratæ, a kindred sect. They are generally regarded as the earliest Gnostics. Hippolytus cites from their writings numerous quotations from the Gospel of John.‡ But it is the view of many scholars that Hippolytus is really describing the opinions and quoting the writings of the later representatives of these sects. Not having investigated this point sufficiently, I shall argue only from what is undisputed.

Were I undertaking a full discussion of the external evidences of John's authorship of the Fourth Gospel, it would be necessary to consider here some questions about Papias,

* Matthew Arnold, *God and the Bible* (1875), p. 268 f., Eng. ed. See, to the same effect, Weizsäcker, *Untersuchungen* u. s. w., p. 232 ff. Compare Dr. Hort, art. *Basilides* in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, i. 271, and Westcott, *Canon of the N.T.*, 4th ed., p. 288. On the other side, see Scholten, *Die ältesten Zeugnisse* u. s. w. (1867), p. 65 f.; *Sup. Rel.*, ii. 51, 7th ed., and the writers whom he there cites.

† The two most recent discussions are that by Jacobi, in Brieger's *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 1876-77, i. 481-544, and, on the other side, by Hilgenfeld, in his *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol.*, 1878, xxi. 228-250, where the literature of the subject is given pretty fully. Moeller, in a brief notice of the two articles (Brieger's *Zeitschrift*, 1877-78, ii. 422), adheres to his former view, *versus* Hilgenfeld.

‡ *Ref. Har.* v. 7-9 (Naassenes), 12, 16, 17 (Peratæ).

and his use of the First Epistle of John, as reported by Eusebius; also the apparent reference to the First Epistle of John by Polycarp, and his relation to Irenæus; and, further, to notice the Ignatian Epistles, the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," and the Epistle to Diognetus. On the first two subjects, and on "The Silence of Eusebius," connected with the former, I would refer to the very able articles of Professor (now Bishop) Lightfoot in the *Contemporary Review*.* As to the Ignatian Epistles, their genuineness in any form is questionable, to say nothing of the state of the text, though the shorter Epistles may belong, in substance, to the middle of the second century; the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" are interpolated, and need a thoroughly critical edition; and the date of the Epistle to Diognetus is uncertain. In any event, I do not think the references to the Gospel of John in these writings are of great importance.

But to return to our proper subject. The use of the Gospel of John by the Gnostic sects, in the second century, affords a strong, it may seem decisive, argument for their genuineness. However ingeniously they might pervert its meaning, it is obvious to every intelligent reader that this Gospel is, in reality, diametrically opposed to the essential principles of Gnosticism. The Christian Fathers, in their contests with the Gnostics, found it an armory of weapons. Such being the case, let us suppose it to have been forged about the middle of the second century, in the heat of the Gnostic controversy. It was thus a book which the founders of the Gnostic sects, who flourished ten, twenty, or thirty years before, had never heard of. How is it possible, then, to explain the fact that their followers should have not only received it, but have received it, so far as appears, without question or discussion? It must have been received by the

* *Contemporary Review*, January, 1875, xxv. 169 ff., "The Silence of Eusebius"; May, 1875, p. 827 ff., "Polycarp of Smyrna"; August and October, 1875, xxvi. 377 ff., 828 ff., "Papias of Hierapolis." On "the silence of Eusebius," see also Westcott, *Canon of the N. T.*, 4th ed., p. 229 f. With Lightfoot's article in the *Contemp. Review* for February, 1875, "The Ignatian Epistles," should be compared the Preface to *Supernatural Religion*, in the sixth and later editions of that work.

founders of these sects from the beginning; and we have no reason to distrust the testimony of Hippolytus to what is under these circumstances so probable, and is attested by other evidence. But, if received by the founders of these sects, it must have been received at the same time by the catholic Christians. They would not, at a later period, have taken the spurious work from the heretics with whom they were in controversy. It was then generally received, both by Gnostics and their opponents, between the years 120 and 130. What follows? It follows that the Gnostics of that date received it because they could not help it. They would not have admitted the authority of a book which could be reconciled with their doctrines only by the most forced interpretation, if they could have destroyed its authority by denying its genuineness. Its genuineness could then be easily ascertained. Ephesus was one of the principal cities of the Eastern world, the centre of extensive commerce, the metropolis of Asia Minor. Hundreds, if not thousands, of people were living who had known the Apostle John. The question whether he, the beloved disciple, had committed to writing his recollections of his Master's life and teaching, was one of the greatest interest. The fact of the reception of the Fourth Gospel as his work at so early a date, by parties so violently opposed to each other, proves that the evidence of its genuineness was decisive. This argument is further confirmed by the use of the Gospel by the opposing parties in the later Montanistic controversy, and in the disputes about the time of celebrating Easter.

THE last external evidence which I shall adduce in favor of the genuineness of the Gospel of John is of a very early date, being attached to the Gospel itself, and found in all the copies which have come down to us, whether in the original or in ancient versions. I refer to what is now numbered as the twenty-fifth verse, with the last half of the twenty-fourth, of the concluding chapter of the Gospel. The last three verses of the chapter read thus: "Hence

this report spread among the brethren, that that disciple was not to die; yet Jesus did not say to him that he would not die; but, If I will that he remain till I come, what is that to thee? This is the disciple that testifieth concerning these things, and wrote these things." Here, I suppose, the author of the Gospel ended. The addition follows: "And *we* know that *his* testimony is true. And there are many other things that Jesus did, which, if they should be severally written, *I* do not think that the world itself would contain the books written."

In the words "And *we* know that *his* testimony is true," we manifestly have either a real or a forged attestation to the truth and genuineness of the Gospel. Suppose the Gospel written by an anonymous forger of the middle of the second century: what possible credit could he suppose would be given to it by an anonymous attestation like this? A forger with such a purpose would have named his pretended authority, and have represented the attestation as formally and solemnly given. The attestation, as it stands, clearly presupposes that the author (or authors) of it was known to those who first received the copy of the Gospel containing it.

What view, then, are we to take of it? The following supposition, which I give in the words of Mr. Norton, affords an easy and natural explanation, and, so far as I can see, the only plausible explanation of the phenomena. Mr. Norton says:—

According to ancient accounts, St. John wrote his Gospel at Ephesus, over the church in which city he presided during the latter part of his long life. It is not improbable that, before his death, its circulation had been confined to the members of that church. Hence copies of it would be afterwards obtained; and the copy provided for transcription was, we may suppose, accompanied by the strong attestation which we now find, given by the church, or the elders of the church, to their full faith in the accounts which it contained, and by the concluding remark, made by the writer of this attestation in his own person.*

The style of this addition, it is further to be observed,

* Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., vol. i., Addit. Notes, p. xcv. f.

differs from that of the writer of the Gospel. It was probably first written a little separate from the text, and afterwards became incorporated with it by a natural mistake of transcribers. According to Tischendorf, the last verse of this Gospel in the Codex Sinaiticus is written in a different hand from the preceding, though by a contemporary scribe. He accordingly rejects it as not having belonged to the Gospel as it was originally written. Tregelles does not agree with him on the palæographical question.

The passage we have been considering suggests various questions and remarks, but cannot be further treated here. I will only refer to the recent commentaries of Godet and Westcott, and end abruptly the present discussion, which has already extended to a far greater length than was originally intended.

Note A. (See p. 140.)

ON THE QUOTATIONS OF MATT. xi. 27 (*comp.* LUKE x. 22) IN THE WRITINGS OF THE CHRISTIAN FATHERS.

Justin Martyr (*Dial.* c. 100) quotes the following as "written in the Gospel":

"All things have been delivered (*παράδοται*) to me by the Father; and no one *knoweth* (*γινώσκει*) the Father save the Son, neither [knoweth any one] the Son save the Father, and they to whomsoever the Son may reveal him" (*οἷς ἂν ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψῃ*). In the *Apology* (c. 63) he quotes the passage twice, thus: "No one *knew* (or "hath known," *ἔγινω*) the Father save the Son, neither [knoweth any one] the Son save the Father, and they to whomsoever the Son may reveal him"; the order of the words, however, varying in the last clause, in which *ὁ υἱὸς* stands once after *ἀποκαλύψῃ*.

It is unnecessary to quote the corresponding passages in our Gospels in full, as the reader can readily turn to them. The variations of Justin are, (1) the use of the perfect (*παράδοται*), "have been delivered," instead of the aorist (*παρεδόθη*), strictly, "were delivered," though our idiom often requires the aorist to be translated by the perfect; (2) "*the* Father" for "*my* Father" (omitting *μου*); (3) the use, in two out of three instances, of the aorist *ἔγινω*, "knew," or "hath known," instead of the present *γινώσκει* (this is the word used by Luke; Matthew has *ἐπιγινώσκει*); (4) the transposition of the two principal clauses; (5) the omission of *τις ἐπιγινώσκει*, "knoweth any one," in the second clause, if we compare Matthew, or the substitution of "the Father" and "the Son" for "who the Father is" and "who the Son is," if we compare Luke; (6) the use of the plural (*οἷς ἂν*), "*they* to whomsoever," instead of the singular (*ᾧ ἂν*), "*he* to whomsoever"; and (7) the substitution of "may reveal" (*ἀποκαλύψῃ*) for "may will to reveal" (*βοιῶμαι ἀποκαλύψαι*).

The author of *Supernatural Religion* devotes more than ten pages to this pas-

sage (vol. i. pp. 401-412, 7th ed.), which he regards as of great importance, and insists, on the ground of these variations, that Justin could not have taken it from our Gospels. To follow him step by step would be tedious. His fundamental error is the assertion that "the peculiar form of the quotation in Justin" (here he refers especially to the variations numbered 3 and 4, above) "occurred in what came to be considered heretical Gospels, and constituted the basis of important Gnostic doctrines" (p. 403). Again, "Here we have the exact quotation twice made by Justin, with the *ἐγὼ* and the same order, set forth as the reading of the Gospels of the Marcosians and other sects, and the highest testimony to their system" (pp. 406, 407). Yet again, "Irenæus states with equal distinctness that Gospels used by Gnostic sects had the reading of Justin" (p. 411). Now Irenæus nowhere states any such thing. Irenæus nowhere speaks, nor does any other ancient writer, of a Gospel of the Marcosians. If this sect had set up a Gospel (*i.e.*, a history of Christ's ministry) of its own, in opposition to the Four Gospels received by the whole Christian Church in the time of Irenæus, we should have had unequivocal evidence of the fact. The denunciations of Marcion for mutilating the Gospel of Luke show how such a work would have been treated. Irenæus is indignant that the Valentinians should give to "a recent work of their own composition" the name of "The Gospel of the Truth" or "The True Gospel" (*Her.* iii. 11. § 9); but this was in all probability a doctrinal or speculative, not an historical work.* The Valentinians received our four Gospels without controversy, and argued from them in support of their doctrines as best they could. (See Irenæus, *Her.* i. cc. 7, 8, for numerous examples of their arguments from the Gospels; and compare iii. 11. § 7; 12. § 12; and Tertull. *Præscr.* c. 38.)

Correcting this fundamental error of the author of *Supernatural Religion*, the facts which he himself states respecting the various forms in which this passage is quoted by writers who unquestionably used our four Gospels as their sole or main authority, are sufficient to show the groundlessness of his conclusion. But for the sake of illustrating the freedom of the Christian Fathers in quotation, and the falsity of the premises on which this writer reasons, I will exhibit the facts somewhat more fully than they have been presented elsewhere, though the quotations of this passage have been elaborately discussed by Credner,† Semisch,‡ Hilgenfeld,§ Volckmar,** and Westcott.†† Of these discussions those by Semisch and Volckmar are particularly valuable.

I will now notice all the variations of Justin from the text of our Gospels in this passage (see above), comparing them with those found in other writers. The two most important (Nos. 3 and 4) will be examined last.

1. *παράδοται* for *παρεδόθη* is wholly unimportant. It is found in Luke x. 22

* See Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, iii. 227 f.; Westcott, *Canon of the N. T.*, 4th ed., p. 297 f.; Lipsius, art. *Gospels, Apocryphal*, in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, vol. ii. (1880), p. 717.

† *Beiträge zur Einl. in die biblischen Schriften* (1832), i. pp. 248-251.

‡ *Die apostol. Denkwürdigkeiten des Märtyr. Justinus* (1848), pp. 364-370.

§ *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Justin's*, u. s. w. (1850), pp. 201-206.

** *Das Evang. Marcions* (1852), pp. 75-80. I follow the title in spelling "Volckmar."

†† *Canon of the N. T.*, 4th ed. (1875), pp. 133-135. See also Sanday, *The Gospels in the Second Century*, pp. 132, 133, and chaps. ii., iv., vi.

in the uncial MSS. K and Π, the cursives 60, 253, p^{scr}, w^{scr}, three of Colbert's MSS. (see Wetstein *in loc.* and his Prolegom. p. 48), and in HIPPOLYTUS (*Noët.* c. 6), not heretofore noticed.

2. "The Father" for "my Father," *μον* being omitted, is equally trivial; so in the Sinaitic MS. and the cursive 71 in Matthew, and in Luke the Codex Bezae (D), with some of the best MSS. of the Old Latin and Vulgate versions, and other authorities (see Tischendorf), also HIPPOLYTUS as above.

5. The omission of *τις ἐπιγινώσκει* or its equivalent in the second clause is found in the citation of the MARCOSIANS in Irenæus (i. 20. § 3), other GNOSTICS in Irenæus (iv. 6. § 1), and in IRENÆUS himself three times (ii. 6. § 1; iv. 6. §§ 3, 7, but *not* § 1). It occurs twice in CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (*Ped.* i. 9, p. 150 ed. Potter; *Strom.* i. 28, p. 425), once in ORIGEN (*Cels.* vi. 17, p. 643), once in ATHANASIUS (*Orat. cont. Arian.* iii. c. 46, p. 596), 6 times in EPIPHANIUS (*Ancor.* c. 67, p. 71, repeated *Her.* lxxiv. 4, p. 891; c. 73, p. 78, repeated *Her.* lxxiv. 10, p. 898; and *Her.* lxiv. 9, p. 643; lxxvi. 7, 29, 32, pp. 943, 977, 981); once in CHRYSOSTOM (*In Joan. Hom.* lx. § 1, Opp. viii. 353 (404) A, ed. Montf.), once in PSEUDO-CYRIL (*De Trin.* c. 1), once in MAXIMUS CONFESSOR (*Schol. in Dion. Areop. de div. Nom.* c. 1. § 2, in Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* iv. 189), once in JOANNES DAMASCENUS (*De Fide Orth.* i. 1) and twice in GEORGIUS PACHYMERES (*Paraphr. in Dion. Areop. de div. Nom.* c. 1, § 1, and *de myst. Theol.* c. 5; Migne, iii. 613, 1061). It is noticeable that the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES (xvii. 4; xviii. 4, 13 *bis*, 20) do not here agree with Justin.

6. There is no difference between *οἷς ἂν*, "they to whomsoever," and *ὃ ἂν* (or *ἐὶν*), "he to whomsoever," so far as the sense is concerned. The plural, which Justin uses, is found in the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES 5 times (xvii. 4; xviii. 4, 13 *bis*, 20), and IRENÆUS 5 times (*Her.* ii. 6. § 1; iv. 6. §§ 3, 4, 7, and so the Syriac; 7. § 3). The singular is used in the citations given by Irenæus from the MARCOSIANS (i. 20. § 3) and "those who would be wiser than the Apostles," as well as in his own express quotation from Matthew (*Her.* iv. 6. § 1); and so by the Christian Fathers generally.

7. The next variation (*οἷς ἂν ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψει* for *βοῦληται ἀποκαλύψαι* is a natural shortening of the expression, which we find in the citation of the MARCOSIANS (Iren. i. 20. § 3) and in IRENÆUS himself 5 times (ii. 6. § 1; iv. 6. §§ 3, 4, 7, and so the Syriac; 7. § 3); in TERTULLIAN twice (*Marc.* iv. 25; *Præscr.* c. 21), and perhaps in Marcion's mutilated Luke; in CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 5 times (*Cohort.* i. 10, p. 10; *Ped.* i. 5, p. 109; *Strom.* i. 28, p. 425; v. 13, p. 697; vii. 18, p. 901; — *Quis dives*, etc., c. 8, p. 939, is a mere allusion); ORIGEN 4 times (*Cels.* vi. 17, p. 643; vii. 44, p. 726; *in Joan.* tom. i. c. 42, p. 45; tom. xxxii. c. 18, p. 450); the SYNOD OF ANTIOCH against Paul of Samosata (Routh, *Rel. sacræ*, ed. alt. iii. 290); EUSEBIUS or MARCELLUS in Eusebius 3 times (*Ecll. Theol.* i. 15, 16, pp. 76^e, 77^d, ἀποκαλύψει; *Ecll. proph.* i. 12 [Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* xxii. col. 1065], ἀποκαλύψει); ATHANASIUS 4 or 5 times (*Decret. Nic. Syn.* c. 12, Opp. i. 218 ed. Bened.; *Orat. cont. Arian.* i. c. 12, p. 416; c. 39, p. 443; iii. c. 46, p. 596, in the best MSS.; *Serm. maj. de Fide*, c. 27, in Montf. *Coll. nova*, ii. 14); CYRIL OF JERUSALEM twice (*Cat.* vi. 6; x. 1); EPIPHANIUS 4 times (*Ancor.* c. 67, p. 71, repeated *Her.* lxxiv. 4, p. 891, but here ἀποκαλύπτει or -τη; *Her.* lxv. 6, p. 613; and without ὁ υἱὸς, *Her.* lxxvi. 7, p. 943; c. 29, p. 977); BASIL THE GREAT (*Adv. Eunom.* v. Opp. i. 311 (441) A); CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA 3 times (*Theol. Opp.* v. 131, 149; *Cont. Julian.* viii. Opp. vi. b. p. 270).

All of these variations are obviously unimportant, and natural in quoting from memory, and the extent to which they occur in writers who unquestionably used our Gospels as their sole or main authority shows that their occurrence in Justin affords no ground for supposing that he did not also so use them.

We will then turn our attention to the two variations on which the main stress is laid by the author of *Supernatural Religion*. He greatly exaggerates their importance, and neglects an obvious explanation of their origin.

3. We find *ἐγνώ*, "knew," or "hath known," for *γινώσκει* or *ἐπιγινώσκει*, in the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES 6 times (xvii. 4; xviii. 4, 11, 13 *bis*, 20), and once apparently in the RECOGNITIONS (ii. 47, *novit*); twice in TERTULLIAN (*Adv. Marc.* ii. 27; *Præscr.* c. 21); in CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 6 times (*Cohort.* i. 10, p. 10; *Pæd.* i. 5, p. 109; i. 8, p. 142; i. 9, p. 150; *Strom.* i. 28, p. 425; v. 13, p. 697; — once the present, *γινώσκει*, *Strom.* vii. 18, p. 901; and once, in a mere allusion, *ἐπιγινώσκει*, *Quis dives*, etc., c. 8, p. 939); ORIGEN uniformly, 10 times (*Opp.* i. 440, 643, 726; ii. 537; iv. 45, 234, 284, 315, 450 *bis*), and in the Latin version of his writings of which the Greek is lost *novit* is used 10 times, including *Opp.* iii. 58, where *novit* is used for Matthew and *scit* for Luke; *scit* occurs also *Opp.* iv. 515. The SYNOD OF ANTIOCH *versus* Paul of Samosata has it once (Routh, *Rel. sacra*, iii. 290); ALEXANDER OF ALEXANDRIA once (*Epist. ad Alex.* c. 5, Migne, *Patr. Gr.* xviii. 556); EUSEBIUS 6 times (*Eccl. Theol.* i. 12, 16, pp. 72^c, 77^d; *Dem. Evang.* iv. 3, v. 1, pp. 149^c, 216^d; *Ecl. proph.* i. 12, Migne xxii. 1065; *Hist. Eccl.* i. 2. § 2); DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA once (*De Trin.* ii. 5, p. 142); EPIPHANIUS twice (*Her.* lxxv. 6, p. 613; lxxiv. 10, p. 898).—Of these writers, Alexander has *οἶδε* once; Eusebius *γινώσκει* or *ἐπιγινώσκει* 3 times, Didymus *γινώσκει* followed by *ἐπιγινώσκει* 3 times, Epiphanius has *οἶδε* 9 or 10 times, and it is found also in Basil, Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria. Marcellus in Eusebius (*Eccl. Theol.* i. 15, 16, pp. 76^c, 78^d) wavers between *οἶδε* (twice) and *γινώσκει* or *ἐπιγινώσκει* (once), and perhaps *ἐγνώ* (c. 16, p. 77^d).

4. We find the *transposition* of the clauses, "No one knoweth [or knew] the Father" coming first, in one MS. in Matthew (Matthæi's d) and two in Luke (the uncial U and i^{scr}), in the *Diatessaron* of TATIAN as its text is given in the Armenian version of Ephraem's Commentary upon it, translated into Latin by Aucher, and published by G. Moesinger (*Evangelii concordantis Expositio*, etc., Venet. 1876),* the CLEMENTINE HOMILIES 5 times (xvii. 4; xviii. 4, 13 *bis*, 20), the MARCOSIANS in Irenæus (i. 20. § 3), other GNOSTICS in Irenæus (iv. 6. § 1), and IRENÆUS himself (ii. 6. § 1; iv. 6. § 3, *versus* § 1 and § 7, *Lat.*, but here a Syriac version represented by a MS. of the 6th century, gives the transposed form; see Harvey's Irenæus, ii. 443), TERTULLIAN once (*Adv. Marc.* iv. 25), ORIGEN once (*De Princip.* ii. 6. § 1, *Opp.* i. 89, in a Latin version), the SYNOD OF ANTIOCH against Paul of Samosata (as cited above), the MARCIONITE in PSEUDO-ORIG. *Dial. de recta in Deum fide*, sect. i. *Opp.* i. 817); EUSEBIUS 4 times (*Eccl. Theol.* i. 12; *Dem. Evang.* iv. 3, v. 1; *Hist. Eccl.* i. 2. § 2), ALEXANDER OF ALEXANDRIA once (*Epist. ad Alex.* c. 12, Migne xviii. 565); ATHANASIUS twice (*In illud, Omnia mihi tradita sunt*, c. 5, *Opp.* i. 107; *Serm. maj. de Fide*, c. 27, in Montf. *Coll. nova*, ii. 14), DIDYMUS once (*De Trin.* i. 26, p. 72), EPIPHANIUS 7 times, or 9 times if the passages transferred from the *Ancoratus* are reckoned (*Opp.* i. 766, 891, 898, 977, 981; ii. 16, 19, 67, 73), CHRYSOSTOM once (*In*

* This reads (pp. 117, 216), "Nemo novit Patrem nisi Filius, et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater."

Ascens., etc., c. 14, Opp. iii. 771 (931) ed. Montf.), PSEUDO-CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA once (*De Trin.* c. 1, Opp. vi. c. p. 1), PSEUDO-CAESARIUS twice (*Dial. i. resp.* 3 and 20, in Migne xxxviii. 861, 877), MAXIMUS CONFESSOR once (*Schol. in Dion. Areop. de div. Nom.* c. 1. §2, in Migne iv. 189), JOANNES DAMASCENUS once (*De Fide Orth.* i. 1), and GEORGIUS PACHYMERES once (*Paraphr. in Dion. Areop. de div. Nom.* c. 1. §1, in Migne iii. 613).

This transposition is found in MS. b of the Old Latin, and some of the Latin Fathers, *e.g.*, Phæbadius (*Cont. Arian.* c. 10); and most MSS. of the Old Latin, and the Vulgate, read *novit* in Matthew instead of *scit* or *cognoscit*, which they have in Luke; but it is not worth while to explore this territory here.

It is manifest from this presentation of the facts that the variations to which the author of *Supernatural Religion* attaches so much importance,—the transposition of the clauses, and the use of the past tense for the present,—being common to Justin not only with the Gnostics, but with a multitude of the Christian Fathers, can afford no proof or presumption that the source of his quotation was not our present Gospels—that he does not use in making it (*Dial.* c. 100) the term “the Gospel” in the same sense in which it is used by his later contemporaries. It indeed seems probable that the reading *ἐγὼ*, though not in the MSS. which have come down to us, had already found its way into some MSS. of the second century, particularly in Matthew. Its almost uniform occurrence in the numerous citations of the passage by Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and the reading of the Old Latin MSS. and of the Vulgate, favor this view. The transposition of the clauses may also have been found in some MSS. of that date, as we even now find its existence in several manuscripts. But it is not necessary to suppose this; the Fathers, in quoting, make such transpositions with great freedom. The stress laid on the transposition in *Supernatural Religion* is very extravagant. It did not affect the sense, but merely made more prominent the knowledge and the revelation of the Father by Christ. The importance of the change from the present tense to the past is also preposterously exaggerated. It merely expressed more distinctly what the present implied. Further, these variations admit of an easy explanation. In preaching Christianity to unbelievers, special emphasis would be laid on the fact that Christ had come to give men a true knowledge of God, of God in his paternal character. The transposition of the clauses in quoting this striking passage, which must have been often quoted, would thus be very natural; and so would be the change from the present tense to the past. The Gnostics, moreover, regarding the God of the Old Testament as an inferior and imperfect being, maintained that the true God, the Supreme, had been wholly unknown to men before he was revealed by Christ. They would, therefore, naturally quote the passage in the same way; and the variation at an early period would become wide-spread. That Irenæus should notice a difference between the form in which the Gnostics quoted the text and that which he found in his own copy of the Gospels is not strange; but there is nothing in what he says which implies that it was anything more than a various reading or corruption of the text of Matthew or Luke; he nowhere charges the Gnostics with taking it from Gospels peculiar to themselves. It is their *interpretation* of the passage rather than their text which he combats. The change of order further occurs frequently in writers who are treating of the divinity of Christ, as Athanasius, Didymus, Epiphanius. Here the occasion seems to have been that the fact that Christ alone fully knew the

Father was regarded as proving his deity, and the transposition of the clauses gave special prominence to that fact. Another occasion was the circumstance that when the Father and the Son are mentioned together in the New Testament, the name of the Father, commonly stands first; and the transposition was the more natural in the present case, because, as Semisch remarks, the word "Father" immediately precedes.

In this statement, I have only exhibited those variations in the quotation of this text by the Fathers which correspond with those of Justin. These give a very inadequate idea of the extraordinary variety of forms in which the passage appears. I will simply observe, by way of specimen, that, while Eusebius quotes the passage at least eleven times, none of his quotations verbally agree. (See *Cont. Marcel.* i. 1, p. 6^a; *Ecl. Theol.* i. 12, 15, 16 *bis*, 20, pp. 72^e, 76^e, 77^d, 78^a, 88^d; *Dem. Evang.* iv. 3, v. 1, pp. 149^e, 216^d; *Comm. in Ps.* cx.; *Ecl. proph.* i. 12; *Hist. Ecl.* i. 2. § 2.) The two quotations which he introduces from Marcellus (*Ecl. Theol.* i. 15 and 16) present a still different form. In three of Eusebius's quotations for *εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ* he reads *εἰ μὴ ὁ μόνος γεννηθεὶς αὐτὸν πατήρ* (*Ecl. Theol.* i. 12, p. 72^e; *Dem. Evang.* iv. 3, p. 149^e; and *Hist. Ecl.* i. 2. § 2). If this were found in Justin Martyr, it would be insisted that it must have come from some apocryphal Gospel, and the triple recurrence would be thought to prove it.* The variations in Epiphanius, who also quotes the passage eleven times (not counting the transfers from the *Ancoratus*), are perhaps equally remarkable. PSEUDO-CESARIUS quotes it thus (*Dial.* i. *resp.* 3): Οὐδὲς γὰρ οἶδε τὸν πατέρα εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱός, οἶδε τὸν υἱὸν τῆς ἐπιστάτης εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ. But the false premises from which the author of *Supernatural Religion* reasons have been sufficiently illustrated.

This Note is too long to allow the discussion of some points which need a fuller treatment. I will only call attention to the fact that in the list of passages in our Gospels which Irenæus (i. 20. § 2) represents the Marcosians as perverting, there is one which presents a difficulty, and which some have supposed to be taken from an apocryphal Gospel. As it stands, the text is corrupt, and the passage makes no sense. Mr. Norton in the *first* edition of his *Genuineness of the Gospels* (1837), vol. i. Addit. Notes, p. ccxlii, has given a plausible conjectural emendation of the text in Irenæus, which serves to clear up the difficulty. For the *πολλὰκις ἐπεθύμισα* of Irenæus he would read *πολλὰ καὶ ἐπεθύμισα*, for *δὲ*, *εἶναι* (so the old Latin version), and for *διὰ τοῦ υἱός, διὰ τοῦ ἐροῦντος*. The passage then becomes a modification of Matt. xiii. 17. Dr. Westcott (*Canon of the N. T.*, 4th ed., p. 306) proposes *ἐπεθύμισαν* for *ἐπεθύμισα*, without being aware that his conjecture had been anticipated. But that change alone does not restore sense to the passage. The masterly review of Credner's hypothesis that Justin's Memoirs were the so-called "Gospel according to Peter," which contains Mr. Norton's emendation to which I have referred, was not reprinted in the *second* edition of his work. It seemed to me, therefore, worth while to notice it here.

* Compare *Supernatural Religion*, i. 341.

NOTE B. (See p. 141.)

ON THE TITLE, "MEMOIRS BY *the* APOSTLES."

In regard to the use of the article here, it may be well to notice the points made by Hilgenfeld, perhaps the ablest and the fairest of the German critics who regard some apocryphal Gospel or Gospels as the chief source of Justin's quotations. His book is certainly the most valuable which has appeared on that side of the question.*

In the important passage (*Dial.* c. 103), in which Justin says, "In the Memoirs which I affirm to have been composed by the Apostles of Christ and their companions (ὁ ὅμιλος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκείνους παρακολουθούτων συντεταχθείς), it is written that sweat, like drops of blood [or "clots," ὁμοῦ ζου], flowed from him while he was praying" (comp. Luke xxii. 44), and which Semisch very naturally compares, as regards its description of the Gospels, with a striking passage of Tertullian,† Hilgenfeld insists—

(1) That the article denotes "the collective body" (*die Gesamtheit*) of the Apostles and their companions.

(2) "The Memoirs by the Apostles" is the phrase generally used by Justin. This might indeed be justified by the fact that the Gospels of Mark and Luke were regarded as founded on the direct communications of Apostles or sanctioned by them; but this, Hilgenfeld says, is giving up the sharp distinction between the Gospels as written two of them by Apostles and two by Apostolic men.

(3) The fact that Justin appeals to the "Memoirs by the *Apostles*" for incidents, like the visit of the Magi, which are recorded by only *one* apostle, "shows clearly the utter indefiniteness of this form of expression."‡ "Manifestly, that single passage, namely, the one quoted above (*Dial.* c. 103), "must be explained in accordance with Justin's general use of language."

Let us examine these points. As to (1), the supposition that Justin conceived of his "Memoirs" as "composed" or "written"—these are the words he uses—by "the collective body" of the Apostles of Christ and "the collective body" of their companions is a simple absurdity.

(2) and (3). For Justin's purpose, it was important, and it was sufficient, to represent the "Memoirs" to which he appealed as resting on the authority of the Apostles. But in one place he has described them more particularly; and it is simply reasonable to say that the more general expression should be interpreted in accordance with the precise description, and not, as Hilgenfeld strangely contends, the reverse.

* See his *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Justin's, der clementinischen Homilien und Marcion's* (Halle, 1850), p. 13 ff.

† *Adv. Marc.* iv. 2: Constituimus in primis evangelicum instrumentum apostolos auctores habere. . . Si et apostolicos, non tamen solos, sed cum apostolis et post apostolos. . . Denique nobis fidem ex apostolis Ioannes et Mattheus insinuant, ex apostolicis Lucas et Marcus instaurant.

‡ Hilgenfeld also refers to Justin (*Dial.* c. 101, p. 328, comp. *Apol.* i. 38) for a passage relating to the mocking of Christ at the crucifixion, which Justin, referring to the "Memoirs," describes "in a form," as he conceives, "essentially differing from all our canonical Gospels." To me it appears that the agreement is essential, and the difference of slight importance and easily explained; but to discuss the matter here would be out of place, and would carry us too far.

(3) The fact that Justin appeals to the "Memoirs by the Apostles" for an incident which is related by only *one* Apostle is readily explained by the fact that he gives this title to the Gospels considered *collectively*, just as he once designates them as *εὐαγγέλια*, "Gospels," and twice as *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, "the Gospel." The usage of the Christian Fathers in quoting is entirely analogous. They constantly cite passages as contained "in the Gospels" which are found only in *one* Gospel, simply because "the Gospels" was a term used interchangeably with "the Gospel," to denote the four Gospels conceived of as one book. For examples of this use of the plural, see the note to p. 141. To the instances there given, fifty or a hundred might easily be added.

Hilgenfeld, in support of his view of the article here, cites the language of Justin where, in speaking of the new birth, he says, "And the reason for this we have learned from *the* Apostles" (*Apol.* i. 61). Here it seems to me not improbable that Justin had in mind the language of Christ as recorded by the Apostles John and Matthew in John iii. 6, 7, and Matt. xviii. 3, 4. That he had *no* particular Apostles or apostolic writings in view—that by "the Apostles" he meant vaguely "the collective body of the Apostles" does not appear likely. The statement must have been founded on something which he had read *somewhere*.

NOTE C. (See p. 196.)

JUSTIN MARTYR AND THE "GOSPEL ACCORDING TO THE HEBREWS."

After remarking that the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" was "almost universally regarded in the first centuries as the Hebrew original of our canonical Gospel of St. Matthew," that Greek versions of it "must have existed at a very early date," and that "at various times and in different circles it took very different shapes," Lipsius observes: "The fragments preserved in the Greek by Epiphanius betray very clearly their dependence on our canonical Gospels. . . . The Aramaic fragments also contain much that can be explained and understood only on the hypothesis that it is a recasting of the canonical text. . . . The narrative of our Lord's baptism (Epiphan. *Her.* xxx. 13), with its *threefold* voice from heaven, is evidently a more recent combination of older texts, of which the first is found in the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke; the second in the text of the Cambridge *Cod. Bezae* at St. Luke iii. 22, in Justin Martyr (*Dial.* c. *Tryphon.* 88, 103), and Clemens Alexandrinus (*Pædag.* i. 6, p. 113, Potter); the third in our canonical Gospel of St. Matthew. And this very narrative may suffice to prove that the so-called 'Hebrew' text preserved by St. Jerome is by no means preferable to that of our canonical Gospel of St. Matthew, and even less original than the Greek text quoted by Epiphanius."* "The attempt to prove that Justin Martyr and the Clementine Homilies had *one* extra-canonical

* Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Christian Biog.*, vol. ii. (1880), p. 710. Many illustrations are here given of the fact that most of the quotations which have come down to us from the "Gospel of the Hebrews" belong to a later period, and represent a later stage of theological development, than our canonical Gospels. Mangold agrees with Lipsius. See the note in his edition of Bleek's *Einleitung in das N. T.*, 3^e Aufl. (1875), p. 132 f. Dr. E. A. Abbott, art. *Gospels* in the ninth ed. of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (x. 818, note), takes the same view. He finds no evidence that Justin Martyr made any use of the Gospel according to the Hebrews.

authority common to them both, either in the *Gospel of the Hebrews* or in the *Gospel of St. Peter*, . . . has altogether failed. It is only in the rarest cases that they literally agree in their deviations from the text of our Gospels; they differ in their citations as much, for the most part, one from the other as they do from the text of the synoptical evangelists, even in such cases when one or the other repeatedly quotes the same passage, and each time in the same words. Only in very few cases is the derivation from the *Gospel of the Hebrews* probable, as in the saying concerning the new birth (Justin M. *Apol.* i. 61; Clem. *Homilies*, xi. 26; *Recogn.* vi. 9); . . . in most cases . . . it is quite enough to assume that the quotations were made from memory, and so account for the involuntary confusion of evangelic texts." (*Ibid.* p. 712.)

Mr. E. B. Nicholson, in his elaborate work on the Gospel according to the Hebrews (Lond. 1879), comes to the conclusion that "there are no proofs that Justin used the Gospel according to the Hebrews at all" (p. 135). He also observes, "There is no reason to suppose that the authorship of the Gospel according to the Hebrews was attributed to the Apostles generally in the 2d or even the 3d cent. Irenæus calls it simply 'that Gospel which is according to Matthew'" (p. 134).

Holtzmann in the eighth volume of Bunsen's *Bibelwerk* (1866) discusses at length the subject of apocryphal Gospels. He comes to the conclusion that the "Gospel of the Hebrews" or "of the Nazarenes" was an Aramaic redaction (*Bearbeitung*) of our Matthew, executed in an exclusively Jewish-Christian spirit, making some use of Jewish-Christian traditions, but presupposing the Synoptic and the Pauline literature. It was probably made in Palestine for the Jewish-Christian churches some time in the second century (p. 547). The Gospel of the Ebionites, for our knowledge of which we have to depend almost wholly on Epiphanius, a very untrustworthy writer, Holtzmann regards as "a Greek recasting (*Uebersetzung*) of the Synoptic Gospels, with peculiar Jewish-Christian traditions and theosophic additions" (p. 553).

Professor Drummond, using Kirchhofer's *Quellensammlung*, has compared the twenty-two fragments of the Gospel according to the Hebrews there collected (including those of the Gospel of the Ebionites) with Justin's citations from or references to the Gospels, of which he finds about one hundred and seventy. I give his result:—

"With an apparent exception to be noticed presently, not one of the twenty-two quotations from the lost Gospel is found among these one hundred and seventy. But this is not all. While thirteen deal with matters not referred to in Justin, nine admit of comparison; and in these nine instances not only does Justin omit everything that is characteristic of the Hebrew Gospel, but in some points he distinctly differs from it, and agrees with the canonical Gospels. There is an apparent exception. Justin quotes the voice from heaven at the baptism in this form, 'Thou art my son; this day have I begotten thee.' 'This day have I begotten thee' is also in the Ebionite Gospel;* but there it is awkwardly appended to a second saying, thus: 'Thou art my beloved Son; in thee was I well pleased; and again, This day have I begotten thee';—so that the passage is quite different from Justin's, and has the appearance of being a later patchwork. Justin's form of quotation is still the reading of the Codex

* See Epiphanius, *Har.* xxx. 13; Nicholson, *The Gospel according to the Hebrews*, p. 40 ff.—E. A.

Bezæ in Luke, and, according to Augustine, was found in good MSS., though it was said not to be in the older ones. (See Tischend. in loco.) * One other passage is appealed to. Justin says that, when Jesus *went down upon the water*, a fire was kindled in the Jordan,—*πῆρ ἀνέφθη ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ*. The Ebionite Gospel relates that, when Jesus *came up from the water*, immediately a great light shone round the place,—*εὐθὺς περιέλαμψε τὸν τόπον φῶς μέγα*. This fact is, I believe, the main proof that Justin used the Gospel according to the Hebrews, and that we may therefore have recourse to it, whenever he differs verbally from the existing Gospels. Considering that the events recorded are not the same, that they are said to have happened at different times, and that the two quotations do not agree with one another in a single word, this argument cannot be considered very convincing, even by those who do not require perfect verbal accuracy in order to identify a quotation. But, further, the author of the anonymous *Liber de Rebaptismate* says that this event was related in an heretical work entitled *Pauli Prædicatio*, and that it was not found in any Gospel: ‘Item cum baptizaretur, ignem super aquam esse visum; quod in evangelio nullo est scriptum.’ (Routh, *Rel. Sac.* v. pp. 325, 326 [c. 14, Routh; c. 17, Hartel.]) Of course the latter statement may refer only to the canonical Gospels. † To this it may be added that a comparison of the fuller collection of fragments of “the Gospel according to the Hebrews” given by Hilgenfeld or Nicholson (the latter makes out a list of thirty-three fragments) would be still less favorable to the supposition that Justin made use of this Gospel.

In the quotations which I have given from these independent writers, I have not attempted to set forth in full their views of the relation of the original Hebrew Gospel to our Greek Matthew, still less my own; but enough has been said to show how little evidence there is that the “Gospel of the Hebrews” in one form or another either constituted Justin’s “Memoirs,” or was the principal source from which he drew his knowledge of the life of Christ. While I find nothing like *proof* that Justin made use of any apocryphal Gospel, the question whether he may in a few instances have done so is wholly unimportant. Such a use would not in his case, any more than in that of the later Fathers, as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Jerome, imply that he placed such a work on a level with our four Gospels.

The notion that Justin used mainly the “Gospel according to Peter,” which is assumed, absolutely without evidence, to have been a form of the “Gospel according to the Hebrews,” rests almost wholly on the hypothesis, for which there is also not a particle of evidence, that this Gospel was mainly used by the

* It is the reading also (in Luke iii. 22) of the best MSS. of the old Latin version or versions, of Clement of Alexandria, Methodius, Lactantius, Juvenius, Hilary of Poitiers in several places, Hilary the deacon (if he is the author of *Quæstiones Vet. et Nov. Test.*), and Faustus the Manichæan; and Augustine quotes it once without remark. It seems to be presupposed in the Apostolical Constitutions (ii. 32); see the note of Cotelier *in loc.* It is altogether probable therefore that Justin found it in his MS. of Luke. The words (from Ps. ii. 7) being repeatedly applied to Christ in the N.T. (Acts xiii. 33; Heb. i. 5; v. 5), the substitution might easily occur through confusion of memory, or from the words having been noted in the margin of MSS. — E. A.

† *Theol. Review*, October, 1875, xii. 482 l., note. The *Liber de Rebaptismate* is usually published with the works of Cyprian.

author of the Clementine Homilies. The agreement between certain quotations of Justin and those found in the Clementine Homilies in their variations from the text of our Gospels is supposed to prove that Justin and Clement drew from a common source; namely, this "Gospel according to Peter," from which they are then imagined to have derived the great body of their citations. The facts stated in the quotation I have given above from Lipsius, who has expressed himself none too strongly, are enough to show the baselessness of this hypothesis; but it may be well to say a few words about the alleged agreement in *five* quotations between Justin and the Clementines in their variations from the text of our Gospels. These are all that have been or can be adduced in argument with the least plausibility. The two most remarkable of them, namely, Matt. xi. 27 (par. with Luke x. 22) and John iii. 3-5, have already been fully discussed.* In two of the three remaining cases, an examination of the various readings in Tischendorf's last critical edition of the Greek Testament (1869-72), and of the parallels in the Christian Fathers cited by Semisch and others, will show at once the utter worthlessness of the argument.†

The last example alone requires remark. This is Matt. xxv. 41, "Depart from me, accursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels." This is quoted by Justin as follows: "Go ye into the outer darkness, which the Father prepared for Satan and his angels." (*Dial.* c. 76.) The Clementine Homilies (xix. 2) agrees with Justin, except that it reads "devil" for "Satan."

Let us examine the variations from the text of Matthew, and see whether they justify the conclusion that the quotations were taken from a different Gospel.

The first is the substitution of ἐπάγχετε, which I have rendered "Go ye," for πομπεύετε, translated in the common version "depart." The two words, however, differ much less, as they are used in Greek, than *go* and *depart* in English. The common rendering of both is "go." We have here merely the substitution of one synonymous word for another, which is very frequent in quotations from memory. Tischendorf cites for the reading ἐπάγχετε here the Sinaitic MS. and HIPPOLYTUS (*De Antichr.* c. 65); so ORIGEN on Rom. viii. 38 in Cramer's *Catena* (p. 156) referred to in the *Addenda* to Tregelles's Greek Test.; to which may be added DIDYMUS (*Adv. Manich.* c. 13, Migne xxxix. 1104), ASTERIUS (*Orat.* ii. in *Ps.* v., Migne xl. 412), THEODORET (*In Ps.* lxi. 13, M. lxxx. 1336), and BASIL OF SELEUCIA (*Orat.* xl. § 2, M. lxxxv. 461). Chrysostom in quoting the passage substitutes ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως for πομπεύετε eight times (*Opp.* i. 27^b ed. Montf.; 285^c; v. 256^c; xi. 29^c; 674^f; 695^l; xii. 291^b; 727^c); and so Epiphanius once (*Hier.* lxvi. 80, p. 700), and Pseudo-Cæsarius (*Dial.* iii. *resp.* 140, Migne xxxviii. 1061). In the Latin Fathers we find *discedite*, *ite*, *abite*, and *recedite*.

* See, for the former, Note A; for the latter, p. 147 ff.

† The two cases are (a) Matt. xix. 16-18 (par. Mark x. 17 ff.; Luke xviii. 18 ff.) compared with Justin, *Dial.* c. 101, and *Apol.* i. 16, and Clem. Hom. xviii. 1, 3 (comp. iii. 57; xvii. 4). Here Justin's two quotations differ widely from each other, and neither agrees closely with the Clementines. (b) Matt. v. 34, 37, compared with Justin, *Apol.* i. 16; Clem. Hom. iii. 55; xix. 2; also James v. 12, where see Tischendorf's note. Here the variation is natural, of slight importance, and paralleled in Clement of Alexandria and Epiphanius. On (a) see Semisch, p. 371 ff.; Hilgenfeld, p. 220 ff.; Westcott, *Canon*, p. 153 f.; on (b) Semisch, p. 375 f.; Hilgenfeld, p. 175 f.; Westcott, p. 152 f.; Sanday, p. 122 f.

The second variation consists in the omission of ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, "from me," and (οἱ) κατηραμένοι, "(ye) accursed." This is of no account whatever, being a natural abridgment of the quotation, and very common in the citations of the passage by the Fathers; Chrysostom, for example, omits the "from me" fifteen times, the "accursed" thirteen times, and both together ten times (*Opp.* i. 103^d; v. 191^c; 473^d; vii. 296^a; 571^d; viii. 356^d; ix. 679^a; 709^c; x. 138^b). The omission is still more frequent in the very numerous quotations of Augustine.

The third and most remarkable variation is the substitution of τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον, "the outer darkness," or "the darkness without," for τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον, "the eternal fire." The critical editors give no various reading here in addition to the quotations of Justin and the Clementines, except that of the cursive MS. No. 40 (collated by Wetstein), which has, as first written, τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἐξώτερον, "the outer fire," for "the eternal fire." It has not been observed, I believe, that this singular reading appears in a quotation of the passage by Chrysostom (*Ad Theodor. lapsum*, i. 9), according to the text of Morel's edition, supported by at least two MSS. (See Montfaucon's note in his edition of Chrysost. *Opp.* i. 11.) This, as the more difficult reading, may be the true one, though Savile and Montfaucon adopt instead αἰώνιον, "eternal," on the authority of four MSS.* But it does not appear to have been noticed that CHRYSOSTOM in two quotations of this passage substitutes the "outer darkness" for "the eternal fire." So *De Virg.* c. 24, *Opp.* i. 285 (349)^c, ἀπέλθετε γάρ, φησὶν, ἀπ' ἐμοῦ εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον τὸ ἡτοιμασμένον κ. τ. λ. Again, *De Panit.* vii. 6, *Opp.* ii. 339 (399)^b, πορεύεσθε, οἱ κατηραμένοι, εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον κ. τ. λ. We find the same reading in BASIL THE GREAT, *Hom. in Luc.* xii. 18, *Opp.* ii. 50 (70)^d; in THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA in a Syriac translation (*Fragmenta Syriaca*, ed. E. Sachau, Lips. 1869, p. 12, or p. 19 of the Syriac), "discedite a me in tenebras exteriores quæ paratæ sunt diabolo ejusque angelis"; in THEODORET (*In Ps.* lxi. 13, Migne lxxx. 1336), who quotes the passage in connection with vv. 32-34 as follows: "Go ye (ὑπάγετε) into the outer darkness, where is the loud crying and gnashing of teeth"; † in BASIL OF SELEUCIA substantially (*Orat.* xl. § 3, M. lxxxv. 308), ὑπάγετε εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξω, τὸ ἡτοιμασμένον κ. τ. λ., and in "SIMEON CIONITA," i.e. Symeon Stylites the younger (*Serm.* xxi. c. 2, in Mai's *Nova Patrum Biblioth.* tom. viii. (1871), pars iii. p. 104), "Depart, ye accursed, into the outer darkness; there shall be the wailing and gnashing of teeth." ‡ Compare SULPICIUS SEVERUS, *Epist.* i. ad Sororem, c. 7: "Ite in tenebras exteriores, ubi erit fletus et stridor dentium" (Migne xx. 227^a). See also Antonius Magnus, Abbas, *Epist.* xx. (Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* xl. 1058), "Recedite a me, maledicti, in ignem æternum, ubi est fletus et stridor dentium."

The use of the expression "the outer darkness" in Matt. viii. 12, xxii. 13, and especially xxv. 30, in connection with "the wailing and gnashing of teeth," and the combination of the latter also with "the furnace of fire" in Matt. xiii. 42, 50, would naturally lead to such a confusion and intermixture of different passages in quoting from memory, or quoting freely, as we see in these

* Since the above was written, I have noticed this reading in Philippus Solitarius, *Dioptra Rei Christianæ*, iv. 20 (Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* cxxvii. 875, b c): "Abite a me procul, longe, maledicti, in ignem exteriorem, qui præparatus est diabolo et angelis ejus."

† The last clause reads ὅπου ὁ βρυγμός καὶ ὁ ὕληνγμός τῶν ὀδόντων, but the words βρυγμός and ὕληνγμός seem to have been transposed through the mistake of a scribe.

‡ Simeon Cionita uses the expression τὸ ἐξώτερον πῦρ, "the outer fire," *Serm.* xxi. c. 1.

examples. Semisch quotes a passage from Clement of Alexandria (*Quis dives*, etc., c. 13, p. 942), in which Jesus is represented as threatening "fire and the outer darkness" to those who should not feed the hungry, etc. Cyril of Alexandria associates the two thus: "What darkness shall fall upon them . . . when he shall say, Depart from me, ye accursed, into the eternal fire," etc. (*Hom. div. Opp.* v. pars ii. b, p. 408 f.) The fire was conceived of as burning without light. In the case of Justin there was a particular reason for the confusion of the "fire" and the "outer darkness" from the fact that he had just before quoted Matt. viii. 12, as well as the fact that "the outer darkness" is mentioned likewise in the same chapter of Matthew (xxv. 30) from which his quotation is derived (*Dial.* c. 76).

Justin's substitution of "Satan" for "devil" is obviously unimportant. It occurs in the Jerusalem Syriac and Æthiopic versions, and was natural in the dialogue with Trypho the Jew.

The remaining coincidence between Justin and the Clementines in their variation from Matthew consists in the substitution of ὁ ἡτοίμασεν ὁ πατήρ, "which the Father prepared" (comp. ver. 34), for τὸ ἡτοίμασμένον, "which is [or hath been] prepared." This is of no weight, as it is merely an early various reading which Justin doubtless found in his text of Matthew. It still appears, usually as "my Father" for "the Father," in important ancient authorities, as the *Codex Bezae* (D), the valuable cursives 1. and 22., the principal MSS. of the Old Latin version or versions (second century), in IRENEUS four or five times ("pater," *Her.* ii. 7. § 3; "pater meus," iii. 23. § 3; iv. 33. § 11; 40. § 2; v. 27. § 1, allus.), ORIGEN in an old Latin version four times (*Opp.* i. 87^b, allusion; ii. 177^f; 298^d; iii. 385^e), CYPRIAN three times, JUVENCUS, HILARY three times, GAUDENTIUS once, AUGUSTINE, LEO MAGNUS, and the author of *De Promissis*,—for the references to these, see Sabatier; also in PHILASTRIUS (*Her.* 114), SULPICIUS SEVERUS (*Ep.* ii. *ad Sororem*, c. 7, Migne xx. 231e), FASTIDIUS (*De Vit. Chr.* cc. 10, 13, M. l. 393, 399), EVAGRIUS presbyter (*Consult.* etc. iii. 9, M. xx. 1164), SALVIAN (*Adv. Avar.* ii. 11; x. 4; M. liii. 201, 251), and other Latin Fathers—but the reader shall be spared.—Clement of Alexandria in an allusion to this passage (*Cohort.* c. 9, p. 69) has "which the Lord prepared"; Origen (*Lat.*) reads six times "which God prepared" (*Opp.* ii. 161^e; 346^a; 416^f; 431^d; 466^b; and iv. b. p. 48^a, ap. Pamphili *Apol.*); and we find the same reading in Tertullian, Gaudentius, Jerome (*In Isa.* l. 11), and Paulinus Nolanus. Alcimius Avitus has *Deus Pater*.—Hippolytus (*De Antichr.* c. 65) adds "which my Father prepared" to the ordinary text.

It is clear, I think, from the facts which have been presented, that there is no ground for the conclusion that Justin has here quoted an apocryphal Gospel. His variations from the common text of Matthew are easily explained, and we find them all in the quotations of the later Christian Fathers.

In the exhibition of the various readings of this passage, I have ventured to go a little beyond what was absolutely necessary for my immediate purpose, partly because the critical editions of the Greek Testament represent the patristic authorities so incompletely, but principally because it seemed desirable to expose still more fully the false assumption of *Supernatural Religion* and other writers in their reasoning about the quotations of Justin.

But to return to our main topic. We have seen that there is no direct evi-

dence of any weight that Justin used either the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" (so far as this was distinguished from the Gospel according to Matthew) or the "Gospel according to Peter." That he should have taken either of these as the source of his quotations, or that either of these constituted the "Memoirs" read generally in public worship in the Christian churches of his time, is in the highest degree improbable. The "Gospel according to the Hebrews" was the Gospel exclusively used by the Ebionites or Jewish Christians; and neither Justin nor the majority of Christians in his time were Ebionites. The "Gospel according to Peter" favored the opinions of the Docetæ; but neither Justin nor the generality of Christians were Docetists. Still less can be said in behalf of the hypothesis that any other apocryphal "Gospel" of which we know anything constituted the "Memoirs" which he cites, if they were one book, or was included among them, if they were several. We must, then, either admit that Justin's "Memoirs" were our four Gospels, a supposition which, I believe, fully explains all the phenomena, or resort to Thoma's hypothesis of an "X-Gospel," *i.e.*, a Gospel of which we know nothing. The only conditions which this "X-Gospel" will then have to fulfil will be: It must have contained an account of the life and teaching of Christ which Justin and the Christians of his time believed to have been "composed by the Apostles and their companions"; it must have been received accordingly as a sacred book, of the highest authority, read in churches on the Lord's day with the writings of the Old Testament prophets; and, almost immediately after he wrote, it must have mysteriously disappeared and fallen into oblivion, leaving no trace behind.*

* Compare Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 1st ed. (1837), vol. i. pp. 225-230; 2d ed., i. 231 f.

THE GOSPEL OF JOHN:

*THE HISTORIC FORCES THAT WORKED TOGETHER TOWARD
ITS COMPOSITION, AND THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPTIONS
IT EMBODIES.*

BY REV. FRANCIS TIFFANY.

BRETHREN OF THE MINISTERS' INSTITUTE,—

German thought has familiarized us all, even to weariness, with discussions as to the characteristics that separate between subjective and objective, idealistic and realistic, writers. Enough, that the moment we turn, of our own native prompting, from a poet like Shakspeare to one like Milton, we are struck with an inherent difference in the habitual action of their minds. We take up Shakspeare's *Macbeth* or *Coriolanus*. In either case, a distinct, concretely built individual confronts us. Ambition or patrician pride may be the dominant passion of his being. Still he embraces a thousand-fold more than this; and the catastrophe ambition or pride ultimately precipitates takes on a genuine human shape through the co-working of strictly individual factors of his nature,—for example, a sensitive conscience or an overweening love for a mother. Turn we now to a dramatic poem of Milton,—we will say, *The Masque of Comus*. It is very beautiful. It lifts us at once into a region of ideal delight. But, if we ask what are the salient characteristics of the *dramatis personae*, we shall have to answer at once that the first brother is simply incarnate despondency, and the second incarnate hope, that the sister is ideal chastity, and Comus and his rout embodied sensuality. No concretely

human blood, nerve, variety, mystery of complication, is there in any of them. Still they charm, inspire, purify us; and we feel that, airy and transfigured as are the shapes with which we have been conversing, they are none the less the palpable powers that availed to fashion so robust a character as that of Milton himself.

Now, it may easily happen that any given age shall more readily appreciate the one class of such works than the other. But it must resolutely be insisted on at the outset that the very highest types of genius the world has been dowered with have illustrated the splendor of each of them. And no mind can think to aspire to comprehensiveness of taste and judgment that does not at least make the attempt to feel at home in both. Very difficult, for example, may it be for men of our prosaic and literal temperament to comprehend the mental process through which a Dante comes at last to kneel in rapt and breathless adoration before the transfiguration of the Florentine girl Beatrice into incarnate manifestation of Celestial Wisdom,—a process rapidly running through the same course in a single mind that in several generations transforms the Galilean peasant woman Mary into the Queen of Heaven and the Mother of God. Still Dante does spontaneously rise into this supernatural sphere, does absolutely fuse the two contraries into one glorified image,—ay, and feel that from communion with its eternal reality he draws redemption from evil, and peace past understanding. And yet, without some conception of such imaginative processes, we shall forever be ruled out from the possibility of comprehending the genesis of the great theologic conceptions that have dominated the world.

Permit me here a personal word. Already you may have begun to think, and for some time to come may feel still more so disposed, that I am wandering from my immediate subject. In the end, I trust you will find I have been steadily working my way into its heart.

Wide-spreading moral and religious movements always emanate from exceptional individuals, who embody and concentrate in themselves the elemental yearnings and passions

of whole ages and races. They are epoch-making men, because embracing within themselves vast epochs. In time, the portrayal of the characters of these founders becomes a necessity, a thing the world will have. Then forthwith does the principle on which we have been dwelling begin to assert its sway. No matter whether direct eye-witnesses or second-hand gatherers up of traditions attempt this portraiture, the fundamental difference in men as to their way of looking at things must and will come out. The Socrates of Xenophon is the record of what an observant, objective man, with little wealth of mind of his own to bewilder him, sees in a remarkable external character. The Socrates of Plato, on the other hand, is the precipitation of the richly-freighted mind of Plato himself on to certain characteristics of one whose native originality has stirred him to endless reflections,—reflections that have carried him whole worlds away from their simple provocative and starting point, while still in memory and gratitude indissolubly fused with it.

On opening the New Testament and comparing the impression produced by the Gospel of Matthew or Mark with that by the Gospel of John, the observant eye is at once struck with as salient a contrast as that already indicated on turning from the *Macbeth* or *Othello* of Shakspeare to the *Comus* of Milton or to Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. Spite of a large amount of legendary accretion, the writer of Matthew evidently draws from the first-hand sketches of an observer with an open, out-of-doors, breezy eye. We see flesh-and-blood men and women, who can taunt and scowl and elbow for place, who are fairly bristling with bigotry and selfishness, or tearfully yearning for solace and sympathy. Turn to a figure like that of John the Baptist. Outside and inside, there is no mistaking the hair-clothed, fiercely ascetic son of the desert. Turn again to the delineation of the virulent enemies alike of John and Jesus. What missiles, that they mean shall draw blood, do these enemies fling, the one set against John as "possessed of the devil," the other against Jesus as a "glutton and a wine-bibber"! We fairly feel with what venomous emphasis the accent

is laid on the "bibber," and that the epithet actually tastes good in the mouth. And so, irresistibly, are we of to-day carried back a few years to flesh-and-blood memories of like venomous outbreaks of temper, in typical conservatives furiously denouncing Mr. Garrison as a "crazy fanatic," and typical total-abstinence men pouring contempt on the more genial Mr. Emerson as a "rummy." In fact, we contract the most delightful sense of home-feeling, as though Jerusalem were, after all, but a sort of suburb of Boston, as we encounter precisely the same passions at work, and with the same exquisite command of the King's English or the King's Aramaic.

Turn we now, for contrast, to the delineation John's Gospel gives of the Baptist. Do we encounter the same rough-hewn, fiercely ascetic character? No, but a metaphysician, at home in the technical subtleties of the school of Alexandria, a devout Catholic adoring the sacrificial Lamb of God. The Baptist has become cosmopolitan. He knows all about the pre-existent, divinely emanating Logos: he does not know, even by sight, his flesh-and-blood cousin. I choose this as a test instance of the change that has come over the objects of our study. Surely one would have pronounced the stern Semitic hermit as intractable a subject for such a transformation; as though we had encountered him clothed in purple and in fine linen, perfumed and supple-kneed at the court of Herod. The powerful flux of an *idea* capable of *melting down* the most refractory individualities into a common fluid is evidently a work here. An *interest* and a *faith* in an idea is here, manifestly so powerful as to *excrete* and throw off all that does not fall into line with it. A *community of readers* is implied, to whom it would seem nothing in the least strange, something on the contrary to be taken as a matter of course, that John the Baptist should have been a mystic adorer of the incarnate Logos. And this is an immense implication. It is a crucial instance of the real phenomenon to account for in all considerations of the Fourth Gospel. In comparison with this, ability or inability to name the actual author of the work is of the smallest possible account.

Only in comparatively recent times has it come about that criticism has been able to cope effectually with this problem. And this for two reasons: First, the growth of mental freedom. For centuries, a paralysis lay on the human mind, under which it dared neither to think nor feel naturally nor humanly on a vast range of subjects. Second, the fructifying principle had not yet been discovered, through which alone investigation could be profitably pursued. That fructifying principle first came into action through the modern perception that every work of literature, every biography, every doctrine, is in reality a monument of the age that gave it birth. A profound sense of the infinite number of elements involved in the structure of every temple, poem, treatise, together with a clear recognition of the co-working of vast issues of race, climate, conquest, of mingling and intermingling religions and philosophies toward the production of every such monument,—these implications have, in our age, come to be regarded as the indispensable outfit of every scholar worthy of the name.

Now, for a long, long time, the writings of the New Testament stood out as isolated phenomena. No prolific soil of human nature in which they grew was adequately realized. The men and women of the time were dogmatic and ecclesiastical phantoms. Of the blood, passion, madness that reigned; of the ferment of wild imaginations that was seething in the masses; of the lone and fervid vigils of thinkers wrestling with the life-questions involved; of the fierce theological and philosophical parties into which men were divided; of the desperate struggles of those whose power, position, even bread, were bound up with the questions in debate; of the yearnings, prayers, despair of the miserable, whose fate hung on the issue,—of all this, how little was seen to be the very life-blood and arterial circulation of the special literary product that, at the best, was of such age but the dim and pale representation! Biblical history was *sacred* history. So even was later Church history that flowed out of it. But how terribly profane such sacred history might be, few had the hardihood to face, till the habit gained ground

of rationally interpreting the past by the present, human nature in a primate of Alexandria by human nature in a primate of English Canterbury, the gathering of the bishops, presbyters, and monks in a Council of Nicæa or Ephesus by the gathering of the political clans in a Tammany Hall. Then first were men in position to see how in this last instance, for example, precisely the same tactics of packing the primaries, distributing the offices (post-offices or bishoprics) where they would "do most good," howling down obnoxious speakers, were in as full vogue and cry in Nicæa in 325 as in New York in 1879; ay, and how indubitably, spite of his gleaming mitre, flowing robes, and patriarchal beard, so many a bishop was underneath but a most superficially converted Ben Butler.

Now, among the realities that have been brought out in vivid light in applying this method to New Testament criticism, two have become especially prominent: first, a more vital conception of the seething and ferment that were going on at the beginning of our era in Palestine, the birthplace of Christianity; second, of the equally intense, though widely different seething and ferment that were going on in the world outside of Palestine, and into whose vortex Christianity was speedily to be drawn and set whirling. And so, of the two elemental forces that were to combine in the one common flood of what afterwards flowed on as the great Christian Church, modern scholars are beginning to get as clear conceptions as the geologists are getting of that great continental river that, born of the confluence of the Missouri and the Mississippi, derives from each distinct coloring matter and fertilizing powers, which tell all the way down to the Gulf, in the nature of every reflection that gleams from its surface and of every harvest that waves on its banks.

First, of the seething and ferment in *Palestine*. Old ideas and faiths had been ruthlessly broken up. All that seemed most reliable and immutable tottered and reeled before the dizzy sense. The devoted were distracted about Jehovah and his ways. They were yearning for something that would give a sense of political, moral, spiritual *unity* to

their minds, that would bring some basis of reconciliation and harmony into the bewildering distraction that reigned. In different ways were they seeking it: the Pharisees,—that, in the main, so noble and patriotic party,—in one more frantic rally around the ceremonial law, in an obedience to it so unflinching and microscopic that Jehovah must perforce come to the rescue; the Essenes, in a despair alike of politics and sacerdotalism, in closer brotherhood and community of love. Life and death problems were these men trying to work out, and strain and agony were their accompaniments. Now, into the stress of this tragic turmoil, the life, character, and vision of Jesus brought to the followers he gathered about him the so pathetically yearned-for sense of spiritual harmony and reconciliation. In ideal, at least, they were the community of the loving ones, children of the Infinite Compassion, sharers and consolers of one another's tribulations, rapt adorers of the beatific vision of the kingdom of heaven, first-fruits of the new realm of beatitude speedily to come in the fulness of glory, in which the old order should be reversed, the greatest of all would be the consecrated servant of all, and there should be "no more death, neither sorrow nor crying." If we would think of this at all, let us try to think of it adequately. It was the concentration, in an outburst of ecstatic faith and in a vision that annihilated the barriers of space and time, of that which, in one shape or other, is the yearning and too often heart-break of every man and woman, through the ages, who has tears for human misery, who feels how the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain, who in prophetic vision of the heart shares hours of rapture in which he forecasts some glorified image of a New Jerusalem descending out of the heavens. I repeat it then: would we compass the problem before us, let us not think to leave out this Palestinian factor, but realize to ourselves all the passion and transport with which (under forms however crude and material) the new faith and expectation glowed in the hearts that shared it, realize to ourselves the yearning and heart-sickness with which something kindred to this was sighed for in every land under the sun to which its heralds should go forth.

Turn we now to the Jews outside of Palestine, as, dispersed through the great cities, Western and Eastern, of the Roman Empire, and brought into vital contact with the most varied systems of subtle thought and fervid imagination, — Syrian, Chaldean, Egyptian, Greek,—they found themselves stirred to the depths in another way. And here let us begin by giving the Hebrew the credit of at least a trace of ordinary human nature. The time has come for abandoning the old stock-conception of the Jew as an intractable type of intellect and character, remaining ever the same under all possible combinations of circumstances,—a sort of human thermometer, its mercury plugged, say at fifty degrees, and never indicating, by a rise or fall of a hair's breadth, whether the surrounding atmosphere is palpitating with the heat of one hundred and twenty degrees or is frigid with the cold of the arctic circle. All which is about as reasonable as the Middle-Age induction that a Jew is naturally and invincibly an unclean creature, because, if barbarity enough can be concentrated on him to keep him shut up, with insufficient water, in a filthy *ghetto* for centuries, the logical results of the law of the cohesion of particles will show themselves; while, as an offset to all this, one has but to throw a glance at the customs of the Essenes in their own land to see that the devout and loving brethren of the community must have lived in a sort of perpetual water-cure run mad.

No: intellectually and speculatively, these Jews of the dispersion were in a ferment as marked as that which, on political and religious issues, characterized their Palestinian brethren. Contact with endless varieties of Oriental Gnostic and Occidental Greek theories and systems had aroused them to a hundred questions of deep thought and intense imaginative brooding, and set them all adrift from their original moorings. Thoroughly wrought up had they become over foundation questions about the origin of things, the inherent depravity of matter, the source and nature of the good principle and the bad principle in the world. In the picturesque expression of the Greeks, we read how those

who were tormented with the poetic frenzy were characterized as "stung by the gad-fly." Ah! there is a gad-fly of metaphysics, and of speculation on the abysses of being, that drives yet more wildly about the mind, for the first time goaded out of the tranquil pasture-lands of traditional faith, by its sharp and stinging puncture. Painfully and inevitably, these keenly stimulated intellects found themselves in a most perplexing "straight betwixt two." Philosophize they must, retain their reverence for their own sacred books and traditions they must. And here were two intensely vital factors in mortal deadlock,—two factors, mark you, that have always played an enormous part in human history,—ay, and are playing it to-day in the breast of every thoughtful man and sensitive woman here present; two factors, finally, that do not stand for a mere abstract conflict between abstract ideas, but for a flesh-and-blood, intellectual, and emotional wrestle between the dearest sanctities of the heart and the most imperative necessities of the head.

Of course this vital issue was settled, reconciliation and harmony were reached, freedom and wings alike for emotion and thought were attained, in the way in which the like issues always are settled, in such great world-processes; namely, by the hearty reception of a *principle that seemed to do full justice to each irresistible desire*. The method of the *allegorical interpretation of the sacred books* came into rapid vogue, and exerted limitless fascination over the mind. Do not let us too contemptuously dismiss this so universal principle, the anodyne and chloroform through which humanity has been lulled into pleasing dreams, or outright insensibility to cruel surgical operations that were actually cutting into the very nerves and dismembering the limbs of the most venerated shapes of faith. Allegory enjoys, by its very nature, the inestimable advantage that there are no limits to it anywhere in time or space, that there is no conceivable thing an ingenious mind—like that of Swedenborg, to take a modern instance—cannot find hidden, as interior or spiritual sense, in the most crude or material outer bark and rind. Ay, and the best of all is that such mind can

honestly find it there, can believe, without a scruple, that it is there, if he but start with an invincible, reverential faith that his sacred Book, being from God, must inevitably embody all the depths of Godhead. And this was precisely what was going on, and upon an enormous scale most notably in Alexandria, at the very time that Jesus was establishing a sense of moral and spiritual unity and reconciliation in Judea.

Pause to glance a moment at the work this struggle after intellectual harmony was, in the very age of Jesus, accomplishing under Philo, a great and individual leader indeed, but only a type of countless others who were absorbed in the self-same task.

To what point has the metaphysical passion of Philo brought him? To this: that he is so enraptured with Greek and Gnostic speculation, sees in it such a noble exercise of the intellect, such light cast upon the problems of this and all other worlds, that he feels it must be dear to the very heart of God himself, must be prefigured and prophesied in the revelation God has made to his chosen ones. So enormous, through this faith, has become the subjective element in his own mind, that the most sharply defined and materially solid of historical objects are dissolved into "such stuff as dreams are made of," and float, as the arid sands of the Sahara desert so oft-times do, in a mirage of lakes and groves. The rugged people Israel have become idealized into the symbol of the soul; Egypt is the dark imprisoning body; Canaan is beatitude; the desert, the deliverance of the soul through stern asceticism. Again and inevitably, the question presses, What power have individual characters and outward events, however strongly marked, to stand out against the flux and solvent of such absolute possession of the idea? Already have we spoken of the transfiguration of the rugged Baptist John into the adherent of an alien metaphysical system. See now how Philo deals with Abraham, and then let us bluntly ask ourselves whether historically, in either case alike, we are not looking on at phenomena in which the same essential principle is at an identical

kind of work. Here again in Abraham a type of character confronts us we should *a priori* pronounce impossible to evaporate into mere abstractions,— the princely sheik of the desert with his aged wife Sarah and her bond-maiden Hagar. But they reckon ill, who leave allegory out. Lo ! Abraham, to suit the temper of the times ! He has become translated into the abstract spirit of consecration and sacrifice ; while Hagar is mundane philosophy, and Sarah divine wisdom. Why is Hagar the slave of Sarah ? Why, but to body forth that profane wisdom ought ever to be subjected to the truth that comes from on high ? Long does Abraham cohabit with Sarah without posterity. Why, again, but to prefigure to the ages that the cultivation of divine wisdom alone is not sufficient to produce fruit ? Shall Abraham obtain a son ? Then must it be that, with the full consent of Sarah (who is divine wisdom), he unite himself with Hagar ; that is, cultivate profane science. Thus is the end of the ages accomplished. Thanks to this alliance of human science and divine wisdom. Abraham is ultimately empowered to render even Sarah fruitful ; that is, to develop all there is of grand and productive in eternal truth.

Now this may seem to us allegorizing with a vengeance. It certainly was. But what I want to fix attention on is that it was a process going forward upon an enormous scale among the Jews of the dispersion, forming a wide-spread habit of regarding outer fact as mere picturesque clothing of inner truth. More than all, especially note this : it was a process that was bringing multitudes of Greek-and-Gnostic-tinctured pagans to see that they could stand on common ground with these Jews, and freely and hospitably sympathize in ideas with them. The most sublimated Platonist would feel all his prejudices against a rude Abraham of the desert irresistibly melting away, as he found him capable of going through with such a transcendental metaphysical feat as that on which we have just been dwelling. And yet these things we smile at were dead earnest to those engaged in them. Perhaps they illustrate what is often called "the irony of history." And yet there is no cruel irony in it.

The bringing the varied members of our one-sided, wrong-headed, inveterately prejudiced race together, so that they can at least exchange ideas and learn to respect the deepest and noblest elements in one another's creeds, is in reality a sublime achievement. How many a Greek, versed in subtlest intellectual speculation as to the unity and ideal root of the cosmos, learned to feel an unknown thrill as he was brought into contact with the Holy God of Israel, "the power that makes for righteousness"! How many a votary of some mystic Syrian or Chaldæan system, with its awful sense of the mystery of Elemental Evil, was awakened to intenser yearning after redemption and to new faith in its possibility, as he was awed and uplifted by the attributes of this self-same Holy God! And, in rich return, how did many a Jew behold the portals flung wide into a new world of wonder and delight, as *the life of reason* awoke within him, and he felt himself borne on a mighty tide out into the ocean of infinity and eternity that is the characteristic of Greek, or, wider yet, of Aryan thought!

Yes, Philo: as Jacob and Esau contended in the womb of Rebekah, so did two mighty races contend in your breast. Only on a broader scale and in a more speculative spirit, were you carrying out the same great impulse that the more directly practical emergencies of life were forcing on the minds of others. Everywhere was the pounding of the great world-ocean breaking down the barriers of nationality and exclusion. Even in Judæa itself, the disposition steadily gathered head to let in on easy terms different orders of the heathen as proselytes of the gate, and to abrogate on their behalf many a cumbersome restriction, still insisted on for the Jewish-born. The schoolmaster of the Law was abroad, and on a scale we are but just beginning to apprehend. And so, in the alacrity with which, for example, a trained theologian like Paul proved ready, when his day came, to level the last remaining frontier fortresses, and stand with the world at large on the ground of a common spiritual country, we see but a prophetic and joyous leap into a mighty stream of tendency, and not a feat of mere individual initiation.

Time will not serve to enter into all the intricacies of the peculiar theologies that were shaping themselves through this fusion of Egyptian, Persian, Chaldæan, Greek, Hebrew ideas. Their main, and most characteristic features were briefly these: First, a profound sense of the abyss and unknowableness of ultimate Godhead, a sensitive shrinking from the crude and passionate characteristics with which it had so often been set forth in literal scripture. And with this allied itself a profound emotional protest. The aspects of the material world had administered to the mind an intellectual and moral shock. Men could not see in this sensual, bestial world the first-hand work of a wise and beneficent Deity. Largely did it impress them as elemental disorder and chaos, hateful in its workings alike to reason, to the tortured heart, to the outraged moral being,—an abyss of evil to be delivered from. Creation, such a realm could not be held, of the one pure, immutable, eternal God. And yet God is and was and ever shall be. For evermore active cause, his being must essentially be going forth in sublime creative process. But it was in the evolution of a spiritual, supersensuous world in his own image, a world in which, unhampered by bondage to materiality, the divine ideas have free play, run, and are glorified. In absolute riot of imagination, these divine ideas are conceived in endlessly varied forms,—as pure abstractions, as potent, shaping forces, as angels and hierarchies of angels, grading up and up till well-nigh indistinguishable in power and attribute from Deity itself, grading down, as farther from central Godhead, till merged in the king of evil or in essentially accursed matter. Thus are these two worlds, the free and spiritual, the bound and fallen. They are set over the one against the other. And yet the light of the higher penetrates in gleams the darkness of the lower. From generation to generation, this light is manifested in the chosen ones of earth, and draws by pure affinity the kindred-minded. But, in union alone with this higher and spiritual world lies man's redemption from the lower; and such redemption must be mediated for him through the indwelling of the powers of the celestial

realm. Of these, the highest, the primal, the soul in the absolute image of the Father is the Logos, or Creative Reason. No divine attributes but are practically accorded him in the adoring tributes paid by a Philo to his grace and power. He is "Before All Things," "First-begotten Son of God," "Image of God," "Creator of the Worlds," "Light," "Mediator," "Intercessor." But here Philo stopped. His Semitic instinct would have shrunk, startled back at the thought of the outright incarnation of the Logos.

Now, in all this, it is not in the least a question of what we individually may think about the worth of such theologies or of such a solution of the earth-mystery. What we need to penetrate ourselves with is the historical fact that the minds of masses of men in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor—the vast realms into which the Palestinian stream was soon to plunge—were absolutely steeped in conceptions kindred to these. The name of such theories and fully wrought-out systems was simply legion. Nor do we form an adequate idea of them, if we regard them as mere philosophies. Philosophy is a cold word. They were also, with thousands, faiths,—faiths with all the blood and fire in them needful to kindle the wildest flames of fanaticism and to raise up prophets and prophetesses inspired with more than Bacchic fury. The most limited knowledge of Church history apprises us of the reality of the passion with which such systems were embraced, the austerity of the asceticism they nerved men to, the eager thirst for martyrdom they inspired. In the tremendous dualism of such conceptions lay endless magazines, alike of terror and of ecstasy, as the fervid imagination of Oriental races seized upon their data. Emanation, Logos, Demiurge, essential evil of matter, elemental wrestle of Light and Darkness, Good and Evil,—these were as much reality to the high-wrought imagination of those ages as are to us food and poison, sunshine and mildew, invigorating mountain-air and pestilential breath of yellow fever.

Surely, no man can share a vivid conception of the way in which the interests and passions of masses of men act and react upon one another, and still continue to dream

that the marvellous movement that was about to start out from Palestine could maintain itself in its original shape, when once it had plunged into so alien a world as this. As well expect a mountain stream (pure, though it be, as crystal) to preserve itself the same in its onward course, where one tributary pours in brown with wood-stain and another red from clay-bottoms. What vast masses of the men and women to whom Christianity was now to make its appeal, were yearning after, was a sense of spiritual unity with that celestial realm, the vision of whose glory lay so radiant before their imaginations. It was after redemption from that lower world, whose fatal and essential evil they recognized with such shudder of sense and spirit. To them was there but one possibility of such redemption. It lay in living unity with the mystic, universal, all-penetrating spiritual image of God, call him Logos, call him any kindred name. For to them evil was not simply this man's sin or that man's sin: it was elemental. Good, to triumph over it, must be likewise elemental. In comparison with the tremendous Ormuzd and Ahriman conflict between the great powers that were to decide the issue, individual personality sank into nothingness. The question of questions was, "Under whose banner?" And so inevitably, irresistibly, the Jesus who was to get any lasting hold on their minds and sway them as masses must become revealed to them as lord and ruler of this supersensuous world, must come trailing in clouds of glory every attribute of well-nigh essential Deity, must become identified with the Logos, Only-begotten, Mediator, Image of God, Creator of the Worlds, waging eternal warfare with the children of Darkness and of Satan.

I repeat it: as well think to look through a window of red glass and not see the landscape all on fire, or through a window of blue glass and not see it white and drear with snow, as to look through the medium of these mystic, fervid, appalling, and enrapturing preconceptions, and dream that they will not project themselves as essential part of the object before the sight.

The Palestinian movement did go forth into vast regions

steeped and saturated with these cosmic and theologic conceptions. And now the simple question arises: "In point of fact, did these conceptions modify or largely transform the image entertained of the character and nature of Jesus himself, and of the doctrines he taught to the world? Does any record exist that bears attestation of such change, and, if so, how shall we recognize the tide-marks of such change? Have we any sound, common-sense principles to go on in insisting on these tide-marks as conclusive?"

Yes: in the Gospel of John we have just such a document; and, in studying it, we need only to apply a common-sense principle we are relying on every day and every hour. When any one of us reads a book that is continually bringing in such a phrase as "the categorical imperative," we say, "Aha! there's Kant!" when such another as "the Will to Live," "Aha! there is Schopenhauer or Hartmann!" when still another like "the Instability of the Homogeneous!" "Aha! there's Herbert Spencer!" And, if such kinds of phraseology and all the implications they carry with them stamp the whole character of the book, then do we without hesitation assert, "Here is precisely the same kind of circumstantial evidence which, to put it plainly, convinces us that the man we meet on the road with his hat and coat all white with meal came out of a grist-mill, or with his face and hands all black with coal-dust came out of a coal-yard."


Open the Gospel of John. At the first stroke, we find ourselves off the solid ground of Judæa and in another realm. Following the line of the clear analysis of Professor Scholten, we note, first, that God is no longer characterized by mere attributes. He is substance, essential Spirit, Life, Light, Love, and that not through his relation to the world, but before the world, and in and of himself. But this does not complete his idea. Is God Thought alone, or is he moreover that which is his thought? He is this also. His own essence enters into what is objectified as thought, lives, moves, has its being in it. Thus, originally in God, as content of the divine thinking, the Logos, or Word, is, ideally

considered, eternally immanent in God; and this, too, before all worlds. Not alone immanent, however: the Logos goes forth a concrete divine substance, sharing in what God is in essence, and so image of God. He, like God, is Light and Life. By him are all things made, not indeed the outright substance of matter or the inherent evil in man,—these indeed have another author, as we shall see farther on,—but such order as marks the imperfect cosmos, and such light as shines in men. And so the world has two contrasting sides. As born of the Logos, it partakes of God; as related to the material and sensuous, it is intractable to or at enmity with God. There are two kinds of men: the one born of the flesh and solely related to the flesh, the other, though born likewise of the flesh, receptive of a higher principle from God,—the men whom the Father draws, the men whom he does not draw. God gives his Son, *not* to save all, but those who believe on his name. Some are, potentially even, incapable of this. Is God, then, the author of sin? No: Light cannot be the cause of Darkness, Life of Death, Love of Hate. Whence, then, the fatal cause? It lies in the rooted dualism of spirit and flesh,—in the nature of that which is eternal opposition to what God is. These are children of the devil, creations of the power in whom good does not dwell. It is not because God is not willing to impart the divine to them, but by derivation they do not belong to the category of those he can draw. Good is a nature, evil is a nature, each attracted to its like, each repelled from its opposite. Is the question asked, Whence the devil? Whence the essential evil? the only reply that can be given is that this is a question this Gospel does not so much as entertain. It simply recognizes evil and its author as existing, as rooted in a common essence, as proceeding to manifest their logical necessities. Such issues as those of free-will and personal accountability were foreign to this mode of thought. The Logos enters the world, assumes flesh, through its veil manifests a glory that draws all who are spiritually qualified to appreciate such glory. The rest it repels. Throughout this whole Gospel,

we see this law of attraction and repulsion at work in as palpable a form as though we were overlooking a vessel filled with water, and watching a little child now drawing to a clustering centre with a magnet the miniature fishes and swans floating on the surface, and anon, by reversing the pole, scattering them irresistibly apart. Nor shall we understand the spirit of this work till we feel that its author was delineating the operation of a power as hidden, as elemental, and as undoubted by him as that which, in the hand of the child, is producing effects he sees to be what they are, and about which he asks no farther questions.

Now, in view of all on which we have been dwelling, I, for one, am unable to see where any valid standing-ground can be found for the supposition of that kind of objective historical verity that attached to the Fourth Gospel in the ages in which it was believed to be the production of an accurate and unbiassed eye-witness, simply adding to the earlier Gospels a number of astonishing events and profoundly important discourses they had omitted. To insist on such a claim seems to me to sacrifice to mere vague tradition the positive knowledge we possess of the spirit in which the work is written, and of the whole chain of causes that had wrought the world to another and utterly different state of spiritual expectancy. A subjective influence, not only greater than the power of original, external facts, but that overrides such facts, that scorns large numbers of them as of the earth earthy, that would wing its flight above them in free, creative sweep, has risen to absolute mastery. Nor is this a new thing. From the very outstart of Christianity, we encounter the might of this self-same impulse. It was the spirit of the age. It is already rife in the mind of Paul. Outright does he glory in *not* having seen and known Christ in the flesh. It is as inner revealer, as inspiration of his own spirit's unfolding of the hidden mystery of that Palestinian life in time and sense, that Paul hails and adores Jesus. Throughout the acknowledged Epistles of the grand apostle to the Gentiles, and onward through those written in his name, like Hebrews and Colossians, does this same

tendency show itself in ever-increasing progress. Already Reflection of God, Maker and Upholder of all things, the intense absorption of the age in theologic adoration is, under our very eyes, steadily advancing the name of Jesus toward deification. And if we ask, Why did not the power of original, external fact arrest this process, and draw back the mind to sober and solid reality? the answer simply is that there was no interest felt in original, external fact, that could for a moment contend with the fervor and passion of the thirst after supernatural vision. Who, where masses of men are burning to burst the bonds of time and sense, to deify and to adore, wants what seems earth-born, prosaic fact? Woe to the man that dares to interpose it! Woe to the sect of faithful Ebionites even, and on the very soil of Palestine, that dare to maintain the earlier, humbler tradition! Swiftly do they become heretics, revilers, blasphemers, though sanctioned by a James, brother of the Lord. Facts! The yearning and creative spirit can evolve what pass for them by the million, evolve them more resplendent, more profound than the original, fuller of symbolic light, more harmonious with what seems the higher vision. *Can* evolve them! *Did* evolve them! We are standing here on absolute historic ground, and raising no hypotheses. Every apocryphal Gospel, every early Church Father, is but in line by line an attestation of the fact. Not an incident in the life of an apostle even, like that of the advanced age to which John lived on in Ephesus, but was destined ultimately to be raised into some touching legend, in which it was revealed to the believing heart how he never really died at all, but lay sleeping in his grave, where, the ground gently heaving with his breath, he awaited in tranquil peace the second coming of his Lord. And yet, in the face and eyes of all this, we hear men continually asking, "Where (if they are not records of objective realities) did the narrations of the Fourth Gospel come from?" To ask such questions, as though they contained staggering arguments, is to be destitute of all historic sense, is to ignore the whole function of imagination in shaping the poetry and religion of the world, is to feel no



pulse-beat of appreciation of a mighty passion that has lifted on its tide whole ages and races of men. As well might the Roman Catholic ask in triumph, Whence all the pathos and tenderness, all the consolation, grace, and ecstatic vision, millions—and among them grand intelligences and canonized saints—have received of Mary, Mother of God and Queen of Heaven, if, as you say, she were but the humble, loving, Palestinian mother of Jesus of Nazareth? Whence? Nowhere, if we ignore the soul of man, its insatiable craving after love and help, and its creative power of bodying forth a realm where all these yearnings are satisfied, and it reaps “beauty for ashes, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness.”

The Fourth Gospel has for generations been very dear to the human heart. Men and women, the most practical, the most intellectual, the most spiritual, have loved it. Without analyzing its contents or giving the reason why, they have yet felt it imparted a hidden something to them the other Gospels did not impart. A noble and saintly brother of our own household of the faith, who in devout humility consecrated the rarest gifts and graces to the life-long service of an obscure village parish, wrote a beautiful book on it, called *The Heart of Christ*,—a book to my mind critically worthless, but spiritually invaluable; and the story is told of the rapture with which Horace Greeley, the restlessly moiling editor, spoke of the fountain of living water that volume had set flowing for him, amid the hurry and rush, the din and clang, of that modern pandemonium, the printing-place of a daily newspaper. Men feel more deeply than they know. All hidden from their eyes may be the stupendous fact that the outcome of the toil and travail of that great Aryan race whose blood and passion circulate in their own veins has been poured along with the Semitic flood into that wonderful Gospel; but none the less, I repeat, do they feel the something there that is not in the other Gospels, and by which they are startled with a peculiar thrill.

The Gospel of John, while stern and terrible in its denunciation of the alien world of the children of darkness and

Satan, is for all the children of the light the gospel of devout contemplation and tender sentiment. It opens the portals into the heart of the inner, mystic, adoring love of the associated believers, the drawn-of-the-Father, and breathes the aroma of exquisite unity and peace, above the smoke and stir of this dim place which men call earth. It is of its very charm that it ushers the soul into a purely ideal realm, and becomes a temporary refuge from the sharply individual shapes and accentuated passions and interests of the actual world, that it does for this later world what a soft and silvery robing of bridal haze does for the granite mountain and rugged cliff, what the translucent cloud screen for the full moon, making itself felt from behind. Perpetually is the reader-reminded of the grace of those celestial visions of the Holy Family, on which Raphael has poured out the exuberant tenderness of his genius,—the picture, not of ordinary domestic love with its prosaic accompaniments, but of transfigured motherhood and of ideal childhood. True, it has become the fashion of the age to disparage Raphael. He is pronounced too monotonously ideal. Desperate realists enough there are, who would prize the picture a thousand-fold more highly, had the great painter only consented to put in a few human touches, and to depict the infant Jesus pulling the hair of the infant John, while in turn the John was inflicting some shape of torment on the lamb. Suffice it to say that this was not the manner in which Raphael worked. No more was it that which commended itself to the author of this kindred Gospel.

Jesus is indeed here a spiritual power that has entered into history. His original redeeming spirit pervades the hearts of his followers. His call to the weary and heavy-laden, and he would give them rest; his vision of the heavenly kingdom, sweet with the peace of God and the love of man,—breathe a celestial atmosphere abroad. But it is the Jesus glorified after the manner of a new race of believers, the Jesus who, *one element only* in a vast theologic movement, has been deified into *Eternal Author, Inspirer, Ruler* of it all. It is the Jesus potent to establish the sense

of indestructible unity because of the adorable truth that before all worlds he was and is and returns to be, one in essence with God, "real presence" in his chosen ones. Utterly abolished in the minds of these worshippers has become the original Jewish conception of the abyss of separation in being between God and all that can wear the shape of man. And so, in the eternal foundation of the believer's peace, are we reminded of that rich line of Milton,

"Such sober certainty of waking bliss, I never felt till now."

The realm of beatitude into which this wonderful Gospel ushers the hearts of "the drawn of the Father" has been called an exclusive one. It has been termed "the rose garden of the petted saints," and stout and loyal champions of salvation for all or none, have flung off from it indignantly. Let us meet this objection fairly. The sphere into which the congenial spirit is here admitted is undeniably a limited one; but it is as wide as the eternal nature of things made possible. Evermore must the children of the Heavenly One ray out light and love. They must yearn to win over all who could be won. That an elemental evil, rooted in the eternal antagonism of Light and Darkness, would somewhere bring them against an iron barrier, was not their guilt. Now, this admitted, forgive me when I say that in this very atmosphere of seclusion we encounter a large element of the peculiar charm imparted by this Gospel, as much so as in the sacred stillness of a grove we find relief from the din and turmoil of a city. Humanity craves a certain element of exclusiveness as one condition of its richest life. Monotonous and unremitting work, even benevolent and reformatory, has in it a fatal tendency toward vulgarization of spirit. Pursued to the point where the powers are sheer drained out, it ends in strain and shallowness, in pain and despair. Men crave and imperatively need the realm in which they can yield themselves up to the luxury, the soul-freedom, the sweetness and light of a circle of purely congenial spirits. Then only does the mind enjoy its hours of play. All life enforces the need of this. The hard-worked teachers in the public schools cry out for their

share in a happy, exclusive world with one another,—the world which neither girl

“Nor boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
Can utterly abolish or destroy.”

So the artists, the merchants, the men of science, the women with their clubs without men, and the men with their clubs without women, all in their several ways attesting the inner feeling that their particular Judas must *go out* before the high rapture will begin.

Now it is the permanent charm of this Gospel that it is so beautiful a picture of just such a sphere, even if a limited one. Hence flowed the sweet and soothing fragrance that, stealing in upon the sense of Horace Greeley amid the hurry and rush of the editorial room, the din and clang of the mammoth press, made him feel in his heart of hearts how he yearned for, needed or he must die, some such refuge from the terrible exactions of that very humanity he was toiling for, and yet which would, from the irresistible power of elemental forces within itself, continue on for centuries to be largely as blind and intractably averse to light as it was to-day. True, such an exclusive realm of sweetness and light has its peril. So has everything beautiful,—music, poetry, domestic love. But escape is not to be sought in making the whole world barren and prosaic, and insisting that no elect spirits shall revel together in nature, light, love, unity, until the last incorrigible hater of them is started out of his lair. Would that this marvellous Gospel had a free and universal faith that the beatitude it chants for those drawn-of-the-Father was but a fore-taste of what should “fall at last, far off, at last for all.” But it had not. In the final ecstatic prayer of the Jesus it portrays, we are borne so high and wide that we hold our breath in expectant sense that now the last barriers will be broken through. But no: this cannot be. The dualism is too profound and elemental. Against its adamant wall does even his celestial voice, in its highest strain, break and fall.

Do we ask who wrote this wondrous Gospel? Mysterious

its origin, as that wind of which its author speaks, which bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof and canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth. As with the Great Unknown of the book of Job, the Great Unknown of the later Isaiah, the ages keep his secret. The first absolutely indisputable evidences of the existence of the book date from the latter half of the second century. Strong but not entirely satisfactory marks, as of quotation from actual phrases and sentences it employs, may be traced to the middle of the same century, or a little earlier. But, as has already been urged to repletion, such phraseology and all the implications of dogma and system they involve were the theologic atmosphere in which vast numbers lived and breathed and had their being. The main satisfactory early traces of the Fourth Gospel come to us from Gnostic sources, and this is precisely what its own inner nature would lead us to anticipate. Its ultimate authority in the Catholic Church was due, no doubt, to the recognition and triumph of so many of the conceptions of that powerful Gnostic element that at one time seems to have constituted the intensest force and fire of the Asiatic Church. For the belief that John, the apostle, was its author, it is probably itself mainly accountable. Yet even this John, woven in so indistinguishably with the tide of its discourse that often it becomes impossible to tell where Jesus ceases to speak and he begins, is as much the figure of an ideal world as are all the other figures. It cannot be too often repeated: there are no real characters in this Gospel, there are simply embodied sentiments and ideas. Nicodemus, the woman of Samaria, the paralytic of the pool, the congenitally blind man, the Jewish race,—all are but symbols of conditions of soul. The mystic truth which, under the Johannine veil in which he enwraps and so elusively hides his own personality, the author seeks to indicate, is that, as none can reveal God but the coessential Son hidden in the bosom of the Father, so none can interpret the Christ but "the beloved disciple," dissolved with him in unity of love.

Personally, therefore, I see no other ground we can take

than that in the Fourth Gospel we are dealing with a free, ideal composition, in which a single mind of transcendent spiritual genius gives expression to the results of the travail and yearning of a whole great epoch; with a devout theosophic glorifying of the person and work of Christ, as he has come to be worshipped by a host of believers. Founded, no doubt, in a measure on traditions existing in the Church, those traditions have yet been so continuously modified to harmonize with the spiritual demands of an advancing system that all attempt at sifting out original historic verities must prove impracticable.

When shall we come to read this marvellous book as freely and helpfully as we are now reading Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia*? Over the spiritual depths unfolded in that, every man of devout heart can hang in rapture, and all around us to-day do we hear men and women crying out in spontaneous delight. Is the reason far to seek? Is it other than simply this? No vain and empty questionings about external material fact invade its ideal and holy realm. A leaf torn out of the heart of one of the world's most pathetic, most triumphant experiences, is there for our souls to commune with. Shall we arrest the heart's full flow, and, getting out our books of archæology and our calculus of probabilities, fall doggedly to the prosaic question whether, in reality, the sympathetic tree bent down its branches to make a secluded arbor for Maya, in which to bear the saviour Buddha, while the grass broke into flowers for a bed for her, and water leaped out of the rock for the child's first crystal bath; whether Buddha's veritable cousin shot the wild swan, the sight of whose blood-stained plumage awoke the boy to that passionate outburst the child-heart ever feels when first confronted with the realities of pain and death; whether, in fine, the description of the palace and enchanted grounds, in which the vain attempt was made to shut out the youth's compassionate heart from all knowledge of earth's misery, were historically exact, and even there

"He would start up and cry, 'My world! O world!
I hear, I know, I come'?"

Enough that in such beautiful legends the grateful heart of humanity uttered its sense of the immeasurable debt it owed to its self-abdicating deliverer, and created a realm in which it could be free to range in rapture.

Brethren, in respect of this our Fourth Gospel, as of all works conceived out of a like spiritual impulse, we are destined to witness, I humbly believe, a fresh illustration of the great law laid down for sculpture by Thorwaldsen, when he said that the clay was the life, the plaster the death, the marble the resurrection. First, historically, do we ever behold a plastic external material, responsive to every touch of the shaping spirit and taking on such forms of grace or beauty as the spirit dictates. To this a plaster age succeeds, when the wondrous form is cast in rigid, dogmatic mould, cold, opaque, and lifeless; at last, in the resurrection of the spirit, the shining out once more, through the translucent veil of the marble, of the inner idea, sole cause and glorifier.

METHODS OF DEALING WITH SOCIAL QUESTIONS.

BY REV. J. B. ^{General Secretary} HARRISON.

The following abstract of this essay appeared in *The Christian Register* of November 1:—

THE very nature of society implies relations and reciprocal obligations among the individuals. In the simplest form of society, the village, people live near enough to each other to work together; but, for many of the larger interests of society, we can work directly with only a few hundred persons, at the most, and much of the best work is done by the co-operation of a score or so of persons in each village. A city is, in most of its social aspects, an aggregation of villages. For nearly all practical purposes and interests, the *nation* is the boundary of our social relations. Our special or particular social interests in America are the divisions and departments of our general national or social life, including a hundred different questions arising from the complex conditions of our time. The social questions which arise are questions which concern the best *methods* of treating these important interests. Some of these great social and national questions have not yet been touched in America by any method, or in any definite way whatever; some of these matters the Church has not even considered, and of course has not formulated or developed any method of dealing with them. Again, some of the social conditions in this country are so new, the constitution, environment, and tendencies of society are so unique, that the Church has not yet had time to adapt itself to the peculiar exigencies. But some of the questions are old and universal, and history gives us the record of the Church's treatment of them. Science, however, has no rep-

representative organization, like that of the Church ; and by the phrase "scientific methods" we must understand methods which are *in accordance with science*, which are suggested by the result of observation, experiment, and careful study of facts. Scientific methods are not always fully developed or exactly determined ; and, in dealing with the formal subject of this essay, we can but examine the Church methods of dealing with these all-important questions, to see how far they are scientific. For the Church methods are already partly scientific,—that is, they are more or less the result of observation and experiment, the comparison of facts, and the co-ordination of practical experience.

The Church is chiefly devoted to religion, which it usually regards as *one* thing, not *the* thing which includes every other department and interest of human life. Of course this former view of the function of the Church has its natural difficulties, as well as its natural justification. But it is important to observe that *religion*, strictly speaking, does not give *method*. Method, by the nature of things, belongs to scientific knowledge and intellectual judgment. Religion is not an intellectual activity ; it is chiefly trust, obligation, obedience,—an inspiration of power. Religion does not use analysis, classification, and synthesis of facts. Religious men may use these methods, but they are the methods of science. It is the social function of science to discover the best available methods of dealing with social questions ; it is the function of religion to supply the impulsion, obligation, patient seriousness and trust, without which the best methods can never be adequately applied or followed.

The Church is also devoted to other things besides religion, taken in the narrow, ecclesiastical sense. It has always been in some measure devoted to morality, to education, and some other secular interests, though she has usually been, since the rise of Protestantism, afraid to say so. The Church methods of dealing with these great interests have always been partly scientific, but they have been much more largely sentimental and traditional, continued because they were adopted in ancient times, though in conditions of society totally different from those which now exist.

What is now required of the Church is that she shall give greatly increased attention to education, sanitary affairs, national morality, and other secular interests, while at the same time she deepens and intensifies her religious vitality. In former days and other lands, the Church had far closer connection with the general social interests of the people. Now, in our own country, most of the secular work of the Church is devoted to education and alms-giving — popularly called charity.

During most of her career, the Church has done the best educational work which has been available,—work which appears to have been indispensable to human advancement. This work is still necessary; for science, in its modern development, still lacks earnestness and morality. The Church methods of education are largely traditional, sentimental, and unpractical, retained because they have been effective in former times. Church schools are generally narrow and un-American, educating children for an unreal world, instead of guiding them in the life they must live on earth. It seems peculiarly difficult for church people to realize that there is a *new environment* here, to the conditions of which education must be adapted.

After education, the most important social work of the Church is "charity,"—the relief of poverty, destitution, and physical suffering. The endowment and maintenance of hospitals is fast passing to secular influence; but the Church still prompts, directs, and administers most of the enormous *alms-giving*. Here the sentimental and traditional church methods are especially dangerous and irrational. Wasting money by giving it foolishly, the Church robs the industrious, provident, and moral, for the support of the lazy, wasteful, and vicious, and, by its ill-advised "charities," perpetuates and multiplies pauperism, vice, and crime. It is certain that if anything is wicked, sinful, and in direct defiance of God's laws, it is the *giving* money or means of living to idle men who have strength to work. Science and common-sense both demand that the Church shall either disregard the New Testament injunctions about alms-giving, or else find a new

interpretation of them. Beggary should not be permitted, and only the absolutely helpless should be supported at the public expense. It would be a blessing if we could make it impossible for any man, pauper or millionaire, to live an idler.

The churches and some of our religious newspapers are characterized by exuberant optimism, approaching the discussion of great social interests by the singing of jubilant hymns, and the quoting of fragments of *mal à propos* Hebrew prophecies. Our optionists are sentimental enough, and have a natural contempt for facts. Comfortable themselves, they cannot understand the condition and life of less fortunate people,—the great, silent multitude who work with their hands. Along with these effeminate sentimentalists are scientific optimists, who think the true use of science is to furnish material for Darwinian essays, and regard the facts of human life as chiefly valuable as illustrations for their interminable speculations. Scientific men are doing even less than the Church to teach people how to live in this world; and both science and the Church have less reason for boasting than for shame at having done so little. The true method of dealing with social questions is first to carefully examine and compare the *facts* of our social environment, then to use this knowledge in the invention and application of remedies for the evils. This is the method of science, and it is the proper method for the Church. We may briefly consider some special directions in which this method may well be applied.

The Church should turn its attention to sanitary reform. She should exorcise the fiends of loathsome disease, that lurk in the dark places of our cities, taking advantage of the ignorance of rich and poor, and ravaging the palace as well as the hovel. Filth is disease. Diphtheria slays more than does the yellow fever. It is the duty of those who understand the laws of public health to teach them to others.

The whole subject of popular education and schools for the children of the laboring classes needs immediate and earnest attention. The educational methods of our public

school are unwise, cramming the children with too many subjects, and doing little to prepare them for practical life. Our system of dealing with the Indians is an outrageous one. The country should learn the facts by sending patient, competent observers to study the frontier relations. The actual constitutional and legal relation of the national government to the governments and people of the several States is of profound importance, on account of the abnormal relations which have grown out of the civil war. The actual relation of the national government to South Carolina and Mississippi is precisely the same as its relation to Rhode Island and Massachusetts; and the partisan politicians who, for their own personal purposes, have done what they could to inflame sectional hatred and jealousy are traitors; and it is a pitiful sight to see religious editors, who profess to follow the Prince of Peace, following in the lead of unscrupulous partisans, and dealing out denunciations and menaces against citizens of other States. The true scientific method here calls for an adequate study of the condition of the South, which, with the patient devotion of religious influence, shall cultivate the feeling of fraternity between the people of all parts of our common country. The vicious juvenile literature demands our attention. Many of the books read in "cultivated families" are written by persons who would not be admitted to the house as friends or guests. The scientific method requires that we should *live with* our children, and thus guide them in their reading.

The conditions and circumstances of the laboring men and their families, and the tendencies of their thought and feeling, are almost unknown to the cultivated classes. This is the greatest of all social interests in America, and a constantly widening chasm is opening. There is some injustice and great misunderstanding on both sides; and the workmen are coming more and more under the influence of earnest men, who sincerely teach the most dangerous doctrines. The scientific method suggests that we must study the people, and teach them. The people of wealth and culture are responsible for the education and character of

the laboring classes; and unless they will freely share their culture and education with the less fortunate, they cannot hope to retain their position of pecuniary advantage. We ought to expend a million of dollars in new means and agencies for teaching the people, during the next three years, as a beginning; and, considering the pecuniary losses it would prevent, it would be a profitable business enterprise. We need small books and newspapers and magazines, prepared especially for the education of the working-people; and cultivated people should learn to speak to the uneducated classes in simple language, without any stilted elegancies of style and language. We have put absolute political power into the hands of capricious, unreasoning majorities; and the only scientific remedy for our evils is the instruction and education of the people. The essayist speaks on this subject from the most earnest convictions, founded on long, careful, scientific study of the conditions of American society.

The condition of the prisons and insane asylums, the character of the national currency, the existence of powerful corporations,—all demand this scientific attention. We must learn from our hard experience to adopt means to prevent the recurrence of hard times, which, if they come again, will be likely to be more disastrous than the business depression from which we are now slowly recovering. The feeling that, if the workingmen do not threaten serious disturbance of the public peace, we need not care much to improve their condition, is unscientific and immoral. They need teaching and guidance; and if we do not share our advantages with them, we shall not be able to retain those advantages ourselves. These are some of the chief things which demand the scientific method of dealing with social interests in this time of rapid and unexpected social changes.

In every village the ministers might do much, working with a few serious young men and women, to *quicken* the general life around them, develop public spirit, and guide it into work for real improvement in the way of better reading, better sanitary conditions, and closer and more general co-operation among the people for moral ends. This would soon *quicken* and improve the life of the whole nation.

ETHICAL LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER.

BY REV. GEORGE BATCHELOR.

AFTER this essay was planned and partly composed, the publication of Mr. Spencer's *Data of Ethics* made it necessary for your essayist to suspend his work until he could determine, by such examination as the time would allow, whether he should continue it as an independent student of ethical science, or come here as an exponent of the doctrines of Mr. Spencer. A careful reading of Mr. Spencer's book has convinced me that it does not contain all the data of ethics, and moreover — what is more to my purpose as a believer in the general doctrine of evolution — it does not contain the most important conclusions which may be drawn by one who accepts the general principles and methods which have shaped Mr. Spencer's system. As it stands, *The Data of Ethics* does not furnish such an explanation of ethical evolution as would give us a complete history of the past; nor such an exposition of ethical principles as might furnish a sufficient standard for the future.

In studying ethics and the law of social evolution, we must remember one characteristic of the science wherein it differs from many others. We are to inquire not merely what is, but also what ought to be; and not merely what ought to be in accordance with immutable laws which work beyond human control, but also what ought to be in regard to means and ends which are to be the result of human choice, willing, and action.

The discussion will be limited to a consideration of human life upon the earth. For although the ethical conceptions of one who believes in God and the immortal life cannot be precisely the same as those of one who does not believe in them, the influence of religion upon ethics will not change the nature of moral action nor shift its standards. It will have its effect rather upon the intensity of conviction, the energy with which moral ends will be pursued, the emphasis to be laid upon certain duties, and the account to be made of conceivable results which extend beyond the limits of terrestrial life.

Thirty years ago Mr. Spencer wrote of the "Divine Idea," and of "Scientific Morality" as a "statement of the mode in which life must be regulated so as to conform" to the conditions under which that idea was to be realized. To-day he drops the phrase and the method; and without detriment to our argument we may follow his example.

Ethics, according to Mr. Spencer, "has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution." "Acts are called good or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends." In the ethical sense, "conduct is considered by us as good or bad, according as its aggregate results, to self or others or both, are pleasurable or painful." "Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception."

Conduct is considered under four aspects, as physical, biological, psychological, and sociological.

Taking the physical view, the progress of evolution is toward a moving equilibrium, and consists in the passage "from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity." (For popular use, the formula would be not less exact and more expressive, if we should render it, "the passage from an indefinite, incoherent sameness to a definite, coherent diversity.") As the physical life becomes more definite, coherent, and diversified, the rhythm of internal actions and the rhythm of external actions must be so adjusted to each other that the combined motions of

all kinds will duly meet every daily process, every ordinary occurrence, and every contingency of one's environment.

From the biological point of view, the process of evolution leads by a like method to a balance of functions. Every function must be performed in such a way as to maintain complete life for the time being, and also to prolong life, while it affords an immediate quantum of pleasure. "Actions are completely right only when, besides being conducive to future happiness, special and general, they are immediately pleasurable," and "painfulness, not only ultimate but proximate, is the concomitant of actions which are wrong." "It matters not, from the biological point of view, whether the motives prompting them are high or low. The vital functions accept no apologies on the ground that neglect of them was unavoidable, or that the reason for neglect was noble."

From the psychological point of view, the problem is more complex. "Here we have to consider represented pleasures and pains, sensational and emotional, as constituting deliberate motives, as forming factors in the conscious adjustment of acts to ends."

Evolution is from the simple to the complex. Feelings acquire authority as they become compound. "Proximate results are compared with remote. The more ideal motives concern ends that are more distant." The genesis of the moral consciousness occurs when the effort is made to bring some feeling or feelings under the control of some other feeling or feelings. In passing from the state in which immediate and simple ends are always sought, men pass under three restraints, which, though not moral, prepare for the emergence of the moral restraint. These three are the social restraint, beginning in the mutual fear of savages; the political restraint, beginning in the fear of chiefs; the religious restraint, beginning in the fear of ghosts. These three controls severally lead men to subordinate proximate satisfactions to remote satisfactions, "yet they do not constitute moral control, but are only preparatory to it, are controls within which the moral control evolves." The restraints properly distinguished as moral refer not to the extrinsic,

but to the intrinsic effects of actions, the consequences which the acts naturally produce. With a perception of these consequences, there have grown "up moral aversions and approvals," "which, being gradually organized and inherited, have come to be quite independent of conscious experience."

Moral obligation is an abstract notion, the result of experience: first, of the necessity of subordinating near to remote pleasures; second, of submitting to the various restraints, social, political, and religious. These being often exercised in connection with the moral control have come to be associated with it. But, as the moral control emerges from the other motives, the feeling of obligation begins to fade, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases. "If some action, to which the special motive is insufficient, is performed in obedience to the feeling of moral obligation, the fact proves that the special faculty concerned is not yet equal to its function, has not acquired such strength that the required activity has become its normal activity, yielding its due amount of pleasure." The sociological point of view supplements the physical, biological, and psychological. The unit must be considered in relation to the whole. At first, society must protect itself regardless of the unit; but, when the social organism is safe, the welfare of the unit takes precedence. Societies, mutually antagonistic to each other, create a constantly changing ratio between the conduct appropriate to a state of war and a state of peaceful co-operation. But, as war gives way to the industrial state, the necessary compromises which have established temporary moralities give way to a final, permanent code, which admits of being definitely formulated. The fundamental requirement of this code is that the life-sustaining actions of each shall severally bring him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally achieved by them; and this implies that he shall suffer no aggressions direct or indirect. Further than this, men will facilitate life for one another by the exchange of services, at first mutually agreed upon, afterward by reciprocities beyond any contract.

This is a general outline of the argument. The remainder of the book is taken up with a consideration of objections, an elaboration of subsidiary arguments, and the working out of the compromises necessary to bring the theory into relation with the facts of man's moral experience, and make it a good working hypothesis.

The fundamental statement with which the argument begins and ends is "that the final justification for maintaining life can only be the reception from it of a surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful feeling; and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which subserve life or hinder life, only on this supposition." "The good is universally the pleasurable."

This discussion, so far as it relates to Mr. Spencer's theory, will be limited to the statement that the production of happiness is the highest end of moral action.

Before discussing the merits of this theory, I shall make the statement which I had prepared because it will bring into notice a different, and I think more powerful, incentive to the highest moral action, one which is not antagonistic to the love of happiness as a moral incentive, but supplementary to it, implicitly contained in Mr. Spencer's theory, but nowhere explicitly stated. I make the statement with diffidence because it is new, and has not been sufficiently criticised. But I submit it with confidence, because it seems to me to be a logical deduction from the law of evolution; because it supplements what seem to me to be the defective systems of Darwin and Spencer; because I cannot apply it to any case of moral casuistry where it does not suggest a shorter answer, and indicate duty by a more immediate process than any other theory of evolution; and because it accords with and explains in comprehensible terms the universal judgments of mankind.

The foundation of morals lies in the perception of human rights. The primary rights which have been successively acknowledged are three: namely, 1. The right to life; 2. The right to happiness; 3. The right to improvement of life and enlargement of its resources. These primary rights of the

individual are the measure of his duties to society. These duties are the negative and positive forms of obligation to respect the life, the happiness, and the improvement of others in society. These three primary rights and their correlated duties come into notice in regular order. They are acted upon as instincts before they appear as rational perceptions. They are necessary amplifications of the belief that anybody has a right to live. Each right and duty is absolute on its own level, and over all below it, so long as it does not conflict with a higher range of rights and duties. If there be any conflict, the lower gives way to the higher. The lower obligations emerge first. When life is held by a slender tenure, everything is adapted to the conduct which will ensure safety. When safety is secured, the right of happiness becomes a higher law by which all mutual relations in society are regulated. Life and happiness being fairly established, the longing to increase the quantity and improve the quality of life establishes a new order of moral relations.

How the love of life and the love of happiness, which suggest the right and duty to maintain them, have become part of the human constitution, we need not consider at length; for they are now commonplaces in the literature of evolution. But a word of explanation may be necessary concerning that which I have made the third stage of moral evolution, — the improvement of life. I do not find any one word which expresses what I mean by that phrase. It is improvement, betterment, progress, development, evolution, — improvement of conditions, betterment of function, increasing adaptation of means to ends, development of all one's native powers; and it is something more than all these. It is in some form a perception of the orderly course of unfolding which has brought human life to its present perfection. It is also an instinct which in the course of that unfolding has been developed in the human mind, in precisely the same way that the instinct of sympathy, and the instinctive love of life and happiness have been produced.

On the theory of evolution, many ages before man became a rational being, there was going on a process by which he

was being shaped and guided toward that rational stage. At first, he was the blind, unconscious subject of laws. If he was adapted to his surroundings, he survived. If not, he perished. Among those who survived were naturally those who wanted to survive, and who had the best resources for defence. They also who had the greatest relish for the pleasure-giving acts which sustain and prolong life, and were best equipped with the means of securing those pleasures, were most likely to live and propagate their kind. In like manner, and long before man became aware of the process by which he was being shaped, the instinct of evolution began to appear. They who had the greatest desire to improve the quality of their lives procured the best implements, weapons, food, clothing, and shelter, and constantly tended to become superior to their rivals and antagonists, who had no such impulse. It is in accordance with the law of evolution to say that, when man appeared on the earth a rational creature, capable of noting his own actions and meditating upon them, he was already, by no act or determination of his own, a progressive being. When he comes to the rational stage, he begins to act with reference to a perception of this fact. The law of evolution was a matter of daily observation. It was clearly seen in the progress of each individual as he passed from infancy to maturity. It was clearly seen that the welfare and dignity of each individual required him to make that passage successfully. Man was not long in discovering that not only was there a natural and orderly process of evolution for the individual, but that each could by his own resources so aid that development that the whole series of improvements might be lifted far above that which would go on under favorable circumstances without special effort, and also that the whole series might be degraded or even reversed by the acts of the individual or the acts of his fellows, even while they were seeking their pleasures.

Still further, as man became possessed of reminiscences, traditions, and records of past generations, he became aware of improvements made on a larger scale. Whole

families were to be contrasted, some advancing, some retrograding, tribes improving or deteriorating, nations rising or falling. Without perceiving the philosophic law of evolution, the fact was noted, and the principles it suggested applied. When it happened that man perceived this law of evolution, and began to classify the rights and duties which related to the maintenance of progress or operated as a check to deterioration, then for the first time, in the modern, ordinary, and highest sense, morality appeared. Before that time, man was like the brutes, subject to the law of natural selection; after that, rational selection became the law of his conduct. Then for the first time was there present among the motives which regulate human action one which in all codes of morality is admitted to have absolute authority over all the passions and powers of the individual and the rights and privileges of society.

This conception of an absolute and imperative obligation and opportunity has shaped both by heredity and by tradition a whole class of aversions and approvals. Corresponding to the intuitive perceptions of symmetry, order, beauty, and grandeur in the outer world, there are now developed intuitive perceptions of the beauty and grandeur of the best products of moral evolution in human nature. Without regard to the production of pain and pleasure, without thought of the consequences which follow the possession of the highest manly and womanly qualities, these are now seen to be worthy to be attained, even at the sacrifice, if need be, of pleasure. A baby is delightful. But a man with baby ways is a slobbering idiot. All art celebrates the beauty of an infant. But a maiden with the form, features, and proportions of an infant, would be hideous. In like manner, men judge moral qualities, and act upon their judgments without reference to pain or pleasure.

Literature is filled with passages which indicate this judgment. Take three, which successively illustrate the love of life, the love of intellectual power, and the love of progress, when divorced from happiness. The love of life has been developed to such a degree that Walter Scott could

describe the victim doomed to death by MacGregor's wife, in these terms : " He prayed for life, — for life he would give all he had in the world ; it was but life he asked,— life, if it were to be prolonged under tortures and privations : he asked only breath, though it should be drawn in the damp of the lowest caverns of their hills." In the Council of Hell, Milton makes Belial express the longing of the rational creature to live the intellectual life, though it be cut off from happiness :—

" To be no more. Sad cure, for who would lose,
Though full of pain, this intellectual being,
Those thoughts that wander through eternity,
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost
In the wide womb of uncreated night,
Devoid of sense and motion ? "

With still a higher flight, in the " Prometheus Unbound," Shelley describes the passionate love of that which leads to and maintains the highest forms of human virtue.

Prometheus chained to the rocks is tormented by the fiends who do the will of Jupiter. Prometheus exclaims :—

" No change, no pause, no hope ! Yet I endure."

* * * * *

" Ah me ! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever ! "

* * * * *

Mercury speaks :—

" Alas !

Thou canst not count the years to come of pain ? "

Prometheus replies, and the dialogue goes on :—

" They last while Jove must reign : no more, nor less
Do I desire or fear."

Mer.

" Yet pause and plunge
Into Eternity, where recorded time,
Even all that we imagine age on age,
Seems but a point, and the reluctant mind
Flags wearily in its unending flight,
Till it sink dizzy, blind, lost, shelterless ;
Perchance it has not numbered the slow years,
Which thou must spend in torture, unreprieved."

- Pro.* "Perchance no thought can count them, yet they pass."
- Mer.* "If thou couldst dwell among the gods the while
Lapped in voluptuous joy"?
- Pro.* "I would not quit
This bleak ravine, these unrepented pains."
- Mer.* "Alas! I wonder at, yet pity thee."
- Pro.* "Pity the self-despising slaves of Heaven,
Not me, within whose mind sits peace serene,
As light in the sun, throned: how vain is talk!
Call up the fiends."

This conception of a possible progress towards and maintenance of a higher stage of being, is the universal and powerful element in all moral codes. It is the only theory which gives dignity to the rights of the individual, and imposes upon him a duty which may in certain cases be paramount to all other obligations. Of the individual, society may demand all that he has but one thing,—his time, his money, his comfort, his happiness, his life. In emergencies, society has made these demands, and they have been honored in accordance with high ethical obligation. But one thing society may not demand, or, if demanded, the individual must not yield. Even society must not require the unit to reverse the law of evolution. On no moral ground can a man be justified if he consent to his own deterioration. Anything which requires man or woman to retrace the steps of progress which lead from the brute to the man, is condemned by every code of morality under all circumstances; and there is no other moral judgment which is thus absolute.

In the highest sense, we call all acts good which tend to accelerate evolution, or maintain the results of it; and we call all acts bad which tend to retard evolution, or destroy the results of it. The popular classification of bad actions shows how this idea is applied. Vices are wrong acts, which principally injure the individual; crimes are wrong acts, which principally injure society. The popular contempt for a vicious man is not caused by the fact that he ceases to become a useful member of society; for society will often admire an energetic criminal who directly threatens and

actually imperils the peace of the world, if in so doing he asserts and glorifies his own personality, while they detest the man whose vices, in the popular phrase, "injure no one but himself"; and this happens because the vicious man has evidently consented to and aided in his own degradation.

It has always been seen that utility was, in some way, a test of moral action. But every attempt to establish it as such has ended ignominiously in some slough of selfishness. But, accepting the principle herein laid down, we may safely make utility the test of morals. In answer to the question, Useful for what? We may say, useful for life; useful for happiness; useful for progress. Whatever is useful for either of these is right; whatever is destructive of these is wrong; with the general qualification that the higher usefulness, in case of any conflict of duties, always takes precedence over the lower.

It now becomes the task of the superior members of the higher races so to organize society that each individual may as speedily and safely as possible pass these successive stages. They may be roughly classified as follows:—

1. The non-moral, in which impulses are obeyed and immediate gratifications are sought, with no question as to whether they are useful or injurious. This stage of social existence corresponds to that of early childhood.

2. The stage of physical morals,—the unconscious result of evolution. In this stage, that which is useful and agreeable is done without reflection. This corresponds to the morality of the pointer and the hound in Darwin's famous example.

3. The stage of conventional and imitative morals, in which utility is made an empirical test. The fortunate results of right conduct are noted, the actions which seem to have served those who have attained a higher mode of life are imitated, and moral codes are accepted on authority. This corresponds to the use of logarithms by those who could not calculate the tables.

4. Rational morals, the result of observation and reflection, of discrimination and choice of the principles which

tend to produce the best results within the conditions furnished by the existing environment. This corresponds to natural science and philosophy.

5. Creative morality. In this stage, man conceives an ideal order of moral progress, nowhere provided for in any existing conditions, and sets himself to create a new environment, adapted to the ideal order which he intends to establish. This corresponds to nothing else in human life, for it is itself the consummate flower of moral progress.

When the superior races attempt to superintend the passage of the whole human family through these successive stages of progress, the question will arise, whether to adopt the method of nature, to let those survive who can, and let those perish who must, leaving the sifting of materials to the law of natural selection. There are those who are ready to announce this as the scientific method. But judging from any scientific knowledge which we have, we must say that Nature is brutal in her methods, and merciless in the execution of her penalties. Human society, attempting to imitate the methods which have been employed in shaping the earlier course of human evolution, would become an enlightened, but savage barbarism. The better conclusion must be, that Nature needs to be corrected, seconded, supplemented, by the rational foresight of the best-endowed members of the race. To natural selection must be added *rational selection*.

The two criteria which we are now to contrast with each other are briefly these: The one, that the highest end of action which any man can conceive is so to live that he and others may enjoy the greatest attainable amount of happiness. The other is, that the highest conceivable end of action is so to live that both the unit and the mass of society shall constantly advance from the lower to the higher stages of mental and moral evolution, if necessary, without regard to consequences of pain and pleasure, extrinsic or intrinsic. Now it is undoubtedly true that the course of human life has been such that there is established a strong conviction that progress and pleasure go together, and will ultimately be concomitant in every case. But it is also clear, that the two are

separable in thought, that they are often separated in experience; and it is doubtful whether this earth can ever furnish the conditions of their unbroken harmony.

Among the great merits of Mr. Spencer's theory are these: That it is founded upon the earth, among the lowest elements of our nature, in the lowest stages of its evolution; that it deals with facts, and discloses many of the right relations between the facts; that it makes morality a practical affair, and appeals to the common sense of mankind for its sanctions; that its standard is not too high; and, above all, that it makes the happiness of mankind a chief right and duty. For the majority of mankind, the acceptance of the doctrine in its present form would require a vast advance over their present moral conceptions. But the moral progress of the world does not depend upon the slow attainment of the many, but the swift advance of the few; and the great defect of the doctrine is, that it does not adequately provide for those who are to lead the moral progress of the future. If this doctrine should be accepted, and no higher elements admitted, my general impression is, that moral evolution will proceed along the path which is marked out by pains and pleasures, and that men, becoming convinced that the most agreeable course must, on the whole, be the best course, they will attempt to keep pace with their fellows, to enjoy what they enjoy, to dislike what they dislike, to avoid the sufferings which devotion to unattainable moral ends always inflict upon individuals and communities, and to evade what will be considered the abnormal struggles by which sainthood and heroism have made the processes of evolution unnecessarily painful. Visions of the unattainable ideal will give way to the practical demands of a peaceful industrialism; and thenceforth human life upon this earth will proceed to develop its possibilities by the slow evolution of a society in which each will be so fitted to his environment that it will be impossible for any one to be much better or much worse than his fellows. All pain, sorrow, and irksome toil which human wisdom can foresee and prevent will be eliminated from human life, and for what will be left that is disagreeable—the unavoidable

results of accident, imperfect knowledge of natural forces, and the occurrence of death by old age,—these being clearly inevitable, will demand a new adjustment of the emotions in order that painful sensations may not continue to cause perturbations of the moral sense. This general impression has been confirmed by reflection.

The statement that the production of pleasure is the highest motive of moral action in any society which has ever existed upon the earth, or which at present can exist, is a reversal of the verdict of the common sense and the common conscience. Sainthood, heroism, consecration to duty, and whatever words are used to describe the highest phases of human attainment, lose their popular meaning when the production of pleasure is made the sole end of virtue. Ever since history began, those who by common consent are regarded as the moral leaders of the race have been men and women who have neglected the instinct which taught them to seek their own pleasure, and have conferred the greatest benefits upon the race by persistently neglecting the alleged source of human progress, and have enjoined this neglect upon those for whom they have sacrificed themselves. It is true their course has sometimes tended towards a perilous asceticism; but between the two perils,—asceticism on the one hand and epicureanism upon the other,—the common judgment has been, that the latter was the more dangerous and the more immoral.

The desire to produce a superior race of men and women must often lead to the deliberate sacrifice of pleasure. The hero has been described as "one who voluntarily endures labor and suffering for the sake of a good cause." The highest form of heroism is seen in the case of an individual who stands far above the multitude, and sees in himself and them possibilities of excellence which they do not see. They may be happy and contented. He sees that to tell them what he knows, and stimulate them to make the progress which will advance them to his own stage of evolution, will bring to them disturbance of their mutual relations, will break the continuity of their lives, will destroy their ac

customed pleasures, will unfit them for their social environment, and bring upon himself reproach, as one who stirreth up strife. But he will make the experiment nevertheless, although he may not be able to foresee the issue in happiness. He would make the experiment, although it were impossible to determine whether this planet of ours is capable of sustaining the superior race of men and women which can be created in imagination.

No one can scientifically prove that men are happier than monkeys. No one can prove that the total amount of happiness upon this earth has been increased by the emergence of man from the brute condition. No one can prove that the surplus of pleasure is greater in the lives of the handful who are the flower of civilization than in the lives of the multitude who only fulfil the conditions of a physical equilibrium and a balance of vital functions. Pleasures of a higher order have been introduced, but more exquisite pains rise up to match them. The course of progress in its higher aspects has always been attended with labor, peril, pain, difficulty; and these have not been tokens of wrong, but signs of growth,—the labor-pains of progress.

We may admit what Mr. Spencer asserts, that in all the lower stages of life pain and pleasure are guides to those actions which sustain and prolong life; that pleasure stimulates the vital functions, while pain depresses them; that the avoidance of pain and the increase of pleasure are legitimate and satisfactory ends of endeavor in the great majority of cases; and that the pursuit of these ends results in progress from the indefinite, incoherent, and monotonous acts of the lower stages of life to the definite, coherent, and diversified actions of the higher forms of vitality. If this were all, and if the process were continued without interruption after rational existence was established, we might accept Mr. Spencer's moral system without a question. But a difficulty arises when we observe that pleasure and pain which are such trusty guides in lower stages of life, become less and less so in the higher. Mr. Spencer meets the objection, first, by disputing the fact, then by admitting it and explain-

ing it. He disputes the fact (p. 84), and says that those who assert it "are required, in the first place, to show us where the line is to be drawn between the two; and then to show us why the system which succeeds in the lower will not succeed in the higher." That line it is, of course, impossible to draw, as it is impossible to tell where vegetable life ends and animal life begins,—where brutish instinct gives birth to human reason, or where animal impulse gives place to moral control. Moreover, we are not required to make the attempt. The history of evolution is one long record of the coming in of new controls, superseding and supplanting those which—their transient purpose being served—disappear, leaving their traces in unused functions and rudimentary organs.

After disputing the fact, he explains it (p. 85) by showing that vicious pleasures and salutary pains merely imply that special and proximate pleasures and pains fail throughout a wide range of cases, which are incidental and temporary. He admits that mankind (p. 99), in passing from the animal conditions, "has been subject to a change of conditions unusually great and involved. This," he says, "has considerably deranged the guidance by sensations, and has deranged in a much greater degree the guidance by emotions. The result is, that in many cases pleasures are not connected with actions which must be performed, nor pains with actions which must be avoided and contrariwise." This disarrangement is, he asserts, temporary. We may admit this explanation as a true one. But it certainly brings us to a place where some other and higher control than pain or pleasure must be introduced. What shall guide the conduct when the right action is difficult and painful, and the wrong conduct easy and pleasurable? Mr. Spencer says the perception of ultimate pleasures, remote ends, represented pains and pleasures.

The more I contemplate the answer, the more inadequate it appears. The case is this: Ever since man emerged from the brute condition, he has found himself more and more at odds with the forces which surround him. As he makes

moral and intellectual progress, the derangement becomes more complete. Every step he takes in advance discloses new difficulties, introduces him to new pains, demands the sacrifice of some pleasures, the control of others, and the postponement of others. He comes into a moral environment, where to obey the instinct which once guided him safely is to invite moral ruin; and this state of things he sees does not draw near its close, but rather there opens before him a career of indefinite length, in which the course of progress must be sustained, not by passive yielding to the influences which play upon him, but by conquering for himself a place worthy his powers, and keeping it, spite of all threats of pain or attractions of pleasure.

The great achievement of the rational man is not adapting himself to the environment in which he finds himself. Savages have done that as successfully as civilized men. The great achievement of the saint, the hero, the sage, is in creating derangement by rising above and becoming unsuited to his social environment, and then falling to work to create a new environment. The rational powers survey the field of human action and the course of human progress; and perceiving that all along that course the field is strewn with the wrecks which indicate the waste of the finest products of human life, cast off and destroyed in the effort of man to live the healthy life of a brute, they declare that these fine fragile, perishable elements are best, with all their pains and perils, and they determine that they shall remain, and that a new environment shall be created in which they shall at last be safe.

This also Mr. Spencer sees and admits; and his explanation is, that if such a course of action be continued, it will end in pleasure. That no moralist denies. The question is, whether in striving for that high good, the civilized man is guided by a calculation of pains and pleasures or by some other motive. If, during all historic time, the derangement which Mr. Spencer admits has continued, if it still continues, and is likely to continue for a time of which no one can foresee the end; and if so long as this derangement con-

tinues, pleasure and pain are not, and cannot be, direct guides of action, then there must be some other rule of life by which mankind has been and is to be guided. Pain and pleasure no doubt have been sufficient guides for those who have survived, but they have certainly failed in the case of those who perished. This objection would be of no weight, if those who survived were always the best, and those who perished were always the worst. But this is true neither in the lower nor the higher stages of development. The law of natural selection which preserved the Hottentot and destroyed the Greek needs amendment in the interest of the higher products of evolution.

So far as we can judge, in the light of any scientific knowledge we now have, the existence of man upon this earth is an accident, the emergence of civilized man from the savage condition is an accident, the continuance of human society upon this planet is not yet assured, and the maintenance of any desirable rate of progress will depend upon the skill with which man secures himself against possible and very probable contingencies in which all the gains of the past will be threatened. During the eternity which lies behind us, the material of which our solar system is composed may have been shaped into the form of planets capable of supporting life millions of times. How many times it has been barren of intelligent life, we may not attempt to say. But, among the myriads of worlds, one world counts for no more than the dust in the balance. Tennyson might have written

And finding that of fifty worlds
She often brings but one to bear,

and it would have been as true of worlds as of seeds. The most ardent advocates of the doctrine of evolution, holding that life was spontaneously generated, admit that the process cannot now be repeated, and that if the fortunate moment in the life of the planet when that generation was possible had passed, the earth would have gone on its way, from its birth to its final catastrophe, barren as a granite boulder. Man alone among the primates, at the fortunate moment when it was possible, lifted himself out of the grooves in

which the rest of the brute creation seems doomed to run its course to the end of terrestrial history. But there is no absolute scientific reason why the highest inhabitants of the earth should not have been monkeys or apes, and not men. Suppose in that hypothetical Lemuria now lying beneath the Indian Ocean, in which Sclater supposes mankind to have originated, an army of gorillas had overwhelmed these human creatures, not yet fairly on their legs, as the Goths and Vandals invaded Rome, what scientific reason have we to suppose the catastrophe might not have been fatal and final?

The monuments of the pre-historic world are the fossil remains of extinct races. Since history began, we see evidences of the same profusion of resources and the same indifference to waste, and the wholesale destruction of the best results of evolution. Elaborate civilizations have been evolved, and recklessly destroyed. The earth is strewn with the ruins of glorious empires. Cambodia, India, Persia, Syria, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, to say nothing of the lost Atlantis, witness to the indifference of Nature. There are not wanting signs that this barbaric display of wealth will not continue forever; and that now at last the opportunity is offered which, being missed, will not return, for rational man to take into his own hands the completion of this terrestrial evolution which can advance no further without his well-considered and energetic coöperation.

Mr. Spencer says that the sense of moral obligation is a sign of the unfitness of certain functions for their work; and he prophesies that, as moralization advances, the sense of obligation will fade away. This statement is true, as a fact of experience, only of such low forms of moral obligation as imply an unwilling assent to the claims of morality. The sense of moral obligation is the sign not of organic imperfection nor of functional incapacity. It is a measure of the great tasks which men of developed moral constitution set for themselves. It is true that there is a sliding scale of duties, and that the tendency is for the sense of obligation to pass on from lower to higher forms of duty; but the sense of obligation deepens and strengthens as it passes.

Nothing seems to me more illustrative of the limitations of Mr. Spencer's theory than this assertion. That he can foresee a time when man upon this earth shall be so adjusted to his environment that there will be no new adjustments to make, and no new moral realms to conquer, indicates a moral system without an ideal; and it sets the end of human progress so near and so low, that to accept it seems to me equivalent to a full surrender of that which has been the highest source of all human aspiration. When rational man at last comprehends the terms of the problem he is to solve, and accepts the trust which is put into his hands, he has choice of two methods,—the one to make pain and pleasure his guides to the action which will complete the process of evolution; the other to secure the progress at all hazards, trusting that the pleasure will follow.

The final and fatal objection to Mr. Spencer's system as a standard of conduct is, that pleasure cannot be made the direct object of action, either by the individual for himself, or by society at large, without moral danger. We need not discuss the point. All experience shows that he who makes pleasure the supreme end of personal endeavor invites moral deterioration without attaining his end. This is obvious enough, and Mr. Spencer admits it. The devices by which he accommodates his theory to the facts are curious. He says: "It is admitted that self-happiness is, in a measure, to be obtained by furthering the happiness of others. May it not be true that, conversely, general happiness is to be obtained by furthering self-happiness?" Another device is, to make the pleasures obtained by proximate means the immediate objects of action. In this way he who sets out in pursuit of a pleasure so remote that it cannot be enjoyed by himself may find his satisfactions in performing the acts which lead up to that distant pleasure. In this way what is lacking in proximate pleasure is made up out of represented pleasures, to be enjoyed by other people or distant generations; and what is lacking of ultimate pleasure is made up by enjoyment of the means which lead up to it.

But there is a more direct explanation. They who have done most for their fellows and themselves have not been

guided by pleasure in any form. They have accepted it as a welcome concomitant to their high purpose,—to improve the quality of human life. That object can always be made the direct end of endeavor. It is safe to say, do that which tends to improve the quality of your life, and pleasure will follow. It is not safe to say, do that which is agreeable, proximately or remotely, and the quality of your life will improve. That is to say, one rule may be applied directly to the life, and the other cannot.

The contrast between the two rules of life can be brought out in no better way than by applying them in a case of Mr. Spencer's own choosing. He imagines a tenant farmer, a liberal, whose landlord is conservative. If the tenant votes with his landlord, he will keep his farm, and add to the prosperity of his family; but he will deny his principles, injure his party, and perhaps change the balance of power in the State. If he votes according to his principles, he will do a slight good to the State (in case he is on the right side), but he will lose his farm, and may be unable to feed his children. Mr. Spencer goes on balancing the relative advantages of each course of action, and closes with these remarkable words: "Admitting, then, that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the State, and admitting that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the family, we have to recognize the fact, that in countless cases no one can decide by which alternative courses the least wrong is likely to be done." To such a strait is a great man of severe morality reduced by the logical necessities of his system. Apply the other rule, and the uncertainty disappears at once. If every interest and advantage for himself, his family, and the State seem to be on one side, and on the other there is nothing but the honor of that solitary tenant farmer, still the duty would be clear. It would be better for England, better for his family, better for himself, that he should be driven from his home, be reduced to beggary, and die of starvation, rather than to allow himself to be turned back in the course of his development, and retrace his steps towards the brute from which he came; and that judgment is in accordance with the decision

which would be instantly made by Mr. Spencer, if the case were his own; and it reveals that which, consciously or otherwise, is made the standard of action by all high-minded men.

There is one possible objection which may be made. We do not know what will tend to progress, any more than we know what will increase the total amount of happiness. I do not think that objection will be seriously made by any one who considers the question. Certainly no evolutionist can be allowed to make it. The perception of the law of evolution implies some accurate knowledge of the details of evolution. A wise man may be unable in any given case to say which is happier, a brute or a man; but he is no man who cannot see that the man is superior to the brute. Men of very ordinary capacities, who could not by any possibility judge concerning the relative happiness of a savage and a saint, will be able not only to perceive the difference in the quality of their lives, but to trace with considerable accuracy the degrees of excellence which separate them.

The defects of Mr. Spencer's system, to which I wish to direct attention, are briefly these:—

1. It reverses the common moral judgments of mankind, in regard to the higher forms of conduct, instead of confirming them.

2. It sets up a standard of conduct which cannot, without moral danger, be made the rule of conduct for the individual.

3. It disparages the sense of moral obligation, when it ought to strengthen it.

4. It fails to give any adequate account of the righteous conduct which has necessarily inflicted suffering.

5. It confounds happiness with well-being, and, making this to consist in adaptation to the external environment, narrows the moral outlook of the race, and causes the moral ideal to vanish.

In the lower stages, definite and coherent; in the higher, it becomes involved and confused, reminding one of the Ptolemaic system in Milton's phrase:—

“ With centric and eccentric scribbled o'er.
Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb.”

But there is a word of commendation which I have reserved. One great merit of Mr. Spencer's system deserves to be mentioned with especial commendation. He does not make social needs the measure of individual obligations.

The doctrine that all duties are social duties seems to me in philosophy a blunder of the first magnitude, and in practice, a source of unmeasured moral danger. The logical results are tyranny and communism. Social duties are paramount only in a barbarous state of society; and success in the effort to make them the supreme law of individual conduct, can have but one issue,— the reduction of the individual to social bondage. Liberty is the result of the protest of the individual. So long as the existence or peace of any society is threatened by rival and antagonistic societies, the right of the unit to make the most of himself must be held in abeyance; but when once peace is established, the unit begins to claim his right to go on in the course of progress which will conduce to the acquirement and permanent possession of the means of individual development; therefore the demand for liberty is made. But the unit is associated with other units claiming the same right. It is seen that each can secure his own development only when he is protected in his course of progress, and the idea of justice is perceived and applied. Justice is done when the individual claims are so adjusted that each may secure his own betterment without interfering with the advancement of his fellows. Complete justice is done only when each individual is permitted to exercise his three primary rights,— the right to live, the right to be happy, the right to development. But liberty and justice being established as the result of the individual protest, the bond of social cohesion would not exist were it not for the unfolding of the brutish, gregarious instinct of sympathy into the sentiment of love. The transition took place when a mother began to love her offspring. The love of the human mother for her infant child founded the home. The affections developed in the home expanded into the wider relations of the tribe, which were at first blood relations. From this grew the patriotic love of the nation, out of which has finally emerged the enthusiasm of humanity. When the

unit begins to feel the pull of this social bond, he thinks of himself as no longer merely a unit, but as a member of that larger unit, that vast organism, which we call humanity; and he thinks of his own progress as a contribution to the completion of a grander work, — the progress of humanity. A necessary result of this perception is the acceptance of the duty of aiding in the improvement of every other individual who is also a part of this whole, — humanity. If this perception were universal, and all individuals regulated their lives according to it, the social duty and the individual duty would become identical. But this ideal state never has existed, does not exist, and will not be established within any time which can be estimated. Meanwhile, because no where is social order established in accordance with the ideal law of society, the individual claims and maintains the right to resist society whenever it demands his degradation, or checks his progress. He may resist, he may bolt, he may emigrate and set up for himself, casting off allegiance to all existing society in accordance with the highest moral law. Upon this principle the republic is founded, and the claim of equality of all men is enforced, with the knowledge that equality of right includes inequality of mental and moral condition, and the means of maintaining whatever superiority of condition the individual can achieve under the law of equal liberty and impartial justice. The denial of this law leads to tyranny and to communism: to tyranny, when the claim is made that the strongest and the wisest have the right to restrict every individual who, in the attempt to exercise his three primary rights, disturbs the equilibrium of society. It has happened, therefore, that some of the advocates of the doctrine of social evolution have become the stoutest defenders of European despotism. When the claim is made by society that the interests which are held in common must always be paramount, the issue is communism. This, in its most offensive and dangerous form, is the declaration that all duties are social duties, and all rights social rights. It follows, of course, that the individual must be compelled to make all his gains contribute to the common stock of advantages, to be equally shared by all members of society. He

may not use his talents, skill, superior industry, or more circumspect frugality to promote himself to a position of superior comfort, happiness, or the attainment of a more rapid rate of progress. Hence logically result trades-unions, enforced strikes, limited hours of labor, equalization of wages, and the denial of the right of the individual to work when he pleases, for whom he pleases, as long as he pleases, and for any rate of compensation which he may think it proper to demand and can get.


It was the claim of the individual to the exercise of his proper rights which established marriage, built the walls of the home, founded the State, erected the church, and inaugurated the generous rivalries of rational evolution. As this claim is denied, naturally enough the church, the State, the family, begin to fall, and the attempt is made to re-establish barbarism under the forms of civilization.

At the beginning of this paper, religion was ruled out of the discussion, because morals and religion are products of unlike instincts, emotions, and perceptions. Each has an origin, a history, and an object of its own. It will be a great gain to unity of thought, unity of moral purpose, and harmony of moral action, if morals can be shown to have a natural basis upon which, independent of all religious conceptions, atheists, agnostics, theists, and Christians may heartily agree to stand and work together. But while I am ready to maintain that a great impetus to moral progress is to be given by a recognition of this fact, I am not blind to the other fact that without an issue in religion the theory and practice of morals must continually lead men and women of the highest attainments up to a stage of life where they will see clearly, not the consummation of human hopes and the perfect result of human endeavor, but rather where they will see, as it never could have been possible before, what contrasts Nature can furnish when she puts the best terrestrial achievement which ever has been, or ever can be possible, by the side of the hope which inspired it; when she offers to hope, love, pity, reverence, the gratifying rewards of a peaceful industrialism, and bids them fold their shining wings, and stop the pulses of their eager aspiration,

lest they wound themselves with useless beatings against the iron walls of the unknown and the unknowable.

This course of progress which man now undertakes, with the alternatives before him, progress or destruction, leads by inexorable law up to the stage where man's expanded powers demand an open way towards knowledge, opportunities, and achievements which can be obstructed by no obstacles, and successfully closed by no event. No man can acquire the magnanimous spirit of the higher morality without being brought again and again, in his striving, to the place where he will see how all common duties and weary drudgeries would instantly be "writ large" — if he could feel the power of an endless life, and the reinforcement of an Almighty will, guiding the faltering steps of humanity to the perfect issues of absolute righteousness and peace. He will feel the need and see the grandeur of such a conception, although he may feel himself compelled in honest doubt to put away the too seductive and tormenting vision.

I have already said that religion will not change the quality of human duties. But to say that the expansion of the terrestrial horizon and the extension of the terrestrial perspective would add nothing to the zeal, the courage, and the content with which mankind pursues its good is to deny the record of history and experience. To suppose that religion can perish, and morality reach its highest evolution, is a reversal of all known laws of living. My conclusions may be summed up in one sentence: The course of human life upon this earth has been such that man has been led to love his life, and defend it; has enjoyed his life, and labored for happiness in it; has seen the opportunity, and undertaken the duty of enlarging his life, multiplying its resources, improving the quality of his powers, and of seeking constantly for higher incentives to action for nobler ends: and that by this course of living progress, he has been brought to contemplate the limit of terrestrial life and the bounds of human desire, with a distinct longing for that unbounded life, unbroken happiness, and unlimited progress which this earthly life can suggest, but cannot supply.



the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased by 1.5 million, from 2.5 million in 1980 to 4 million in 1995. The public sector has become a major employer in the UK, and its growth has been a major factor in the overall growth of the economy.

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
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